

ROUTLEDGE

Unconventional Warfare in South Asia

Shadow Warriors and Counterinsurgency

SCOTT GATES AND KAUSHIK ROY

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN SOUTH ASIA

This page has been left blank intentionally

Unconventional Warfare in South Asia

Shadow Warriors and Counterinsurgency

SCOTT GATES
Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Norway and Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), Norway

KAUSHIK ROY
Jadavpur University, India and Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Norway

ASHGATE

© Scott Gates and Kaushik Roy 2014

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher.

Scott Gates and Kaushik Roy have asserted their right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the authors of this work.

Published by
Ashgate Publishing Limited
Wey Court East
Union Road
Farnham
Surrey, GU9 7PT
England

Ashgate Publishing Company
110 Cherry Street
Suite 3–1
Burlington, VT 05401–3818
USA

www.ashgate.com

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

The Library of Congress has cataloged the printed edition as follows:
Gates, Scott.
Unconventional warfare in South Asia : shadow warriors and counterinsurgency / by Scott Gates and Kaushik Roy.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978–1–4094–3706–2 (hardback : alk. paper) – ISBN 978–1–4094–3707–9 (ebook) – ISBN 978–1–4724–0579–1 (epub)
1. Irregular warfare – South Asia. 2. Counterinsurgency – South Asia.
3. Insurgency – South Asia.
I. Roy, Kaushik. II. Title.
DS341.G37 2014
355.02’180954–dc23
2013033631

ISBN 9781409437062 (hbk)
ISBN 9781409437079 (ebk – PDF)
ISBN 9781472405791 (ebk – ePUB)

Contents

List of Maps and Tables *vii*
Preface *ix*
List of Abbreviations *xi*
Glossary *xv*

Introduction 1

1 Counter-Insurgency: Theories and Tools in South Asia 5

2 Tribes, State-Building and Guerrillas in North-East India 39

3 Communist Insurgencies: Maoists in Nepal and India 65

4 *Jihad*is in Kashmir 89

5 Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies in Pakistan 113

6 Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan: From the Soviets to the Americans 131

7 Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Punjab 163

8 Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Sri Lanka: 1983–2009 175

Conclusion *191*
Index *195*

This page has been left blank intentionally

List of Maps and Tables

Maps

1 Kashmir xvii

2 Pakistan xviii

Tables

1.1 Expansion of the Different Paramilitary Forces 26

1.2 Pakistan Army Corps in the New Millennium 31

2.1 Naga Clans within India in 1960 43

2.2 Strength and Areas of Operations of the Insurgent Armies in North-East India in 2008 50

8.1 Strength and Organization of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces in 2005 181

8.2 Formations Originally Earmarked for Operation PAWAN 184

This page has been left blank intentionally

Preface

This volume, which deals with insurgencies and counter-insurgencies in South Asia, is the product of two on-going projects. At the beginning of the first millennium both of us started working on a project titled Colonial Legacies at the Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW) at Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Norway. And both of us had also started another project on Afghanistan two years ago. We come from different academic streams. While one (who himself was the director of the CSCW) is an economist and political scientist, the other is a historian. While one author is theoretical, the other is empirical. While the former's strongpoint is global perspective, the latter is a South Asia expert. The amalgamation of different methodologies widens the approach and offers a fresh perspective, which in turn adds strength to this volume. We two authors have benefitted from the excellent library facilities at PRIO. We have both aired our views (which have been put forward in a more finished form in this volume) in several seminars that had been held at PRIO and attended by not only PRIO members but also scholars from different parts of the world. We acknowledge our debt to the organizers and participants of these seminars. We also thank the Research Council of Norway's most excellent Centre of Excellence program that funded the Centre for the Study of Civil War at PRIO. CSCW provided a marvellous environment for research. We also received valuable financial support from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence. We thank them for their valuable support. This volume, which is the only one of its kind, was written for post graduate students, researchers and policy makers. We hope they find it useful.

This page has been left blank intentionally

List of Abbreviations

AD	Air Defence
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier
ATPLO	All Tripura Peoples Liberation Organization
ATTF	All Tripura Tiger Force
BLA	Baluch Liberation Army
BLF	Baluch Liberation Front
BLT	Bodo Liberation Tigers
BMP	A Soviet tracked infantry fighting vehicle
BSF	Border Security Force
BVF	Bodo Volunteer Force
CCOMPOSA	Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia
CHT	Chittagong Hill Tract
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COAS	Chief of the Army Staff
COIN	Counter-Insurgency
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPI	Communist Party of India
CPI(M)	Communist Party of India (Maoist)
CPI-ML	Communist Party of India – Marxist Leninist
CPN	Communist Party of Nepal
CPN(M)	Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
DGFI	Directorate General of Forces Intelligence of Bangladesh
DGP	Director-General of Police
DIG	Deputy Inspector General of Police
EBR	East Bengal Regiment
EPR	East Pakistan Rifles
EPRLF	Eelam People's Liberation Front
EROS	Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students
FAC	Fast Attack Craft
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas in North-West Pakistan
FC	Frontier Corps of Pakistan
FR	Frontier Region in Pakistan
GHQ	General Headquarter
GOC	General Officer Commanding

GOI	Government of Independent India
GOP	Government of Pakistan
GSO	General Staff Officer
HQ	Headquarter
HUA	Harkat-ul-Ansar
IAF	Indian Air Force
IDR	*Indian Defence Review*
IED	improvised Explosive Device
IG	Inspector General of Police
INC	Indian National Congress
IPC	Inshore Patrol Craft
IPKF	Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan
JCO	Junior Commissioned Officer
JCR	*Journal of Conflict Resolution*
JEM	Jaish-e-Mohammad
JKLF	Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front
JMB	Jamat ul Mujahideen Bangladesh
JME	*Journal of Military Ethics*
JPR	*Journal of Peace Research*
JSS	*Journal of Strategic Studies*
JUSII	*Journal of the United Service Institution of India*
KLNLF	Karbi Longri National Liberation Front
KLO	Kamtapuri Liberation Organization
KSF	Kashmir State Force
LET	Lashkar-e-Toiba
LIC	Low Intensity Conflict
LMG	Light Machine-Gun
LOC	Line of Control between India and Pakistan in Kashmir
LST	Landing Ship Tank
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MCC	Maoist Coordination Committee
MODAR	*Ministry of Defence Government of India Annual Report*
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NC	National Conference Party of Jammu and Kashmir
NCO	Non Commissioned Officer
NDFB	National Democratic Front of Bodoland
NFA	Naga Federal Army
NGO	Non Government Organization
NLFT	National Liberation Front of Tripura
NNC	Naga National Council
NSCN	Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland
NSCN(IM)	National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muviah)
NSCN(K)	National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang)

NSCN-U	National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Unification
NSG	National Security Guard
NWFP	North-West Frontier Province
OPV	Offshore Patrol Vessel
PLA	People's Liberation Army of Manipur
PLAN	People's Liberation Army of Nepal
PLGA	People's Liberation Guerrilla Army
PLOTE	People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam
POK	Pakistan occupied Kashmir
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
PWG	People's War Group
RAF	Royal Air Force
RAW	Research and Analysis Wing (India's External Counter-Intelligence Agency, somewhat equivalent to the CIA)
RBA	Royal Bhutan Army
RNA	Royal Nepal Army
SAM	Surface to Air Missile
SLA	Sri Lanka Army
SLAF	Sri Lankan Armed Forces
SLG	Sri Lankan Government
SLN	Sri Lanka Navy
SLOC	Sea Lines of Communication
SLR	Self Loading Rifle
SOF	Special Operation Force
SP	Superintendent of Police
SPO	Special Police Officer
SSG	Special Services Group of Pakistan
TELO	Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization
TNT	Tamil New Tigers
TNV	Tripura National Volunteers
ULFA	United Liberation Front of Asom (Assam)
UN	United Nations
UNLF	United National Liberation Front
YCL	Youth Communist League

This page has been left blank intentionally

Glossary

Adivasis	Aboriginal inhabitants of South Asia
Bania	Hindu businessman
Bazaar	Market
Crore	One crore is 100 lakhs or 10 million
Ghazi	One who fights for spreading Islam
Ghazian	One who becomes a *ghazi*
*Janajati*s	Indigenous communities of Nepal. They are non-Aryan in origin and are Mongoloids like Magars, Gurungs, etc.
Janayuddha	People's war in Hindu military theory
Jawan	Literal meaning young man. The term refers to a private of the Indian Army
Jihad	Holy war of the Muslims against the *kafirs* (infidels)
Jirga	Tribal assembly where decisions are taken on a collective basis
Lakh	One lakh=100,000. Ten lakh is one million
Lashkar	Armed militia of a Pashtun tribe
Madrassa	Islamic religious school/seminary
Maharaja	Literal meaning King of kings; the term represents a big Hindu ruler
Melmastia	Afghan concept of hospitality
Mohajirs	Muslim immigrants from India to Pakistan
Mujahideen	Holy warriors of Islam
Mukti Bahini	Freedom Fighters Force comprising of Bengali Muslims in East Pakistan
Mullah	Preacher of Islam
Nullah	Dry bed of a narrow stream
Qaum	Muslim community; equivalent to *umma*
Shahadah	Martyrdom in the cause of Islam
Sharia	Derived from *Shariat*: Islamic
Tanzeem	Islamic militant outfit operating in Kashmir
Ulema	Islamic cleric

This page has been left blank intentionally



Map 1 Kashmir

Map 2 Pakistan

Introduction

India is the world's tenth largest economy, and is experiencing an impressive 7% growth rate. India possesses the world's fourth largest military. The subcontinent is the home to about one-fifth of the world's population. Its inhabitants are divided into various tribes, clans, linguistic and ethnic groups who follow five main religions: Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam and Sikhism. The inhabitants are engaged in multifarious struggles against each other as well as against the state. India is the premier country in South Asia. Besides India, South Asia includes Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and Sri Lanka. South Asia in this volume is defined widely. Because China and Burma play important roles as regards insurgencies in the north-east of the subcontinent, due attention is also paid to these two countries. Technically, Afghanistan is not part of South Asia but Southern Asia. Nevertheless, the unconventional warfare in Kashmir and in North-West Pakistan is linked to the Afghan imbroglio. Hence, part of the book focuses on Afghanistan.

Terrorism and insurgency are similar, but in fundamental ways very different. Terrorism is a nuisance involving random killing of civilians by non-state actors, which delegitimizes the government. In contrast, large-scale guerrilla warfare by non-state forces (i.e. insurgency) occasionally results in the breakdown of the state. This volume gives equal attention to the organization and doctrines of the 'shadow armies' from the periphery and to the government forces that fight them. The book deals with three questions: Why do stateless marginal groups rebel? How do states attempt to suppress them? and What are the consequences in the aftermath of the conflict, especially in relation to conflict resolution and peace building? Due attention is given to the long-term social, economic, religious and political aspects which fuel civil wars, in addition to examining aspects of policing and military factors. Overall, this volume attempts to grapple with two big debates: whether South Asia is witnessing New War and whether the twenty-first century belongs to the insurgents.

This volume does not attempt to cover all the insurgencies of the whole subcontinent. The literature on Pakistan's COIN is very thin indeed. There are a few articles that deal with the COIN campaigns of US-NATO-Pakistan forces in the aftermath of Operation Enduring Freedom. As regards India's COIN campaigns, we have a few books and articles. Lieutenant-Colonel Vivek Chadha's monograph (New Delhi 2005) is a detailed narrative account of the various insurgencies in India. Nonetheless, there is not much analysis available. Sumit Ganguly and David Fidler's edited volume (London 2009) offers a good collection of essays about the Indian army's COIN campaigns in Kashmir, Punjab, North-East India

and Sri Lanka. Unlike their edited volume, our book takes a historical approach and also include Nepal and Pakistan. Rajesh Rajagopalan's monograph (Delhi 2008) tries to interpret India's COIN doctrine through the realist lens and gets somewhat confused in the process. By making two case studies of Nagaland during the 1960s and IPKF's intervention in Sri Lanka in the 1980s, Rajagopalan claims that the Indian Army lacks a COIN doctrine. This is a point that we will challenge in this volume by taking all the important COIN campaigns of the Indian security forces into perspective. Laurent Gayer and Christophe Jaffrelot's edited volume (New Delhi 2009) is a valuable study of rebel armies between 1980 and 2005. In fact, a dialectical relationship exists between the rebel forces and the organization and doctrine of the government's COIN forces. Our objective is to use historical analysis of the evolution of the 'rebel armies' and its interaction with the governments' security forces during the past 70 years. Deepa M. Ollapally's overview (New Delhi 2009) concentrates on the political aspects of insurgencies from the 1990s. The present volume focuses on the military aspects of COIN from 1947 onwards.

The archival documents for the post 1947 period are not open to the public. Senior government and bureaucratic officials are tight-lipped about sensitive national security affairs. Even when they are willing to provide bits and pieces of information, they are unwilling to give their names. Such an attitude makes a mockery of the empirical value of their evidence. Oral history techniques for extracting information from the public in the disturbed regions are good for assessing the current scenario but cannot illuminate what went on in the 1950s and in the 1960s. Hence, we have opted for open source analysis. The volume is based on memoirs of the military and police officers, civilian bureaucrats, newspapers, magazines, accounts of the journalists, *Ministry of Defence Reports*, articles by the participants, and interviews of the insurgents published in various official and semi-official publications.

We see no point in following a chronological approach. The reasons behind the origins of insurgencies varied from region to region. For instance, while relative wealth and development resulted in insurgency in Punjab, underdevelopment partly caused armed rebellion in central India. Again, a particular factor may play various roles in different geographical locales. The role played by a particular religion differs from region to region. For instance, Buddhism in Ladakh follows non-violence, but Buddhism in Sri Lanka played an aggressive role during the civil war between the Sinhalese and the Tamils. Further, the response of the state and the varying success of COIN also differ from region to region due to differences in the political and cultural contexts and physical geography. The dense railroad network in Punjab and the support of the middle peasantry for the state facilitated India's COIN, while the jungle covered hilly terrain without a dense railroad net along with the popular aspiration for regional autonomy aid the insurgent forces in North-East India. The case of Waziristan and North-East India show the difficulties of centralizing governments in state building at the peripheries with open external borders. Hence, the chapters are arranged by region and theme. Within each

chapter, a chronological approach is followed to portray the changing character of insurgency and evolution of COIN with time. This monograph has eight chapters. The first assesses the theories that relate to insurgency and COIN. The remaining seven chapters deal with insurgency and COIN in the various geographical zones of South Asia. Of these seven chapters, five deal with the continuing tussle between the insurgent and government forces. And the last two deal with successful COIN.

Chapter 1 attempts to conceptualize unconventional warfare in the South Asian context. Chapter 2 shows the interaction between demands for regional autonomy with Government of India's (GOI) aggressive and repressive measures in North-East India; it deals with tribes, state building and guerrillas in North-East India. Chapter 3 portrays the unfolding of Marxist insurgency in Nepal and Central India; it focuses on the communist insurgencies in Nepal and India. After the fall of USSR, pundits asserted that Marxism should be confined to the dustbins of world history. However, homegrown Maoists partly spurred by the Peruvian 'Shining Path' have come back like a phoenix. The Maoists were not only able to capture power in Nepal but also posed a serious threat to the world's largest democracy. Chapters 4 and 5 turn the focus to the role of radical Islam in fuelling insurgencies in Kashmir and Pakistan. Chapter 4 deals with the *jihadi*s in Kashmir. Pakistan refuses to accept the inclusion of Kashmir in India because Kashmir is a Muslim majority state. In both 1947–48 and 1965, Pakistan attempted to encourage the Kashmiris to rebel against India, but the plots failed. Nevertheless, in the late 1980s, the Kashmiris started an armed struggle. The political chicanery of Delhi and the influx of the Afghan *jihadi*s after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan have given a new fillip to the struggle. Chapter 5 turns the spotlight on the issues of ethnicity and radical Islam in Baluchistan and Waziristan. Though Pakistan is encouraging insurgencies in Kashmir, ironically it is itself afflicted with large-scale armed rebellions both in its northern and southern parts. The Baluchi resistance is partly due to economic exploitation by the Punjabi Muslims. The ideology of the Baluchi rebels is quasi-Marxist. But, in FATA and Waziristan, the rebels are fighting for establishing an Islamic *Caliphate* (a similar aim pursued by some of the *tanzeem*s in Kashmir). The erstwhile allies of the ISI of Pakistan have turned against their former patron due to Pakistan's anti-Taliban stance in the wake of US pressure after 9/11. And this brings us to the scenario in Afghanistan. In fact, the situation in Afghanistan has serious repercussions in both Kashmir and Waziristan. The US-NATO COIN campaign in Afghanistan (the subject of Chapter 6) is pushing the *jihadi*s into Waziristan and the indirectly ruled North-West Frontier Province (tribal districts) of Pakistan. Due to pressure from USA to flush out the *jihadi*s, the Pakistan government has been forced to start its ham-handed COIN campaign in North-West Pakistan. A comparative analysis of the Pakistan's COIN campaigns along with India's in Kashmir and the Soviet-US-NATO's in Afghanistan will pay dividends to the security analysts.

Chapters 7 and 8 deal with two successful COIN campaigns in Punjab and Sri Lanka. Chapter 7 concerns itself with Sikhism and *Khalistan*. Punjab is economically one of the most developed states in India. The armed rebellion in

Punjab gives a lie to the Marxist assertion that economic underdevelopment fuels insurgencies. Sikhism is a martial religion and martyrdom is an integral component of Sikhism as in Islam. The demand for *Khalistan* resulted in an armed struggle in Punjab during the 1980s and early 1990s – so much so that the Indian Army had to be deployed in the mid-1980s. Lack of adequate external support contributed to the collapse of the Sikh insurgency. However, the repercussion of crushing the Sikh insurgency was felt throughout the military establishment of India. Sections of the Punjabi dominated Indian Army came very close to a mutiny, and this resulted in policy change in the recruitment of the Indian Army. The last chapter of this volume tells the story of the rise and fall of the LTTE in Sri Lanka. In the late 1980s, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) failed against the LTTE. But, the state forces of a small country, the Sri Lanka's Army (SLA) was successful against the Tamil militants. Hence, the SLA's COIN techniques are worth studying. Sri Lanka is a classic case of government force triumphing over insurgents. This, along with the case of Punjab, challenges the dominant interpretation as advanced by several scholars belonging to what we call the 'doom and gloom' school. The proponents of this school believe that the twenty-first century belongs to the armed insurgents and that the state forces are bound to fail against them. The Conclusion sums up the arguments advanced in this volume.

References

Chadha, Lieutenant-Colonel Vivek (2005). *Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis*. New Delhi: Sage.

Ganguly, Sumit and Fidler, David (eds) (2009). *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*. London: Routledge.

Gayer, Laurent and Jaffrelot, Christophe (eds) (2009). *Armed Militias of South Asia: Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists*, tr. by Cynthia Koch, Gregory Elliott and Roger Leverdier. New Delhi: Foundation.

Ollapally, Deepa, M. (2009). *The Politics of Extremism in South Asia*. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press. Originally published in 2008.

Rajagopalan, Rajesh (2008). *Fighting Like a Guerrilla: The Indian Army and Counterinsurgency*. Delhi: Routledge.

Chapter 1
Counter-Insurgency: Theories and Tools in South Asia

Counter-insurgency (COIN) theory is composed of roughly three parts: the nature of the rebellions, factors behind the origins of the rebellions, and the measures to be adopted for crushing such anti-state movements. As such, the term 'theory' is used as an equivalent of doctrine, which refers to a set of guidelines and often a composite body of ideas that influences the organization and deployment of the military assets. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the New War theory regarding insurgencies and COIN in the contemporary world. The second section contextualizes COIN theories as propounded by the Indian security elite within the broader background of Western theories regarding COIN that emerged in the course of the twentieth century. This section also discusses the tools available to the Indian state for fighting the 'shadow warriors'. And finally the third section shows the theory and instruments of COIN available to Pakistan.

COIN Theories in the Western World

In 1999, Mary Kaldor asserted that the end of Cold War and the beginning of globalization resulted in the genesis of New Wars. These new conflicts are a mixture of war and criminal activities characterized by large-scale abuse of human rights. In such wars, one finds a blurring of state and non-state distinctions. The autonomy of the state is eroded both from above and below and the net result is privatization of violence. Though these conflicts are local, they have transnational linkages. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international reporters and diaspora volunteers play an important role in such conflicts. Kaldor claims that the New Wars are different from traditional guerrilla struggles conducted by the Marxists. While the communist guerrillas tried to control territory, the objective of New War is to displace the civilian groups who are considered to be outsiders. In New War, the principal targets are the civilians; while in guerrilla struggles the principal victims of violence are security forces, nodes of communication, etc. The basic objective of New War is not state-building but to destroy the existing state structure. One of the basic factors behind the emergence of such wars is the rise of narrow and exclusive identity politics based on national, clan, religious and linguistic ethos. Political mobilizations for conducting such wars are accelerated due to the on-going revolution in information technologies. Such conflicts are financed through illegal trade in arms, drugs and other valuable commodities like

oil and diamonds. And traditional humanitarian interventions will fail to stop such wars which will continue in the twenty-first century. The spectacle wars launched by the USA with high technology precision weapons to destroy the 'rogue' regimes (Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.), accelerate state collapse and further fuel the criminalized New War (Kaldor 2005a: 1–12; Kaldor 2005b: 210–22).

Herfried Munkler supports the New War theory of Kaldor. In Munkler's paradigm, New War is characterized by three trends: the privatization of war, asymmetricalization, and demilitarization of war. Demilitarization of war means that the irregulars' targets are civilians and the non-military infrastructure. Munkler contends that each of these trends was present in the history of warfare. But the simultaneous presence of these three trends is an original development and hence constitutes the nature of New War. Munkler points to a distinction between guerrilla war and New War. While the guerrillas use civilians for cover and logistical backbone, in New War, the civilian population is the prime target of the irregulars. Guerrillas depend on the support of the people. In contrast, those engaged in terrorism in the conduct New War use the civil infrastructure. The characteristics of such wars are de-territorialized and non-state forms of violence. Non-state agents such as affluent émigré communities and large companies finance these wars (Munkler 2007: 67–82).

A retired British General Rupert Smith also stresses the paradigm shift of war. Instead of New War, he uses the term 'war amongst people'. The paradigm of industrial war, which emerged during the American Civil War and reached its logical culmination during the two World Wars, was eventually replaced by the new paradigm of war amongst people. Smith, influenced by the French post-modernist political philosopher Michel Foucault claims that power is a relationship and not a possession. In order to exert power, a country has to use its strength. Since the insurgents/terrorists move among the people, it is extremely difficult for the conventional armies of the West to use their strength. Insurgents organized in small cells and the members of each cell are often unaware of the members of another cell. The functions of a cell are to: direct military actions, collect and hold resources, and conduct political actions. The results of the activities of such cells are sub-strategic conflicts, which in turn challenge the strict bipolar peace-war distinction. Information – and not firepower – is the new tool required for fighting amongst the people. Further, media plays an important role in the new paradigm of warfare initiated by the non-state agents. While in the industrial war, the objectives are measured in territorial and material terms, in fighting amongst the people, the objective is to capture the will of the people. This can be done by collecting information about the local societies undergoing troubles and about the insurgents. After getting such information, the security force should strive to separate the insurgents from the people and attempt to change the attitude of the people till the rule of law is established. To achieve this, the security forces have to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the people. So, the moral component of the operation is vital. In order to gain information superiority as well as to influence the mind of the people, the commander of

the government force must establish a positive relationship with the journalists (Smith 2006: 17, 329, 381, 393; Smith 2007: 28–43).

A more recent theory in the field is the concept of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), which is actually a derivative of the New War concept. In 2006, retired American Colonel Thomas X. Hammes wrote that warfare evolves from generation to generation (Hammes 2006: xi). This view contradicts the argument put forward by one school that a series of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMAs) had occurred in Western history and that at present, we are witnessing a RMA based on information technology (Goldman and Mahnken 2004; Knox and Murray 2003). Hammes writes that modern warfare is divided into several generations. First Generation Warfare (1799–1815), represented by mass military manpower, reached its epitome under Napoleon Bonaparte. Second Generation Warfare, characterized by firepower, reached its culmination in the trenches during the Great War (1914–18). The Nazis introduced Third Generation Warfare (1939–42) with their use of *panzers* for conducting large-scale manoeuvres. Now, we are in midst of a 4GW. The evolution of each generation of warfare requires an earlier evolution in the political, economic, social, and technical spheres. Hammes is influenced by Toffler's wave theory, which states that the entire society was transformed before the transformation of warfare occurred with each wave. 4GW is characterized by manpower-intensive low-technology conflicts around the world (Hammes 2006: xii, 12, 16–31). To quote Hammes: 'It is an evolved form of insurgency. Still rooted in the fundamental precept that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power, 4GW makes use of society's networks to carry on its fight' (Hammes 2006: 2). 4GW have been evolving around the world over the past seven decades. Two examples are Vietnam and Chechnya. Hammes warns that as the world still conceptually grapples with the 4GW, the 5GW (an individual or a small group causing devastating damages by sudden terrorist strikes, especially using biological weapons) is just round the corner (Hammes 2006: 3, 290–91).

In 2007, the 4GW theory received a shot in the arm from Frans Osinga, a retired colonel of Netherlands. Osinga writes that 4GW is distinctly non-conventional and non-military in character. The 4GW opponents wage war in the political and moral arena rather than in the military dimension (Osinga 2007: 179). To quote him, 'It will be characterized by: very small independent groups or cells acting on mission-type orders; a decreased dependence on logistics support; emphasis on manoeuvre; and psychological goals rather than physical ones' (Osinga 2007: 174). Non-state groups like the Hamas and *Al-Qaeda* represent agile cellular organizations. They are networked through ideology, shared ideas, experience, trust, goals and doctrine that thrive in uncertainty and foster innovation, creativity and initiative. Such a setup enables rapid and varied actions in a non-linear fashion. Osinga continues that in order to counter 4GW, close attention should be paid to the culture of the local societies in which this form of warfare is occurring. Following the American air-power theorist of manoeuvre warfare, John Boyd, Osinga claims that the COIN forces must observe, learn, and adapt to the local changing circumstances.

Overall, 4GW points to the rise of non-trinitarian warfare and irrelevance of the Clausewitzian Trinitarian paradigm (army, people and the government forming the three sides of an equilateral triangle) that mostly focuses on conventional warfare between the nation states. In order to destroy the 4GW enemy, the COIN force must isolate the insurgents from three essential vectors (physical, mental and moral), while improving their own connectivity across the same vectors. The 4GW model derives from Martin Van Creveld's argument put forward in 1991 in the book *On Future War*, that interstate war has become obsolete due to the decline of the nation states. The works of Christopher Coker and the British historian John Keegan who argue that warfare is not merely instrumental, as the West conceives, but also cultural for many societies, are the basic building blocks of 4GW theory (Osinga 2007: 174, 177, 179–81, 184).

Hugh Smith equates low intensity conflicts (LIC) and terrorism with anti-modern war. He says that after 1945, anti-modern warfare has killed more people than conventional war and this is the trend for the future. Besides kidnappings and extortion, these New Wars will be fought in cyberspace. The increasing reliance of states on information superhighways will generate cyber-terrorism. Computer hackers would be the new warriors. Somewhat in tune with Kaldor and Rupert Smith, Hugh Smith writes that anti-modern war is less of an instrument of policy wielded by the government on behalf of the people than a violent activity that engages all the elements of the society including those who are unarmed. Violence is more endemic than instrumental. In Hugh Smith's paradigm, anti-modern war appears to be irrational because the insurgents participate in insurgencies for mindless violence rather than any rational calculation (Smith 2005: 251–71).

Similarly, Coker writes that the non-West's understanding of warfare and warriors is psychologically and emotionally distinct from the Western concept of warfare. The Americans with their rigid instrumental or utilitarian attitude of warfare will never be able to grasp the objectives of 9/11. For the West, war is the means to an end but for the non-West, war is an end in itself. Hence, the Clausewitzian principle that war is a form of political intercourse is not applicable to the wars waged by non-Western societies. He continues that in instrumentalizing war, the West no longer understands the expressive elements inherent in the warfare waged by non-Western elements. Violence for the latter is not only instrumental but also constitutes the moral essence of the warrior. In the non-Western military cultures, for a true warrior, violence is existential. War is as much a means of realizing one's humanity as achieving their political objectives. Through violence, a warrior comes to know himself and he creates his self. For the Asian insurgents, violence is cathartic, an existential experience by which they liberate themselves from their squalid circumstances and achieve their humanity. For Coker, the concepts of revenge and honour, rather than the Western concept of rationality, shape warfare outside the West. The West also possesses honour codes but has instrumentalized them. This is not the case in the Islamic societies. The Arab and Pushtun ideas of honour are an important component of the militant Islam that is fuelling the current insurgencies. Coker hints at 5GW warfare when he asserts that

the citizens of the developed countries are now more interested in private security. And the military institutions of the state are failing to provide that. To counter the new terrorists, the mass conscript military must act more like a police force and must transform itself into small self-sufficient composite brigades filled with thinking middle-class citizens (Coker 2002; Coker 2007: 83–103).

Coker seems to have influenced Robert M. Cassidy, a battalion commander of the US Army. Cassidy, in his monograph which came out in 2006, writes that the present global insurgency is an evolving insurgency (the same term is used by Hammes, the proponent of 4GW) of a new kind. It has some similarities with twentieth-century revolutionary guerrilla war but also lot of differences from it. This evolving hybrid form of insurgency remains the strategy of the weak and embraces the hit-and-run tactics associated with guerrillas (Cassidy 2006: vii) Cassidy warns his American audience:

> Potential adversaries are from Asia and the East, from cultures that have generally espoused an Eastern tradition of war. The Eastern way of war stems from the philosophies of Sun Tzu and Mao Tse-Tung, and is distinguishable from the Western way by its reliance on indirectness, perfidy, attrition, and protraction. In other words, the Eastern way of war is inherently more irregular, unorthodox, and asymmetric than our traditional conception of war. (Cassidy 2006: 3)

Cassidy continues that besides culture, which encourages attritional evasive warfare, the material and technological weakness of the Islamic world will encourage it to wage asymmetric warfare through ideas. While the twentieth century revolutionary guerrilla warfare was driven by the secular Marxist ideology, this new form of global insurgency is driven by a radical variant of Islam. The objective of the Islamic form of global insurgency is to overthrow the Westphalian system of states and establish an ideal Islamic Caliphate (Cassidy 2006: 6, 10–13).

Before moving on, we need to take stock of the theories regarding the paradigm shift of warfare discussed above. Most of the theorists who argue for a paradigm shift in warfare pay lip service to the history of warfare and state formation. Unlike Hugh Smith and Coker, several scholars search for rational reasons behind the genesis of insurgencies and reject the bipolar division of the world into Western and non-Western categories. Coker's division of the world into Western mentality and non-Western mentality shaping warfare reminds one of Herodotus' division of the world into Orient versus the Occident. Coker has to produce empirical evidence to prove his claim that the non-Western people fight for irrational atavistic reasons. Every insurgent group, be it *Al-Qaeda* or a Naga outfit in North-East India, has political objectives. So Clausewitz is not merely dead but alive and kicking. It is simplistic for Cassidy to argue that Marxist guerrilla warfare has been replaced by Islamic guerrilla warfare. Take for example South Asia. While in Kashmir, Islamic guerrilla warfare is going on; in Nepal and Jharkhand, the Maoist insurgencies constitute the principal threat. And in North-East India, the tribal feelings since the eighteenth century remain the principal driver of insurgencies.

In a compelling counter-argument to the New War thesis, Stathis Kalyvas shows that New Wars are first hardly new – that the qualities that distinguish supposed New Wars were evident in civil wars fought in the 19th and early 20th Centuries (Kalyvas 2001). Moreover, some New Wars exhibit the ideological purity that supposedly characterizes 'old wars' (Kalyvas 2005: 92).

The opportunity costs of joining a rebel movement cannot be dismissed out of hand. A highly educated relatively wealthy potential recruit must give up much more than a poorly educated poor peasant (Collier and Hoeffler 2002: 14–15). But this does not necessarily mean that material incentives are the main factor inducing young men to join an insurgency. Some insurgent groups are able to recruit without providing any economic remuneration (for instance, Maoists in Nepal and in Central India) and several insurgent groups which depend heavily on a supply of tangible incentives to attract and retain personnel within their ranks. The role of non-pecuniary rewards is especially significant for recruiting and maintaining the allegiance of rebel soldiers (Gates 2002). This is not to say that material incentives play no role. In the case of a cash crunch (limiting the ability to purchase weapons and supplies), a rebel group may then be forced to turn to loot and plunder. In the case of South Asia, one such example is the Khalistani insurgents of the late 1980s. Some groups may not rely on non-pecuniary rewards, by promising economic rewards and political power in the future when the rebels would capture the state apparatus. In present Pakistan, tribal and clan linkages and the hope for a better future sustains the rank and personnel of the Baluchi insurgents.

Elisabeth Jean Wood's case study of the civil war in El Salvador in the 1980s features several motives for fighting. 'While material grievances, principally inadequate access to land, played a role, I show that emotional and moral motives were essential to the emergence and consolidation of insurgent collective action … . Insurgent *campesinos* in interviews repeatedly stressed the importance of motives such as "that we not be seen as slaves"'[1] (Wood 2006: 2). Wood continues that the *campesinos* (landless day labourer, permanent wage employee or farmer working on a small holding) who participated in land occupations and marches and provided logistical support to the guerrillas ran enormous amount of risk. Moreover, participation was voluntary. About 75,000 civilians in a population of five million died during the civil war. Wood does not find any evidence of E.P. Thompson's 'moral economy'. She claims that moral commitments and emotional engagements were the principal reason behind insurgent collective action during the civil war. The insurgents believed that they are creating a new social order in accordance with God's will and they are also making history (Wood 2006). In a different context, Islamic insurgents in Kashmir are also in many cases motivated by non-tangible incentives: that they are fighting to establish a *Caliphate* in accordance with the will of the Allah.

Patrick M. Regan claims that identity wars last longer than ideological conflicts. He continues that the duration of civil wars is directly proportional to the extent of

1 Italics in original.

ethno-linguistic fractionalizations (Regan 2002: 58, 63). Regan in later work offers an intimate account of the struggle to understand why civil wars occur and what we can do to prevent them: People rise up against their governments when they have little else to lose; structural poverty stands as the root cause of civil war (Regan 2010). The fashionable Western and the Eastern ways of warfare have no basis in history but exist in the imaginations of some European and American historians who are great in their fields but have little knowledge about Asian military history. The 4GW theory is historically shallow. Why date the origin of modern warfare with Napoleon Bonaparte and not with Frederick the Great? And how to define modern war? Hammes and Osinga are rabidly Eurocentric. What about the evolution of warfare before and after 1800 beyond West and Central Europe?

Taken together, the theorists of New War assert that the power of the state is decreasing. Kaldor and Rupert Smith's analysis is based mainly on Yugoslavia. True, the states in the Balkan are in flux. However, the state structures in the Balkan have been in flux from the time of Ottoman conquest. In the 1930s, the German diplomats rightly described the Balkan states as *saisonstatten* (states born for one season only). One could argue that the states have always been weak in Africa and Latin America, regions which are witnessing various sorts of irregular warfare. However, the state is not declining in regions where historically strong states have evolved. For instance in India and China, the state continues to remain strong for the foreseeable future.

Again, despite a plethora of new names and acronyms, the characteristics of the New War are not at all new or innovative. The trends that Munkler cites as constituting New War were evident in central Europe during the Thirty Years War and in South Asia during the eighteenth century. The idea of separating the insurgents from the populace of the disturbed regions and attempting to change the attitude of the people (on which Rupert Smith harps), is an age-old principle of COIN warfare. Munkler and Rupert Smith claim that the New Wars are going to be attritional. Since the rise of Maoist warfare in the 1920s, theoreticians have been aware that insurgencies as well as COIN campaigns are going to be attritional. Again, Munkler and Rupert Smith's challenge to the peace-war bipolar division is a theme which is present in Kautilya's *Arthasastra* composed around 300 BCE (Roy 2009: 36). This is not to suggest that nothing has changed or that warfare is in a stasis. Definitely, media plays an important role in modern-day insurgencies and the population of the countries is now more sensitive of their rights as citizens. However, on that basis it would be too rash to argue for a paradigm shift in warfare. Still, credit is due to the proponents of New War for bringing political, economic, social and cultural factors within the orbit of analysis, unlike the RMA theorists who focus merely on technology, especially information technology.

Nevertheless, the exact nature of future insurgencies cannot be portrayed with any certainty. In recent times, some scholars have argued that LIC is inherently non-linear and chaotic. According to some interpreters of Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War* recognizes the inapplicability of the 'scientific' paradigm in understanding war. In accordance with this interpretation, Clausewitz implies that warfare is a

human rather than mechanical activity. Hence, the nature of future warfare cannot be predicted. Still, some scholars and military officers take the trouble to discern mechanisms for combating both present and future insurgencies.

One group of scholars asserts that a clear cut division between LIC and conventional war creates only semantic confusion. M.L.R. Smith claims that guerrilla warfare is not merely intra-state warfare; inter-state warfare also includes elements of guerrilla warfare. Take for example the case of North Vietnam, which conducted guerrilla warfare against South Vietnam during the 1960s. Again, not all civil wars are characterized by LIC. The English Civil War, the American Civil War, the Spanish Civil War and the Chinese Civil War were characterized by high-intensity conventional operations. The so-called characteristics of guerrilla warfare, such as ambushes, sabotage operations, and raids behind enemy lines, are also employed by special forces of the regular armies during conventional warfare (Smith 2005: 29–31). He continues that 'Guerrilla methods do exist as *tactics* within war, but they do not intrinsically constitute a separate category of war … . What we call low-intensity conflict can only be understood fully within Clausewitzian parameters, which embrace the entire spectrum of war' (Smith 2005: 51).[2] Isabelle Duyvesteyn says that several tactics of conventional warfare are also used in civil wars. For instance, the warring parties in Ethiopia and Eritrea resorted to trench warfare. Centralized command, a key requirement for conducting high-speed conventional warfare, was also emphasized by Mao Tse-Tung for waging a protracted people's war. So, irregular war (or the so-called LIC) is indistinguishable from regular or high-intensity conventional warfare (Duyvesteyn 2005: 65–80).

This chapter in particular and the book in general argue that LIC/unconventional/irregular war constitutes an entity distinct from high-intensity conventional warfare. There do exist certain similarities between conventional warfare and LIC, but the differences are too great for merging these two concepts into a composite category. Certainly thousands of high caliber guns did not pulverize the trench lines manned by millions of conscript soldiers in Ethiopia and Eritrea as was the case in France during 1914–18. Despite possessing some similarities, the two Gulf Wars are distinct from the present day American policing of post-Saddam Iraq. Similarly, the three India-Pakistan Wars (1947–48, 1965, 1971) are different from the ongoing insurgency in Kashmir. The bottom line is that aerial dogfights, fleet encounters and deep penetration armoured strikes, etc., which constitute the crucial characteristics of twentieth century high-intensity conventional warfare, are absent in LIC. Azeem Ibrahim rightly says that guerrilla warfare is a specific form of warfare characterized by small bands of irregulars fighting a regular army either to weaken the latter's hold over a conquered territory or as a supplementary means in a conventional warfare. The tactics of guerrilla warfare comprise of hit-and-run operations and ambushes. Hence, the weapons of the guerrillas tend to be light (Ibrahim 2004: 112–13). Again, as we will see

2 Italics in original.

in this chapter in particular and throughout this book, it is not essential to debunk Carl Von Clausewitz to understand LIC. However, more than two thousand years ago, the Indian theoretician Kautilya actually argued for interconnections between intra-state war and inter-state conflicts. The next section focuses on theory and tools of COIN in modern India.

India's COIN: Theory and Tools

After the departure of the British in 1947, the post-colonial Indian state had to tackle several insurrections which burst out in various parts of the country. Independent India is a developing economy and is composed of many communities with different social, cultural and linguistic identities. Indian society is divided along caste, class, ethnic and religious identities. And such a society is vulnerable to a high degree of insurgencies. For the present and the near future, insurgencies constitute the principal threat to the state system. Many modern scholars (both Indian and foreigners) also accept such a pessimistic view of the future. John Keegan says that religious extremism and ethnic strife will cause insurgencies in the near future (Keegan 1999: 71). In 2005, Lieutenant-Colonel Vivek Chadha of the Indian Army, influenced by Martin Van Creveld's book published in 1991, writes that for the present and future, the LIC rather than conventional conflicts remain the greatest danger (Chadha 2005: 19). General K. Sundarji, ex-Chief of Army Staff (COAS) of India asserted in 2003 that in the coming decades, unconventional force (such as proxy war by sponsored insurgency, subversion and terrorism, including narco-terrorism) would be used to a greater degree by the nation states as an instrument of policy against neighbouring enemy states (Sundarji 2003: 37). Several military officers and some civilian analysts have chalked out the trajectory of COIN theory in independent India. Let us have a look at the evolution of the various dimensions of the Indian Army's COIN doctrine since 1947.

Rajesh Rajagopalan in a monograph after analyzing the Indian Army's experience in Nagaland and Sri Lanka asserts that a strong conventional war bias reduces the effectiveness of the Indian Army's COIN campaigns. And the positional warfare doctrine that is the chief characteristic of Indian Army's conventional war formula had indirectly influenced the Indian Army's unconventional warfare doctrine too. Area domination and saturation of the disturbed region with troops are key components of India's COIN. Rajagopalan defines insurgency as armed rebellions that seek to replace existing political authority. All insurgencies in his framework go through three distinct stages: political preparatory state, guerrilla war stage and the conventional war stage (Rajagopalan 2000: 45, 51; Rajagopalan 2008: 17, 48). One detects the influence of Mao here.

Lieutenant-General S.K. Sinha (he served as Adjutant-General at the Army Headquarters, then General Officer Commanding Western Command and retired as Vice-Chief of Army Staff in 1983. Later he became Governor of Assam) defined insurgency in 1970 in the following words:

> Insurgency may be defined as an armed rebellion against the legally constituted government with the support or sympathy of the bulk of the local population, obtained voluntarily or by coercion … modern insurgency has become a complicated affair calling for understanding of its military, political, social and economic aspects. Previously, nationalism provided the prime fuel for insurgency movements. Now-a-days, Communism is often the motive power. Modern insurgency covers the full spectrum of conflict from subversion to guerrilla war and the emergence of guerrilla bands into regular units to fight in a conventional manner. (Sinha 1980: 163)

The fact that insurgencies involve an amalgam of military and non-military elements and the role of communism as a causative factor were also noted during the 1960s by the Western theoreticians. In 1963, Brigadier-General Samuel B. Griffith (a retired officer of the United States Marine Corps), reacting to the insurgency in Vietnam, wrote about the communist inspired guerrilla warfare in the following words:

> A revolutionary war is never confined within the bounds of military action. Because its purpose is to destroy an existing society and its institutions and to replace them with a completely new state structure, any revolutionary war is a unity of which the constituent parts, in varying importance, are military, political, economic, social, and psychological. For this reason, it is endowed with a dynamic quality and a dimension in depth that orthodox wars, whatever their scale lack. This is particularly true of revolutionary guerrilla war, which is not susceptible to the type of superficial military treatment frequently advocated by antediluvian doctrinaires. (Griffith 1963: 9)

A British historian Ian F.W. Beckett equates modern revolutionary guerrilla warfare with insurgency. Like Griffith, he defines it as revolutionary in intent and practice, with social, economic, psychological and political elements grafted to traditional irregular military tactics (Beckett 1988: 194).

Marxist theorists throw light on various aspects of insurgencies which are relevant even today. In contrast to Kaldor's claim that privatization of violence is a cardinal feature of the New War in the age of globalization, Karl Marx, while writing about the Spanish guerrillas against Napoleonic regime, pointed out that occasionally guerrilla movement degenerates into feuds between private armies of the warlords (*Guerrilla Warfare and Marxism* 1970: 14). Kaldor states that post-Cold War New Wars are characterized by the absence of states and the rise of non-state groups. It is to be noted that for the Marxist theoreticians, in the paradigm of guerrilla war, conflict between the states is replaced by conflict among various social groups within the state. Since Marxist ideology presumes to be a poor man's religion, the Marxist military theory (especially the component dealing with irregular warfare) is to a great extent also a poor man's weapon. In 1917, V.I. Lenin declared that insurrection against the ruling class also belongs to the art of war

(Neumann 1971: 160). In 1938, Mao claimed that 'Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun' (*Marxism and the Science of War* 1981: 191). He theorized how a political party weaker than its enemy in arms and military organization could defeat them. Before Mao, Mazzini developed the theory of partisan warfare in the first half of the nineteenth century. Mazzini argued that small groups of dedicated patriots could enter enemy territory. And guerrillas could be encouraged to arise even from the populace. Then they could start an insurrection. Once the partisans captured power, popular bands would emerge spontaneously throughout the length and breadth of the country (Gooch 1986: 304). Again, transnational links in insurgencies are not a feature of the New Wars in the era of globalization, as Kaldor argues. Many Marxist thinkers have emphasized the supranational connections in conducting guerrilla warfare. Lin Piao claims that the Maoist guerrilla strategy of surrounding a city from the countryside can be conducted as a worldwide struggle against imperialism. For Lin Piao, the underdeveloped countries constitute the countryside and the isolated cities are the developed Western capitalist countries. And the latter should be isolated and surrounded by the former (*Guerrilla Warfare and Marxism* 1970: 29–30).

Maoist guerrillas operating from the mountains of central Nepal and the jungles of Terai continue to pose a security risk to India's northern frontier. In India's North-East Frontier, the Nagas and ULFA continue to fight from the jungle clad mountains. Nevertheless, since the last decade of the twentieth century, rather than communist-inspired insurgency, the Indian state is threatened more by armed challenges of the Islamic fundamentalists. The emergence of Islamic insurgencies is a global phenomenon. Especially, the collapse of the USSR resulted in Islamic guerrillas becoming powerful in the post-Soviet space in Central Asia. Close to India, Afghanistan is an example. In 1992, the Najibullah regime collapsed. And 1994 witnessed the emergence of the Taliban in Kandahar. Mullah Omar's role as a religious teacher enabled him to wield influence with the tribal communities in southern Kandahar. The Taliban captured Kabul in September 1996. The political economy of the Taliban supports Kaldor thesis. Opium production sustained the Taliban's finances. In 1997, Afghanistan produced 2,800 tons of opium half of it in Helmand region. The Taliban administration collected a 10% tax from the opium cultivators (Nojumi 2002: 11–27, 134–42). And the Taliban-Pakistan axis supported the proxy war in Kashmir with manpower, money and equipment.

Lieutenant-Colonel Chadha, who served in the Indian Army Headquarters, New Delhi in 2005, equates LIC with partisan warfare, revolutionary war, insurrection, asymmetric warfare, little war and small war. He differentiates between terrorism and guerrilla movements, although both fall under the rubric of LIC. Terrorism occurs in the urban areas, whereas insurgencies start in the rural areas and then graduate into urban centres. Terrorism enjoys little popular support and employs sensational and visible violence to terrorize and break the will of the people and in turn, forces the government to accede to its demands. On the other hand, insurgency enjoys popular support (Chadha 2005: 25, 403–4). An Indian police officer named Ved Marwah disagrees by asserting that a successful terrorist

movement cannot function without the support of the populace (Marwah 1996: 109). The IRA,which practices terrorism, enjoys the support of a large segment of the Irish populace (*Guerrilla Warfare and Marxism* 1970: 26). It is to be noted that the Nepalese and the Indian Maoist leaders practicing insurgency, like the Chinese communists always try to win over the peasantry to their side.

In general, the Indian military officers who theorize about LIC agree that the guerrillas, unlike the terrorists, do not attack common people. The guerrillas confront mostly the state's security forces (Nayyar et al. 2003: 213–14). Violence directed by the terrorists against civilians is a case of displaced or redirected aggression (Barash and Webel 2002: 134). In this case, anger generated by the state machinery is displaced or redirected to other targets (for example, civilians). Kanti P. Bajpai, a civilian analyst, conceptualizes that terrorism as the organized use of violence for political ends and that it is directed primarily at the non-combatants. So, terrorism involves a combination of elements of physical and psychological struggles. Bajpai differs from the military analysts when he speaks about state-sponsored terrorism against its own citizens. He asserts that terrorist violence is also an instrument of states or governments who are trying to combat non-state terrorists (Bajpai 2002: 6–7). Here, one is reminded of Kautilya's injunction of the state using irregular techniques that are similar to the tactics used by the rebels.

Like Bajpai, Kalyvas accepts that both the counter-terrorist forces and the terrorists indulge in violence. The military, while conducting mopping-up operations or combing operations or cordon and search operations, indulge in indiscriminate violence. For the terrorists, violence is primarily a resource rather than the final product, says Kalyvas. Its objective is to mould the behaviour of a targeted audience. The aim of terrorist-induced violence is terrorization, intimidation, demoralization and radicalization of the public. Terrorists indulge in violent activities against those who collaborate (either passively or actively) with the government forces. Further, violent acts by the terrorists also result in advertisement of their movement. Indiscriminate violence is a weapon of deterrence for the terrorists. To sum up, terrorists use violence to deter elements within society from cooperating with the government and the government forces' use of indiscriminate violence against the inhabitants in a disturbed territory alienates the latter group from the state (Kalyvas 2004: 97–138).

The objectives of insurgents could be categorized as: irredentism (i.e. unification of two regions within a country which is inhabited by the same ethnic or religious group), separatism, and autonomy. Jean Dreze, an economist, has theorized the impact of LIC with special reference to India. He says: 'Most armed conflicts today are "internal" wars, rather than inter-state disputes. Internal wars are socially divisive and undermine the integrity of the nation-state. This creates a vicious circle of violence and social disintegration' (Dreze 2003: 282). Dreze continues that such conflicts, far from promoting participation of the underprivileged in the mainstream, exacerbate their marginalization. Also, war conditions often undermine earlier achievements in fields such as democratic rights, gender equality and ethnic harmony (Dreze 2003: 296).

Sinha accepts that insurgency is not unique to India but is a growing phenomenon in most of the developing countries, due to poverty and illiteracy (Sinha 1980: 163). The role of external powers in instigating insurgencies, which is present in Kautilya's discourse, receives attention from the modern Indian commentators. Chadha claims that the causal factors behind the origin of LIC are an amalgam of political, economic, social and external factors (Chadha 2005: 405). Lieutenant-General Depinder Singh (the commander of IPKF in Sri Lanka from 1987–88) asserts that the external sponsors sustain ongoing insurgency with financial assistance, arms, training of the cadres, etc. (Singh 2001: 120).

Brigadier Vivek Sapatnekar's philosophy, like that of Chadha and Kautilya, is somewhat pessimistic. Insurgencies are inevitable in a multi-ethnic, multi-racial and multi-religious country like India. In 1988, Sapatnekar wrote: 'Differing ethnological and social systems, massive migrations of populations, religious fundamentalism and the isolated and inert nature of large groups only generate or inflame racial, religious, cultural, regional, linguistic and other contradictions' (Sapatnekar 1988: 122). Sapatnekar and Kautilya agree that insurgencies are inevitable due to the social and political issues that promote regionalism, religious fundamentalism and sub-national identities. However, James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin assert that the assumption of plural societies being conflict prone due to ethnic and religious tensions is erroneous. Not ethnic nationalism nor growth of population, but low per capita income among the inhabitants of remote mountainous regions is the principal factor behind young men joining insurgencies (Fearon and Laitin 2003: 77–88). To an extent, this is applicable to the Maoist uprising in Nepal and in pockets of Central and North India.

Sapatnekar is also influenced by the British Martial Race theory and makes a point somewhat similar to that made by Fearon and Latin. The colonial British military officers believed that in India only some groups who live in economically underdeveloped mountainous regions near the frontier (such as the Pathans and Gurkhas) are martial. And those communities who inhabited the river valley plains producing bumper crops become peace loving and addicted to a life of ease, hence non-martial. In the eyes of the British strategists, the 'martial races' were more prone to rebellions. Sapatnekar notes: 'Alienated minorities, such as the Gorkhas [the British called them Gurkhas][3] of the Hill Districts of North Bengal belonging to virile and turbulent ethnic stock are ideally suited for insurgency, while economically well placed and prosperous groups remain contented and become soft' (Sapatnekar 1988: 122). The new millennium has proved Sapatnekar partly right.

Sinha argues that the basic objective of an army is to defend its country against external enemies. So, the army should not be used for internal security tasks; pacification campaigns should be left to the police and home guards. Both Sinha and Bajpai accept that it is better to deploy the police instead of the army because the police know the terrain intimately and have links with the local populace

3 [ ] authors' intervention.

and unlike the army, they are not viewed by the inhabitants of the periphery as a coercive instrument of the distant centre (Bajpai 2002: 176). However, when the police fail, the army has to be deployed to take up the task of maintaining law and order, running essential services and aiding civil administration during emergencies (Sinha 1980: 142–3, 151).

The militaries outside India are also engaged in fighting insurgencies. And the Indian military's COIN doctrine has been shaped partly by experiences of the foreign militaries, especially the British and the American armies. The post-modern name for Western pacification campaign is peacekeeping operations. In peacekeeping operations, the actual use of force is mostly replaced by mere threats of using force and thus forces the insurgents to negotiate. And in peace-enforcement operations, a moderate amount of force is used in a gradual manner.

Tim Jones asserts that from the late 1960s, there was a growing consensus among Western analysts that insurgencies could be crushed not merely by colonial policing but by a mixture of reforms, propaganda and relocation of the populace to secure areas (Jones 2001: 3). In reality, the transition in the doctrines of the Western militaries engaged in COIN duties was much more tortuous. The French Army, while fighting insurgencies in Vietnam and Algeria, evolved *guerre revolutionnaire* which could be described as a rigid military response to LIC (Pimlott 1985b: 46). In contrast, the principal elements of British Army's COIN doctrine are primacy of political elements, flexibility and coordination of civil-military responses at every level (Pimlott 1985a: 20). This was evident during British COIN warfare in Malaya. Gerald Templer, British commander of the forces in Malaya during the early 1950s, was able to defeat the communist insurgents. According to Templer, shooting constitutes 25% of the COIN operations. The remaining 75% involves winning the hearts and minds of the people in the disturbed zone (Grey 2003: 81–2).

Winning over the people in insurgency prone zones is necessary because the guerrillas also try to curry favour with the common people for getting logistical support. Maoist strategy emphasizes that without intimacy between the population at large and the guerrillas, a guerrilla movement is not possible. The support of the masses, says Mao, is necessary (Mao 1963: 79). Mao asserts: 'Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation' (Mao 1963: 33). In the case of civil war or insurgency-like situations, the communist insurgents did not conceive the theatre in a linear matter. There is no clear separation of enemy and allied forces. And there is no clear demarcation of front and rear (Lansky 1983: 630). The guerrillas move back and forth between the front line and home front. The scenario is somewhat similar to Kautilya (Roy 2007: 235–6) and Kaldor's conceptualization of blurring the distinction between the rebels and the common mass in the disturbed region. So, the objective of the COIN force is to strike at the contact between the masses and the insurgents.

The British Army's COIN doctrine emphasizes that during the policing operations, military officers must be given training in handling public relations (Gregorian 2002: 55). While fighting a LIC, Britain's priority is isolating the

insurgents from the support of the populace. This is done by spreading propaganda via various means such as films, leaflets, etc. (Pimlott 1985a: 21). The South African Army focuses on psychological actions. The security personnel are advised, trained and instructed to maintain good relations with the local population (Toase 1985: 211).

After the Vietnam War, the US Army accepted the emphasis on political initiatives and 'proper treatment' of the civilians in the insurgency prone areas. In 2001, one of the American proponents of COIN doctrine, Wray R. Johnson wrote: 'The application of purely military measures may not, by itself restore peace and orderly government because the fundamental causes of the condition of unrest may be economic, political or social … . The solution of such problems being basically a political adjustment, the military measures to be applied must be of secondary importance and should be applied only to such an extent as to permit the continuation of peaceful corrective measures' (Johnson 2001: 20). Johnson continues that at heart, insurgencies are not military problems but that the root causes are political, economic and social. Therefore, the military measures against the guerrillas that include the tenets to find, fix and destroy them in a fire fight, are inadequate. The political, economic and social aspects of insurgencies also need to be tackled. The non-military programmes aim to win the hearts and minds of the populace through welfare schemes and to construct grass-roots level political institutions (Johnson 2001: 87, 91). For this, writes Peter M. Dunn, the security forces require a thorough knowledge of the needs, customs and beliefs of the people (Dunn 1985: 80). However, the US Army seems to have forgotten these lessons in post-Saddam Iraq (Stephens 2007: 146).

Besides the British colonial heritage, one could discern the influence of ancient Hindu theoreticians like Kamandaka (600 CE) (Singh 2010: 40–41, 48, 51–2) and diffusion of modern Western ideas about peacekeeping operations behind the Indian Army's technique of winning hearts and minds. Like their British predecessors, most of the officers of the Indian Army accept that even after deploying army units, the principal mechanism for countering insurgencies is to win the 'hearts and minds' of the people in the troubled areas. Winning the people's support is considered necessary because the role of ideology behind insurgencies is emphasized in the writings of many Indian Army officers. Chadha writes:

> The value of ideas is often a very important factor in the successful conduct of Low Intensity Conflicts … . In conventional wars it is the importance and relative reliance on arms that tilts the scale in favour of the victor. However, in Low Intensity Conflicts, more often than not it is the idea around which hinges the result of a conflict. This is because most Low Intensity Conflicts are people centric where an idea can convert a group of dissatisfied people into a revolution. (Chadha 2005: 19)

This is also one of the basic tenets of Marxist theoreticians, 4GW theorists, and proponents of population centric COIN theorists like Rupert Smith. Colonel

Bhaskar Sarkar gives less importance to the issue of public support to the insurgents. According to Sarkar, in a particular disturbed area, only 10% support insurgency, another 10% are against it and the remaining 80% remain indifferent. However, Sarkar does not underestimate the battle for winning 'the hearts and minds of the people'. Influenced by the Vietnamese General Vo Ngyuen Giap's writings, Sarkar states that security forces must respect the people and help them when they are in distress (Sarkar 1998: 17, 111).

The Indian regimental officers accept that to reinstate faith in the civil population, the regiments engaged in COIN tasks must conduct various welfare measures such as setting up medical camps or arranging sports meets, which would also draw large crowds. The Rashtriya Rifles (special regiments of the Indian Army designated for COIN duties) are ordered to undertake civic actions as part of winning the hearts and minds of the people. Distribution of rations, organization of veterinary camps, distribution of books to children, etc. are some of the elements of the army's civic action scheme (*Dogras* 2005: 201, 398).

Sinha writes that army personnel must try to establish rapport with the local populace, especially the students, village elders and respected gentry (Sinha 1980: 157). In 1999, one of the articles in a service journal of the Indian armed forces noted that greater interaction between the civilian population of the disturbed area and the COIN forces is necessary as part of the state's campaign to win the affection of the populace in insurgency prone areas. It is necessary for the personnel of the COIN forces to learn the local language and familiarize themselves with the customs and religious practices of the various segments of the populace. This will help in breaking down the wall of mistrust between the populace in a disturbed region and the state's forces created by rebel propaganda (OP TOPAC 1999: 33). This statement is similar to Dunn's admonition to the US Army. In Vietnam, because the American intelligence officers had to rely on interpreters, they could not establish rapport with the local population. Hence, the US military authorities failed to generate friendly bonds with the locals and acquire adequate intelligence about the ground situation (Mackenzie 1997: 160). Needless to say, the US Army now faces problems in Afghanistan and Iraq partly due to the above mentioned deficiencies.

To prevent alienation of the inhabitants in disturbed areas, it is necessary to ensure proper behaviour by the personnel of the COIN forces. Colonel Harjeet Singh writes that the troops engaged in COIN operations should follow these '10 commandments': no rape, no molestation, no torture resulting in death and maiming, respect for human rights, fear of God and upholding *dharma* (i.e. ethical code of conduct), no meddling in civil administration, carrying out civic actions, developing a model for media interaction and using it as a force multiplier, no military disgrace (loss of arms, surrender etc.), and competence in platoon/company actions. The morale and behaviour of the soldiers are maintained by focusing on their *dharma*. It is to be noted that Harjeet Singh is influenced by the concept of *dharma* as used by Asoka and Kamandaka for good governance. And of the 10 commandments only the last two deal with military aspects. So, while Templer

says that shooting concerns 25% of COIN operations, in Harjeet Singh's model, shooting constitutes only 20% of the COIN campaign. Harjeet Singh points out that the military actions are going to be small-unit decentralized operations. Proper behaviour of the troops, especially with respect to the women of the disturbed areas, is emphasized. This is a point which Mao also emphasized. About 40% of the COIN campaign, according to Harjeet Singh, deals with ensuring human rights of the populace (Singh 1999: Appendix D).

Both the proponents of guerrilla warfare and the doctrinaires of COIN campaigns note the importance of media and the use of new technology in the overall framework of their campaigns. Urban guerrilla warfare or terrorism involves attacks on banks, kidnappings of businessmen and assassination of political leaders, etc. Such activities generate greater media publicity than the actions of the guerrillas in the rural areas (Kalyanaraman 2003: 181). Carlos Marighela, the urban guerrilla warfare theorist writes that for the urban guerrillas, media is the vital weapon. For bank raids, street ambushes, spectacular kidnappings, etc., the media provide propaganda (Godfrey 1985: 117). Urban guerrilla warfare emerged as an alternative strategy among the Latin American revolutionaries in the late 1960s because the rural revolutionaries failed to bring about revolutions. The guerrillas who were largely city bred people from middle class origin had difficulties identifying with the peasants. In general, the peasants considered the guerrillas as an alien body grafted in the countryside. The advocates of the urban guerrilla strategy pointed out that the fast pace of urbanization has caused the strategy of the countryside encircling the cities (as chalked out by several Chinese Maoists) has to become outdated. Since the cities constitute the hub of economic, political and military power, the guerrillas must assault the cities in order to achieve revolutionary success (Ibrahim 2004: 120). Ivan Arreguin-Toft rightly says that terrorism is largely an urban phenomenon. It aims to inflict punishment on the non-combatants so that they will pressurize the government to accept the terrorists' political demands or to delegitimize the government to replace or to coerce it. Terrorist actions are effective in a democratic set up where the people have some say in the functioning of the government (Arreguin-Toft 2001: 103). Thus, terrorism is an offshoot of urban guerrilla warfare.

Several Indian military officers have noted the use of the media as a force multiplier by the insurgents. Brigadier R.K. Nanavatty wrote in 1993: 'The new forms of warfare thrive on publicity. The "enemy" seeks to manipulate the media. The media falls prey to the lure of sensationalism and unwittingly endangers individuals, state and public security. The government lacks an effective and modern apparatus to disseminate *"Public information"* despite exclusive control over the electronic means of mass communications' (Nanavatty 1993: 13).[4] One Indian police officer writes: 'The information technology has greatly enhanced the ability of the groups to spread terror and thus achieve the desired emotional response that made this particular mode of violence a psychologically effective

4 Italics in original.

weapon' (Kumar 2001: 73). He continues that by highlighting terrorist activities, the global media furthers the objectives of the terrorists to terrorize members of the civil society (Kumar 2001: 73). As we have seen earlier, the importance of media is highlighted by Rupert Smith as one of the characteristics of his so-called war amongst the people.

For gaining an advantage over the insurgents, the Indian Army is geared to wage what could be categorized as 'information warfare'. Akshay Joshi emphasizes the 'information revolution' as a component of the RMA. He asserts: 'In the Information age, using information, communication and media technologies in pursuance of national aims and foreign policy objectives has to supplement the use of force. It will be wrong to ignore the basic realities of international politics in the information age, that is the supremacy of the mind over muscle' (Joshi 1999: 37). Joshi further states: 'We have enough material and technical expertise to launch a propaganda blitz using modern information and communication technologies. The first step is to formally include information warfare as part of our national security strategy. There is tremendous patriotism and talent in the media, armed forces, government, and research community to launch and win the information war' (Joshi 1999: 36–7).

Besides information warfare, the role of political institutions remains vital in checking insurgencies. Insurgencies are rampant in states with weak political institutions. Semi-democracies are more vulnerable to civil wars. When political institutions decline due to political transition, then one witnesses the rise of insurgencies. An underdeveloped democratizing country has to live through unsettling internal rebellions (Hegre et al. 2001: 33–44). India is vulnerable because it is 'a nation in making'. There is a consensus among the civilian and military analysts of independent India that some sort of political compromise is necessary to avert insurgencies. This trend was also present in the COIN doctrine of the British officers of colonial India and the theoreticians of ancient India.

Depinder Singh writes:

> Insurgency is a consequence of political ineptitude, where alienation has been allowed to grow from minor, unfulfilled demands to a stage where the alienated feel that there is no other recourse except to take up weapons. Therefore, this stage must never be allowed to be reached; if it has been reached, a political solution must be swiftly found. The assumptions that time is a healer and insurgency will eventually die a natural death are just plain stupid, because when a section of people take up arms they have burnt all their boats and the only vision they perceive is victory or death. What such sections seek is not promises of good governance, but prompt and sincere implementation. (Singh 2001: 191)

Singh claims that a functional democracy and political debates are absolutely necessary for ending insurgencies (Singh 2001: 191). Bajpai harps on the various political measures that should be introduced in order to win over the alienated minorities in North-East India and in Kashmir. The 'borderlanders' should be

given special constitutional status. Since secessionist violence emerges due to localized fears between various ethno-religious groups at the periphery, devolution of power to autonomous councils and *panchayats* (elected village councils with administrative and limited economic power) are important mechanisms for satisfying the local minorities. These institutions enable the minorities at the periphery to enjoy autonomy over their cultural and economic life (Bajpai 2002: 124, 133). In tune with Bajpai, Depinder Singh agrees that devolution of power is necessary to combat insurgencies (Singh 2001: 194). And this strand of thinking could be traced back to Kamandaka's concept of good governance for preventing rebellions. However, political solutions need to be backed by force. Rajagopalan has a point when he states that the Indian Army's officers believe that an insurgency cannot be solved militarily. Military pressure can at best push the insurgents towards the negotiating table (Rajagopalan 2008: 107). But how is military force to be applied?

Major-General V.K. Shrivastava says that because there is neither a visible enemy nor a definite territory to capture in the COIN operations, such operations demand the application of 'minimum force' (Shrivastava 2001: 497). The Indian Army's manual for COIN, published by the Military Intelligence Training School and Depot Pune notes: 'Assistance by the Army for the maintenance of law and order is provided at the request of the civil authorities who retain control. While rendering such assistance, it should be borne in mind that measures are being taken against misguided, restive and unruly citizens and not against an enemy. This imposes certain restrictions and the task of soldiers acting in aid of the civil authority is, therefore, a difficult one' (Counter-Intelligence 234). In S.K. Sinha's paradigm, the military aspect of COIN operations should be guided by the principles of minimum force, impartiality and good faith. Sinha emphasizes that close cooperation between the military commander and the civil magistrate while actually conducting the COIN operations are absolutely necessary (Sinha 1980: 154–5). It is to be noted that the principles of close civil-military cooperation for countering insurgency and the focus on minimum force were also present in the British colonial doctrine.

Within the paradigm of applying minimum force, it is necessary to determine how such force is to be applied at the tactical and operational levels. The characteristics of the military component of COIN doctrine need to be fleshed out. Modern counter-guerrilla actions by the Western COIN forces, asserts Jones, focus on prolonged area saturation patrolling by semi-independent small units (platoons or sections of less than 10 men). They carry out ambushes, raids and harassment from strategic bases, using all available intelligence about insurgent support, resources and the rebel forces (Jones 2001: 3–4). Leroy Thompson, who had served in the US Special Forces, claims that rather than heavy-weapon systems, specially trained and equipped light infantry constitute the best answer against the unconventional warriors (Thompson 1994: 7).

Brigadier Gavin Bulloch, while analyzing the military components of British COIN doctrine, emphasizes continuity between the colonial and post-

colonial eras as well as changes from the traditional attritional paradigm of warfare. Bulloch says that jungle patrolling and anti-ambush drills by light infantry are vital carryovers from the colonial campaigning. He continues that the other elements are surprise, tempo and waging simultaneous operations along multiple lines in order to unhinge the insurgents psychologically to bring about the complete collapse of will of the insurgents. Cognitive destruction of the insurgents is more important than their physical destruction (Bulloch 1996: 4–16). These latter elements are taken from the modern doctrine of manoeuvre warfare.

Modern manoeuvre warfare theory for conducting high-technology conventional war emphasizes the necessity to outmanoeuvre the enemy. This is to be done by gathering, processing and disseminating information at a rate faster than the enemy's command. This will in turn enable maintenance of tempo at a rate higher than the enemy. The acronym used is OODA loop: observe, orient, decide and act faster than the enemy. Tempo at the tactical level is defined as the rate of activity relative to the enemy within engagements. At the operational level, it is the rate of activity relative to the enemy between engagements (Irwin 1996: 245, 250).

Some proponents of the manoeuvre theory have modified the manoeuvre doctrine for meeting the requirements of 'operations other than war' (OOTW), which is LIC. The doctrine of manoeuvre war, argues J.J.A. Wallace, offers a quicker and cheaper route to success than the attritional approach. COIN is not merely countering the insurgents' activities. Instead of being reactive, the government forces should catch the initiative. Pre-emption is always a better policy than the slow building of huge forces in reaction to an emergency. It seems a return to a particular reading of Clausewitz that emphasizes that 'offence is the best defence'. The characteristics of such operations are risk taking and to dislocating the insurgents' command apparatus. Surprise, deception and simultaneity are the cardinal features of this doctrine. Flexible tactical groupings and mission style commands (decentralized command which the Germans called *Auftragstaktik*) enable the security forces to conduct manoeuvre operations successfully. At the tactical level, the government troops could maintain higher tempo than the rebels by using helicopters (Wallace 1996: 207–24).

As early as 1836, General Bugeaud of France used light flying columns to harry the mobile guerrillas in Algeria (Thompson 1994: 9). Modern day heliborne infantry serve as a virtual parallel of Bugeaud's flying columns. Sapatnekar argues that the Indian Army requires special weapons and training for handling COIN tasks. He demands heavy lift helicopters for increasing mobility of the ground troops, body armour for protecting the military personnel in close quarter combat, special purpose APCs and night vision scopes for the soldiers (Sapatnekar 1988: 125–7).

The use of modern manoeuvre doctrine for countering Small War is a reaction to the attritional paradigm of guerrilla warfare developed by Mao. Mao's argument that a technologically inferior guerrilla force could only win against a

sophisticated COIN force through protracted war is now turned on its head. In the age of post-heroic mentality, no government forces would allow large number of its personnel dying over a long period. Hence, the attempt is to win COIN campaigns quickly and cheaply (Munkler 2003: 7–10). Here, the manoeuvre doctrine as developed in the last decade of the twentieth century seems to provide a solution.

The Indian Army's regiments' tactical thought as far as COIN is concerned involves extensive cordon-and-search operations to check and control terrorists' mobility. And the regiments plus the paramilitary units implement border sealing duties to prevent ingress and egress of terrorists along the international border (*Dogras* 2005: 200–201). After the IPKF's experience, retired Indian military officers Gautam Das and M.K. Gupta-Ray emphasize the importance of the basics of small unit infantry warfare: field craft, fire discipline especially at the section and platoon levels. The two officers note that in COIN campaigns, the Indian infantry must learn to move away from roads and to patrol in small groups of three to five men. Lieutenant-General S.C. Sardeshpande, who commanded a division of the IPKF and later was the deputy commander, notes that the focus ought to be on individual and small group actions. The focus of training should be to develop counter-ambush techniques (Das and Gupta-Ray 2008: 276, 286, 288, 307). Depinder Singh emphasizes the use of communications, especially signal intelligence which functions as a force multiplier for the COIN force. In the end, the principal burden of fighting insurgents remains with 'poor bloody infantry'. The personnel in the COIN forces have to be motivated to fight and if necessary, to die while combating the non-state elements. Depinder Singh focuses on the importance of equipping the soldiers with latest weapons and distributing honours and awards for keeping their morale intact (Singh 2001: 123, 191–2).

Now, let us shift the focus to the instruments of COIN at the disposal of the Indian state. The country's last line of defence remains the long-service volunteer army that is used for both internal and external security. The expansion of the Indian Army after 1947 has been slow but steady. Between 1947 and 1954, the Indian Army grew from 280,000 to 350,000 men; in 1962, it had 550,000. After the defeat at the hands of China, the India government decided to increase its army to 825,000 men (MacMillan 1969: 50–51). In the late 1960s, the Indian Army set up a counter-insurgency and jungle warfare school at Virengte in Mizoram. And specialized COIN battalions known as I- (insurgency-) battalions were set up. The I-battalions were shorn of their logistical and administrative tails and without heavy artillery were deployed in north-east India. However, it proved to be a short-term experiment. During the 1990s, the Indian Army used light infantry battalions known as Rashtriya Rifles for COIN tasks (Rajagopalan 2004: 25–6). In 1998, 156 infantry battalions out of 356 (44%) were engaged in COIN. In 2001, some 117 infantry battalions were deployed only in Jammu and Kashmir (Rajagopalan 2004: 26). In the new millennium, the Indian Army possesses more than a million men.

Table 1.1 Expansion of the Different Paramilitary Forces

Year	NSG	ITBP	CRPF	BSF	Assam Rifles	CISF
1988	7,482	23,419	120,979	135,544	52,067	66,102
1989	7,482	25,482	121,206	149,568	52,460	71,818
1990	7,482	29,488	131,260	171,168	52,460	74,334
1991	7,482	29,504	159,091	171,363	52,460	79,620
1992	7,485	29,504	158,907	171,501	52,482	84,611
1993	7,485	29,504	158,693	171,735	52,504	87,337
1994	7,512	30,297	165,334	171,735	52,504	88,603
1995	7,360	30,293	165,408	181,269	52,223	91,212
1996	7,360	30,369	166,198	181,403	52,223	96,567
1997	7,360	29,275	167,383	182,675	52,269	96,534
1998	7,360	30,367	167,329	182,732	52,223	95,863
1999	7,357	30,367	167,637	183,790	51,985	94,598
2000	7,357	30,356	171,443	181,839	51,056	95,000

Source: (Indian Defence Yearbook 2003: 251).

India has a host of paramilitary forces under the Home Ministry, and their numbers are increasing: in total, about one million men. In some of the paramilitary forces, the junior and middle grade officers are from the Indian Army but the top posts are filled by personnel from the Indian Police Service. The Assam Rifles came into existence in 1917. Till 1965, it was under the Ministry of External Affairs (Chibber 1979: 7). The BSF was created in 1965 after the Pakistani incursion in the Rann of Kutch area (Misra 1980: 373). The 25.5 State Armed Police battalions stationed along the India-Pakistan border formed the core of the BSF. The BSF has a fair share of short service commissioned officers from the Indian Army. The age of retirement for the men and officers are 55 and 58 respectively (Chibber 1979: 6). In 2003, the BSF started importing large numbers of thermal imagers (to supplement night vision equipment) which the Indian Army is using effectively in Jammu and Kashmir. The BSF comprises 160 battalions and 20 artillery batteries. The BSF is demanding 135 105-mm howitzer guns and some weapons locating radars (*Indian Defence Yearbook* 2003: 198, 250–51). The Central Industrial Security Force was created in 1979 and it numbered 26,000 men (Misra 1980: 374–5). The Indo-Tibetan Border Force (ITBP) came into existence in 1954. After 1962, it was redesigned to operate as a guerrilla force. The retirement age for its officers and men is 55 years (Chibber 1979: 7). The ITBP is also going through a spate of modernization. It is procuring Carl Gustav rocket

launchers, LMGs, and MP-5 sub-machine guns. About 11 ITBP battalions were deployed in 2002 in Jammu and Kashmir (*Indian Defence Yearbook* 2003: 252). While the BSF and ITBP guard the international border to check cross-border terrorism, COIN inside the country is the task of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). In 1992, the CRPF had created 10 Rapid Action Force battalions and two *Mahila* (Women) battalions (*Indian Defence Yearbook* 2003: 253–4). The National Security Guard (NSG) was raised in 1984. The Indian Army component of the NSG is called the Special Action Group and the paramilitary component, the Special Rangers Group (*Indian Defence Yearbook* 2003: 256). Table 1.1 shows the expansion of the various types of paramilitary forces in the last decade of the twentieth century. Only the NSG did not expand as it remained an elite force within the various paramilitary organizations.

Besides the Indian Army and the paramilitary forces, the Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force (IAF) officers also participate in the COIN discourse. Retired Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, one of the foremost air power theorists of India, asserts that all future conflicts would be limited wars. The origins of such limited wars would be due to foreign sponsorship of insurgencies against India. To deter the enemy from engaging in 'salami slicing' India's territories, New Delhi requires deterring the potentially hostile neighbours, which could be done with the IAF's help. The IAF should be prepared to launch both long-range accurate 'surgical' strikes and controlled punitive strikes as part of coercive diplomacy (Singh 2000: 1209, 1219). This is possible due to the RMA. One feature of the ongoing RMA is the advent of sensor technologies and precision guided munitions (PGMs). Jasjit Singh comments that these two technologies make it possible to attack targets across long distances which earlier would have required close combat (Singh 1999: 1814). The use of knowledge-intensive weapons drastically reduces the circular error of probability. The PGMs make selective air strikes very precise and lethal (Bakshi 1999: 792, 794). Air Vice-Marshal Viney Kapila writes that the PGMs have made the notion of mass use of conventional weapons obsolete (Kapila 2002: 23). This would reduce collateral damage. And minimizing collateral damage is also a vital principle for the Western militaries engaged in non-state wars (Angstrom 2005: 17). The IAF's spokesmen are also demanding acquisition of the sensor technologies that have made possible the RMA in the West. Kapil Kak writes that the IAF needs airborne warning and control systems for reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (Kak 2001: 2115). Air-Commodore A.K. Tiwary argues that it is necessary for the state of art aerial platforms to be fitted with electro-optical cameras, infrared including thermal imaging and radar sensors etc. Tiwary accepts that the emergence of stealth technology represents a revolutionary asset for attrition-free precision strikes (Tiwary 2000: 54–5, 59).

As part of the RMA, Air-Commodore C.N. Ghosh and Squadron-Leader P.M. Sinha emphasize the role of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). Sinha argues the case of UCAVs which are to be flown by high-speed fibre optic and satellite communication links (Sinha 2001: 48). Ghosh asserts: 'The UCAVs will be smaller, faster and more versatile than their manned counterparts. The UCAVs

are not bound by the limits of human tolerance. They will be used to penetrate airspace that may be considered dangerous for manned aircraft, can carry out reconnaissance and surveillance, or be used for jamming the enemy air defence system. This has become a necessity in the face of the quick reaction, low looking missiles …' (Ghosh 2001: 599–600). The spokesmen of Indian air power have in mind the Stinger missiles in the hands of the insurgents that caused problems for the Soviet Air Force in Afghanistan and the IAF in the Kargil War (1999).

From air let us move to the sea. Colin S. Gray and Roger W. Barnett write: 'Maritime strategy refers to the purposeful exercise of the sea-using national assets of all kinds for the political goals set by government. Naval strategy refers more narrowly to the purposeful exercise of naval forces, again for the political goals set by government' (Gray and Barnett 1989: 378). Paul Wilkinson writes that anti-terrorist activities of the navies comprised of raids on terrorist targets ashore, blockading and bombarding insurgent bases from the sea, naval patrols for intercepting arms supplies to the rebel groups through sea, etc. (Wilkinson 1986: 174). For countering low-intensity maritime threats, civilian analyst Rahul Roy-Chaudhury writes that what is required is greater cooperation between the Indian Navy and the Coast Guards for conducting maritime policing against the narco-terrorists and gun runners (Roy-Chaudhury 2000: 181). In a similar vein, S.C. Sardeshpande warns that for fighting insurgencies, the maritime contacts of the insurgents must be severed. And for this, the Indian Navy requires craft and manpower designed to police the brown water rather than the heavy craft required for power projection across the ocean (Das and Gupta-Ray 2008: 283).

COIN in Pakistan: Theory and Instruments

Seth G. Jones and C. Christine Fair assert that the Pakistan Army's COIN operations are in line with Russia's operations in Grozny and Chechnya. The Russian units attempted to crush organized resistance and reassert control of the capital and all the principal towns and transportation routes. The combat caused extensive bloodshed on both sides and the Chechen cities, especially Grozny, was almost levelled by Russian air and artillery strikes (Jones and Fair 2010: 35–6). Russian strategists consider peacekeeping forces as the first-echelon troops which provide operational intelligence and deal with small-scale threats. The first-echelon forces are to be reinforced in a matter of days with powerful second-echelon forces to provide effective escalation dominance. To sum up, peacekeeping techniques as developed by the Russian forces while fighting in Georgia and Chechnya in the 1990s include combing, blocking, ambush plus combined air-ground strikes (Baev 1996: 141). The Russian COIN operations could be traced back to Soviet times. During the 1980s, the Soviet tactical formula in Afghanistan was to block off a region in which the guerrilla forces were located and then to comb the region to find and destroy the *mujahideen*. The Soviets realized that achieving this task required thorough preparation of personnel and weapons for combat;

skilful coordination between the blocking and combing forces; the application of cunning; plus brave and decisive action by both the commanders and their troops. The goal was to block the region several days prior to launching anti-guerrilla operations. The Soviet General Staff ensured that the battalion commander must detach reconnaissance patrol as well as flanking patrol for successful operation against the *mujahideen* (Grau 1998: 1, 4).

Between 2003 and 2007, the Pakistan Army, while conducting COIN, caused tremendous collateral damage. The firepower-intensive approach characterized by liberal use of helicopter gunships and artillery was responsible for this state of affairs. The Pakistan Army ought to use minimal force and saturate the disturbed area with troops rather than using air power and artillery. Instead of heavy weapons, the Pakistani infantry, like the Indian infantry, requires night-vision devices, latest communication sets, and advanced bulletproof jackets (Yusuf and Mukherjee 2007: 1–4).

Shuja Nawaz, the foremost Pakistani expert on the Pakistan Army, asserts that Pakistani security agencies are learning COIN techniques by performing them. The Pakistan Army officers, like many Indian Army officers, previously used the term LIC, but since 2008, they are using COIN. And for Nawaz, the 2008 Swat Operation marked a doctrinal shift in Pakistan's COIN. After the Swat Operation, the Pakistan Army emphasized COIN training. It became part of Pakistan's military academy and the School of Infantry and Tactics curriculum and is also studied at the Command and Staff College and National Defence University. Under General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the COIN doctrine comprises of the following four principles: clear, hold, build and transfer. Although the Pakistan Army remains a conventional force geared to deter the Indian Army from Pakistan's eastern frontier, there is an attempt to rotate the forces in and out of FATA and Swat (Nawaz 2011: 1). Nawaz continues that there is inadequate collaboration between the civil government and the military on counter-terrorism issues (Nawaz 2011: 1). However, the Pakistan Army is slowly learning. Nawaz writes:

> In the process of shifting to improved COIN operations, the army has learned to fight the Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) that are increasingly being used by the Pakistani Taliban. However, the focus has been largely on detecting and disabling such devices. The army's technical capacity for detection of explosive devices appears to be limited to hand detectors of dubious worth, and it seems to have limited data-collection and forensic-evidence collection on each IED incident. (Nawaz 2011: 1)

Nawaz sums up that Pakistan requires a more holistic approach to COIN. Military action, says Nawaz (somewhat like Wray Johnson), could only reduce the symptoms of insurgencies but long-term factors behind the origins of the insurgencies require addressing the inherent social and economic issues (Nawaz 2011: 2).

The biggest deficiency of the Pakistan Army at the strategic level in fighting the insurgents and terrorists, writes Paul Staniland, is that the cohesive organization

is too powerful to remain under the control of the elective representatives. The Pakistan Army has a skewed and narrow view of national security which in turn is harming the regional security scenario. Pakistan conceives India as a big conventional threat and is unwilling to accept India's control of the Kashmir Valley. The Pakistan Army perceives the Hamid Karzai regime in Kabul as friendly towards India. So, the Pakistan GHQ fears an east–west encirclement by Delhi-Kabul axis. Hence, the Pakistan Army still supports the neo-Taliban and other associated insurgent groups in east and south Afghanistan. In recent times, the Pakistan Army is conducting COIN only against those insurgent groups which had challenged its writ (like Tehrek-i-Taliban, etc.) and not necessarily against all those insurgent outfits (like Haqqani network, etc.) which are fighting the US-NATO and the Karzai regime in Afghanistan. Washington itself cannot do much to sway the Pakistan Army because as long as it maintains troops in Afghanistan, the logistical lifeline through Pakistan to Afghanistan remains at the mercy of Islamabad. Worse, warns Staniland, with the gradual withdrawal of US troops from the Auf-Pak region, Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan will increase and it might try to replace the Karzai regime with a friendly quasi-Taliban regime. And the West does not have much leverage over the Pakistan military establishment (Staniland 2011: 133–48).

Pakistan uses three types of forces for COIN operations: the Pakistan Army, Frontier Corps (FC) and the Frontier Constabulary (Jones and Fair 2010: 36). In the new millennium, the Pakistan Army has 550,000 active duty personnel and 500,000 reservists. It has nine corps headquarters in addition to the Army's Strategic Forces Command which commands Pakistan's land-based strategic assets. Each corps has two or three divisions and is commanded by a lieutenant-general. Each division has three brigades under a major-general. Ususally, 16,000 to 18,000 soldiers are in each division. A brigade is commanded by a brigadier and comprises of three or more battalions, each of which has between 600 and 900 soldiers under a lieutenant-colonel (*Indian Defence Yearbook* 2003: 90; Jones and Fair 2010: 37). The organizational structure of the Indian Army is more or less same. Table 1.2 shows the corps of the Pakistan Army.

Occasionally, Pakistan also uses the Special Services Group, which was created in 1966 with support from the US Special Operations Forces (SOF). During the 1980s, the SOF was engaged in covert operations against the Soviets in Afghanistan (Jones and Fair 2010: 38). In the FC, a battalion is called a wing (Jones and Fair 2010: 37). In 1979, the FC had 90 wings (80,000 personnel). The FC is a federal paramilitary force that belongs to the Ministry of Interior but comes under Pakistan Army's (as in the case of India's BSF) control during specific operations. The FC has two forces: FC North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and FC Baluchistan with separate inspector-generals controlling them. The FC officers are seconded from the Pakistan Army and rotated between the FC and the Pakistan Army. The FC NWFP is deployed in FATA and NWFP and its headquarters is in Peshawar. It comes under the operational command of the 11th Corps (Chibber 1979: 17; Jones and Fair 2010: 38). The headquarters of the FC in Baluchistan is Quetta. This force

Table 1.2 Pakistan Army Corps in the New Millennium

Corps	Headquarter	Province
1	Mangla	Kashmir
2	Multan	Punjab
4	Lahore	Punjab
5	Karachi	Sindh
10	Rawalpindi	Punjab
11	Peshawar	NWFP
12	Quetta	Baluchistan
30	Gujranwala	Punjab
31	Bahawalpur	Punjab

Source: (Jones and Fair 2010: 38).

comes under the operational control of the 12th Corps. The FC NWFP is mostly Pushtuns but the FC Baluchistan is not overwhelmingly Baluch. The FC NWFP cadres are recruited from FATA and it cuts both ways. They possess the language skills and know the human terrain well. But on the other hand, some elements in the FC also facilitated the movement of the insurgents across the Durand Line (Jones and Fair 2010: 38–9). After 2008, the FC personnel are being trained by US trainers at Warsak in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (Nawaz 2011: 1).

The Frontier Constabulary maintains law and order in the settled areas outside FATA and guards Pakistan's border with Afghanistan. This force also provides static security duties in Islamabad and Punjab. Most of the personnel are Pushtuns and the officers are from the Pakistan police. Until 2009, the Frontier Constabulary was mostly combating the insurgents in Swat. Its outposts throughout FATA and in the settled areas of NWFP were targeted systematically by the insurgents. The Frontier Constabulary personnel are poorly trained and have outdated weapon systems and little personal protection equipment. Many of its members were killed by the insurgents and many deserted (Jones and Fair 2010: 39–40).

After 1971, Z.A. Bhutto set up a Federal Security Force armed with modern weapons as a counterweight to the Pakistan Army (Tahir-Kheli 1980: 645). In addition to the above mentioned forces, Pakistan also has the 15,000 strong Rangers (similar to India's BSF) for guarding the borders. However, in the Rangers, the officers down to majors are drawn from the Pakistan Army. In addition, Pakistan has the *Mujahid* Force which is equivalent to the Territorial Army. Further, an effective type of homeguard, the Janbaz Force also exists. This force is commanded by retired Pakistan Army officers. They protect villages, airfields, etc. (Chibber 1979: 16–18).

Conclusion

Despite Kaldor and Munkler's claim about New Wars, there is nothing much new in the insurgencies occurring in the post-Cold war era. The model of cultural uniqueness of non-Western warfare as advanced by scholars like Coker and Cassidy is ahistorical. Ancient India experienced insurgencies, and they continued in the colonial and post-colonial eras. Rajagopalan's negative assertion about the post-colonial Indian Army's COIN doctrine is too sweeping and a bit simplistic. The post-colonial state has preserved, modified and elaborated ancient India's COIN doctrine, the colonial heritage regarding small war, and also absorbed certain elements introduced by latest Western theoreticians in order to tackle the insurgencies that have intensified due to global diffusion of arms and ideologies. Between late nineteenth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, the principal causal agent behind insurgencies has shifted from nationalism to communism and then to religious (mainly Islamic) fundamentalism. Of course, there are some exceptions to this model. The insurgents of North-East India are motivated by clan tribal feelings as well as Christianity. The concept that the use of violence is the last resort in tackling disturbances within the state was present in the political theories of British and pre-British India. The ethical limit on the use of force by the polity against its subject was well developed among the Hindu theoreticians of ancient India. The late nineteenth-century doctrinaires of COIN did not give much attention to the social and political dimensions of countering insurgencies. They gave the lion's share of attention to the military aspects of crushing insurgencies. The beginning of twentieth century witnessed a growing consciousness among the officials about the humanitarian side of tackling insurgencies. This trend is strengthened both within and outside India with the passage of time. Good governance for tackling rebels, an aspect highlighted by ancient India's theoreticians, has become vital in modern Western COIN doctrines. The role of naked force within the ambit of COIN theories has become more controlled and restricted towards the end of twentieth century. And in recent times, the Western doctrine of manoeuvre war for countering insurgencies has had some spillover effect on a certain segment of Indian military officers.

In contrast to Kaldor and Munkler, the principal change as regards LIC has occurred in the field of technologies. In modern times, though the military aspect of COIN doctrine has become limited, the doctrinaires are speaking about the use of high-grade weapons for precision or surgical strikes. This is because of continuous development of military hardware in the twentieth century. Tackling COIN from the sea and especially from a third dimension are obviously new vistas that no theorist before the twentieth century could have visualized. The new millennium witnesses the use of non-lethal information technologies in fighting armed insurgents because of the rapid spread of dual use technologies. As far as minor tactics are concerned, light infantry trained for mobility and skirmishing remains the most important instrument for combating the insurgents.

However, in recent times, we find that the theorists and practitioners of COIN are asking for specialized light infantry backed by a lot of advanced sensor technologies. For contemporary and near-future scenarios, Clausewitz's clear and strict division between state and non-state actors and external and internal wars seems less relevant than Kautilya's fuzzy logic which meshes polity, non-state actors, internal and external factors into one inseparable stream, which he calls the *vigraha* (conflict).

References

Angstrom, Jan (2005). 'Introduction: Debating the Nature of Modern War', in Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom (eds), *Rethinking the Nature of War*. London/New York: Frank Cass, pp. 1–27.

Arreguin-Toft, Ivan (2001). 'How the Weak win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict', *International Security*, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 93–128.

Baev, Pavel K. (1996). *The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles*. London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: Sage.

Bajpai, Kanti P. (2002). *Roots of Terrorism*. New Delhi: Penguin.

Bakshi, G.D. (1999). 'Yugoslavia: Air Strikes Test of the Air War Doctrine', *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 23, no. 5, pp. 791–807.

Barash, David P. and Webel, Charles P. (2002). *Peace and Conflict Studies*. Thousand Oaks/London/New Delhi: Sage.

Beckett, Ian (1988). 'Guerrilla Warfare: Insurgency and Counter-insurgency since 1945', in Colin McInnes and G.D. Sheffield (eds), *Warfare in the Twentieth Century: Theory and Practice*. London/Boston/Sydney/Wellington: Unwin Hyman, pp. 194–212.

Bulloch, Gavin (1996). 'Military Doctrine and Counterinsurgency: A British Perspective', *Parameters* (Summer), pp. 4–16.

Cassidy, Robert M. (2006). *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War*. Westport, Connecticut/London: Praeger.

Chadha Vivek (2005). *Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis*. New Delhi: Sage.

Chibber, Lieutenant-General M.L. (1979). *Para Military Forces*, USI Papers, no. 4. New Delhi: United Service Institution.

Coker, Christopher (2002). *Waging War without Warriors? The Changing Culture of Military Conflict*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.

Coker, Christopher (2007). 'The Future of War: What are the New Complexities?', in John Andreas Olsen (ed.), *On New Wars*, Oslo Files on Defence and Security. Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, pp. 83–103.

Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke (2002). 'On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa', *JCR*, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 13–28.

Collier, Paul and Sambanis, Nicholas (2002). 'Understanding Civil War: A New Agenda', *JCR*, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 3–12.

Counter Intelligence, Security, Military Intelligence Training School and Depot Pune, Copy no. 1, Restricted, n.d (probably published in the 1980s).

Das, Gautam and Gupta-Ray, M.K. (2008). *Srilanka Misadventure: India's Military Peace-Keeping Campaign, 1987–1990*. New Delhi: Har-Anand.

Dreze, Jean (2003). 'Militarism, Development and Democracy', in M.V. Ramana and C. Rammanohar Reddy (eds), *Prisoners of the Nuclear Dream*. New Delhi: Orient Longman, pp. 273–314.

Dunn, Peter M. (1985). 'The American Army: The Vietnam War, 1965–73', in Ian F.W. Beckett and John Pimlott (eds), *Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency*. London/Sydney: Croom Helm, pp. 77–111.

Duyvesteyn, Isabelle (2005). 'The Concept of Conventional War and Armed Conflict in Collapsed States', in Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom (eds), *Rethinking the Nature of War*. London/New York: Frank Cass, pp. 65–87.

Fearon, James D. and Laitin, David D. (2003). 'Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 97, no. 1, pp. 77–88.

Gates, Scott (2002). 'Recruitment and Allegiance: The Microfoundations of Rebellion', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 46(1), pp. 111–30.

Ghosh, C.N. (2001). 'Application of Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles in Future Battles of the Subcontinent', *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 599–611.

Godfrey, F.A. (1985). 'The Latin American Experience: The Tupamaros Campaign in Uruguay, 1963–73', in Ian F.W. Beckett and John Pimlott (eds), *Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency*. London/Sydney: Croom Helm, pp. 112–35.

Goldman, Emily O. and Mahnken, Thomas G. (eds) (2004). *The Information Revolution in Military Affairs in Asia*. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gooch, John (1986). 'Clausewitz Disregarded: Italian Military Thought and Doctrine, 1815–1943', *JSS*, vol. 9, nos. 2–3, pp. 303–24.

Grau, Lester W. (1998). *The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan*. London: Frank Cass. Originally published in 1996.

Gray, Colin S. and Barnett, Roger W. (1989). 'Reflections', in Colin S. Gray and Roger W. Barnett (eds), *Seapower and Strategy*. London: Tri Service Press, pp. 371–86.

Gregorian, Raffi (2002). *The British Army, the Gurkhas and the Cold War Strategy in the Far East: 1947–54*. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Grey, Jeffrey (2003). 'Malaya, 1948–60: Defeating Communist Insurgency', in Julian Thompson (ed.), *The Imperial War Museum Book of Modern Warfare: British and Commonwealth Forces at War, 1945–2000*. London: Pan Macmillan, pp. 69–86. Originally published in 2002.

Guerrilla Warfare (1963). Samuel B. Griffith and Harris-Clichy Peterson (eds). With a Foreword by B.H. Liddell Hart. London: Cassell. Originally published in 1962.

Guerrilla Warfare and Marxism: A Collection of Writings from Karl Marx to the Present on Armed Struggles for Liberation and for Socialism (1970). Ed. with

an Introduction by William J. Pomeroy. New York: International Publishers. Originally published in 1968.

Hammes, Colonel Thomas X (2006). *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*. St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press.

Hegre, Harvard, Ellingsen, Tanja, Gates, Scott and Gleditsch, Nils Petter (2001). 'Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 95, no. 1, pp. 33–44.

Ibrahim, Azeem, 'Conceptualisation of Guerrilla Warfare', *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, vol. 15, no. 3 (2004), pp. 112–24.

Indian Defence Review Research Team, 'OP. TOPAC: The Kashmir Imbroglio' (1999). *IDR*, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 19–34.

Indian Defence Yearbook 2003 (2003), ed. Lieutenant-General R.K. Jasbir Singh. Dehra Dun: Natraj.

Irwin, Alistair (1996). 'The Buffalo Thorn: The Nature of the Future Battlefield', *JSS*, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 227–51.

Johnson, Wray R. (2001). *Vietnam and American Doctrine for Small Wars*. Bangkok: White Lotus Press.

Jones, Seth, G. and Fair, C. Christine (2010). *Counterinsurgency in Pakistan*. Santa Monica: RAND.

Jones, Tim (2001). *Postwar Counterinsurgency and the SAS: 1945–52, A Special Type of Warfare*. London: Frank Cass.

Joshi, Akshay (1999). 'Information Warfare in Kargil Operations', *IDR*, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 35–7.

Kak, Kapil (2001). 'A Century of Air Power: Lessons and Pointers', *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 24, no. 12, pp. 2111–27.

Kaldor, Mary (2005a). *New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Dehra Dun: Natraj, 2005). Originally published in 1999.

Kaldor, Mary (2005b). 'Elaborating the "New War" Thesis', in Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom (eds), *Rethinking the Nature of War*. London/New York: Frank Cass, 2005, pp. 210–24.

Kalyanaraman, S. (2003). 'Conceptualizations of Guerrilla Warfare', *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 172–85.

Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2001). '"New" and "Old" Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction? *WorldPolitics*, vol. 54, no. 1 (Oct., 2001), pp. 99–118.

Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2004). 'The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil War', *The Journal of Ethics*, vol. 8, pp. 97–138.

Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2005). 'Warfare in Civil Wars', in Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom (eds), *Rethinking the Nature of War*. London/New York: Frank Cass, pp. 88–108.

Kapila, Viney (2002). *The Indian Air Force: A Balanced Strategic and Tactical Application*, New Delhi: Ocean Books Pvt. Ltd.

Keegan, John (1999). *War and Our World: The Reith Lectures 1998*. London: Pimlico. Originally published in 1998.

Knox, MacGregor and Murray, Williamson (2003). *The Dynamics of Military Revolution: 1300–2050*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Originally published in 2001.

Kumar, Ashwini (2001). 'Latest Trends in Terrorism', in V.D. Chopra (ed.), *Rise of Terrorism and Secessionism in Eurasia*. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, pp. 67–80.

Lansky, Mira Beth (1983). '"People's War" and the Soviet Threat: The Rise and Fall of a Military Doctrine', *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 619–49.

MacKenzie, S.P. (1997). *Revolutionary Armies in the Modern Era: A Revisionist Approach*. London/New York: Routledge.

MacMillan, Margaret (1969). 'The Indian Army since Independence', *South Asian Review*, vol. 3, no. 1 (October), pp. 45–58.

Marwah, Ved (1996). *Uncivil Wars: Pathology of Terrorism in India*. New Delhi: Indus. Originally published in 1995.

Marxism and the Science of War (1981). ed. with an Introduction by Bernard Semmel. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Misra, K.P. (1980). 'Paramilitary Forces in India', *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 371–88.

Munkler, Herfried (2003). 'The Wars of the 21st Century', *International Review of the Red Cross Humanitarian Debate: Law, Policy, Action*, vol. 85, no. 849, pp. 7–21.

Munkler, Herfried (2007). 'What is really New about the New Wars? – A Reply to the Critics', in John Andreas Olsen (ed.), *On New Wars*, Oslo Files on Defence and Security. Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, pp. 67–82.

Nanavatty, R.K. (1993). 'Use of Armed Forces in Aid to Civil Authority: Problems and Prospects', *National Defence College Journal*, vol. 15, pp. 1–25.

Nawaz, Shuja (2011). *Learning by Doing: The Pakistan Army's Experience with Counterinsurgency*. Washington, DC: Atlantic Council

Nayyar, K.K., Suri, R.B., Jayal, B.D., Singh, V.K. and Karim, Afsir (2003). *National Security: Military Aspects*. New Delhi: Rupa.

Neumann, Sigmund (1971). 'Engels and Marx: Military Concepts of the Social Revolutionaries', in Edward Mead Earle (ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 155–71. Originally published in 1943.

Nojumi, Neamatollah (2002). *The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region*. New York: Palgrave.

Osinga, Frans, 'On Boyd, Bin Laden, and Fourth Generation Warfare as String Theory', in Olsen (ed.), *On New Wars*, Oslo Files on Defence and Security. Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, pp. 168–97.

Pimlott, John (1985a). 'The British Army: The Dhofar Campaign, 1970–75', in Ian F.W. Beckett and John Pimlott (eds), *Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency*. London/Sydney: Croom Helm, pp. 16–45.

Pimlott, John (1985b). 'The French Army: From Indochina to Chad, 1946–84', in Ian F.W. Beckett and John Pimlott (eds), *Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency*. London/Sydney: Croom Helm, pp. 46–76.

Rajagopalan, Rajesh (2000). '"Restoring Normalcy": The Evolution of the Indian Army's Counterinsurgency Doctrine', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 44–68.

Rajagopalan, Rajesh (2004). 'Innovation in Counterinsurgency: The Indian Army's Rashtriya Rifles', *Contemporary South Asia*, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 25–37.

Rajagopalan, Rajesh (2008). *Fighting Like a Guerrilla: The Indian Army and Counterinsurgency*. Delhi: Routledge.

Regan, Patrick M. (2002). 'Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intra-State Conflicts', *JCR*, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 55–73.

Regan, Patrick M. (2009). *Sixteen Million One: Understanding Civil War*. Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm Publishers.

Roy, Kaushik (2007). 'Just and Unjust War in Hindu Philosophy', *Journal of Military Ethics*, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 232–45.

Roy, Kaushik (2009). 'Norms of War in Hinduism', in Vesselin Popovski, Gregory M. Reichberg and Nicholas Turner (eds), *World Religions and Norms of War*. Tokyo/New York: United Nations University Press, pp. 30–59.

Roy-Chaudhury, Rahul (2000). *India's Maritime Security*. New Delhi: Knowledge World.

Sapatnekar, Vivek (1988). 'The Threat from within – A Perspective of Insurgency in India', *IDR* (July), pp. 122–7.

Sarkar, Bhaskar (1998). *Tackling Insurgency and Terrorism: Blueprint for Action*. Delhi: Vision Books.

Shrivastava, V.K. (2001). 'Indian Army: The Challenge Ahead', *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 491–501.

Singh, Depinder (2001). *Indian Peacekeeping Force in Sri Lanka*. Dehra Dun: Natraj.

Singh, Harjeet (1999). *Doda: An Insurgency in the Wilderness*. New Delhi: Lancer Publishers & Distributors.

Singh, Jasjit (1999). 'Strategic Framework for Defence Planners: Air Power in the 21st Century', *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 22, no. 12, pp. 1805–20.

Singh, Jasjit (2000). 'Dynamics of Limited War', *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 24, no. 7, pp. 1205–20.

Singh, Upinder (2010). 'Politics, Violence and War in Kamandaka's *Nitisara*', *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, vol. 47, no. 1, pp. 29–62.

Sinha, P.M. (2001). 'Air Power in the Information Age', *IDR*, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 44–9.

Sinha, S.K. (1980). *Of Matters Military*. New Delhi: Vision Books.

Smith, Hugh (2005). *On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas*. New York: Palgrave, Macmillan.

Smith, M.L.R. (2005). 'Strategy in an age of "Low-Intensity" Warfare': Why Clausewitz is still more relevant than his Critics', in Isabelle Duyvesteyn

and Jan Angstrom (eds), *Rethinking the Nature of War*. London/New York: Frank Cass, pp. 28–64.

Smith, Rupert (2006). *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*. London: Penguin. Originally published in 2005.

Smith, Rupert (2007). 'Thinking about the Utility of Force in War amongst the People', in John Andreas Olsen (ed.), *On New Wars*, Oslo Files on Defence and Security, Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, pp. 28–43.

Staniland, Paul (2011). 'Caught in the Muddle: America's Pakistan Strategy', *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 133–48.

Stephens, Alan (2007). 'Effects based Operations and the Fighting Power of a Defence Force', in John Andreas Olsen (ed.), *On New Wars*, Oslo Files on Defence and Security, Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, pp. 131–49.

Sundarji, K. (2003). *Vision 2100: A Strategy for the Twenty-First Century*. Delhi: Konark.

Tahir-Kheli, Shirin (1980). 'The Military in Contemporary Pakistan', *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 639–53.

The Gallant Dogras: An Illustrated History of the Dogra Regiment (2005). New Delhi: Lancer.

Thompson, Leroy (1994). *Ragged War: The Story of Unconventional and Counter-Revolutionary Warfare.* London: Cassell.

Tiwary, A.K. (2000). 'Future of Fighter Operations', *IDR*, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 54–9.

Toase, Francis (1985). 'The South African Army: The Campaign in South West Africa/Namibia since 1966', in Ian F.W. Beckett and John Pimlott (eds), *Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency*. London/Sydney: Croom Helm, pp. 190–221.

Wallace, J.J.A. (1996). 'Maneuver Theory in Operations other than War', *JSS*, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 207–24.

Weinstein, Jeremy M. (2005). 'Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 598–624.

Wilkinson, Paul (1986). 'Navies in a Terrorist World', in Captain John Moore (ed.), *Jane's Naval Review*. London: Jane's, pp. 166–76.

Wood, Jean Elisabeth (2006). *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Originally published in 2003.

Yusuf, Moeed, and Mukherjee, Anit (2007). 'Counterinsurgency in Pakistan: Learning from India', *American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research* (September), pp. 1–6.

Chapter 2
Tribes, State-Building and Guerrillas in North-East India

North-East India has witnessed intense insurgencies by various ethnic groups and tribes from 1947 onwards. Communities have taken up arms against the Government of India (hereafter GOI), while various militant groups have fought against one another. The most prominent ethnic group fighting the GOI is the Nagas. Marcus Franke asserts that post-colonial India's policy towards the Nagas is in many ways a continuation of the colonial policy of subjugating the Naga tribes. Franke continues that:

> The modern Indo-Naga war is clearly a product of post-colonial politics and could have been avoided. There were several points and turns where Phizo signaled that the Nagas would accept something short of complete sovereignty. Nehru had the standing to push such constitutional arrangements through parliament, but it seemed not to have been within the scope of India's decision-makers' imagination. Rather than negotiate, India's political elite then and now were ideologically inclined towards expansion and domination, not accommodation. (Franke 2009: 148)

It would be simplistic to put all the responsibility on the Indian state for insurgencies. Besides inefficiency, corruption and lack of wisdom on the part of the political managers, inter-ethnic rivalries, economic and geographical factors, and foreign interventions are also responsible for the emergence of militancy in North-East India. Moreover, the Naga problem is not separate, but related to other militant struggles going on in that region. We now turn to examine how the post-colonial Indian state has dealt with the insurgents in North-East India since1947.

Origins of Insurgencies in the Land of 'Seven Sisters'

The whole region of North-East India is spread over 263,000 square km and located at Longitude 89.46 degree E to 97.30 degree E and Latitude 21.57 degree N to 29.30 degree N (Hussain 2012: 173). At present, North-East India comprises the following seven states: Arunachal Pradesh (previously North-East Frontier Agency), Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura. About 98% of the North-East India's borders are international borders which are mostly porous (Upadhyay 2009: 29). North-East India makes up 8.06% of India's

territory and is home of 3.73% of the population (Cline 2006: 127). According to the 1991 census, its population was estimated as 32 million (Roy 2010: 209), and its inhabitants could be broadly categorized as hill tribes, plains tribes and non-tribal people of the plains (Upadhyay 2009: 29). The number of ethnic groups and tribes that inhabit this region remains a matter of controversy among scholars. According to one author, North-East is home to about 75 major population groups, and taking into account the sub-groups, they speak about 400 languages and dialects (Grewal 2003: 265–6). Lawrence Cline states that some 200 tribal groups and sub-clans with histories of internecine conflicts inhabit this region (Cline 2006: 127). Another scholar asserts that North-East India is the home of about 250 ethnic groups and tribes (Mukhim 2007: 1). Tribal conflicts result from the numerically smaller and less dominant tribes resisting the political and cultural domination of the bigger tribes, especially when both the majority and minority tribes share the same territorial space. Identity assertions of the smaller groups can result in violent inter-tribal fights (Upadhyay 2009: 32–3). However, cultural identity, the platform on which ethnic ties are built is a fluid concept that is situational and hence, subject to being redefined, invented and imagined (Upadhyay 2009: 34).

In the British-Indian Empire, various hill tribes were scattered over North-East India and the territories under the control of each tribe overlapped each other. Large groups of culturally diverse minority hill people lived in uneasy coexistence with culturally different inhabitants of the lowlands. The Naga Hills especially constitute what can be termed a 'non-state space' (Baruah 2003: 324). The states of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Mizoram and Meghalaya originally formed part of Assam. Shillong was the capital of the undivided Assam of the British-Indian Empire. The states of Manipur and Tripura were princely states. The original inhabitants of the North-East are the Indo-Mongoloid people. Oil, tea and forest resources abound in North-East India (*Indian Defence Year Book 1997–8*: 292). For reasons of security and to prevent exploitation of the tribesmen by the plains people, the British had a system of Inner Line Regulations. This prevented entry of an inhabitant of the plains without prior permission into the tribal regions known as the Excluded Area (*Indian Defence Year Book 1997–8*: 292–3). As a result of the partition of British-India in 1947, the traditional lines of communication and transit routes by water, road and rail were snapped and most of the markets that were previously in East Bengal were disrupted. Some products rotted, there was a scarcity of other products. The result was that the economic pace of North-East India slowed down due to separation of East Bengal from India which became East Pakistan after 1947 (Verghese 1997: 37). The North-East shares boundaries with Bhutan, China, Bangladesh and Myanmar and a mere 22 kilometer wide land corridor in Siliguri connects the region with rest of India (Gogoi 2007: 116). After 1947, the North-East lost its access to the sea through Chittagong, which had become part of East Pakistan. In 1949, China occupied Tibet and the closure of the land border with Myanmar resulted in the economic isolation of this region (Gogoi 2007: 122). The GOI's decision in 1953 to reorganize the states on a linguistic basis added fuel to the simmering discontent (Verghese 1997: 49).

Assam comprises two valleys: Brahmaputra and Surma. These two valleys are separated by a string of mountains: Garo, Khasi, Jaintia, Karbi, North Cachar and Naga Hills. The Himalayas are in the north of the Brahmaputra Valley and in the east, the two valleys are bound by the Patkoi Range, which separates the two valleys from the Chindwin River in Burma, which runs from north to south (Rammohan 2007: 14). Because all the land routes between North-East India and the rest of the country pass through Assam, this state is the hub of the North-East. In independent India, undivided Assam had an area of 89,040 square miles and a population of 9.7 million (Verghese 1997: 50–51). There was an influx of illegal land hungry Hindu and Muslim peasants from East Bengal into sparsely populated Assam even in the colonial era (Verghese 1997: 42). However, after 1947, illegal immigration increased in intensity and frequency and the issue has become politicized. The huge influx of Hindu Bengali refugees from East Pakistan during the 1947 Partition and its immediate aftermath disturbed the demographic balance in Assam (Chadha 2005: 234). In 1970–71, the Pakistan Government initiated a reign of terror against the Bengali Muslims in East Pakistan. As a result, some 10 million refugees moved into India from East Pakistan; about one million of them (mostly Bengali Muslims) settled in Assam (Chadha 2005: 235). The Congress under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (Jawaharlal Nehru's daughter) went for appeasement of the illegal Muslim immigrants in order to win the votes of the 'minority' community (Chadha 2005: 241). The central government tried to underplay the illegal immigration issue. In 1980, the Home Ministry of India informed an All Assam Students Union (AASU) delegation that 967,000 immigrants had entered Assam between 1961 and 1971 (Verghese 1997: 41), but such figures did not satisfy the Assamese middle class. According to the AASU and the Gana Sangram Parishad sources, the number of infiltrators in Assam during 1961 was one million and in 1971, 2.3 million, and by 1979, 3.5 million (Verghese 1997: 42).

In 1978, the hardliners within the AASU decided to form an armed outfit which a year later became the ULFA. On 7 April 1979, the ULFA was founded in the Sibsagar District of Assam by some Assamese youths led by Paresh Barua and Arabinda Rajkhowa. The moderates within the AASU formed a political party, the All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP), later called the AGP (Mukherjee 2005: 20; Rahman 2012: 85). A campaign ensued to draw attention to illegal immigration from Bangladesh and to migration from other parts of India into Assam (Mazumdar 2005: 567). Most of the Assamese Muslims were accused of being anti-Indian. According to the 1991 census, the religious composition of Assam's populace was: 67.13% Hindus, 28.48% Muslims, 2.4% Christians, 0.8% Buddhists, 1.8% Sikhs, and the rest unknown. As per the 2001 Census, Assam's population was 2,668,407 (Mukherjee 2005: 17). In the new millennium, we could speculate that of all the Muslims of Assam, about 25% were settled before 1901. The other 75% had moved into Assam from East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) after 1947, especially during 1971.Some 17% of Assam's population includes Hindus who had come from East Pakistan after the 1947 Partition (Mukherjee 2005: 18).

The changing demography of Assam and the large-scale entry of illegal migrants from Bangladesh are responsible for the antipathy of the Assamese Hindus towards the GOI (Saikia 2004: 14). Bangladesh is sympathetic to the separatist movements in North-East India and has turned a blind eye to the fundamentalist groups that are operating in both North-East India and within Bangladesh itself (Saikia 2004: 16). From the 1990s, Bangladesh witnessed politicization of Islam and the rise of extremist groups that became very popular between 2001 and 2005 (Bhardwaj 2010: 151). In 2001, the fundamentalist parties in Bangladesh spread a slogan in rural areas: *Amra hobo Taliban, Bangla hobe Afghan* (We will be Taliban, Bangladesh will become Afghanistan), which represented the growing Islamisation of Bangladesh (Saikia 2004: 23). The important fundamentalist parties in Bangladesh are Jamat ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), and Harkatul Jihadi Islami (HUJI). NGOs funded by Saudi Arabia provide money to these organizations (Pattanaik 2008: 191). The JMB draws its personnel from the Quami *madrasa*s who function outside the government control. Most of the JMB foot soldiers are from the lower stratas of society (Pattanaik 2008: 189). In fact, the ISI and the Directorate General of Field Intelligence Bangladesh (the military wing of intelligence in Bangladesh) encourage the illegal movement of people from Bangladesh to North-East India and encourage the agenda of *Brihot Bangladesh* (Greater Bangladesh) (Saikia 2004: 17).

Several politicians, diplomats and intellectuals have floated the idea of *Brihot Bangladesh* because Bangladesh's population is growing quickly and there is already a shortage of land. So the excess population should move into the sparsely populated areas of western Myanmar and North-East India. The radicals within Bangladesh argue that these settlers who carry the flag of Islam would, in the near future, agitate for secession from India and merger with Bangladesh (Mukherjee 2005: 21–2). Further, the ISI also formed cells inside Assam, each of which has 10 to 20 persons, many of whom are illegal migrants from Bangladesh. The cells are grouped into modules in which they are equipped with money and arms and are ideologically indoctrinated. The modules function as 'sleepers' that could be activated in the near future for terrorist activities or for instigating religious riots (Saikia 2004: 23). The Khaleda Zia Government in Bangladesh (2001–06) adopted a 'soft' attitude towards the Islamic militants within Bangladesh (Codron 2009: 178). The Deobandi *madrasa*s in Sylhet and the university campuses of Sylhet, Rajshahi and Khulna are the recruiting centres of the Islamist militants (Codron 2009: 179). On 17 August 2005, 459 coordinated blasts in 63 districts of Bangladesh proved that Islamic insurgency had finally arrived in Bangladesh (*Indian Defence Yearbook 2006*: 90).

The Bodos are the largest tribe in the plains of Assam. They include 12% of Assam's population in 1991 (Mukherjee 2005: 18). In the 1980s, they started protesting against the dispossession of their tribal lands to the Bengali and Assamese settlers. The All Bodo Students Union (ABSU) demanded a separate state called Udayanchal. The Bodo Security Force (BDSF) emerged in 1986. Its members were radical Bodo youths who believed that armed struggle was necessary to achieve Bodoland. The demand for Bodoloand was motivated by unemployment and

Table 2.1 Naga Clans within India in 1960

Clan	Number
Konyak	63,000
Ao	50,000
Sema	48,000
Chakasang	31,000
Angami	30,000
Lotha	23,000
Sangtam	20,000
Chang	17,000
Khienmuguns	17,000
Yimchungar	17,000
Phom	13,000
Rengma	5,000
Zeliang	5,000

Source: Thorat 1986: 179–80.

economic underdevelopment among the Bodos, the rise of political consciousness that resulted from the spread of education, and a desire to protect their language and identity in response to the imposition of Assamese (Mazumdar 2005: 568; Mukherjee 2005: 23). The National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) came into existence in 1988 and demanded an independent Bodo country. Another insurgent group, the Bodo Volunteer Force (BVF) signed an accord in February 1993 with the central government of India. However, a section of the BVF rejected the accord and formed the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) on 18 June 1996 under the leadership of Prem Singh Brahma (Rahman 2012: 86; Routray 2010: 127).

Nagaland is located east of Bangladesh and its border touches Myanmar. Nagaland is mountainous; the average altitude ranges from 900 to 1,500 metres above sea level. It covers 16,488 square kilometers of thick tropical forests and the weather is humid (Shekatkar 2009: 9). The Naga Hills are populated by the Tibeto-Burman tribes and the Lushai (or Mizo Hills) are inhabited by the Chin-Kuki-Mizo groups that belong to the Tibeto-Burman groups (Rammohan 2007: 15). In 1946, the Naga National Council (NNC) came into existence under Angami Zhapu Phizo (Thorat 1986: 181). On 14 August 1947, Phizo, the General Secretary of the NNC, declared Nagaland's independence from India (Shekatkar 2009: 11). On 16 May 1951, Phizo called for a plebiscite; he stated that 99% of the Nagas had voted for independence (Goswami 2007: 135). The 1960 census provides the populations of the Naga clans within India (see Table 2.1). Lieutenant-General S.P.P. Thorat

writes in his memoirs that when he took over the Eastern Command in India in 1956, Naga clans raided each other's territories in pursuit of head hunting. Among the Nagas, unless a young man has a head to his credit, he cannot get a good bride (Thorat 1986: 180).

Since 1980, the strongest Naga militant outfit was the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN). In 1988, the NSCN split into NSCN (Isak-Muviah) [NSCN(IM)] and NSCN Khaplang [NSCN(K)]. In 2010, there were some three million Nagas;two million lived in Nagaland and the rest were scattered over North-East India's three other states. The Greater Nagalim demand encompassed some areas in western Burma that were inhabited by the Nagas. The Kachin State and the Sagaing Division are regarded as part of the Greater (or one could say *Brihot*) Nagaland. These areas are also called Eastern Nagaland just as Manipur's Naga inhabited areas are called Southern Nagaland. The NSCN(IM) faction dropped the claim over Eastern Nagaland from the *Nagalim* project because Khaplang is a Burmese Naga (Bashir 2010: 22; Upadhaya 2009: 36).The Southern Nagaland project continues to haunt the Indian state.

In June 2005, the All Naga Students Association in Manipur forced an economic blockade in Manipur's four hills districts: Tamenglong, Chandel, Ukhrul and Senapati. The 52 day long blockade cut Manipur from rest of India and this led to economic hardship for its people (Saikia 2007: xv).

Besides the Nagas resident in Manipur, the indigenous inhabitants of Manipur have also launched an insurgency against the GOI for several reasons. In September 1949, the Governor of Assam, Sri Prakasa invited *Maharaja* Bodh Chandra to Shillong for negotiations. On 18 September 1949, Prakasa presented the *maharaja* with the Merger Agreement under which Manipur would be a part of India. Chandra refused to sign and asked for time to discuss it with his council of ministers. On returning to his Redlands residence, the *maharaja* found that the premise was surrounded by Indian troops and he was put under house arrest. On 21 September 1949, Bodh Chandra signed the Merger Agreement. On 15 October 1949, the Manipur State Assembly and the elected council of ministers were dissolved (Nepram-Mentschel 2007: 36).

Manipur has borders with Myanmar, Assam, Mizoram and Nagaland. Green hills make up 91% of the area of the Manipur state, and they are inhabited by about 30% of Manipur's tribesmen. The fertile valley is inhabited by the Meiteis who are 65% of Manipur's population (Nepram-Mentschel 2007: 34).

Mizoram is a hilly region with average altitude varying between 3,000 and 4,000 feet. This state has Manipur and Assam on its north, Tripura and Bangladesh in its west and Bangladesh in the south (Mukherjee 2005: 49). The natural disaster known as Mautam (Rat Famine) in the late 1950s was one of the factors behind the Mizo insurgency. An abnormal increase in the rat population related to the life cycle of the bamboo plant forced the rats to eat the human food supplies (for example, they destroyed the rice fields). The resulting food shortage caused famine. Mautam related famine occurred in 1911 and another famine was expected in 1959. At that time, Mizoram was part of Assam and the Assam government did not prepare

to handle the Mautam and food stocks were not built up. When the Mautam occurred, the Mizos were angry and bitter with the governance of the Indian state (Chadha 2009: 29). In 1955, when India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru visited Assam, the Mizo leaders apprised him of the negative impact of imposing Assamese on the Mizos. In spite of Mizo opposition, the Assam Pradesh Congress Committee in April 1960 passed the Assamese State Language Bill. This resulted in widespread opposition from various Mizo parties. In addition to the Mautam disaster, this attempt by the Assam government which threatened the Mizo cultural heritage reinforced Mizo nationalist sentiment (Chadha 2009: 31).

Tripura is the smallest state in North-East India with an area of 10,491 square kilometers. On its east is Mizoram, Assam in the north and in the south and west is Bangladesh. According to the 2001 census, its population was 3.1 million and 84% of them were rural. More than 70% of the population are settlers from Bangladesh and the rest are indigenous people who call their land Twipra (Bhaumik 2007: 93). From being predominantly tribal, Tripura became a non-tribal state due to the massive migration of the Hindu-Bengali migrants from Bangladesh. The tribals not only became a minority but the land that they owned was passed into the hands of the migrants (Subramanian 2000: 601). In 1970, some of the tribals in Tripura formed a militant group, the Tripura Sena, under Bijoy Hrangkhawl. In December 1978, the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) was formed to secure the independence of Tripura (Rao 2001: 340).

Insurgent Armies

North-East India shares a 4,500 km long international boundary with Bangladesh in the south-west, Myanmar in the east, China in the north and Bhutan in the north-west. A 22 kilometre land corridor across the Siliguri District of West Bengal that connects North-East India with the rest of the country juts between Bangladesh in the southeast and Bhutan and Sikkim in the north. A bit to the north is China's Chumbi Valley (Hussain 2012: 173–4). The terrain aids the operations of the insurgent armies. Poor communications and abundant forest land aids the insurgent hit-and-run operations. North-East India has 63% of India's forest area (Mukhim 2007: 2). Let us start with the oldest insurgent armies: the Nagas.

In 1952, Phizo went underground and started organizing the Naga Federal Army (NFA) (Sarkar 1998: 55). According to one estimate, Phizo's NFA had 15,000 personnel (Upadhyay 2009: 38). In 1956, Phizo went to East Pakistan and then to West Pakistan (Das 2002: 539). The Naga militants attacked the police outposts, loyal villagers (who were castigated as collaborators), government buildings, and communication hubs. During the late 1950s, many Naga insurgents were deserters from the Assam Rifles and the Indian Army's Assam Regiment (Rajagopalan 2008: 142). Lieutenant-Colonel F.L. Freemantle, an officer of the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Gurkha Rifles which was deployed in the Naga Hills in 1957, notes in his memoirs:

> Reinforcements had arrived consisting of soldiers from other battalions who were at the Regimental Centre awaiting discharge. Instead of going home they landed up in inhospitable Nagaland. They were a disgruntled lot housed in one corner of our perimeter. In the same location was Rifleman Raj Bahadur who was also disgruntled. He had assisted Rifleman Dhansing Pun whose courage earned him a gallantry award; Raj Bahadur earned no reward. He also had family problems … He was vulnerable and succumbed to hostile propaganda. He deserted and joined the hostiles. (Freemantle 2000: 74)

As a point of comparison, many Malayan Communist Party insurgents also had military experience. Like the Nagas, they fought against the Japanese under British tutelage during the Second World War (Jeffery 2007: 119).

The Naga insurgents were organized by tribe. Each tribe was allotted one division commanded by a brigadier. A brigade had one or more battalions, each of which had two or three companies with four sections of 11 men each. In 1956, the Naga rebel forces were organized into an army headed by a commander-in-chief who had four commands under him. Each battalion had three companies, each company had two platoons of two sections each, and each section had 28 men. There were also supplementary organizations for logistical and reconnaissance purposes; these included volunteer parties, courier parties, and women's volunteer organizations in which young women functioned as nurses and could also fight during emergencies. For example, in 1957, at the Mon Village, the women fooled the local police, locked them up, fired a few rounds to scare off the villagers, and looted grain, cloth and pigs (Thorat 1986: 183). Occasionally, the *jawan*s sold their arms and ammunition to the Nagas for a handsome fee, and the *jawan*s were treated with wine and women by the insurgents (Thorat 1986: 184). In the late 1950s, the Naga rebels were equipped with British and Japanese rifles, sten guns, and a few LMGs. The latter came from the weapons dump left behind by the Japanese and Allied soldiers in North-East India and India-Burma border. The Konyak Nagas manufactured muzzle-loading guns and supplied them to the hostiles (Thorat 1986: 185). Their training camps were located deep inside the jungles. From 1956 onwards, the Naga militants shifted their tactics from attacking static military posts to ambushing army patrols (Sarkar 1998: 56).

After 1958, the Naga militants went to East Pakistan to get training and weapons (Das 2002: 539). In 1967, 1,500 trained Nagas moved from China to North-East India At that time, some 2,000 Nagas were undergoing training in China (Franke 2009: 133). In 1969, a group of NFA personnel who were returning to India from weapons training in China were captured along with their leader Mowu Angami and his second-in-command Lovicho Angami (Sarkar 1998: 57). In 1971, it was estimated that there were 10,000 Naga fighters in North-East India and in the Chittagong Hill Tract (CHT) of East Pakistan (Franke 2009: 134). As a point of comparison, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) had 10,000 combatants in the early 1950s. The KNLA was trained by the mercenary French officers and by the CIA (Egreteau 2009: 114–15).

Between 1975 and 1988, the NSCN grew from 143 personnel to 3,000 personnel equipped with the latest weapons bought with drug money. The NSCN has strongholds at Chandel, Churchandpur, Ukhrul and Imphal (Sarkar 1998: 59). Illegal weapons are acquired from the arms *bazaars* in and around Bangkok. These are usually Khmer Rouge surpluses. They are transported by sea in fishing vessels and coastal crafts to landing points at St Martin's Island and around the coast near Cox Bazaar and Chittagong Port in Bangladesh. Then, the weapon crates are carried in man pack columns to the insurgent training bases in CHT and on to Manipur (Nepram 2002: 50; Roychowdhury 2002: 85). Several *madrasa*s and mosques patronized by the ISI at Sylhet and Cox Bazaar are used as storehouses for arms procured from Thailand and Myanmar (Kotwal 2001: 2225). In addition, the armed police in Nagaland and Manipur willingly handed over their weapons to the insurgents out of sympathy and fear (Roychowdhury 2002: 113). In most cases, the insurgent outfits had better arms than the ordinary police. On 3 May 1998, six members of ANVC in Meghalaya, armed with AK-47 and AK-56 rifles and grenades, took over one police station and one anti-dacoity camp in the East Garo Hill District. They did not take the weapons from the police; they said that they had no use for such outdated weapons (Nepram 2002: 87).

In 1988, the Indian intelligence won over Bronsen, the President of Kachin Independent Organization (KIO), and he withdrew support to NSCN, PLA and ULFA. In response, the PLA arranged safe houses in Srimangal, Adams Bazaar and Chotto Dhamai in Sylhet District of Bangladesh, especially among the Meithei settlers (Rammohan 2003: 594). At the beginning of the new millennium, the NCSN(K), ULFA and the Bodo militants had their training camps in the Tirap-Changlang region of Arunachal Pradesh as well as near Bhalukpong where the road from Bomdila enters the plains of the Brahmaputra Valley en route to Tezpur (Roychowdhury 2002: 113).

Arambam Somorendro Singh founded the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) of Manipur in 1964. His deputies, Oinam Sudhir and Naorekpam Bisheswar, visited Pakistan in October 1968 to get aid in order to start a Naga style militant movement against India. In January 1969, three men were sent to Dacca (also Dhaka) and met Chaudhury Ghulam Hussain of ISI's East Pakistan unit. The ISI's initial aim was to unite the UNLF with the Naga Federal Government. But this scheme failed due to inter-ethnic rivalries of the two militant groups. The second group returned to Manipur in February 1969 with a Pakistani instructor via the Sylhet-Cherrapunji sector. A group of nine Meitei youths were trained in the manufacture and use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) with dynamite sticks and timers. For the first time in North-East India, they used IEDs for a powerful explosion, in Imphal town in May 1969 (Dhar 2007: 67). Till 1969, the Intelligence Bureau (IB) of India was in the dark about the cooperation between the ISI and the militant groups in North-East India (Dhar 2007: 68).

Since 1990, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of Manipur was trained by the Chinese in Lhasa (Bajpai 2002: 102). In the middle of August 1990, the ULFA, the United Liberation Front of Manipur and the NSCN(K) reached an understanding to

coordinate their military operations (Franke 2009: 137). In 1991, the ULFA's ration strength was two brigades in Upper Assam and one brigade in the Lower Assam. Its personnel were trained to be physically fit and were equipped with AK-47 assault rifles, LMGs, MMGs and 2-inch mortars. The couriers between the units were women and children who worked under Mrs Boby Hazarika, the president of the ULFA's women's wing (Sawhney 1992: 78–80). Most of the ULFA cadres, unlike the Naga insurgents, were from urban region. Hence, after the military operation against them in 1991, the ULFA personnel had problems adapting to hardships and life in the jungle (Chadha 2005: 249). The ULFA's Dibrugarh based 28th Battalion (in 2003, its headquarters was in the Myanmar Naga Hills) refused to obey the ISI's dictates to destroy the oil fields of Assam (Saikia 2003: 56). In 2010, the two important ULFA leaders who were still free were Paresh Barua the Commander-in-Chief and Anup Chetia (alias Gulab Barua), the General Secretary (Gaganjit Sigh 2010: 12). The ULFA was initially organized to stop illegal immigration from Bangladesh, but because the ULFA now is dependent on Bangladesh' support, the militant group is engaged in overt anti-Indian rather than Bangladeshi immigration issues. In January 2007, the ULFA targeted the Hindu speaking Bihari labourers in Assam (Saikia 2007: xv), despite the fact that labourers from all over India constitutes less that 3% of Assam's population (Mukherjee 2005: 18). In the new millennium, under pressure of Bangladesh (who provides the ULFA refuge as well as financial and military aid), ULFA is propagating the message about the positive contribution of the illegal migrants from Bangladesh to Assam's economy and culture (Routray 2008: 155).

There exist internal linkages among the various insurgent groups. One Indian military officer speculates that in the 1990s, the Bodoland Army had some 1,200 cadres; about 600 of them were trained by the ULFA and the NSCN(IM) (Chadha 2005: 268).

Tripura has fewer than 150 kilometers of railroad and only one badly maintained highway to connect the state with the rest of India. A landslide or a roadblock by the militants could cut off the state's lifeline (Bhaumik 2007: 94). In 1979–80, the TNV was responsible for killing some 500 people. The TNV attacked police stations and CRPF camps and looted their weapons, set fire to the *bazaars* and government offices, killed non-tribals and intimidated government personnel. They established links with the Mizo National Front (MNF) and East Pakistan and received assistance from them. In reaction, the Indian Army was inducted. Hrangkhawl, the Commander-in-Chief of the TNV, was arrested. The rest of the TNV personnel escaped to the CHT in East Pakistan where they formed a new organization known as the All Tripura Peoples Liberation Organization (ATPLO) under Binanda Jamatia. Later, Hrangkhawl was released and rehabilitated by the state government in his village near Ambassa and then in August 1982, he was kidnapped by a Binanda Jamatia group (Rao 2001: 341). In the new millennium, the two most important insurgent groups in Tripura are the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) and the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF). At the end of 2002, the NLFT's strength was 110 people and the ATTF's strength was down to only 20.

Biswamohan Debbarma was the most important leader of the NLFT. Most of the leaders of these two insurgent outfits live in Bangladesh and has invested heavily in legal businesses such as transport. These insurgent outfits are still capable of serious nuisance. For example, on the night of 1 October 2008, the ATTF exploded a series of bombs at the state capital Agartala. These explosions left 76 people injured just before the Hindu festival Durga Puja (Vohra 2011: 207–8).

Let us analyze the political economy of insurgent violence in North-East India. The NSCN obtained money from the ISI and the Chinese Communist Party (Nepram 2002: 91). In Nagaland and Mizoram, insurgents tax the villages for money and food and the young people are forcibly recruited to act as fighters or bearers (Ladwig III 2009: 51). Abductions of businessmen and government officials are carried out almost regularly by the insurgent factions in order to raise money (Chadha 2005: 244). Till 2002, Tripura was known as 'abduction centre of the North-East'. At times, peoples in batches of 10 were abducted and taken to Bangladesh for safekeeping. They were released after their families paid ransom money by selling land and other property (Vohra 2011: 155). Certain NGOs acted as middlemen between the arms dealers and the insurgent organizations (Saikia 2003: 58).

In February 2001, the NSCN(K) activists visited Champu Village in Miao Circle in Arunachal Pradesh and directed the villagers to convert to Christianity. From each village in the Nampong Circle in Arunachal Pradesh, they collected between Rs 500 and 700. They also demanded Rs 10,000 from each business organization (Mamang Dai 2007: 53). The NSCN(IM) runs a parallel government in Nagaland. They collect tax, provide work permits to outsiders and have their own village judiciary (Gaganjit Singh 2010: 13). The NSCN(IM) is financially strong and maintains offices in Bangkok, Manila and Netherlands. In Tripura, both the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) and the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) are armed and trained by NSCN(IM). In Manipur, the NSCN(IM) has strong links with the Kanglei Yuwol Kanna Lup (KYKL), which is floated by the Namoijan Oken Singh, a Meithei insurgent group that runs an extortion net in the Imphal Valley (Rammohan 2003: 593). Out of fear, tea industry executives pay big money to the ULFA and Bodo militants. For example, Tata Tea pays huge sums to the ULFA. During 1994–95, Williamson Magor paid Rs one crore (a crore is 100 lakhs or 10 million) to the Bodo militants, and in 1995–96, Bhergaon Tea Estate paid up to Rs 25 lakhs (a lakh is 100,000) to the Bodos (Das 2007: 158–9). In 2001–02, ULFA's annual expenditure exceeded Rs 30 crore (Das 2007: 160).

The principal source of funding for NSCN during the 1990s came from the drug trade. The drug barons of the Golden Triangle (the remote regions on the borders of Burma, Laos and Thailand) have been forced by stringent drug offence laws of Thailand and Singapore to shift the route of drug smuggling from east to west. The new route runs through Manipur/Mizoram, Silchar, Karimganj to Bangladesh. The Kachin area of Burma emerged as a major poppy growing region. The drug trade is controlled by the Shan and Kachin rebels of Burma. And the NSCN have influence in the Naga dominated areas of Manipur and entry points like Moreh and Chandel. Thus, the NSCN benefits hugely from narco-terrorism (Sarkar 1998: 59).

Table 2.2 Strength and Areas of Operations of the Insurgent Armies in North-East India in 2008

Name of the Group	Personnel Strength	Weapons and Equipments	State	Area of Influence
ULFA	700–1,000	AK-47/57, sniper rifles, grenade launchers, LMGs, Chinese grenades, TNT and RDX	Assam	Dibrugarh, Tinsukia, Sibsagar, Karbi, Anglong, Dhemaji, Nalbari, Sonitpur, Kamrup
KLNLF	150–200	Locally made rifles and AK-47s	Assam	Karbi, Anglong, North Cachar Hills
UNLF	2,500	AK-47, M-16 rifles, mortars, pistols, grenade launchers, IEDs	Manipur	Valley Districts
PLA	1,500	AK-47, M-16 rifles, mortars, pistols, grenade launchers, IEDs	Manipur	
NSCN(IM)	6,000	AK-47, M-16 rifles, mortars, pistols, grenade launchers, IEDs	Manipur	Hill Districts
NSCN(K)	750	AK-47, M-16 rifles, mortars, pistols, grenade launchers, IEDs	Manipur	
ATTF	200	Locally made rifles, AK-47 and Chinese grenades	Tripura	West Districts
NSCN(IM)	2,500	AK-47, LMGs, grenade launchers	Nagaland	Phek, Kohima, Tuensang
NSCN(K)	1,250	AK-47, LMGs, grenade launchers	Nagaland	Dimapur, Mokokchung
NNC	250–500	AK-47 and locally made guns	Nagaland	Phek, Wokha
HNLC	50	Locally made weapons and AK-47	Meghalaya	Khasi Hills
HPC-D	50	Locally made arms	Mizoram	Border areas with Assam and Manipur

Source: Routray 2008: 160, 162–5.

According to one estimate, in 2003, more than 40 insurgent groups were operating in North-East India (Grewal 2003: 268). Table 2.2 provides information about the strength and operational area of the important insurgent groups in 2008. Let us see the military and non-military measures that have been adopted by New Delhi to deal with insurgency.

COIN Techniques of the Indian State

Stick-and-carrot policy characterizes India's COIN. The GOI's initial gut reaction is to treat insurgency as a 'law and order' problem. However, the police force in North-East India remains both qualitatively and quantitatively inadequate. For instance, the police force in Arunachal Pradesh was created in 1972. In an area of 83,743 square kilometres, most of which is inaccessible, the police force lacks modern vehicles and arms. The police-public ratio in the state is 1:800 and the police-area ratio is 1:67 square kilometres (Dai 2007: 54–5).

When the level of insurgency crossed a certain threshold, the GOI responded with a mailed fist. Before initiating military operation against the insurgent outfits, special laws were applied or the state came under the president's rule which means the state legislatures were dissolved and the central government of India took over administration of the state for the time being. When the Indian Army was deployed against the Naga militants, the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act was implemented in 1958 (Goswami 2007: 135). In 1967, the Prevention of Unlawful Activities Act was enforced in Nagaland by the Governor B.K. Nehru (Rao 2001: 279–80). On 12 December 1979, Assam came under President's Rule (Verghese 1997: 43).

Generally, Indian COIN operations were characterized by jointness. The army units did not operate alone but cooperated with the police and civil administration of the disturbed areas. This trend could be traced back to the colonial era. As early as the 1930s, the official manual of the British Army emphasized close cooperation between the army, police and other civil agencies while fighting the irregulars (Jeffery 2007: 110). In March 1955, two companies of the 17th Rajputs moved to the Tuensang area. With 15 Assam Rifles platoons under their command, the 17th Rajputs attacked the rebel strongholds of Lhosphyapu and Khekiya and the rebels fled to the jungle. However, lawlessness spread to the Kohima region. The Naga rebels disrupted road communications and attacked the neutral villages. The Assam Rifles failed to control the situation, and on 26 January 1956, two companies of the 1st Battalion of the 3rd Gurkha Rifles were sent to Kohima at the request of the State Government of Assam. In 1957, Lieutenant-General S.P.P. Thorat took over the Eastern Command with the express objective of quelling the Naga insurgency. He created the Naga Hill Force under Major-General R.K. Kochar. This force gradually evolved into one regiment of mountain artillery, 17 infantry battalions, 50 platoons of Assam Rifles, 33 platoons of Assam Police and 15 other police

companies (Thorat 1986: 182). Thus, Thorat created a joint anti-insurgent force comprising of police, paramilitary units, infantry and artillery.

The 3rd Battalion of the 5th Gurkha Rifles was an Indian unit that was deployed in the Naga Hills in 1957. The region comprises high hills and jungles. All the Naga villages as well as the army's posts for defensive purpose were located on the hill tops where the steep slopes and sharp bends precluded the use of stretchers for carrying wounded soldiers away from the battlefield (Freemantle 2000: 69). F.L. Freemantle, who was in this unit, narrates his combat experience in the Naga Hills: 'Tactically, it was best to operate on dark nights or in pouring rain to surprise the hostiles and nullify their intimate knowledge of the terrain. Leeches, which infest Nagaland, are another hazard especially when one is forced to stay absolutely still for long periods when laying an ambush' (Freemantle 2000: 70). Freemantle accepts that the Naga militants' intelligence network was better than the army's (Freemantle 2000: 72).

Rajesh Rajagopalan asserts that the Indian Army's attempt to dominate Nagaland failed and the Indian units were frequently ambushed by the Naga rebels. Nevertheless, the Naga insurgents failed to uproot any of the army camps from their homeland (Rajagopalan 2008: 152; Freemantle 2000: 73).

On 30 January 1988, the central government of India declared Tripura to be a disturbed area. Two brigades of the Indian Army were inducted and a Headquarters Task Force was created. Major-General Sher Amir Singh of the GOC 23rd Mountain Division took command. After his retirement from the Indian Army, General K.V. Krishna Rao was appointed governor of the states of Nagaland, Manipur and Tripura between 1984 and 1989. Krishna Rao directed the Chief Secretary of Tripura and Director-General of Police (DGP) of the state to cooperate with the army. Further, the Inspector-General of Border Security Force (BSF) was ordered to step up their vigil so the TNV personnel could not exfiltrate from Tripura to the neighbouring states due to military pressure (Rao 2001: 352–3).

Due to pressure exerted by the Indian security forces, the TNV succumbed. On 23 February 1988, the TNV agreed to a ceasefire and started negotiations with the GOI. One characteristic of India's COIN is that instead of attempting to root out the insurgents with military operations, in case of a positive signal from a rebel outfit, the GOI also responded with a gloved fist. In April 1988, the GOI agreed to enter into talks with the TNV (Rao 2001: 356–7). Such pressure-compromise-pressure stance was always partly successful. On 10 September 1988, 438 TNV personnel came over ground (Rao 2001: 361).

The 8th Indian Division conducted COIN campaigns in North-East India especially in Nagaland and Manipur. However, during the 1971 War, it operated in East Pakistan (Rao 2001: 308, 311). Generally, an Indian battalion was assigned to cover 30 to 35 square miles (78 to 90 square kilometres). A battalion was divided into companies and in Mizoram the companies were sub-divided into sub-posts of 20 men each. These sub-posts were located near the villages to bolster the confidence of the people (Ladwig III 2009: 51).

On 14 September 1991, the GOI launched Operation RHINO against the ULFA. Unlike its precursor Operation BAJRANG (28 November 1990 to 20 April 1991), RHINO was more successful. Over 300 ULFA cadres surrendered within 40 days of RHINO. RHINO, unlike BAJRANG, was characterized by more jointness between the army, paramilitary forces, state government and the police. For instance, the insurgents were surprised because the army personnel moved in civilian jeeps. Moreover, RHINO witnessed greater troop density. To use modern terminology, RHINO unlike BAJRANG was characterized by a higher number of feet on the ground and less mechanization. During Operation BAJRANG, the Army Aviation helicopters were used to reconnoiter dense forest in East Assam along the Brahmaputra. To prevent the ULFA from being alerted and escaping, little air reconnaissance was undertaken during RHINO and by that time, the army personnel knew the terrain well. While Operation BAJRANG resulted in the deployment of eight brigades over an area of 4,500 square kilometers, RHINO resulted in the use of 15 brigades in an area of 3,000 square kilometers on both banks of the Brahmaputra River. The forces deployed for RHINO included brigades from the 5th Mountain and 17th Mountain divisions, which were put under Headquarter 4th Corps. Out of 23,000 villages in Assam, some 15,000 villages were monitored by the army through their COIN grids. One characteristic of RHINO was decentralization of its command structure. It seems that the Indian Army had learnt the strength of *Auftragstaktik* (mission oriented command system) at least in the field of COIN operations. Quick Reaction Teams (QRTs) of 18 to 20 soldiers were used against definitive leads dependent on the use of real-time intelligence. On the receipt of timely and precise data, the QRTs rushed to the danger zone and searched the villages; cordon was laid later. The use of QRTs yielded maximum results (Sawhney 1992: 71–5).

The above analysis of Operation RHINO shows that Rajesh Rajagopalan's assertion that India's COIN has been characterized by conventional war bias is not totally true (Rajagopalan 2008: 134). Small unit patrols for moving through the jungle was a principle evolved by the Army in India during its colonial campaigns in the late nineteenth century. And the 14th Army elaborated on this tactical practice during its combat with the Imperial Japanese Army. A highly decentralized small unit approach was also the hallmark of British techniques in fighting the Malayan guerrillas in early 1950 (Gregorian 2007: 32–3, 44). The QRTs somewhat resembled this model. One could speculate that since the Indian Army is a successor of the British Army in India, the former inherited these tactical principles from the latter. However, this is not to say that Indian COIN techniques merely copy British COIN. For instance, the food-denial programme in the villages sympathetic to the insurgent cause, which was practiced by the British both in Malaya (1948–60) and in Kenya (1952–56) was never resorted to by the Indian government. Although the RAF used heavy bombers and fighter-bombers in the jungles of Kenya against the Mau Mau rebels (Heather 2007: 81–2), aerial power (at least offensively) was never used by the IAF. This is also partly because Indian security forces, unlike the British Army, were conducting

COIN inside their homeland rather than in the foreign countries. These two above-mentioned techniques question whether British COIN doctrine was actually based on 'minimum force'. But this concept could be applied in case of Indian Army's COIN.

In 1994, Lieutenant-General K.M. Seth was in charge of the 3rd Corps which was handling COIN in North-East India (Roychowdhury 2002: 101). General Shankar Roychowdhury, COAS of India from November 1994 till September 1997, visited Nagaland in 1994. In his autobiography, he put forward the Indian Army's COIN techniques in the following words:

> The bases of both the Army and Assam Rifles covered the mountains and jungles of the entire region in a grid pattern. This had been gradually established over a period for area domination, intelligence collection and offensive action wherever the underground could be identified. Our posts were located mostly in isolated areas, some of which could be logistically replenished only by aerial resupply. In addition to 'jungle bashing' in order to establish their presence in the allotted sector, our troops also undertook civic action to bring some administrative succour and relief to the local population, whose lives were otherwise hardly touched by the processes of civil policing or administration. (Roychowdhury 2002: 101)

Between 1997 and 2000, 390 ULFA militants were killed and over 3,000 were arrested and another 2,400 surrendered. In the same period, 199 NDFB militants were killed, 632 were arrested and more than 300 surrendered (Mukherjee 2010: 19).

Cooperation with the armies of neighbouring states to check militancy was another element of India's strategy to fight insurgency. In September 2000, about 2,000 personnel of the Royal Bhutan Army (RBA) were trained in India in COIN tasks (Kotwal 2001: 2228). In December 2003, the RBA launched a military operation against the ULFA and cleared the insurgents from Bhutan's soil (Routray 2010: 127). The Indian Army cooperated by sealing the border on India's side (Mukherjee 2005: 22). China is the Burmese military junta's principal economic and political ally. And China had provided military training and sanctuary to the insurgents of North-East India. In the first decade of the new millennium, India is Burma's fourth largest trading partner (Wade 2010: 27). And India needs Burma's help to prevent the Kachin rebels from aiding the NSCN(I-M) and NSCN(K).

In Bangladesh, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) has emerged as the most prominent law enforcement agency and the main state instrument for COIN duties. This force included some police, but mainly military officers (Bhardwaj 2010: 152).

At times, the GOI resorted to maritime policing in order to check gun smuggling across the Arabian Sea. In February 1998, Indian security forces launched Operation LEECH in the high sea near Andamans. About six gun runners were killed, 73 were arrested and 140 AK-47 rifles and ammunition was seized. These

weapons were being sent for the NSCN(IM), ATTF and the Chin National Army in Myanmar (Nepram 2002: 49).

At least in Tripura, in the new millennium, the police under the stewardship of DGP B.L. Vohra (May 2000-July 2002) took a proactive role in COIN. In early 2000, there was little coordination between the CRPF, BSF, local police and the three battalions under the Assam Rifles under command of a brigadier. The BSF was concerned with guarding the border. The duty of countering the insurgents was left to the CRPF and the local police (Vohra 2011: 147). The three army battalions deployed in Tripura were withdrawn in 1999 due to the Kargil War (Vohra 2011: 148). Vohra writes in his memoirs: 'The local police and CRPF, the two main fighting forces, were suffering from a "siege" mentality. These forces were mainly deployed on static duties and quite a number of their own men were being used for their own protection duties not leaving much for counterinsurgency operations' (Vohra 2011: 147–8). Vohra admits that putting most of the forces on static duties gives lots of space to the insurgents. Moreover, the thinly spread force does not put any pressure on the insurgents. The Bengali settlers in Tripura demanded that security camps should be established in their midst to protect them against the insurgent tribals. Since the politicians of the ruling party considered the Bengali settlers as their vote bank, the former supported the demands of the latter. As a result, many personnel of the Tripura State Rifles (TSR) were deployed in sections (each with 8 people) for various static duties. This was because the locals had more faith in the TSR than in the CRPF. In addition, according to the regulations, the CRPF cannot be deployed in less than platoon strength (30 men). The police stations were fortified with fences, watch towers were equipped with search lights, and LMGs were protected with sandbags (Vohra 2011: 148, 153). For 'area domination', B.L. Vohra set up TSR camps in the insurgent-infested jungle-covered mountainous region. Such camps were either tents or *bashas* (made of bamboos and covered with tin sheets). Later, some of the permanent tents were reinforced with brick walls. Night patrols in small groups even during the winter and monsoon became the norm to beat the guerrillas at their own game (Vohra 2011: 163, 167).

Raising local auxiliary forces to check the insurgents was another COIN technique of India. Thorat established the local village defence force. In 1957, when the Naga insurgents demanded grain and pigs from the village of Thevopesimi, the villagers refused. In retaliation, the insurgents butchered 48 villagers. When Thorat visited the widows, they said: 'If you cannot protect our villages, give us some guns and we will protect ourselves and avenge the murder of our husbands.' (Thorat 1986: 183). Thorat writes in his memoirs:

> I saw their point. But obviously the Army could not give protection to each and every village, so I acted on their suggestion and in consultation with the Government of Assam raised a force called 'Village Guards'. We supplied them with smooth bore muskets and established camps to train them in musketry and

> simple field-craft. This force proved effective mainly because I gave them the task of guarding only their own village (Thorat 1986: 183–4).

The Village Guards are similar to the British Home Guards in Kenya. In 1955, the Home Guards were reformed as Tribal Police Units. However, there were obvious differences between these two bodies. While an European military officer was in charge of the Home Guard unit, no Indian Army officer was in actual charge of any of the Village Guard units (Heather 2007: 81, 101). About the Village Guards in the new millennium, Krishna Rao writes in his memoirs:

> The Village Guards, a voluntary force of peasant villagers, was raised in 1957 in the border area with the role of defending their villages against insurgent activities and to assist security forces. Over a period, they rendered valuable services to the state and many of them had received honours and awards. An expert committee suggested certain reorganization to make the Village Guards more effective. The recommendations need to be implemented to get the best out of this loyal armed element. (Rao 2001: 310)

Reordering state boundaries, creating new states, extending ceasefire with the insurgent groups and holding peace dialogues with them are non-military aspects of India's COIN. On 1 December 1963, the India Government created Nagaland as a separate state of the Indian Union. This state comprises the Naga Hill Districts of Assam and the Tuensang area of the North-East Frontier Agency (Baruah 2003: 321). The creation of the state of Nagaland was the product of the six-point agreement between the GOI and a section of the Naga leadership held in July 1960 (Upadhyay 2009: 39). The Tuensang area was divided into two districts of Kohima (the site of a famous battle in 1944) and Mokochung (Thorat 1986: 179). Manipur became a state on 21 January 1972; Tripura was given the status of statehood on 1 December 1972; and, Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram became separate states on 20 February 1987 (Upadhyay 2009: 30).

On 11 November 1975, the Shillong Accord was signed by the GOI and the NNC. The GOI's representative was Governor L.P. Singh. The NNC accepted the Constitution of India and agreed to come overground, deposit their weapons and discuss a final settlement (Rao 2001: 280). One section of the NNC considered it as a sell out to the GOI. The disgruntled leaders were Thuingaleng Muviah, Isak Chisi Swu and S.S. Khaplang, who broke away from the NNC and formed the NSCN in 1980 at Myanmar (Rahman 2011: 124). The GOI entered into a ceasefire with the NSCN(IM) in 1997 and with the NSCN(K) in 2001. The NSCN(IM) split again on 23 November 2007 with the formation of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Unification (NSCN-U) (Rahman 2011: 124).

In December 2009, Muviah and Chairman Isak Chishi Swu arrived in India and spent several weeks in Nagaland meeting members of the civil society including the apex tribal body the Naga Ho Ho, NGOs and students, members of the youth organizations, women's bodies, and representatives of the church.

Muviah and Swu also met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and UPA Chairman Ms Sonia Gandhi. This was the second time that the top NSCN(IM) leaders met the Manmohan Singh Government which had come to power in 1997 (Bashir 2010: 23).

Samir Kumar Das asserts that peace talks with groups like the NSCN will only succeed if the GOI starts thinking 'outside the box'. Das comments:

> … what the rebels describe as 'special federal relations' between India and Nagalim. Does this mean any new political dispensation that might vaguely resemble the present-day European Union?. As one engages in dialogue, one is required to think beyond the textbook notion of sovereignty hitherto defined in absolutist and binary terms … . Dialogue on the issue of sovereignty is required to be dialogical sovereignty in its essence, that is to say, sovereignty negotiated only in and through dialogue (Das 2010: 17).

By the middle of the 1990s, the NSCN(IM) had established itself as the most powerful insurgent organization in North-East India. In response, Indian intelligence agencies tried to create as many factions as possible among the insurgents. So, any peace formula with the NSCN(IM) would anger the Indian intelligence agencies' client insurgent organizations. The Nagaland State Government (which would lose power in case a loose Naga federation comes into existence), drug mafia, India's intelligence agencies and their clients are thus opposed to a comprehensive peace plan with the NSCN(IM) (Franke 2009: 140).

In 1985, the GOI signed the Assam Accord agreeing to 25 March 1971 as the cut-off date (which coincided with the birth of Bangladesh). The Assam Accord stated that all migrants who had settled in Assam on or before that date should be treated as Indian citizens and all those who entered the state after that date should be detected and deported. Elections were held and the AGP came to power. However, the cut-off date for distinguishing legal from illegal migrants did not meet the aspirations of the hardliners and the implementation of the Assam Accord and deportation of the illegal migrants was slow. So in 1988, the ULFA took over the control of Assam. Military action against ULFA followed in 1990 (Mukherjee 2005: 20–21). On 17 June 2010, the GOI decided to start talks with the ULFA and named former Intelligence Bureau (IB) Director P.C. Haldar as the interlocutor (Das 2010: 15).

Sanjib Baruah analyzes the emergence of insurgency in Assam as the product of micro-politics which derives its strength from civil society. Micro-nationalism is stronger than pan Indian nationalism projected by the Indian state. Baruah writes: 'The politics of micro-nationalism is premised on a poetics about a homeland and its people. If nations and nationalities are "imagined communities", it is a poetics that transforms the geography of an area into primal, home-like or sacred space and transforms a people into a collectivity with imagined ties of shared origins and kinship' (Baruah 1994: 652). A dense social space unpenetrated by the state allows the reproduction of micro-national imagined communities. Micro-nationalist

politics in India at times pits segments of the civil society against the Indian state. The Assam Sahitya Sabha and the AASU provide Assamese civil society its organizational capacity (Baruah 1994: 653, 668). The challenge before the Indian state is to construct an inclusive brand of Indian nationalism that will incorporate rather than marginalize sub-nationalisms of the Assamese and the Nagas.

At times, India's COIN has been totally successful. For instance, the MNF was weaned back from militancy to mainstream politics. The MNF competed and won the state election in 1987 and Laldenga became the Chief Minister of Mizoram (Rajagopalan 2008: 140).

Political cooption of the former and potential rebels, as enunciated by Kautilya, is an integral component of Indian COIN policy. In the 1980s, many Naga insurgents who surrendered were absorbed into the Naga Regiment in two specially raised BSF battalions, others in the state police or the village guards (Rao 2001: 311). K.V. Krishna Rao, COAS of the Indian Army (1981–83) notes in his autobiography:

> … the only new regiment raised in the Infantry after independence was the Naga Regiment. This was a long pending demand of the Nagas and after the surrender of the underground Nagas, it was decided that the demand should be conceded. Earlier, the Nagas had indeed been serving mainly in the Assam Regiment and proved their loyalty, steadfastness and courage on many occasion … . The regiment was raised with one battalion to start with. Later, a second battalion has also been raised. With the raising of the Naga Regiment I felt that the state government had to take greater interest in the welfare of the ex-servicemen as well as serving soldiers. At my instance the chief minister attended the meeting of the Rajya Sainik Board, where many decisions were taken on the spot. (Rao 2001: 310–11)

During 1972 and 1973, 2,650 Naga militants surrendered. Especially on 16 August 1973, General Zuheto Sema surrendered with his retainers to the governor. They were absorbed into the Nagaland Police and the BSF. Zuheto became the second-in-command of a BSF battalion and rose to the post of Deputy Inspector General of Police (Sarkar 1998: 57–8).

Offering an economic package to the disturbed zone in order to wean away the insurgents is a time-tested policy of India. Except Assam, the states of North-East India are driven by a 'donor economy'; 90% of their annual budget is aid from New Delhi (Akoijam 2010: 33). However, implementation of the rural-development packages in various states of North-East India remains defective. In the 1980s, it was found that as regards the implementation of the Integrated Rural Development Project (IRDP), while financial targets were met, physical achievement was poor. For example, an evaluation of a central government project for wasteland development in Tripura found that 11 of the 15 tribal majority villages in the original proposal had been excluded in favour of the Bengali

dominated villages on the ground that the tribal villages concerned were affected by insurgency (Subramanian 2000: 601).

Conclusion

Inefficient governance, unbalanced demographic growth and ethnic assertion are the factors that trigger and sustain insurgencies in North-East India. Christianity and the narcotics trade also play important roles in sustaining the 'rebels'. Preaching among the Naga tribes by the Christian missionaries from late nineteenth century strengthened the self-identity and cohesion of the amorphous hill tribes. The Nagas believed that the culturally 'other' Hindus from the plains exploit them. Their religious identity somewhat activated the demand for *Nagalim* (Greater Nagaland) autonomous from India. Till the 1960s, Pakistan and China supported the Nagas against the Indian security forces with money and weapons. In recent times, money from the Golden Triangle sustains the rebels' activities. In fact, the Naga insurgents gain more through kidnapping and extortion than they could if the conflict were resolved. The jungles of Burma offer them refuge, and training facilities are offered by the Kachin guerrillas fighting the Burmese junta. The GOI's policy has been displaying political flexibility and delivering economic packages on one hand and the use of calibrated coercion on the other hand.

References

Akoijam, A. Bimol (2010). 'Homelands: Politics of an Idea'. *Look East*, vol. 1, Issue 5 (August), pp. 28–33.

Bajpai, Kanti P. (2002). *Roots of Terrorism*. New Delhi: Penguin.

Baruah, Sanjib (1994), '"Ethnic" Conflict as State-Society Struggle: The Poetics and Politics of Assamese Micro-Nationalism', *Modern Asian Studies*, vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 649–71.

Baruah, Sanjib (2003). 'Confronting Constructionism: Ending India's Naga War', *JPR*, vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 321–38.

Bashir, Syed (2010). 'Peace Talks, Blockade, Nagalim – Dangerous Portents', *Look East*, vol. 1, Issue 5 (August), pp. 21–5.

Bhardwaj, Sandeep (2010). 'Bangladesh: The Clampdown', in D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2009: Continuing Violence, Failing Peace Processes*. London/New York/New Delhi: Routledge, pp. 150–67.

Bhaumik, Subir (2007). 'Taming the Twipra Tempest: Ethnic Conflict and Militancy in Tripura', in Jaideep Saikia (ed.), *Frontiers in Flames: North-East India in Turmoil*. New Delhi: Viking, pp. 93–115.

Chadha, Lieutenant-Colonel Vivek (2005). *Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis*. New Delhi: Sage.

Chadha, Vivek (2009). 'India's Counterinsurgency Campaign in Mizoram', in Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (eds), *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*. London/New York: Routledge, pp. 28–44.

Cline, Lawrence (2006). 'The Insurgency Environment in Northeast India', *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 126–47.

Codron, Jeremie (2009). 'The Islamist Militias of Bangladesh: Symptoms of a Weak State', in Laurent Gayer and Christophe Jaffrelot (eds), *Armed Militias of South Asia: Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists*, tr. by Cynthia Schoch, Gregory Elliott and Roger Leverdier. New Delhi: Foundation Books in association with C. Hurst, pp. 177–96.

Dai, Mamang (2007). 'Living the Untold Myth: Politics of Conflict in Arunachal Pradesh', in Jaideep Saikia (ed.), *Frontier in Flames: North-East India in Turmoil*. New Delhi: Viking, pp. 50–64.

Das, Gurudas (2002). 'India's North-East Soft Underbelly: Strategic Vulnerability and Security', *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 537–49.

Das, Harendra Nath (2007). 'Brigands of Fortune: The Economics of North-East Militancy', in Jaideep Saikia (ed.), *Frontier in Flames: North-East India in Turmoil*. New Delhi: Viking, pp. 155–69.

Das, Samir Kumar (2010). 'Base of Contention', *Look East*, vol. 1, Issue 5 (August), pp. 14–17.

Dhar, Maloy Krishna (2007). 'Fulcrum of the Eastern Dark: Motivational Mechanics of the ISI and DGFI', in Jaideep Saikia (ed.), *Frontier in Flames: North-East India in Turmoil*. New Delhi: Viking, pp. 65–92.

Egreteau, Renaud (2009). 'Burma's Militias: Between Insurgency and Maintaining Order', in Laurent Gayer and Christophe Jaffrelot (eds), *Armed Militias of South Asia: Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists*, tr. by Cynthia Schoch, Gregory Elliott and Roger Leverdier. New Delhi: Foundation Books in association with C. Hurst, pp. 113–33.

Franke, Marcus (2009). *War and Nationalism in South Asia: The Indian State and the Nagas*. London/New York. Routledge.

Freemantle, Major-General F.L. (2000). *Fred's Foibles*. New Delhi: Lancer.

Gogoi, Dilip (2007). 'Resurrection of a Sunset Dream: ULFA and the Role of the State', in Jaideep Saikia (ed.), *Frontier in Flames: North-East India in Turmoil*. New Delhi: Viking, pp. 116–33.

Goswami, Namrata (2007). 'Twilight over Guerrilla Zone: Retracing the Naga Peace Process', in Jaideep Saikia (ed.), *Frontier in Flames: North-East India in Turmoil*. New Delhi: Viking, pp. 134–54.

Gregorian, Raffi (2007). '"Jungle Bashing" in Malaya: Towards a Formal Tactical Doctrine', in Ian Beckett (ed.), *Modern Counter-Insurgency*. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 29–50.

Grewal, Brigadier R.S. (2003). 'Ethno Nationalism in North Eastern India', *JUSII*, vol. CXXXIII, no. 552, pp. 262–76.

Heather, Randall W. (2007). 'Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency in Kenya, 1952–56', in Ian Beckett (ed.), *Modern Counter-Insurgency*. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 79–105.

Hussain, Wasbir (2012). 'Northeast: From Insurgency to Terrorism?', in D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Armed Conflicts in South Asia: 2011*. London/New York/New Delhi: Routledge, pp. 173–98.

Indian Defence Year Book: 1997–98 (1997). Lieutenant-General R.K. Jasbir Singh (ed.) Dehra Dun: Natraj.

Indian Defence Year Book 2006 (2006). Lieutenant-General R.K. Jasbir Singh (ed.). Dehra Dun: Natraj.

Jeffery, Keith (2007). 'Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency Operations: Some Reflections on the British Experience', in Ian Beckett (ed.), *Modern Counter-Insurgency*. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 107–38.

Kotwal, Dinesh (2001). 'The Contours of Assam Insurgency', *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 24, no. 12, pp. 2219–33.

Ladwig III, Walter C (2009). 'Insights from the Northeast: Counterinsurgency in Nagaland and Mizoram', in Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (eds), *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*. London/New York: Routledge, pp. 45–62.

Mazumdar, Arijit (2005). 'Bhutan's Military Action against Indian Insurgents', *Asian Survey*, vol. XLV, no. 4, pp. 566–80.

Mukherjee, Lieutenant-General J.R. (2005). *An Insider's Experience of Insurgency in India's North-East*. London: Anthem.

Mukherjee, Lieutenant-General J.R. (2010). 'Despondent Armed Forces in Assam Demands Unified Command', *Look East*, vol. 1, Issue 5 (August), pp. 18–20.

Mukhim, Patricia Mary (2007). 'Turbulence in the Abode of Clouds: Military Resurgence in Meghalaya', in Jaideep Saikia (ed.), *Frontier in Flames: North-East India in Turmoil*. New Delhi: Viking, pp. 1–13.

Nepram, Binalakshmi (2002). *South Asia's Fractured Frontier: Armed Conflicts, Narcotics and Small Arms Proliferation in India's North-East*. New Delhi: Mittal.

Nepram-Mentschel, Binalakshmi (2007). 'Red Chebons and Crimson Wars: The Origins of Manipuri Insurrection', in Jaideep Saikia (ed.), *Frontier in Flames: North-East India in Turmoil*. New Delhi: Viking, pp. 34–49.

Pattanaik, Smruti, S. (2008). 'Bangladesh: Islamic Militancy and the Rise of Religious Right', in D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Armed Conflicts in South Asia: 2008.* New Delhi/Abingdon: Routledge.

Rahman, Mirza Zulfiqar (2011). 'Northeast India: Protracted Conflicts and Protracted Peace Processes', in D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Armed Conflicts in South Asia: 2010*. London/New York/New Delhi: Routledge, pp. 123–51.

Rahman, Mirza Zulfiqar (2012). 'Northeast India: Turn towards Sustainable Peace?', in D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Armed Conflicts in South Asia: 2011*, London/New York/New Delhi: Routledge, pp. 84–108.

Rajagopalan, Rajesh (2008). *Fighting like a Guerrilla: The Indian Army and Counterinsurgency*. New Delhi/Abingdon: Routledge.

Rammohan, E.N. (2003). 'The Naga Insurgency (Part II)', *JUSII*, vol. CXXXIII, no. 554, pp. 592–608.

Rammohan, Edavelth Nalaamveetil (2007). '*Lebensraum* in the East: Illegal Migration from Bangladesh', in Jaideep Saikia (ed.), *Frontier in Flames: North-East India in Turmoil*. New Delhi: Viking, pp. 14–33.

Rao, K.V. Krishna (2001). *In the Service of the Nation: Reminiscences*. New Delhi: Viking.

Routray, Bibhu Prasad (2008). 'Northeast: Island of Peace and Ocean of Conflict', in D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2008: Growing Violence*. New Delhi/Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 153–88.

Routray, Bibhu Prasad (2010). 'North-East: Minimal Gains of Counter-Insurgency Operations', in D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2009: Continuing Violence, Failing Peace Processes*. London/New York/New Delhi: Routledge, pp. 125–49.

Roy, Kaushik (2010). *The Armed Forces of Independent India*. New Delhi: Manohar.

Roychowdhury, General Shankar (2002). *Officially at Peace: Reflections on the Army and its Role in Troubled Times*. New Delhi: Viking.

Saikia, Jaideep (2003). 'Changing Contours of Separatism', *AAKROSH*, vol. 6, no. 18, pp. 52–74.

Saikia, Jaideep (2004). *Terror Sans Frontier: Islamist Militancy in North-East India*. New Delhi: Vision Books.

Saikia, Jaideep (2007). 'Prolegomena: Quest for a Proximate Frontier', in Jaideep Saikia (ed.), *Frontier in Flames: North-East India in Turmoil*. New Delhi: Viking, pp. xiii–xxxiv.

Sarkar, Colonel Bhaskar (1998). *Tackling Insurgency and Terrorism: Blueprint for Action*. New Delhi: Vision Books.

Sawhney, Pravin (1992). 'Operation RHINO: A Case Study', *Indian Defence Review* (January), pp. 71–82.

Shekaktkar, D.B. (2009). 'India's Counterinsurgency Campaign in Nagaland', in Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (eds), *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*. London/New York: Routledge, pp. 9–27.

Singh, Lieutenant-General Gaganjit (2010). 'Mapping Insurgency', *Look East*, vol. 1, Issue 5 (August), pp. 10–13.

Subramanian, K.S. (2000). 'Tribal Insurgency and Rural Development in Tripura', *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 35, no. 8/9, pp. 601–2.

Thorat, Lieutenant-General S.P.P. (1986). *From Reveille to Retreat*. New Delhi: Allied.

Upadhyay, Archana (2009). *India's Fragile Borderlands: The Dynamics of Terrorism in North-East India*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Verghese, B.G. (1997). *India's Northeast Resurgent: Ethnicity, Insurgency, Governance, Development*. New Delhi: Konark. Originally published in 1996.

Vohra, B.L. (2011). *Tripura's Bravehearts: A Police Success Story of Counterinsurgency*. New Delhi: Konark.

Wade, Francis (2010). 'US "Look East" to break Burma Deadlock'. *Look East*, vol. 1, Issue 5 (August), pp. 26–7.

This page has been left blank intentionally

Chapter 3
Communist Insurgencies: Maoists in Nepal and India

After the fall of USSR, pundits asserted that Marxism is confined to the dustbins of world history. However, in several parts of South Asia, homegrown Maoists, partly spurred by the Peruvian 'Shining Path', have come back like a phoenix. Without any significant outside help, they are not only able to capture power in Nepal but also to threaten the world's largest democracy, India. In July 2006, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh publicly asserted that the Maoists (also known as the Naxalites), pose the most serious danger to India's internal security (Banerjee 2012: 116). In this chapter, the terms Maoists and the Naxalites (especially in case of India) have been used interchangeably. Like the insurgents in North-East India and Kashmir, the Maoists have started conducting terrorist strikes against civilians, targeting the state's infrastructure and security personnel and engaging in selective execution of civilians. India is now thinking of using gunships against the Maoists who are rampaging in Central India. The moderates in the political establishment argue that job creation and land-redistribution programmes are the only way to cut the Maoists' support. Let us look at the rise of Maoism in the Himalayan Kingdom of Nepal.

Nepal

Origins of the Insurgency

The Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) was established in September 1949 in Calcutta with active assistance from Indian communists (Lawoti 2010a: 5). Manmohan Adhikari (1920–1999) had been a member of the Communist Party of India (CPI) before joining the CPN under Pushpa Lal Shreshta (Boquerat 2009: 46). When the Rana rule collapsed in 1951, the monarchy became supreme and control of the Nepal Army passed to the monarch. In Nepal, the first democratic government was established in 1959 by the Nepali Congress Party which had a two-thirds majority in its parliament.The king dismissed it in 1960, but it was re-established in 1990. The popular uprising in 1990, forced the king to replace the no-party Panchayat System that had been imposed in 1962 with a multi-party democracy in April 1990 (Joshi 2010: 92, 94). In 1971, some communists in Jhapa, inspired by the Naxalite movement in West Bengal in India, attempted to start an armed uprising. However, this attempt was swiftly crushed by the police (Nepali and Subba 2005: 84). In November 1990, a new constitution came into existence;

a general election was held in 1991 and local elections in 1992; and the ruling Nepali Congress was defeated in the 1994 mid-term elections (Singh 2011: 152).

The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) [CPN (M)] participated in the 1991 general election and in the 1992 local elections. The CPN(M) launched the insurgency in February 1996 (Lawoti 2010a: 3). Pushpa Kamal Dahal (nicknamed Prachanda, meaning 'the furious' or 'the terrible') revised the views of Nirmal Lama and M.B. Singh by advocating the army as the principal form of organization and war as the principal form of struggle. Prachanda was influenced by Peru's experience but ignored Africa's Maoist movement and Cambodia's (Lecomte-Tilouine 2009a: 65–6). In 1980, when a civilian government was elected in Peru, a small Maoist Party, the *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path), launched its offensive by burning the ballot boxes in a remote Ayacucho village. The Sendero's leadership is made up of provincial intellectuals but its core supporters come from the marginalized of society, the poor Andean peasantry. The Sendero insurgency first started in the underdeveloped, difficult terrain of the highlands and attempted to follow Mao's principle: 'circle the city from the countryside' (Mauceri 1991: 84). Abimael Guzman, a university professor from Ayacucho of the Peruvian Andes, spread the Maoist ideology and became the ideological father of the Shining Path. Its objective was to overthrow the Peruvian Government and install a peasant revolutionary government with Guzman as president. In contrast, the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), which started in 1984 under the leadership of Victor Polay Campos, was influenced by the ideals of Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution. The MRTA and the Shining Path fought each other for recruitment and collection of taxes from the farmers, cocoa producers and drug smugglers (Sanchez 2003: 185–6).

Nepal is composed of 75 districts across five geographical areas: eastern, central, western, mid-western, and far western. Each of these areas is divided into three ecological zones: mountain, hill and plain (Terai). (Murshed and Gates 2005: 121). About 85% of the population is rural (*Indian Defence Yearbook 2006*: 80). The insurgency first started in the hills of mid-western Nepal (as in Peru), especially in the areas of Rolpa and Rukum, with significant participation of the Kham Magars (Lawoti 2010b: 138; Shah and Pettigrew 2012: 5). Initially, the insurgency was most intense in North Rolpa and Rukum which had not seen any major development activity (Graham 2007: 233): they did not have any motorable roads until 2002–2003, when the army constructed roads to the two district headquarters (Acharya 2010: 267). Inequality in development in various regions and different communities, argues George Graham, might have sparked the insurgency. Primary school enrollment among the rural Nepalis between 1965 and 1987 rose from 20% to 82%; total secondary school attendance between 1986 and 1992, rose from 21,000 to 497,000. Increased literacy and the spread of Nepali language skills among the *janajati*s (Nepal's ethnic nationalities) together with a somewhat improved road network encouraged migration and enabled the village youth to compare and contrast their lives with the privileged people in the Kathmandu Valley (Graham 2007: 234). The *janajati*s constitute one-third

of Nepal's population, and the largest *janajati* group is the Magars of central Nepal. According to the 1991 census, the Magars numbered one and half million (Lecomte-Tilouine 2009b: 4, 140). The indigenous nationalities of Nepal include some 59 groups (Tiwari 2010: 262).

Bishwa Nath Tiwari agrees that inequalities in the level of development and poverty increased the likelihood of conflict, and after the conflict has been initiated by political leaders or conflict entrepreneurs, its intensity was guided more by social than economic variables (Tiwari 2010: 253). Avidit Acharya opines that economic grievances and ethnic tensions played supplementary roles in the outbreak of the insurgency. The real reason behind the outbreak of the insurgency was political animosity between the ultra-left and those in power (Nepali Congress, CPN-UML, etc.) (Acharya 2010: 267). S. Mansoob Murshed and Scott Gates assert that the Maoist insurgency began as a struggle against the elite (Bahun-Chetri-Newari) domination of political and cultural life. Greed was not important as there are few capturable resources (e.g. oil, drugs and diamonds) in Nepal. Nevertheless, grievance, at least from the Maoist side was a major catalyst of the revolt (Murshed and Gates 2005: 122, 124).

The 1990s witnessed two interrelated movements: ethnic revivalism and the Maoist uprising. Both were directed against the Hindu kingship and caste organization. The ethnic revivalist movement was aimed at de-Sanskritization of the *janajati* groups. For instance, in 2001, 25% of the Magars declared themselves Buddhists. Buddhism as a religion was promoted by their ethnic association Magar National Liberation Front. In the same year, 86% of the Limbus who had been depicted as Hindus declared Kirant as their religion (Lecomte-Tilouine 2009b: 3, 130, 141). The Maoists' challenge to the hegemony of the Brahmin-Chhetri domination tapped into the anti-Hindu ethnic movements.

Sara Shneiderman challenges the view that conflict entrepreneurs manipulated the ordinary Nepalis into joining the movement. In fact, the Nepalis who joined the Maoists movement, argues Shneiderman, were not victims of false consciousness (Shneiderman 2012: 67). Political instability and delegitimization of the political system in Nepal facilitated the rise of the ultra-left insurgency. On 1 June 2001, King Birendra and Queen Aishwarya were shot dead by Crown Prince Dipendra, who also killed his brother, sister and five other relatives. Prince Gyanendra (Birendra's younger brother), who was then in western Nepal, became the 11th king of the Shah Dynasty, and in February 2005, he seized power by dismissing the elected government (*Indian Defence Yearbook 2006*: 79).

One of the most famous quotes of Chairman Prachanda is 'It should be strictly expressed in both our policy and practice that red terror does not mean anarchy' (Lecomte-Tilouine 2012: 212). Prachanda advised the CPN(M) cadres that liquidation of class enemies and spies should be practiced 'in a selective way' by informing the masses and obtaining their consent as far as possible. Moreover, a system of punishing and taxing the enemy should be developed (Lecomte-Tilouine 2012: 212). The wealthy middle-aged and elderly people see the Maoists as a threat. In fact, their anxiety increases in relation to their wealth (Pettigrew

and Adhikari 2012: 238). The inhabitants of Rukum District engage in selling hashish in the Nepalganj market, close to the Indian border. The Maoists take taxes from smugglers and small shopkeepers and the villagers are obliged to feed the cadres (Sales 2012: 192, 202). In western Nepal, the Maoists clamped down on the worship of gods and goddesses, which is considered a conservative tradition. They claim that such worship does not result in positive changes in society (Lecomte-Tilouine 2010: 116). The Maoists rank an informer as more dangerous than a class enemy. The response, as in the case of the LTTE in Sri Lanka, is generally liquidation of the informer (Thapa, Ogura and Pettigrew 2012: 328).

In 2007, Nepal represented an almost failed state with a population of 27 million (Lawoti and Pahari 2010: 318). As a point of comparison, during the 1960s, the population of Vietnam was 30 million (Giap 1971: 330). The total casualties of 10 years of civil war in Nepal (February 1996 to December 2006) exceeded 13,000 dead, including 4,970 killed by the Maoists and 8,377 killed by Nepal's security forces (Boquerat 2009: 45), and more than 200,000 people were displaced from their rural homes (Leve 2012: 161). As a point of comparison, between 1980 and 1999, there were 30,000 casualties in Peru (Lawoti 2010b: 139). According to one calculation, Nepal's civil war in resulted in the destruction of properties worth Nepali Rs 5.127 billion (Rajamohan 2008: 212). The principal instrument for conducting *janayuddha* (people's war) is the People's Liberation Army Nepal (PLAN) of the CPN(M). Let us have a look at the PLAN's organization and doctrine.

Maoist Army and its Adversaries

From the start of the insurgency in 1996 until the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in November 2006, the CPN-M's insurgent army had increased from a few dozen fighters to 30,000 personnel (Eck 2010: 33). One author estimates that in 2000, the Maoists had between 6,000 and 7,000 hardcore combatants, a militia numbering between 20,000 and 25,000 and about 100,000 sympathizers (Rajamohan 2007: 106). According to another estimate, in 2001, there were 11,000 combatant fighters and 20,000 local militia members. Usually during a military operation, the PLAN takes advantage of the logistical help of the volunteers, who provide auxiliary support (such as carrying ammunition or evacuating the wounded) but do not engage in actual fighting. The volunteers are from the larger Maoist organizational structure comprising the party and united fronts or are ordinary villagers forced to attach themselves to a particular PLAN detachment for a particular operation (Thapa, Ogura and Pettigrew 2012: 325, fn 45). In 2006, there were over 30,000 members in the PLAN and among them, about 11,000 were child soldiers (younger than 18 years) (Shneiderman 2012: fn 26, 69). One scholar asserts that one-third of the foot soldiers of the Maoists are women. Besides serving as combatants, the women cadres of PLAN also function as couriers and guides as in the case of the Naga militant outfits (Leve 2012: 162). There are many young Gurung female combatants in the PLAN (Pettigrew and

Adhikari 2012: 239). The PLAN is divided into two divisions, seven brigades and 19 battalions (Pahari 2010: 199). Though high caste Hindus dominate the Maoist leadership, most of the personnel of the PLAN are Magars (Lecomte-Tilouine 2009b: 130).

The Maoists also tapped the indigenous traditional martial ethos in Nepal's countryside. In traditional Nepal, every adult male was a potential warrior and one man from each house had to take part in armed conflicts. The Maoists revived this rule for participation in their meetings, contributions to forced labour and entry in the PLAN. Military service is a channel for upward mobility for rural males. But, the RNA did not recruit anyone who had failed to obtain his school leaving certificate. These uneducated disgruntled youths are absorbed into the PLAN. In Nepal, in the past as well as in the present, military service is equated with sacrifice (*balidan*) and a warrior's death is regarded a sacrificial gift. War involves an offer to sacrifice (to kill) or to be offered in sacrifice (to die). The Maoist ideology portrays the warrior as heroic and noble. When he meets a glorious death, he becomes an eternal martyr (Lecomte-Tilouine 2009b: 224–5, 239). Martyrs' photos are exhibited in the villages and the hamlets; and the companies, battalions and brigades are given martyrs' names (Lecomte-Tilouine 2009b: fn 6, 240–41).

We are lucky to have a first-hand account of the organization and doctrine of the PLAN from one of its high ranking commanders nicknamed Pasang (Nanda Kishore Pun). He was born on 23 October 1965 in Rangsi Village in Rolpa, one of the western hilly districts of Nepal. In 1973, he became a teacher at Rangsi and joined in leftist teacher's union. After the formation of the CPN (Unity Centre), he became a member of the First District Committee at Rolpa. During the *janayuddha*, in the NCP (Maoists), he served as a military trainer and also as president of the Young Communist League (YCL). In 1999, Pasang became the commander of the Combatant Team, a Task Force Commander. Gradually, Pasang rose in the hierarchy: from First Company Commander to Deputy Commander and finally to Chief of PLAN. By this time, Pasang also became a member of the Central Committee and the Politburo. Among his men, he was known as General Giap of Nepal. Pasang himself was influenced by Vo Nguyen Giap who also started his career as a teacher and ended up as commander of the army under Ho Chi Minh's political direction. Besides Marx, Lenin and Mao, Pasang also studied the 'bourgeois' philosopher Clausewitz and the ancient Chinese theoretician Sun Tzu. Sun Tzu also influenced Mao Tse-Tung. Pasang has also been influenced by the Hindu epics *Ramayana* and *Mahabharata* (Pasang 2008: Translator's Saying, Pasang and his Life).

For Pasang, the proletariat human science is truthful (Pasang 2008: 217). He says: 'Our party, the true leader of Nepalese proletariat is utilizing the dialectical materialism in true sense. The sincerity and dedication to the proletariat class is [the] primary to all other factors of appearance' (Pasang 2008: 217; authors' note: 'the' is probably a typographical mistake by the translator). However, Pasang accepts that successful prosecution of war requires the balanced fusion of arts and science (Pasang 2008: Events that lead History to Civilization).

The influence of the Mao comes clearly in Pasang's strategy of villages encircling the cities and the formation of base areas. Pasang notes:

> It is one of the strategy [strategies][1] of MLM-ism[2] of the long term people's war: village encircling the city, formation of base area, and capturing the central power. This procedure and strategy applied and developed by Chairman Mao in the semi-feudal and semi-colonial country in the recent century has got success. It was not only essential, but also compulsion to apply this principle in the country like ours. It was the primary issue, how to apply and develop MLM-ism in the context of Nepal the similarly semi-feudal and semi-colonial country Nepal of 21st century. For its implementation, the unity national convention struggled against different kinds of non-Marxism deviations and rejected them, and identified and applied the Marxism in true sense. (Pasang 2008: 216)

Pasang asserts that *janayuddha* was launched with the avowed objective of destroying the archaic political norms and political culture of Nepal, but the Maoists had a constructive approach too. Pasang comments that after destruction, establishment of a new political culture is also on the Maoists' agenda (Pasang 2008: Events that lead History to Civilization). In the Hindu epics, in times of maladministration and misgovernment, the government loses the ethical right to rule its subjects, and it is then righteous for the subject people to revolt against the decadent and oppressive government. Pasang notes: 'What would the people do when the government imposes barbaric cruelty upon them ousting all the cruelties of the history, while government is supposed to be affectionate guardians and ultimate source of justice and life in civilized society? The government entered into its villages grasping the throat of its people, keeping no alternative to live but to die; to die with courage only' (Pasang 2008: Events that lead History to Civilization).In Pasang's view, launching the *janayuddha* was a *dharmayuddha* (just war). Interestingly, the Marxists of Nepal as well as those of Vietnam, despite being 'Godless', use the term just war (a derivative from the Christian just war doctrine) to justify their armed struggle against the establishment. Giap wrote: '… war of national liberation, a just war to counter the unjust war of aggression launched by the enemy' (Giap 1971: 163).

Pasang provides a detailed overview of the PLAN's organizational structure. The PLAN comprises eight departments. The Training Department (of which he was a part initially) is the most important, followed by the Technical Department which has both hardware and software wings. The Hardware Wing is in charge of manufacturing weapons and ammunitions like 81-mm mortar, 2-inch mortars, LMGs and other explosives. Towards the later phase, this wing acquired the expertise to manufacture even missiles and rocket launchers which could hit targets up to a distance of 600 meters. Pasang admits that the members of the

1 [ ] Authors' intervention.
2 Marxist-Leninism-Maoism

Hardware Wing still lack adequate technical expertise. The Software Wing is in charge of manufacturing weapons like remote-controlled cordless mines or radio sets. The cordless and radio-controlled mines are capable of hitting targets up to a range of 12 kilometers. The Technical Department is also in charge of weapon maintenance and repair of weapons. Third is the Publication Department which handles the collection and publication of achievements and casualties of the People's War. The accounts of the martyrs and the wounded are given due publicity. This department collects stories of the brave heroes of the organization and systematically disseminates the lessons. That is, the Publication Department is a sort of propaganda department of the PLAN. The Administrative Department administers these activities and coordinates the publication of these data. The Library Department collects and translates books on military writings and publishes the translations. Clausewitz's *On War* and Giap's *People's War and People's Army* are the most important translations. Pasang emphasizes that collection and dissemination of the 'bourgeois principles' of war is a priority for both the PLAN and the party. Marx, in his correspondence with Engels, described Clausewitz as the greatest bourgeois military philosopher worth reading. What is interesting is the emphasis put on collection and dissemination of knowledge for fighting war and an inquisitive yearning to learn from the 'enemy'. The Intelligence Department focuses on information technology and deals with both tactical battlefield intelligence for the PLAN and long-term strategic intelligence for the party. Pasang admits that in terms of technology, this department is lagging (Pasang 2008: 220–22).

At the divisional level, audio-visual materials on military raids and campaigns are prepared for training the PLAN personnel (Pasang 2008: 224). Cross-country training is emphasized. The personnel are trained in PT drills for one and half months. Then they are trained in intelligence gathering and map reading. Company level training is carried out for one month, and finally the troops are trained to handle weapons like 81-mm mortars. (Pasang 2008: 225).

Raids on the police armouries enabled the CPN-M to acquire .303 rifles, 12-bore shotguns and pistols. Sten-guns and Indian made SLRs were looted after attacking the army camps (Nayak 2007: 924). Many Gurkhas who serve in the Indian Army also provide training and weapons to the Maoists when they return to their villages in Nepal in lieu of donations demanded by the Maoist insurgents (Mehta and Lawoti 2010: 179). Despite Pasang's claim that the PLAN manufactured most of its weapons, 85% of its weapons are actually looted from the Nepal Police and the RNA. The rest are manufactured by the Maoists in makeshift factories in various villages, and some are acquired from the international arms market (Mehta and Lawoti 2010: 179).The Hardware Wing of the Technical Department is probably capable of making copies of captured weapons.

Mao Tse-Tung has written: 'Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail' (Mao 1963: 33). Political and military training of the Maoists' activists in Nepal is intensive, in accordance with the Maoist doctrine that political work is of outmost importance for creating successful guerrilla units (Mao 1963: 55). The subjects of

study included dialectics, historical materialism, negation of the self and frugality, and effectiveness of Prachandapath. The objective is to inculcate a sense of self sacrifice and renouncement (Lecomte-Tilouine 2010: 118). Indoctrination is an important aspect of Maoist recruitment. The villagers' local grievances are linked to larger problems in the political system (Eck 2010: 34). Since the beginning of the *janayuddha* in 1996, the Maoist cultural troupes traveled all over Nepal and offered the villagers colourful politico-cultural programmes. The cultural battalion, the Madhya Samana Battalion 6, was formed. It comprises four cultural companies of central Nepal: Sen Chyang Cultural Company, Anekot Cultural Company, Shiva Sharada Cultural Company and Chunu Shilpa Cultural Company. The cultural battalion comes under *Akhil Nepal Jan Sanskitik Mahasangh* (All Nepal People's Cultural Federation) (Mottin 2010: 52). Besides being a mechanism for mass mobilization, the cultural companies are also used for fund raising. Further, during internal meetings of the party, the cultural companies also criticized the party's leadership. About 200 artists lost their lives during the 10 year struggle (Mottin 2010: 52–3).

Because both the Maoists themselves as well as several scholars assert that the Nepali Maoists were influenced by the Shining Path guerrilla movement in Peru, a brief analysis of the Peruvian Maoist's objectives and the Peruvian Government's COIN policy is required. Philip Mauceri writes that the *Sendero*'s strategy was different from Che Guevera's foco strategy used by the Peruvian guerillas during the 1960s. The *Sendero* guerrillas, following Mao's dictum that revolutionary soldiers should be indistinguishable from the local population, were organized into cells rather than into a military force. Instead of concentrating on penetrating the *Sendero* organization through intelligence operations, the Peruvian Army, which had started its COIN in 1982, treated the *Sendero* as a foco army. This resulted in not only an ineffective COIN but also massive human rights abuse. By 1984, the military commander of Ayacucho realized the mistake and initiated a development-oriented humanistic strategy. He realized that poverty and the neglect of the highlands by the central government were the root causes of the insurgency (Mauceri 1991: 92–3). In the 1990s, the Shining Path had 2,000 armed cadres in the rural areas and the MRTA had around 600 members. Both outfits had many sympathizers, and both had infiltrated the workers' unions and universities (especially the State University of San Marcos in Lima) (Sanchez 2003: 187).

Back in Nepal, King Gyanendra announced a nationwide emergency on 26 November 2001 and issued the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities Control and Punishment Ordinance. This was ratified by the House of Representatives on 21 February 2002. The emergency was extended for another three months while the RNA and the Special Armed Police went after the Maoists (*Indian Defence Yearbook 2006*: 81).

Before using the RNA, the successive governments of Nepal tried to douse the Maoist problem with the aid of the police. Between 1990 and 2000, the police budget was increased 800% (Nepali and Subba 2005: 94). According to one

estimate between 1996 and 2006, the budget of Nepal's police rose from Nepali Rs 2.36 billion to Nepali Rs 7.88 billion (Pandey 2012: 199).

The RNA was undergoing a slow process of modernization when the Maoists rebellion burst over Nepal's landscape. In 1990, India provided a package of Rs 500 crore for upgrading the RNA (*Indian Defence Yearbook 2006*: 84). By 2003, the RNA expanded from 58,000 to 80,000 soldiers (*Indian Defence Yearbook 2006*: 85). Between 1996 and 2006, the strength of the RNA doubled from 45,000 to 90,000 and the military budget of Nepal rose from Nepali Rs 2.58 billion to Nepali Rs 10.9 billion (Pandey 2012: 199). One of the most famous battalions of the RNA, the Shri Singha Nath Battalion, was converted with US aid into a Rangers battalion. And the Shri Bhairab Nath Battalion became a Special Force battalion (Mehta 2005: 33). Before the royal coup of 2005, the Bush Administration helped the Gyanendra Government by providing US$22 million worth of military supplies including 20,000 M-16 rifles. Britain provided a few helicopters and Belgium sold Nepal 5,500 machine-guns (*Indian Defence Yearbook 2006*: 88). In 2005, the defence budget of Nepal was Rs 8 billion (Mehta 2005: 36) and China provided the RNA with 12,000 AK-47 rifles, 80,000 high explosive grenades and 4.2 million rounds of 7.62-mm rifle ammunition. China pledged Rs 72 million in military aid to Nepal (Rajamohan 2007: 114). During his visit to Nepal, Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji assured his host that China does not recognize the Maoists of Nepal (*Indian Defence Yearbook 2006*: 88).

The RNA had limited experience in conducting COIN. Before the Maoists came into the scene in 1976, two RNA battalions were involved against the Khampa rebels in the Mugu region, which later became a hotbed of the Maoists. During the 1950s and 1960s, between 1,500 and 2,000 Khampa rebels from Mustang, Manang and Mugu operated against the Chinese force in Tibet. When China threatened Nepal in 1976, two battalions of the RNA from Pokhara and Nepalganj under Brigadier Aditya Shamsher Rana moved against the Khampas. The Khampa leader Wangdi was ambushed and killed near Tinker after he had moved from Mugu in May 1977. The RNA's anti-Khampa COIN campaign involved infantry supported by helicopters, which were used for logistical purposes (Mehta 2005: 34–5).

While most of the personnel of the PLAN are *janajati*s, the Chetris and the Thakuris (high Hindus caste) are overrepresented in its adversary, the RNA. To an extent, the conflict between the RNA and the PLAN also represents the confrontational relationship between the high caste Hindus and the *janajati*s in Nepal's rural society (Mehta 2005: 33).

Even at the height of its power, the PLAN was not able to control any district headquarters nor could it defeat the RNA in any direct confrontation (Mehta and Lawoti 2010: 176): the correlation of force was against it. During 2003, Nepal's COIN force had 140,000 men (*Indian Defence Yearbook 2006*: 85). In the next two years, the number of security force had increased by 14,000. In November 2005, while the CPN-M's PLAN had some 20,000 militia equipped with AK-47, AK-57, .303, LMGs and rocket launchers, the security forces of Nepal numbered

154,000 (47,000 ordinary police, 17,000 armed police and 90,000 personnel in the RNA [Nayak 2007: 928]).

Post- Insurgency Era and Mainstream Politics

After 10 years of civil war, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed on 21 November 2006. The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists (CPN-M) agreed to join the People's Coalition. The People's Coalition comprised Seven Party Alliance (SPA), Madhesis, and others, all united against despotic King Gyanendra who imposed Emergency Rule and abolished the democratically elected government on 1 February 2005 (Housden 2010: 169). After the king's takeover, international opinion turned against the Nepal Government. The UK suspended its planned package of military aid (1.3 million sterling pounds), which included vehicles, night flying helicopters, and bomb disposal equipment. (Upreti 2010: 228).

Pasang justifies the Maoists' renunciation of violence: The armed struggle and peaceful struggle, including fighting elections, have identical objectives. They are actually different forms of people's struggles that have to be applied in accordance with different situations and contexts (Pasang 2008: 218). As Mao had noted: 'While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from the other' (Mao 1963: 65). Similarly, Giap had also written that political struggle and armed struggle must be fused together to achieve the revolutionary aim (Giap 1971: 163).

On 11 January 2008, it was announced that a general election would be held that April. The Maoists won stunningly (229 seats) and formed the coalition government (Housden 2010: 169). The Nepali Congress lost votes to the Maoists who had fielded 52.5% of their candidates from the 18 to 35 age group (51% of the voters), which resonated well with the young people. Again, many Nepalis voted for the Maoists out of fear; many of the Maoist leaders had publicly warned that they might revert to insurgency if they did not win. The public wanted peace at any price, so they voted for their former enemies (Lawoti 2010c: 289, 291). On 28 May 2008, Nepal was declared a federal republic. On 15 August 2008, Prachanda was elected as the Prime Minister, but the Maoist candidate for the post of president was defeated. And Ram Baran Yadav, supported by several opposition parties, became President of Nepal (Singh 2011: 153–4). In November 2008, the possibility of a split appeared within the Maoists. While Prachanda represented the moderate wing, the dissident leader Kiran represented the hardcore radical wing (Lawoti and Pahari 2010: 317).

The Youth Communist League (YCL) is used to absorb several PLAN members especially those who are under 18 years of age, who are not kept in the cantonments or in the UN designated camps. Moreover, the YCL is used to recruit and train Maoist cadres and to retain their influence over the country. The YCL occasionally criticizes the CPN(M) leadership and function as a pressure group. The YCL demanded compensation for the orphaned children of the PLAN soldiers (Snellinger 2010: 88–9).

The Maoists fell out with the ruling coalition on the issue of integrating the PLAN with the RNA. As Pasang notes:

> Because the old traditional army is feudal, autocratic, fascist and comprador bourgeoisie, its character is against the people, the people's expectations and the people's sentiments. It has been structured by policies which are very primitive, which provides security, serves and is devoted to the monarchy and the aristocracy. It serves the handful of rich upper class people … . The army shouldn't be confined to barracks, the army should be with the people; the army should serve the people. (Pasang 2008: 230)

In January 2007, the Madhesi People's Rights Forum (MPRF) started its campaign against the Seven Party Alliance and the Maoists (SPA-M). The protest movement against the *pahari* domination grew stronger in Nepal's southern plains. The term Madhesi refers to the people inhabiting the Terai. The Madhesis make up 33% of Nepal's population and the Terai is composed of 20 districts. Terai is the plains region adjacent to the foothills within Nepal's boundaries. The foothill range is known as the Siwalik or Churia Range and the Nepalese Terai is 500 miles long. Its western boundary is the Mahakali River and its eastern limit is the Mechi River. At its widest point, the Terai is 33 miles long and at its narrowest only 2 to 3 miles; its average width along the east-west axis is 20 miles (Kantha 2010: 156–7). There are now several splinter Madhesi groups conducting LIC against the central government of Nepal.

India

Origins and Spread of Maoist Insurgency

In 1961, a violent movement under the banner of the Srikakulam Armed Struggle started in Andhra Pradesh. It was geared to liberate the hill people from the domination of the plainsmen who had deprived the former of their land and exploited them economically (Joseph and Srivastava 2008: 119). In March 1967, at Naxalbari Village in Darjeeling District of West Bengal, radical left extremist insurgency started. The Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (CPI-ML) supported the sharecroppers against the landlords (Srivastava 2010: 103). The Santhal tribal labourers of the tea plantations were supported by the CPI-Maoists against the Hindu upper caste landlords. Charu Mazumdar (1918–72) and Kanu Sanyal (born 1932) along with Jangal Santhal provided the leadership (Jaoul 2009: 23). Students were recruited by their teachers and professors (Donner 2012: 144). On 28 June 1967, Radio Beijing backed the revolt and called it 'Spring Thunder'. The revolt lasted only 52 days before being crushed (Jaoul 2009: 23).

Down south, the People's War Group (PWG) was formed in 1980 by Kondapalli Seetharamiah. From northern Telengana, this group gradually spread

its net to other parts of the Andhra Pradesh State and then beyond the state. The PWG's objective is to overthrow the parliamentary democracy and establish a people's government through protracted armed struggle and seizure of power by building bases in the rural and remote regions. These bases would eventually be transformed into guerrilla zones and later into liberated areas, which in accordance with the Maoist strategy, would encircle the urban centres of power (Joseph 2007: 68–9). On 15 November 2000, when Jharkhand was separated from Bihar, three Maoists organizations – the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Party Unity, the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) – made inroads into the area. Initially, the tribals formed the Maoists' support base, and later the educated rural elite also collaborated with the Naxalites who provided an efficient protection racket (Shah 2012: 40, 44). On 1 July 2001, the Indian Maoist parties formed the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) to achieve political power through military means (Upreti 2010: 222). In 2003, the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) and the Revolutionary Communist Centre of India-Maoist (RCCI-M) merged to form MCC-I (Joseph 2007: 68). On 21 September 2004, the Andhra Pradesh based PWG and the Bihar based Maoist Coordination Committee (MCC) merged to form the Communist Party of India (Maoist). In 2009, the insurgency led by the Communist Party of India (Maoist) had spread across 13 states (Pahari 2010: 196; Srivastava 2010: 103). Probably, the Naxals control some 10 million hectares of forest, that is, one-seventh of India's total forest land (Ahuja and Ganguly 2007: 250).

From a micro-view of the scene,in the 1980s, the Naxalites spread into Bastar region from neighbouring Andhra Pradesh. In July 2005, the DGP of Chhattisgarh State asserted that more than 40,000 square miles of jungle spread over 10 of the state's 16 districts was under the operational control of the Naxalites. The Naxals forcibly recruit one cadre from each household. If a household lacks a male member, they conscript a female. The Communist Party of India (Maoists) in Dantewada District also conscripts children and they have a department known as the *Bal Mandal* (Children's Division). In 1992–93, a rebellion against the Naxalites was suppressed after the execution of 70 Adivasis. The Adivasis do not share the Naxalite's dream of marching one day to Delhi with the Red Army but they were offered some protection by the Naxalites for their day-to-day problems. Initially, the Naxals provided protection to the Adivasis against the corrupt officials (especially forest department officials), police personnel, timber mafia and the money lenders. The Adivasis constitute 78.51% of the total population of Dantewada District of Chhattisgarh State. Most of the Naxalite cadres in this region are Adivasis but the leadership is from outside, especially from Andhra Pradesh. During 2005–06, Commander Kosa was leading the Maoists in Dantewada (*Adivasis of Chhattisgarh* 2006: 2–3, 7–8).

Combat against the traditional culture of the inhabitants is a characteristic of the Maoists of both Nepal and India. According to the programme of the CPI(M), anti-witchcraft measures and the use of *shaman*s and sorcerers are to be discouraged

and banned in the areas under their control. However, there is tension between the Maoists' desire to gain the support of the local populace and the newly established Maoist village government cadres in rural Maharashtra, who are eager to establish their ideological credentials by banning the traditional rituals altogether (Desai 2012: 278).

In 2006, it was believed that the PWG had 6,000 committed armed cadres and the MCC had 1,300 armed personnel (Ahuja and Ganguly 2007: 250). The Indian Maoists People's Liberation Army in 2010 was calculated as 15,000 strong (Srivastava 2011: 92). Most of the personnel in the tribal areas are economically deprived lower-caste Hindus (Misra 2002: 62). Some of their cadres are also Dalits and Adivasis (*Indian Defence Yearbook 2006*: 54). Looting police stations and state armouries remains the principal source of weapons for the Maoists. The Maoists deny linkages with the other insurgent groups, but in 2004, the Assam Government warned the Central Government about attempts by the ISI to forge links between the ULFA, KLO and the Maoists with the aid of *jihadi* groups in Bangladesh (*Indian Defence Yearbook 2006*: 61). However, the GOI believes that the Maoists smuggle weapons from Nepal, Myanmar and Bangladesh (Srivastava 2011: 93). Amamlendu Misra asserts that MCC and PWG receive arms from the Nepali Maoists and in return, the Indian left extremist groups give them lessons in guerrilla warfare and logistical support, such as setting up training camps in India. (Misra 2002: 60). In May 2012, the Calcutta Police arrested a middleman from Kolkata who bought arms and ammunition from the People's Liberation Army of Manipur and supplied them to the Maoists (*Telegraph* 4 May 2012). In accordance with one estimate, in 2006, the Naxalites' armoury included 900 AK-47 rifles, 200 LMGs, 100 grenade firing rifles, 2-inch mortars, thousands of .303 rifles, SLRs, 12 bore guns and a range of explosives (*Indian Defence Yearbook 2006*: 54).

The overall organization of the Maoists is structured hierarchically. At the top is the Politbureau, which has a general secretary and 13 members. In 2010, Mullappa Laxman Rao (alias Ganapati) was the general secretary. Below the Politbureau is the Central Military Commission (CMC); its 8 members exercise operational control over the PLGA. Below the CMC are the five Regional Bureaus: North Regional Bureau, South-West Regional Bureau, Orissa-Chhattisgarh Regional Bureau, Eastern Regional Bureau and Central Regional Bureau. Each Regional Bureau is subdivided into several Zonal Military Commissions (ZMCs) that control the fighting cadres. The fighting cadres are of three types: Squad Area Committee (also known as *Dalam*), People's Militia and *Gram Raksha Dal* (also known as Area *Raksha Dal* or Self Defence Squads). Each *Dalam* has 12 to 18 armed members. Their commanders are members of the District/Division Committees of the Naxals. The *Dalam*s also control the Local Guerrilla Squads; each Squad has 10 to 25 members including a party committee. The People's Militia is also known as *Sangam*s. Each *Sangam* has 30 to 45 armed cadres who are equipped with low-grade traditional weapons like bows and arrows. The Self Defence Squads consist of selected personnel of the villages. Their job is to control, motivate and influence activities of the villagers for propaganda and psychological operations (Handa 2010: 8–10).

Colonel Akshaya Handa computed the strength of PLGA in 2010 at about 32 platoons and six companies. The strength of a company varies between 90 to 95 armed cadres. Each company is organized into three platoons and each platoon has 25 to 30 armed cadres aged 16 to 21 years; each platoon is commanded by a platoon commander who is supported by a deputy commander, and each platoon is subdivided into three sections; and each section is headed by a section commander; and each platoon has a rifle section, a support section and a heavy weaponry section equipped with LMGs, grenade launchers and mortars. For operating in the jungle, the Maoists use low frequency radios. The units are more or less self-reliant and the whole system depends on a decentralized supply system (Handa 2010: 10–11, 15–16).

The Maoists collect funds from the contractors, mining companies and truck drivers. The road contractors and the forest produce (tendu leaves, timber, bamboo and wood) contractors are the major targets. The smugglers and liquor runners are also taxed.The Maoists also tax small business units like *beedi* manufacturers, cigarette shops, spinning mills, rice and flour mills, and grocery and medicine shops. (Achuthan 2010: 10; Handa 2010: 13). Several NGOs linked with international donor agencies also fund the Naxals. In July 2007, 22 NGOs in Gaya District were charged with having links with the Maoists. The PWG and the MCC probably collect between Rs 500 to 700 crores annually (*Indian Defence Yearbook 2006*: 55). Colonel Handa estimates that in 2010, the Naxals were able to collect Rs 10 to 20 billion from 223 districts in India. In 2007, the Maoists spent over Rs 1.75 billion to purchasing weapons such as AK-47s and landmines. At the end of 2008, an Australian arms dealer agreed to supply 200 AK-47s via the Malaysia-West Bengal drug route. Besides buying weapons and explosives, the funds are used for propaganda activities and for the cadres' salaries. The Maoists publish a Hindi magazine, *Awam-e-Jang,* and an English magazine, *CPI-Maoist*. Each Maoist cadre is paid Rs 3,000 per month (Handa 2010: 13–15).

Some of the Maoists' daring actions need to be recounted. On 11 November 2005, the Home Guards Training Centre in Giridhi was raided and 185 rifles and 25,000 rounds of ammunition were looted. Two nights later, the Maoists attacked the Jehanabad District Jail and looted 16 rifles and ammunition. About 350 personnel of the PLGA participated and logistical support was provided by another 650 cadres. After the raid, about half of the jail's 650 inmates were missing. They were either liberated by the Maoists or escaped during the confusion. As part of their diversionary tactics, the Maoists simultaneously attacked two subsidiary targets: the police lines and the outposts of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). The latter attacks distracted the security forces from the main target of the Maoists: the Jehanabad Jail (*Indian Defence Yearbook 2006*: 51–3).

The Naxalites, like the Maoists of Nepal, claim that feudalism, imperialism and comprador bourgeois capitalism prevail in India. And these three interrelated structures must be overthrown by armed struggles that result in the capture

of state power and the establishment of a just and equitable social order. In December 2010, Prasad, an influential member of the Andhra Orissa Border State Committee of CPI (Maoist), claimed that the Naxals are systematically working to expand their influence, power and area of operation. The PLGA will be transformed into a People's Liberation Army within the liberated zone. The PLGA are to conduct mobile war by carrying raids on targets at faraway places by mobilizing its armed cadres and taking assistance from people along their way (Kujur 2012: 111).

Some scholars opine that Naxalism might spread further in India. Medha Chaturvedi and P.G. Rajamohan identified a second stage in Naxal movement that involves its front organizations starting limited action in the form of propagating ideology and collecting funds for future actions. Linkages with like-minded organizations are established internally and externally. Chaturvedi and Rajamohan opine that in Punjab and Haryana, the Naxal threat is at present in the second stage. In Punjab's poorer districts (Dhuri, Mansa, Sangrur, Bhatinda and Barnala) and in Haryana (in districts such as Kurukshetra, Jind, Kaithal and Jamuna Nagar), the CPI (Maoist), the CPI-ML (Party Unity), and CPI-ML (Liberation) are organizing tenant farmers, students and landless labourers. Haryana and Punjab are overdependent on agriculture. The soil in this region is becoming soggy from underground seepage from the Indira Gandhi Canal and the Ghagger River. The sub-soil water in many blocks of Punjab has been declared grey and unfit for agriculture. Its farmers use a lot of chemical fertilizers, resulting in further decline of the land's quality (Chaturvedi and Rajamohan 2012: 256–8).The relative deprivation due to deteriorating land quality might push a large chunk of the agrarian population towards Naxal radicalism in the near future.

George J. Kunnath claims that the Maoists' failure in practicing 'mass politics' resulted in the failure to build a mass movement. As a result, many Dalits felt betrayed by the Maoists failure to genuinely look at their upliftment (Kunnath 2012: 110). Killing villagers as suspected government spies, extorting money from the traders, and destroying public property (schools, government buildings, and especially, public transport) have alienated the masses from the Maoists (Banerjee 2012: fn 1, 114).

Government Response

Land reforms can, to a great extent, take the wind out of the sails of the Naxalites. For example, land redistribution in West Bengal played an important role in withering away the Naxalite challenge between 1967 and 1971 (*Indian Defence Yearbook 2006*: 58).

The extreme left insurgency has not been as volatile as the ethno-tribal insurgency in North-East India nor the ethno-religious insurgency in Kashmir. The Indian state has been able to contain the left extremist (Maoist/Naxalite) challenge with the aid of paramilitary forces. The GOI did not consider it important to deploy

army units against them. Modernization and expansion of the police force has been the foremost response of the state and central governments. During Naxalite uprisings, the government passes special laws that increase the state's power of the coercive and surveillance apparatus. For example, in 1970, the government passed the West Bengal Prevention of Violent Activities Act and the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) (Donner 2012: 139).

India's police force requires anti-landmine vehicles to safely traverse the Naxalite ridden areas. In 2008, Andhra Pradesh had a sanctioned strength of 14,372 armed police personnel, but only 12,874 police personnel were actually present in 2008. Similarly, Jharkhand had only 2,412 police personnel against the sanctioned strength of 3,490 police personnel. Chhattisgarh had 9,863 police personnel against the sanctioned strength of 10,865. Bihar had only 8,833 armed police personnel against the sanctioned strength of 16,394 (that is, a shortfall of about 53%). Most of the vacancies were for the posts below the sub-inspectors, who were the 'tip of the spear' (Joseph and Srivastava 2008: 122–3).

In 2003, in Maharashtra, the police started establishing armed outposts to show a government presence in disturbed areas and have a base for quick reaction against insurgents. Each outpost had 25 to 50 policemen led by a sub-inspector. The armed outposts did not conduct regular policing duties; they patrolled the Maoist infested villages and jungles. Each patrol had 15 policemen who spent three to four days a week in the jungle or in a village (Desai 2012: 271).

In Andhra Pradesh, the Armed Reserve Police battalions have been converted into commando units under the Greyhound group under a separate IG. All new police personnel spend their first four years of service in the Greyhound units before being transferred to the district police establishments and meritorious service with the Greyhound units is mandatory for accelerated promotions. Greyhound personnel serving in Maoist effected areas get an added 50% commando pay. Each joint operational base has two Greyhound companies and two home guard platoons of local recruits who act as guides and interpreters and perform garrison duties to free the Greyhounds for area domination tasks and 'seek and encounter' patrol operations. Each Greyhound joint operational base is capable of sending out four platoon-strength patrols at any given moment. Each Greyhound joint operational base is under a deputy or assistant SP. The Greyhounds do not report or work under the district police but report directly to the special DIG in charge of several Maoist infected districts (Achuthan 2010: 12).

In early 2006, there were 2,000 CRPF personnel in Chhattisgarh engaged in COIN against the Maoists. However, 80% of this force was deployed for passive defence like protecting government installations and political VIPs (Miklian 2012: 285). The ratios of Maoists killed per year by security personnel are: 0.54 in 2005; 2.13 in 2006; 0.4 in 2007; 0.99 in 2008; 1.13 in 2009 (Handa 2010: 24).

The government also indirectly encourages the upper-caste groups to create private militias. One such private militia was the Ranvir Sena in Bihar. In the last 30 years, some 5,000 people have died as a result of fighting between the Ranvir Sena and the Maoists (*Indian Defence Yearbook 2006*: 51). The Kurmi landowners,

alarmed by the killing of landlords and seizure of land by the Dalit labourers, formed the Bhumi Sena in 1982 in the Punpun-Masaurhi area of Patna District. This caste militia collected arms from the landlords and the Kurmi youth joined the organization. During 1982–85, the Bhumi Sena, especially in Dumari, targeted the Dalit labourers and the impoverished Kurmi households who supported the Maoist movement (Kunnath 2012: 98).

At times, the government raised semi-private auxiliary forces. An anti-Naxalite campaign known as the Salwa Judum was launched in the Dantewada District of Chhattisgarh State in June 2005. This COIN campaign was launched under the leadership of Mahendra Karma, Member of the Legislative Assembly and Leader of the Opposition in the Chhattisgarh State Assembly. Later, this campaign received the blessing of the Chhattisgarh State Government. On 4 March 2006, some 45,958 Adivasi villagers from 644 villages in six blocks of Dantewada District came under the Salwa Judum programme. Though called a peace initiative, the Salwa Judum aimed to counter Naxalite violence with state-sponsored violence. Under the Salwa Judum campaign, hundreds of cadres were given military training and inducted as Special Police Officers (SPO). In many cases, it was found that while one member of a household had been forcibly inducted in the Naxalite force, another member of the same household had become a SPO. By 4 March 2006, 3,200 Adivasi boys and girls had been recruited as SPOs. Each SPO was paid Rs 1,500 per month. Many joined with the hope that they would be inducted into the regular police force, that is, the Chhattisgarh State Police Force. Many Naxalite cadres and SPOs were below 18 years of age; they could be categorized as child soldiers. In fact, nine SPOs recruited from the Bangapal Relief Camp in 2006 were below 16 years. Between 5 June 2005 and 6 March 2006, 138 Salwa Judum activists were killed by the Naxalites. Although in many cases the Salwa Judum activists were responsible for human rights violation, the government (especially the police) did not register any cases against them. Again the victims of Naxalite violence, and not the victims of Salwa Judum personnel, were compensated by the state. As a result of the civil war among the Adivasis (to the result of fighting between the Naxalites and the SPOs of Salwa Judum), many Adivasis have been displaced and are living in temporary camps. Many government schools have been converted into relief camps. The conditions of the camps are bad: The houses have roofs made of leaves and the inmates are given meals of rice and watery pulse. The government claims that it is providing business education to the inmates of the camps. However, students who appeared for secondary and higher secondary school examinations in 2006 were adversely affected. The government also started some anti-Naxalite indoctrination in these camps (*Adivasis of Chhattisgarh* 2006: 3–5). In 2005, an estimated 40,000 villagers languished in internally displaced persons camps in Chattisgarh due to Naxal violence. Tens of thousands fled to the neighbouring states (Miklian 2012: 283). By 4 March 2006, about 1,999 Naxalites had surrendered in Dantewada. One group of independent analysts claims that they had been kept in chains and were denied freedom of movement (*Adivasis of Chhattisgarh* 2006: 4).

Conclusion

There are similarities as well as dissimilarities in the Maoist movements in Nepal and India. In both cases, the leaders are highly educated, urban, higher-caste middle class. The political leadership that became the vanguard of the leftist insurgency did not emerge out of massive peasant rebellion but preceded it (Shah 2012: 39; Shah and Pettigrew 2012: 5).In Nepal (unlike India), the Maoist rebellion is the product of a fusion of traditional and modern elements, indigenous and foreign ideologies. Credit is due to the Nepali Maoists for establishing a balance between elements of foreign ideology (Marxism) with constituents drawn from the traditional Hindu ideology that holds sway over the rural masses, in accordance with the specific contexts and needs of Nepal. Due to their flexibility and vision, the Maoists of Nepal have been more successful than their counterparts in India. In India, the ultra-leftists adhere strongly and at time rigidly to a brand of Marxism that has only a few followers among certain intellectual groups. The danger is that despite the carnage committed by the Naxals, a certain group ofintellectuals support them. For instance, in March 2010, Arundhati Roy asserted that the Maoists are 'Gandhians with a Gun' (Kujur 2012: 109). For the poor and downtrodden in India, Marx, Lenin and Mao are still *terra incognita*. The recent spurts of the Maoists (Naxalites) in parts of India are not strong enough to threaten the foundations of the Indian state: Unlike Nepal, India is just too big and is made up of various ethnic sub-nationalities. The Maoists in India have support only among the tribes of central India. Neither the low-caste Hindus nor the urban proletariat in the mega cities are with them. To incorporate them into the Maoist fold, the latter needs to create a more inclusive ideology that must include elements of traditional religious and cultural components. Also, while Nepal remains a quasi-democracy, India with all its limitations, has been a mature democracy that has functioned for more than half a century. Whether the Naxals will be able to reorganize themselves or whether the Indian state can sustain itself with vigorous economic and military countermeasures remain to be seen.

References

Acharya, Avidit (2010). 'The Maoist Insurgency and the Political Economy of Violence', in Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (eds), *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century*. Oxon/New York: Routledge, pp. 263–84.

Achuthan, Colonel J.K. (2010). 'Tackling Maoists: The Andhra Paradigm', *Indian Defence Review*, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 8–15.

Ahuja, Pratul and Ganguly, Rajat (2007). 'The Fire Within: Naxalite Insurgency Violence in India', *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 249–74.

Boquerat, Gilles (2009). 'Maoism and the Ethnic Factor in the Nepalese People's War', in Laurent Gayer and Christophe Jaffrelot (eds), *Armed Militias of South Asia: Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists*, tr. by Cynthia Schoch, Gregory Elliott and Roger Leverdier. New Delhi: Foundation, pp. 45–64.

Chaturvedi, Medha and Rajamohan, P.G. (2012). 'Will the Naxal Conflict Spread into Rest of India?' in D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2011: The Promise and Threat of Transformation*. London/New York/New Delhi: Routledge, pp. 255–77.

Desai, Amit (2012). 'Anti-"Anti-Witchcraft" and the Maoist Insurgency in Rural Maharashtra', in Alpa Shah and Judith Pettigrew (eds), *Windows into a Revolution: Ethnographies of Maoism in India and Nepal*. New Delhi: Social Science Press, pp. 259–81.

Donner, Henrike (2012). 'Radical Masculinity: Morality, Sociality and Relationships through Recollections of Naxalite Activists', in Alpa Shah and Judith Pettigrew (eds), *Windows into a Revolution: Ethnographies of Maoism in India and Nepal*. New Delhi: Social Science Press, 2012, pp. 136–59.

Eck, Kristine (2010). 'Recruiting the Rebels: Indoctrination and Political Education in Nepal', in Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (eds), *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century*. Oxon/New York: Routledge, pp. 33–51.

Graham, George (2007). 'People's War? Self-Interest, Coercion and Ideology in Nepal's Maoist Insurgency', *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 231–48.

Handa, Colonel Akshaya (2010). *Left Wing Extremism: Assessment & Counter-Insurgency Strategy*. New Delhi: Vij Books in association with the United Service Institution of India.

Housden, Oliver (2010). 'Nepal: Out with the Old, In with the New', in D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Annual Conflicts in South Asia 2009: Continuing Violence, Failing Peace Processes*. New Delhi/Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 168–90.

Indian Defence Yearbook 2006 (2006). *Lieutenant-General R.K. Jasbir Singh* (ed.). DehraDun: Natraj.

Jaoul, Nicholas (2009). 'Naxalism in Bihar: From Bullet to Ballot', in Laurent Gayer and Christophe Jaffrelot (eds), *Armed Militias of South Asia: Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists*, tr. by Cynthia Schoch, Gregory Elliott and Roger Leverdier. New Delhi: Foundation, pp. 21–43.

Joseph, Mallika (2007). 'Left Extremism in India: From Red Corridor to Red Land', in D. Suba Chandran (ed.), *Armed Conflicts and Peace Processes in South Asia 2006*. New Delhi: Samskriti, pp. 66–101.

Joseph, Mallika and Srivastava, Devyani (2008). 'Left Extremism: The Naxal Conflict in India', in D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2008: Growing Violence*. New Delhi/Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 118–52.

Joshi, Madhav (2010). 'Between Clientelistic Dependency and Liberal Market Economy: Rural Support for the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal', in Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (eds), *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century*. Oxon/New York: Routledge, pp. 92–111.

Kantha, Pramod K. (2010). 'Maoist-Madhesi Dynamics and Nepal's Peace Process', in Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (eds), *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century*. Oxon/New York: Routledge, pp. 156–72.

Kujur, Rajat Kumar (2012). 'Naxal Movement: Resurgence or Desperation?', in D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2011: The Promise and Threat of Transformation*. London/New York/New Delhi: Routledge, pp. 109–33.

Kunnath, George J (2012). 'Smouldering Dalit Fires in Bihar', in Alpa Shah and Judith Pettigrew (eds), *Windows into a Revolution: Ethnographies of Maoism in India and Nepal*. New Delhi: Social Science Press, pp. 89–112.

Lawoti, Mahendra (2010a). 'Evolution and Growth of the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal', in Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (eds), *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century*. Oxon/New York: Routledge, pp. 3–30.

Lawoti, Mahendra (2010b). 'Ethnic Dimensions of the Maoist Insurgencies: Indigenous Groups' Participation and Insurgency Trajectories in Nepal, Peru and India', in Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (eds), *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century*. Oxon/New York: Routledge, pp. 135–55.

Lawoti, Mahendra (2010c). 'Bullets, Ballots, and Bounty: Maoist Electoral Victory in Nepal', in Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (eds), *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century*. Oxon/New York: Routledge, pp. 289–303.

Lawoti, Mahendra and Pahari, Anup K (2010). 'Violent Conflict and Change: Costs and Benefits of the Maoist Rebellion in Nepal', in Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (eds), *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century*. Oxon/New York: Routledge, pp. 304–26.

Lecomte-Tilouine, Marie (2009a). 'Fighting with Ideas: Maoist and Popular Conceptions of the Nepalese People's War', in Laurent Gayer and Christophe Jaffrelot (eds), *Armed Militias of South Asia: Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists*, tr. by Cynthia Schoch, Gregory Elliott and Roger Leverdier. New Delhi: Foundation, pp. 65–89.

Lecomte-Tilouine, Marie (2009b). *Hindu Kingship, Ethnic Revival, and Maoist Rebellion in Nepal*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Lecomte-Tilouine, Marie (2010). 'Political Change and Cultural Revolution in a Maoist Model Village, Mid Western Nepal', in Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (eds), *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century*. Oxon/New York: Routledge, pp. 115–32.

Lecomte-Tilouine, Marie (2012). 'Terror in a Maoist Model Village in Mid-Western Nepal', in Alpa Shah and Judith Pettigrew (eds), *Windows into a*

Revolution: Ethnographies of Maoism in India and Nepal. New Delhi: Social Science Press, 2012, pp. 207–32.

Leve, Lauren G. (2012). 'Women's Empowerment and Rural Revolution: Rethinking "Failed Development"' in Alpa Shah and Judith Pettigrew (eds), *Windows into a Revolution: Ethnographies of Maoism in India and Nepal*. New Delhi: Social Science Press, pp. 160–84.

Mao Tse-Tung (1963). 'Guerrilla Warfare', tr. with an Introduction by Brigadier-General Samuel B. Griffith, in *Guerrilla Warfare by Mao Tse-Tung and by Che Guevera*. London: Cassell. Originally published in 1962.

Mauceri, Philip (1991). 'Military Politics and Counter-Insurgency in Peru', *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 83–109.

Mehta, Ashok K. (2005). *The Royal Nepal Army: Meeting the Maoist Challenge*. New Delhi: Rupa.

Mehta, Ashok K. and Lawoti, Mahendra (2010). 'Military Dimensions of the People's War: Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Nepal', in Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (eds), *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century*. Oxon/New York: Routledge, pp. 175–94.

Misra, Amalendu (2002). 'Subaltern and the Civil War: An Assessment of Left Wing Insurgency in South Asia', *Civil War*, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 56–76.

Mottin, Monica (2010). 'Catchy Melodies and Clenched Fists: Performance as Politics in Maoist Cultural Programmes', in Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (eds), *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century*. Oxon/New York: Routledge, pp. 52–72.

Murshed, S. Mansoob and Gates, Scott (2005). 'Spatial-Horizontal Inequality and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal', *Review of Development Economics*, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 121–34.

Nayak, Nihar (2007). 'The Maoist Movement in Nepal and its Tactical Digressions: A Study of Strategic Revolutionary Phases, and Future Implications', *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 916–42.

Nepali, Prakash and Subba, Phanindra (2005). 'Civil-Military Relations and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal', *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 83–110.

Pahari, Anup K. (2010). 'Unequal Rebellion: The Continuum of "People's War" in Nepal and India', in Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (eds), *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century*. Oxon/New York: Routledge, pp. 195–215.

Pandey, Nischal N (2012). 'Nepal: Old Conflict, New Issues', in D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2011: The Promise and Threat of Transformation*. London/New York/New Delhi: Routledge, pp. 199–210.

Pasang (2008). *Red Strides of the History: Significant Military Raids of the People's War*, tr. from Nepali by Sushil Bhattarai, Kathmandu: Agnipariksha Janaprakashan Griha Putalisdak.

Pettigrew, Judith and Adhikari, Kamal (2012). 'Fear and Everyday Life in Rural Nepal', in Alpa Shah and Judith Pettigrew (eds), *Windows into a Revolution:*

Ethnographies of Maoism in India and Nepal. New Delhi: Social Science Press, pp. 233–58.

Rajamohan, P.G. (2007). 'Nepal: Continuing Violence', in D. Suba Chandran (ed.), *Armed Conflicts and Peace Processes in South Asia 2006*. New Delhi: Samskriti, pp. 102–17.

Rajamohan, P.G. (2008). 'Nepal: State in Dilemma', in D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2008: Growing Violence*. New Delhi/Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 211–37.

Sales, Anne De (2012). 'From Ancestral Conflicts to Local Empowerment: Two Narratives from a Nepalese Community', in Alpa Shah and Judith Pettigrew (eds), *Windows into a Revolution: Ethnographies of Maoism in India and Nepal*. New Delhi: Social Science Press, pp. 185–206.

Sanchez, W. Alejandro (2003). 'The Rebirth of Insurgency in Peru', *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 185–98.

Shah, Alpa (2012). 'In Search of Certainty in Revolutionary India', in Alpa Shah and Judith Pettigrew (eds), *Windows into a Revolution: Ethnographies of Maoism in India and Nepal*. New Delhi: Social Science Press, pp. 39–59.

Shah, Alpa, and Pettigrew, Judith (2012). 'Windows into a Revolution: Ethnographies of Maoism in India and Nepal', in Alpa Shah and Judith Pettigrew (eds), *Windows into a Revolution: Ethnographies of Maoism in India and Nepal*. New Delhi: Social Science Press, pp. 1–38.

Shneiderman, Sara (2012). 'The Formation of Political Consciousness in Rural Nepal', in Alpa Shah and Judith Pettigrew (eds), *Windows into a Revolution: Ethnographies of Maoism in India and Nepal*. New Delhi: Social Science Press, pp. 60–88.

Singh, Kirti (2011). 'Armed Conflict in Nepal: From Parliament to the Siege of Kathmandu', in Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Annual Conflicts in South Asia 2010: Growing Left-Wing Extremism and Religious Violence*. New Delhi/Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 152–73.

Snellinger, Amanda (2010). 'The Repertoire of Scientific Organization: Ideology, Identity and the Maoist Student Union', in Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (eds), *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century*. Oxon/New York: Routledge, pp. 73–91.

Srivastava, Devyani (2010). 'Left-Wing Extremism in India: The Rule of the Maoists', in D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Annual Conflicts in South Asia 2009: Continuing Violence, Failing Peace Processes*. New Delhi/Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 103–24.

Srivastava, Devyani (2011). 'Left Wing Extremism: Misplaced War Monering?', in Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Annual Conflicts in South Asia 2010: Growing Left-Wing Extremism and Religious Violence*. New Delhi/Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 91–122.

Thapa, Deepak, Ogura, Kiyoko and Pettigrew, Judith (2012). 'The Social Fabric of the Jelbang Killings', in Alpa Shah and Judith Pettigrew (eds), *Windows into a*

Revolution: Ethnographies of Maoism in India and Nepal. New Delhi: Social Science Press, pp. 309–33.

The Adivasis of Chhattisgarh: Victims of the Naxalite Movement and Salwa Judum Campaign (2006). New Delhi: Asian Centre for Human Rights.

The Military Art of People's War: Selected Writings of General Vo Nguyen Giap, ed. and with an Introduction by Russell Stetler (1971). New York/London: Monthly Review Press.

The Telegraph (2012). Kolkata edition, 4 May.

Tiwari, Bishwa Nath (2010). 'An Assessment of the Causes of Conflict in Nepal', in Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (eds), *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century*. Oxon/New York: Routledge, pp. 241–62.

Upreti, Bishnu Raj (2010). 'External Engagement in Nepal's Armed Conflict', in Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (eds), *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century*. Oxon/New York: Routledge, pp. 219–37.

This page has been left blank intentionally

Chapter 4
*Jihadi*s in Kashmir

Introduction

Jammu and Kashmir has proved troublesome for India since 1947. Praveen Swami asserts in his monograph that the *jihad* against India started in this province during 1947–48 and has continued unabated. Swami continues that the four wars between India and Pakistan (1947–48, 1965, 1971 and 1999) were interrelated with the Kashmir problem (Swami 2007: 2, 4). This chapter argues that although anti-Indian troubles started in Jammu and Kashmir in 1947, those troubles had no support among the domestic audience of the region. The 1947–48 War, the 1965 War, and the 1999 Kargil conflict to some extent were related to the Kashmir problem. But the 1971 War resulted from troubles in East Pakistan and was only indirectly (if at all) related with Kashmir, and the 1999 War had more to do with India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests as well as the trouble in Kashmir. In fact, the 1980s could be considered a break when a compound of home grown insurgency supported by foreign backers transformed the nature of 'shadow warfare' in Jammu and Kashmir. Now, let us look back to the immediate aftermath of decolonization.

Pakistani Infiltrations and Conventional Wars: 1947–1971

The Hindu Kush, Pamir and the Karakoram separate Kashmir from Central Asia. East of Srinagar, the Indus River separates Karakoram from the Himalayan Range (Riza 2003: 267). There are six main rivers in Kashmir. The Indus starts in Tibet and flows through Skardu, Bunji to Attock. The Nilam (Kishanganga) starts in Sonamarg and flows through Tithwal Valley and joins Jhelum at Domel. The Jhelum flows from Wular Lake through Baramula, Domel, Mirpur and Mangla. The Chenab starts at Kulu and flows through Kishtwar, Ramban, Akhnur to Gujrat (in Pakistan not India's Gujarat). South of Muzaffarabd and Srinagar are two important rivers: The Mahl passes through Bagh, Monj Bajri into Jhelum, and the Punch from Poonch to Kotli and then into Mangla Reservoir near Mirpur (Riza 2003: 269–70).

The population of the Dogra Kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir included 77% Muslims in 1947 (Jha 2003: 2), and Srinagar Valley was 90% Muslims. In Jammu and Poonch, the inhabitants were Sunnis, ethnically akin to the Muslims of west Punjab (after 1947 Pakistan's Punjab). In Ladakh and Baltistan, the inhabitants were Shias and Buddhists. In Gilgit, there were Shias, and in Hunza, the Ismailis dominated (Jha 2003: 17; Racine 2002: 211). The total population of Kashmir

was about four million and 3.5 million of them lived in villages (Riza 2003: 271). The civil service and businesses were dominated by the Hindu Kashmiri Pandits. The army and police were dominated by the Dogras (Riza 2003: 271). In 1947, the population of East and West Pakistan included some 65 million Muslims, and there were 35 million Muslims in India. In the 1990s, India had 100 million Muslims, but in Kashmir (despite it being a Muslim majority province) there were only four million Muslims (Varshney 1991: 1000). In 1981, 94.5% of the Kashmir Valley's populace was Muslim. The share of the Muslims in Jammu was 29.6% and in Ladakh 46%. Overall, in the Jammu and Kashmir State, Muslims made up 64.1% of the population and the Hindus (mostly concentrated in Jammu) some 32.2% (Varshney 1991: 1006).

In 1932, the charismatic Sheikh Abdullah formed the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, a political party with mass support (Suri 2011: 67). As the British were departing from the subcontinent in August 1947, Abdullah's secular National Conference (which included the Hindus and the Sikhs also) favoured accession to India, but Ghulam Abbas' Muslim Conference favoured accession to Pakistan. Nevertheless, in the Kashmir Valley, the National Conference was more powerful than the Muslim Conference (Raghavan 2010: 103).

If Gurdaspur (a Muslim majority district) had been awarded to Pakistan, there would have been no land connection between India and Kashmir. However, the Boundary Commission awarded Gurdaspur to India (Jones 2002: 60). There were only four roads capable of bearing motor traffic from Punjab to Kashmir in 1947. They were: Gurdaspur-Kathua-Jammu-Banihal Pass-Srinagar; Sialkot-Jammu-Banihal Pass-Srinagar; Rawalpindi-Murree-Kohala-Domel-Srinagar; and Rawalpindi-Abbottabad-Manshera-Muzaffarabad-Srinagar. During the winter, the Banihal Pass becomes snowbound and is closed to traffic (Riza 2003: 268). Of these four roads, the first two run from Indian Punjab to Srinagar and the second two, from Pakistan's Punjab (west Punjab of pre-1947 era) to Srinagar. In addition to the four principal roads, there were four single roads which could be used by jeeps only during fair weather: Jammu-Naushera-Kotli-Poonch/Palandri; Naushera-Rajauri-Mendhar-Poonch; Naushera-Jhangar Dharamsal-Mirpur; and Jammu-Akhnur-Manawar-Bhimber-Mirpur-Poonch-Uri (Riza 2003: 268).

Sardar M. Ibrahim Khan, a Muslim Conference leader, met Colonel Akbar Khan of the Pakistan Army and demanded arms. A Muslim League leader named Mian Iftikharuddin asked Akbar Khan to prepare a contingency plan to acquire Kashmir for Pakistan (Raghavan 2010: 105). By mid-September 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir fired his prime minister Ram Chandra Kak who had wanted Kashmir to remain equidistant from India and Pakistan. The new prime minister of Jammu and Kashmir was M.C. Mahajan. He met Sardar Patel (India's first home minister) and Jawaharlal Nehru (India's first prime minister) and said that the Maharaja was willing to accede to India but wanted the political reforms to be delayed. Nehru replied that Sheikh Abdullah must be released and that he should be allowed to establish a popular government. Only then, Kashmir should declare accession to India. On 29 September, the Maharaja's government set Sheikh

Abdullah free. Emissaries from Pakistan contacted Sheikh Abdullah but the latter remained non-committal (Raghavan 2010: 106).

In late October 1947, Pakistan encouraged the tribesmen (Mohmand, Waziris, Mashuds and Afridis) from its North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) to move into Kashmir. In addition, ex-servicemen of the Indian National Army and members of the Muslim League National Guard were also used for actual operations (Dasgupta 2002: 39). There were 60,000 ex-servicemen from the Muslim tribes of Poonch who were demobilized after the end of World War II; in 1947, they were jobless and restless (Riza 2003: 271) and provided easy material in the hands of the Pakistani backers. Pakistan distributed some 4,000 rifles to the Pathan tribal raiders. The total strength of the raiders was some 10,000 (Sen 1994: 50). A regular Pakistan Army officer named Akbar Khan, who was the product of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, was put in charge of the Kashmir operation (Sen 1994: 16). General Mohammad Musa H.J. COAS of the Pakistan Army (27 October 1958 to September 1966) was GSO, 1st Grade in the Lahore Area from September to December 1947. In his memoirs he recalls that Colonel Mohammad Akbar Khan who was then Director of Weapons and Equipment at General Headquarters visited Lahore. He requested some bren-guns for protection of Kohala and other bridges on River Jhelum against Indian attacks. Akbar Khan told Musa that the guns must be sent unofficially. Musa sent the bren-guns as well as their crews by giving them official leave of absence from their units (Musa 1987: 79). Initially, it seemed that Pakistan was conducting the war in Kashmir unofficially.

The Kashmir State Force (KSF) under Brigadier Rajinder Singh comprised 8,000 personnel and 3,000 of them were Muslims. The Muslim component of the KSF deserted and joined the raiders (Singh 2000: 210). About 30% of the rank and file was recruited from the Muslim tribes of Poonch. These Muslims were actually Rajputs who had accepted Islam during the medieval era. The British considered them an important 'martial race' and recruited them in the British-Indian Army till 1945. The KSF was mainly an infantry force without any artillery support. It did not perform well against the Pakistani tribal raiders (Jha 2003: 11; Riza 2003: 271; Sen 1994: 3; Singh 2001: 10). The 4th Jammu and Kashmir Infantry Battalion of the KSF was deployed in the Muzaffarabad-Domel area. This unit was 50% Dogra (Jammu Hindus) and 50% Muslims from Poonch. It was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Narain Singh (Sen 1994: 34–5).

The Gilgit Scouts imprisoned the governor, Brigadier Ghansara Singh, and then attacked the Hindu personnel of the garrison. The Muslim personnel in this region joined the insurgents. Thus, Gilgit passed to Pakistan's control (Singh 2000: 226). There were two roads linking Pakistan with Gilgit: Mardan-Saidu-Kalam-Gupis-Gilgit, which was motorable up to Saidu; and Abottabad-Balakot-Kagan-Babusar Pass-Chilas-Bunji-Gilgit, which was motorable up to Balakot (Riza 2003: 269). From Srinagar, there were two roads to Gilgit. The first was across Srinagar-Bandipur-Gurais-Burzil Pass-Astor-Bunji-Gilgit. This road was motorable to Bandipur. The other road was from Srinagar-Sonamarg-Zojila Pass-Kargil-Skardu-Gilgit and was motorable to Sonamarg (Riza 2003: 269). Most of

the roads are perched on rickety embankments on the riverside and hug the hills on the other side.From the hills, the *nullah*s carry water or melting snow across the road into the rivers. The *nullah*s and the hills make the roads an unending series of ups and downs (Riza 2003: 269).

The border town of Muzaffarabad was attacked and sacked by the raiders (Sen 1994: 15). The tribesmen captured Uri, Baramula, (27 October 1947) and reached the outskirts of the capital Srinagar (Swami 2007: 21). As a nervous Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947, the Indian Army moved in to protect the province from the tribal raiders (Jha 2003: 2). The airlift of Indian troops started on 27 October 1947 (Jones 2002: 66) and continued on 30 and 31 October (Sen 1994: 54). The 1st Sikh was the first to go. Initially, it was planned to build up an infantry brigade in the Kashmir Valley (Sen 1994: 46). By 5 November, the 4th Kumaon was flown in (Singh 2000: 203). A new formation known as the Jammu and Kashmir Force was built up and Major-General Kulwant Singh was appointed as its commander (Sen 1994: 56). The 50th Para Brigade was ordered to defend Jammu and the lines of communication between Jammu and Pathankot (Singh 2001: 10).

The Indian Air Force (IAF) used some Harvard aircraft for reconnaissance duties. Later, some IAF Spitfires came to the Kashmir Valley (Sen 1994: 68). The IAF attacked the trucks which were carrying supplies along the Uri-Baramullah Road (Singh 2000: 201). On 3 November 1947, the Indian aircraft strafed the raiders in the Badgam area (Sen 1994: 72–3). On 4 November, two infantry battalions along with a squadron of armoured cars and a field artillery battery were sent to Kashmir Valley from India by road (Sen 1994: 76). By the evening of 6 November, some armoured cars under the command of Major Ravi Rikhye arrived at Srinagar. They were given the task of patrolling the approaches of Srinagar from the north (Singh 2000: 204). On 7 November 1947, at Shalateng, a joint Indian air-land attack occurred on the raiders (equipped with medium machine-guns, 3-inch mortars and grenades) who were dispersed with great loss. While the 1st Sikhs attacked the raiders frontally, the 4th Kumaon attacked the Zainkut Village from the left of the 1st Sikhs to cut the raiders from their base. The raiders left 472 dead at Shaltung and another 146 when they were retreating to Baramula. In addition, 138 civilian buses that were used to carry them were left behind (Sen 1994: 98–9; Singh 2000: 204, 206). On 8 November 1947, Indian troops captured Baramula (Riza 2003: 135). The 161st Infantry Brigade under the command of Brigadier L.P. Sen (also known as Bogey Sen) comprising the 1st Sikhs, 1st Kumaon, and 2nd Battalion of the 17th Dogra Regiment continued to chase the raiders (Singh 2000: 208). On 20 November, the 1st Kumaon, the 2nd Battalion of the 17th Dogra Regiment, and a troop of armoured cars advanced along the Uri-Poonch road to link up with the 50th Para Brigade from Kotli. The 1st Sikh was left behind to defend Uri (Singh 2000: 210). On the night of 22 November, 900 raiders shouting *Ya Ali* launched an attack on Uri (Singh 2000: 215, 238).

During November 1947, Lord Mountbatten (Independent India's first Governor-General), on behalf of the GOI, went to meet M.A. Jinnah (Pakistan's

Governor-General) in Lahore and declared that India was ready to hold a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir. Jinnah was against it because he felt that with Sheikh Abdullah running the government and the Indian Army in Kashmir, the average Muslim lacked the courage to vote for Pakistan. Jinnah also realized that the rape and pillage committed by the raiders had alienated the Kashmiris from Pakistan (Raghavan 2010: 110–11).

In response to the entry of Indian armed forces, the Pakistan Army also moved into west and northern Kashmir. When on 27 October 1947 Jinnah ordered the Pakistan Army to move into Kashmir, the Commander-in-Chief Lieutenant-General Douglas Gracey refused (Jones 2002: 67). Due to the British Government's stand down order, the British officers still serving in the Indian and Pakistan armies were not to take part in active hostilities. In late 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru (1899-May 1964) was for the Indian Army attacking Domel and Kohala. Domel controlled the roads from Pakistan to Kashmir. However, the Indian Army was unable to advance beyond Uri and the invaders' lines of communication with Pakistan over the bridges at Domel remained intact (Dasgupta 2002: 88–9). During February 1948, 1st Battalion of the Azad Kashmir Force (about 800 personnel) was deployed at Handwara. This unit was organized and equipped like a Pakistani regular battalion. Its commanding officer was Lieutenant-Colonel Nausherwan Khan who had served in the 5th Battalion of the 11th Sikh Regiment during World War II (Singh 2000: 231).

The insurgents had been able to gain some traction with the locals at least in parts of Kashmir. On the morning of 23 February 1948, 300 insurgents (mostly locals) attacked the picket of a company of the 7th Sikh at Kupwara. The headman of the Hyahom (a Pathan village) some four miles from Kupwara supported this attack. The headmen's two sons were commissioned officers in the Azad Kashmir Force and the headman's son-in-law was a deserter from the KSF. The 3-inch mortar detachment of the 7th Sikh picket, firing at a range of 150 yards, was able to beat off the attack (Singh 2000: 239). A company of 3rd Garhwal Rifles, supported by two troops of armoured cars and a section of troop carriers, advanced towards Pethahir along Trahgam Road on 18 May 1948 (Singh 2000: 260). On 18 and 19 May, two IAF planes attacked the Pakistanis as they withdrew from the Shulur Valley trying to escape towards Parthian-ki-Gali. But due to the lack of radio contact between the Indian ground troops and their aircraft, the close air support was not very effective (Singh 2000: 261). By May 1948, the Indian Army had two divisions in Kashmir. The SRI Division comprising the 161st and 163rd infantry brigades and the 77th Para Brigade, which was under Major-General K.S. Thimayya who was responsible for the Kashmir Valley. And the Jammu and Kashmir (JAK) Division under Major-General Atma Singh comprising the 50th Para, 5th, 19th and 268th infantry brigades conducted operations further south of Kashmir Valley. The two divisions were under Kulwant Singh (Singh 2001: 14).

After the capture of Tithwal on 23 May 1948, the 163rd Indian Infantry Brigade consolidated its position and prepared to advance towards Muzaffarabad. A large number of picquets were established by the 1st Sikh and by the 1st Madras on the

left and right of Tithwal. These picquets were designed to stop the ingress of the raiders and the Pakistanis to Tithwal from Keran and Muzaffarabad areas. As part of the defence of Tithwal, the ridge across Kishanganga was occupied. The Pakistani units opposed the advance of the 1st Sikh towards Mir Kalsi. On 28 May 1948, B and C companies of the 1st Sikh advanced to occupy Richhmar Gali (Pt. 7895). Their mission was not successful. On 30 May, two platoons of the D Company of 1st Sikh reinforced them and then the objective was captured. On 31 May, B Company pushed towards the next objective-Pt. 7802. And D Company advanced towards Pir Saheba, which was captured on 1 June. On the same day, the Mir Kalsi Ridge (vital for the defence of Tithwal) was captured The Pakistani counter-attack was not slow in coming. On 2 and 3 June, the Mir Kalsi Ridge was heavily shelled. The Indian troops in the ridge had failed to prepare bunkers covered with barbed wires for protection. This was a serious failure on their part. On 4 June, the Pakistani counter-attack began. The Pakistanis used 3.7-inch howitzers, 3-inch mortars, bren-guns and machine-guns to attack the Indian units. The Indian troops confronted the assaulting Pakistanis with grenades and bayonets in close-quarter combat. Cries of *Allah Hu Akbar* and *Sat Sri Akal* motivated the attackers and the defenders . The assaulting troops were both Pathan raiders and regular Pakistani troops. Meanwhile, the Indian commanders decided to strengthen the defence of Tithwal by capturing Keren. On 9 June, C and D companies of the 3rd Royal Garhwal Rifles started to move towards Keren. On 11 June, Keren was captured and then garrisoned by a company of the Jammu and Kashmir militia (Prasad and Pal 2005: 192–95).

Since May 1948, three brigades of the Pakistan Army were operating in Kashmir (Dasgupta 2002: 163). Unlike India, Pakistan did not commit the Pakistan Air Force during the 1947–48 War. Capture of the Zoji La (pass) was necessary to secure Leh (the capital of Ladakh). The Pakistanis had entrenched themselves with machine-guns and mortars. On 14 September 1948, the 77th Para Brigade with Stuart tanks of the 7th Cavalry Regiment attacked Zoji La (Singh 2001: 15–16).

On 17 December 1948, Jawaharlal Nehru noted that if India were to lose Kashmir, the position of the Muslims in India would become more difficult because Hindu communalism would spread among the citizens of India (Raghavan 2010: 101). The war was not going well for India, and Jawaharlal Nehru on Mountbatten's advice appealed to the United Nations (UN). Britain was anxious that if London sided with India, there would be an anti-British reaction throughout the strategically vital Middle East (Dasgupta 2002: 53). Mr Bevin (Britain's Foreign Secretary) and Clement Attlee (British Prime Minister of the Labour Party) were anxious that if it appeared that Britain was siding with India, the Islamic world would be alienated (Dasgupta 2002: 111). In early 1948, UK suddenly reduced India's oil supplies. This not only adversely affected India's economy but also its military operations in Kashmir (Dasgupta 2002: 134). Under the auspices of the UN, a ceasefire was arranged on 1 January 1949.

The net result was that 37% of Jammu and Kashmir's territory remained under Pakistan's occupation (Bhan 2012: 147; Jones 2002: 70). In January 1949, the

6th Battalion of the 10th Baluch Regiment garrisoned Azad Kashmir (Riza 2003: 210). Gilgit remained under Pakistan's control. The Gilgit Agency shares 50 miles of land border with Afghanistan. At Wakhan, a small strip of Afghan land separates Gilgit from USSR. Gilgit and Ladakh are about 20,000 feet high (Riza 2003: 267). When USSR took virtual control of the Sinkiang in 1935, the British Government of India took a 60 year lease of Gilgit from the Maharaja. Later, Pakistan allowed USA to mount surveillance operations on the USSR from Gilgit (Sen 1994: 22–3). One Pakistani scholar asserts that while Pakistan had sent two divisions to fight the First India-Pakistan War, India had two divisions in Jammu and two in Kashmir (Cheema 2003: 61). The total casualties of the Indian Army during the 14 month campaign numbered 1,500 killed, 3,500 wounded, and 1,000 missing (most of them were taken prisoners) (Singh 2001: 18).

Musa asserts in his memoirs:

> In my opinion, India would not have been able to fight a guerrilla war with the tribesmen, particularly when the latter were convinced they were engaged in a crusade against the Dogra rulers and their henchmen for their genocidal conduct. If the guerrilla war had been properly waged, we might not have been compelled to send a contingent of our regular troops to the valley to prevent the Indian Army from occupying the area which forms part of Azad Kashmir and to stop migration of a large number of Muslim refugees, who having been driven out of their homes, were fleeing to Pakistan. (Musa 1987: 81)

Sheikh Abdullah (father of Farooq Abdullah) became the prime minister of Jammu and Kashmir and declared his total support for India (Swami 2007: 28). However, by 1949, Sheikh Abdullah had started harping on Jammu and Kashmir independence in order to shore up his political support, which seemed to be falling among the Kashmiris (Swami 2007: 29). From time to time, again to strengthen his political support base, Sheikh Abdullah would inflame the parochial feelings of the Kashmiris (Jagmohan 2011: 107). In October 1951, Pakistan's Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated (Raghavan 2010: 10). In 1952, Jawaharlal Nehru stated publicly that if Pakistan again invaded Kashmir, then India would retaliate not only in Kashmir but elsewhere and there would be a full scale war (Ganguly 2002b: 38). In September 1954, Pakistan became a member of the US sponsored South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SENTO) (Singh 2001: 21). On 7 October 1958, President Iskander Mirza clamped martial law in Pakistan. Mirza was soon replaced by General Ayub Khan who held the Defence Minister's portfolio as well as the position of the COAS. Ayub Khan declared himself President of Pakistan (Cheema 2003: 136).

In 1962, as a result of the defeat in the China-India War, India lost some 14,000 square miles (26,000 square kilometres) of territory in North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA now Arunachal Pradesh) and Ladakh (Ganguly 2002b: 36–7). On 26 December 1962, Pakistan agreed to cede 2,500 square miles (6475 sq. km.) of territory in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK) to China. This territorial concession

enabled China to build a road linking its Xinjiang Province with Tibet. Tibet had experienced Khampa rebellion against Beijing in the 1950s. The Khampa rebels were assisted by CIA agents, and some of these agents were stationed in India. The new road enabled China to strengthen its control over Tibet (Dunham 2005; Ganguly 2002b: 33).

Just after being defeated in the China-India War (1962), India tried to negotiate the Kashmir issue with Pakistan. But despite the good offices of mediation offered by USA and UK, Pakistan, considering India's military weakness, refused to budge. On 13 August 1963, Nehru made the following statement in the Parliament as regards Kashmir:

> These talks originated from a joint statement which the President of Pakistan and I issued on November 29 1962, announcing our agreement to make a renewed effort to resolve the outstanding differences between India and Pakistan on Kashmir … so as to enable the two countries to live side by side in peace … . The discussions which I had with Mr Duncan Sandys, Minister for Commonwealth Relations of the UK and Mr Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State of the United States. In pursuance of the joint statement our delegation led by Sardar Swaran Singh, Minister of Railways, participated in six rounds of talk … . Spread over nearly five months … . Pakistan gave away as much as about two thousand square miles of our territory to China … . Pakistan claimed the catchment areas and the water-sheds of the three Western rivers, the Chenab, the Jhelum and the Indus, in Jammu and Kashmir. (*Kashmir Parliament* 1963: 1–4)

During December 1963, anti-Indian riots broke out in the Kashmir Valley following the theft of a holy relic that was believed to be a hair of the Prophet Muhammad, from the Hazratbal mosque in Srinagar (Ganguly 1996: 81). On 8 April 1964, the India Government released Sheikh Abdullah (Swami 2007: 43). On 21 December 1964, the president of India Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan issued an ordinance under which articles 356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution were extended to Jammu and Kashmir. These two articles enabled the Indian central government at Delhi to initiate President's Rule (imposition of direct administration after dissolution of the state legislative assembly) during times of crisis (Ganguly 2002b: 35). Thus, Jammu and Kashmir lost their special federal status; this measure was an attempt to strengthen the centralizing grip of India's central government over the troublesome region. In March 1965, President of Pakistan Field-Marshal Ayub Khan visited China. China firmly supported Pakistan's claim of holding a plebiscite in Kashmir (Jones 2002: 74).

By late 1964, Pakistan had developed two interrelated plans known as Operation GIBRALTAR and Operation GRANDSLAM to 'liberate' Kashmir. In accordance with Operation GIBRALTAR, armed militants would cross into the Indian part of Kashmir and instigate rebellions. They would be backed up if necessary by Operation GRANDSLAM by which Pakistan would launch a conventional operation across the international border (Jones 2002: 75). In his

autobiography, Musa asserts that he himself, Ayub Khan and the GHQ opposed the Pakistan Foreign Ministry's proposal of sending guerrillas into Indian Kashmir. In December 1964, President Ayub Khan told Musa that he would not support the plan to launch guerrillas into Indian held Kashmir. Moreover, there was no linkage, asserts Musa, between Pakistan's move in the Rann of Kutch and Operation GIBRALTAR, which was launched in August 1965 (Musa 1987: 164, 167, 171). During March-April 1965, Pakistan conducted a probing operation at the Rann of Kutch. The Rann becomes marshy for six months with the onset of the South-West Monsoon. For the rest of the year, it remains a sandy, dry saltpetre desert (Singh 1993: 87–8). Pakistan inducted two brigades of the 8th Infantry Division supported by Patton tanks and artillery from Badin into the Rann (Singh 2001: 28). A ceasefire was declared on 29 April 1965 (Singh 1993: 88).

Major-General Jogindar Singh, who was Chief of Staff Headquarters Western Command during the 1965 India-Pakistan War, asserts that the Pakistan Army was instructed by the Chinese technicians about how to conduct a People's War in Kashmir. On 5 August 1965, Operation GIBRALTAR was launched by Pakistan. Major-General A.H. Malik GOC 12th Pakistan Infantry Division at Murree was given command of this force. Each task force included a number of companies. Some Special Service Group (SSG) personnel from the 19th Para (Baluch) were attached to the columns for demolition and sabotage works. The task force was affiliated with a local Azad Kashmir battalion. The Pakistan Army also supplied the infiltrators with rations, Indian currency (so that they could live off the land) and intelligence inputs (Singh 1993: 107). The names of the columns of infiltrators and their area of operation are as follows: Tariq Force in Kargil; Qasim Force in Gurez; Khalid Force in Tithwal; F Force in Uri-Rampur; Salauddin Force in Mandi; Gulmarg and Srinagar, Nusrat Force in Rajauri-Mendhar; Ghaznavi Force in Darhal-Thanamandi-Budil; and Babar Force in Naushera-Chhamb. The total strength of these forces numbers 10,000 men (Singh 1993: 108).

Before launching Operation GIBRALTAR, the Pakistani establishment was anxious to know about the American stand in case a conventional war were to break out between India and Pakistan. On 30 April 1965, Ayub Khan's Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto asked the US ambassador to Pakistan what would be USA's stand be in case of an Indian attack against Pakistan. The US ambassador responded that the situation at Rann of Kutch was volatile and that in this probing attack, Pakistan had used equipment provided by USA to combat global Communism and refrain from fighting local or regional wars (*American Papers* 1999: 3–4).

On 5 August, two local Kashmiris who were grazing cattle in the mountainside met the first batch of infiltrators on their way to Srinagar, and they informed the local police station. In response, the Indian Army moved the 163rd Infantry Brigade from Leh to Srinagar. This brigade's duty was to deal with the infiltrators and protect the Srinagar airfield. Sri Force Headquarters was created in order to conduct counter-infiltration activities in the Kashmir Valley (Singh 1993: 108–10).

It was decided to cut off the infiltration columns by attacking their bases. Two attacks were planned: one along the Uri-Haji Pir Pass axis and the other from the

direction of Poonch. The Uri-Haji Pir thrust was to be undertaken by Brigadier Z.C. Bakshi. The code name was Operation BAKSHI. Its troops included five regiments (1st Para, 4th Rajput, 19th Punjab, 6th Jammu and Kashmir Rifles and 4th Sikh Light Infantry) of the 68th Infantry Brigade of the 19th Indian Infantry Division, one section of 4.2-inch mortars, one field regiment (less one battery), one mountain battery and one troop (four) of medium guns. Operation BAKSHI was launched on 26 August 1965. The link-up from Poonch was named as Operation FAULAD and its objective was Kahuta. Three infantry regiments (3rd Rajputana Rifles, 3rd Dogra and 2nd Sikh) from the 93rd Infantry Brigade were used. On 27 August, 1st Para captured Sank and Lediwali Gali. The Haji Pir Pass was captured on 28 August. On 29 August 1965, the Pakistani units counter-attacked in this sector (Singh 1993: 110–11). Meanwhile, the 19th Punjab captured Pathra. Bedori was captured only after stiff fighting on 29 August. However, the 4th Rajput failed to capture Basoli which would have secured the western flank of the Haji Pir Pass. On 29 August, the 6th Bihar was able to capture Mehni Gali and Jani Gali (Singh 1993: 112). By this time, Pakistani opposition was stiffening. The attack of the 3rd Dogras at Raja picquets during the night of 1–2 September failed due to inadequate artillery support. The Pakistani defenders equipped with automatic weapons in shellproof bunkers surrounded by barbed wire and mines fought well. However, during the night of 5–6 September, the 2nd Sikh was able to capture Raja picquet and the 3rd Dogra occupied Chand Tekri. Only on 10 September, the link up at Kahuta occurred. The Kishanganga River flows from the Indian part of Kashmir and enters Pakistan's Kashmir at Nekrun and in this region, the name of the river changes to Neelum River. After the capture of the Haji Pir Pass and domination of the Kishanganga Valley, the infiltrators were cut off from their bases in Pakistan and surrounded by the Indian security forces (Musharraf 2006: 57; Singh 1993: 112–13).

On 5 September 1965, the second conventional war between India and Pakistan erupted across Punjab. On 6 September 1965, Chester Bowles, US Ambassador in New Delhi, in a telegram informed the State Department: 'mass infiltration by Paks into Kashmir valley was starting point. Then Indian seizure of strategic Hazir Pir pass on Pak side of ceasefire line led to Pak retaliatory thrust into strategically sensitive area of Jammu which was followed in turn by current Indian movement against Lahore … . Only ones who will surely gain are Chinese who will support Paks verbally and possibly by some diversionary movement' (*American Papers* 1999: 15). When the US ambassador in Islamabad confronted Ayub Khan about the origin of the war having been the result of Pakistani incursion, Z.A. Bhutto retorted that the Indians had always treated Kashmir as a closed question and that was not acceptable to Pakistan (*American Papers* 1999: 17). Ayub Khan also told the American ambassador that Pakistan accepted the original ceasefire on the understanding that a final settlement would be made for Kashmir. However, Pakistan received nothing in the next 17 years (*American Papers* 1999: 25). Ayub referred to the 1947–8 India-Pakistan War over Kashmir as an unfinished war. On 7 September 1965, McConaughty, the US Ambassador in Pakistan informed the

State Department in a telegram: 'As to Kashmir problem, GOP may contemplate mutual complete Indo/Pak withdrawal from entire Kashmir, with U.N. force similar Cyprus arrangement and commitment both sides to U.N. supervised plebiscite; GOP apparently fully aware Kashmir issue cannot be settled by military force as such, but Pak may hope through anticipated early military gains to propel Indians toward political compromise which they would not consider on their own initiation' (*American Papers* 1999: 33). This war lasted 17 days (Musharraf 2006: 45). On 16 September 1965, China accused India of violating its border and gave the Indians three days to withdraw from Chinese territory and to demolish the military outposts the Indians had built there or suffer the consequences. In response, USSR accused China of aggressive intent. As a result of the counter-threat, on 22 September 1965, China announced that India had complied with its demands (Cheema 2003: 72–3).

On 26 March 1969, Ayub Khan (COAS of the Pakistan Army from 1951) resigned and General Aga Mohammad Yahya Khan (COAS of the Pakistan Army) became the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) (Ganguly 2002b: 55). In 1970, the Bengali Muslims in East Pakistan rebelled against West Pakistani domination. In August 1971, Indira Gandhi (India's Prime Minister and Nehru's daughter) signed a 20-year Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with USSR. One of the clauses of this treaty stated that if one nation was attacked by some other power, the other nation would come to its aid (Bajwa 2012: 38). On 3 December 1971, the Pakistan Air Force attacked airfields in East and West India. On 4 December, India launched an invasion of East Pakistan and on 16 December, Indira Gandhi declared a unilateral ceasefire (Bajwa 2012: 33). During the 1971 India-Pakistan War, only minor operations occurred in Jammu and Kashmir. The main front during this war was East Pakistan (later Bangladesh). Nevertheless, India did not reduce its defensive forces in Jammu and Kashmir. In the Jammu-Kashmir front, Pakistan deployed its 12th and 23rd divisions (Bajwa 2012: 43). On the Indian side, Lieutenant-General Sartaj Singh commanded the 15th Corps in Jammu and Kashmir. It comprised the 3rd, 19th, 25th, 10th and 26th Infantry divisions and the 121st Independent Infantry Brigade. The 10th Infantry Division was in charge of defending Chhamb and the 3rd Infantry Division for securing Ladakh (Bajwa 2012 165). The 121st Independent Infantry Brigade was in charge of Kargil. The 19th Infantry Division was deployed between Zoji La to Hajipur Bulge in the Pir Panjal Range and the 25th Infantry Division defended Rajauri, Poonch and Naushera. And finally, the 26th Infantry Division was in Jammu (Bajwa 2012: 166).

Indigenous Insurgency, External Support and India's COIN: 1983–2012

Political chicanery by New Delhi created a loss of legitimacy of the Indian state among the Kashmiris. During the June 1977 elections, the National Conference (NC) won 39 seats in the Kashmir Valley out of 42, seven seats from the Muslim

majority districts of Jammu region out of 32, and both seats in the Ladakh. The Janata Party won two seats in the Kashmir Valley and 11 in Jammu. The Indian National Congress (INC) was wiped out in the Kashmir Valley and in the Jammu region won 10 seats as a result of the infighting within the Janata Party (Jagmohan 2011: 107–8). On 9 July 1977, Sheikh Abdullah was sworn in as the Chief Minister. He passed away on 8 September 1982 (Jagmohan 2011: 108), but he had prepared the ground for his son Farooq Abdullah's succession, which was also supported by Indira Gandhi and Governor of Jammu and Kashmir B.K. Nehru. In 1983, Dr Farooq Abdullah's NC won the assembly elections and was installed as Chief Minister. But during the June 1983 election, serious differences occurred between the NC and the Indian National Congress, and on 2 July 1984, Abdullah was replaced. Indira Gandhi unjustly accused Farooq Abdullah of rigging the polls (Bhan 2012: 148). G.M. Shah's Ministry was dismissed by recently appointed Governor Jagmohan on 7 March 1986 and Governor's Rule was imposed. Following the Rajiv Gandhi (son of Indira Gandhi and grandson of Jawaharlal Nehru) Farooq Abdullah accord, on 7 November 1986, Dr Farooq Abdullah again was sworn in as the Chief Minister (Jagmohan 2011: 9, 108–9). The March 1987 election, which is considered the most unfair in Kashmir's history, was the initial spark behind the genesis of indigenous insurgency in the region. The disaffected populace was mobilized by using the symbolism of Islam. So, an ethno-secessionist movement acquired a religious colour. In the first phase, the insurgency was led by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). From the 1990s, the JKLF was sidelined and Hizbul Mujahideen took over the main task of conducting insurgency. During this period, the JKLF started to distance itself from the Hizbul Mujahideen's ideology.

The militants were lucky. Changes had occurred both in Pakistan and in the international scenario: On 5 July 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq replaced Z.A. Bhutto and became the President of Pakistan (Cheema 2003: 145). In the mid-1980s, the Pakistan Army started giving active support to the *tanzeem*s. Instead of directly recruiting and arming the tribal raiders as the Pakistan Army had done during 1947 and in 1965, the militant organizations were provided with arms and money. Amelie Blom calls this technique the process of sub-contracting *jihad* to the *tanzeem*s; it had worked with great benefits in Afghanistan during the 1980s (Blom 2009: 135, 137). The number of *tanzeem*s operating in Kashmir rose from a dozen in the early 1990s to more than 50 during the middle of the penultimate decade of the twentieth century (Blom 2009: 135). Since the late 1980s, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan became the principal instrument for funding and training insurgents. In 1993, the ISI spent US$ 3.3 million per month on the Kashmiri militants (Talbot 2002: 313). In 1992, the ISI operated 13 permanent, 18 temporary and 8 joint military training camps for the Kashmiri youths. About 3,800 Kashmiri militants were trained in these camps. By 1993, some 20,000 young Kashmiris were trained and equipped by the ISI ready to be pushed into Kashmir (Mir 2006: 5). During June 2004, the Indian intelligence agencies assessed that the largest terrorist training camp was located at the Jangal-Mangal area, where about

300 terrorists were being trained (Mir 2006: 8). Thanks to the ISI, the divisional and area commanders of the insurgents were given satellite phones to maintain communications not only with their Pakistani sponsors across the LOC but also with their associates in cities within India like Aligarh, Ahmedabad, Mumbai and Kolkata (Jamwal 2003: 387).

A brief glance at the various *tanzeem*s which operated in Kashmir from the last two decades of the twentieth century would be appropriate here. The Al-Barq (ABQ) was formed in 1990. Its strength was about 350 personnel (including 20 foreigners). During 1994, some 300 veteran Afghan *mujahideen* were in the ranks of this organization. The objective of this outfit is liberation of Kashmir and establishment of Islamic rule (Santhanam et al., 2003: 55, 59). This organization disposed of some 100 AK Series rifles. The ISI used to provide some Rs 700,000 per month for hiring the foreign mercenaries (Santhanam et al., 2003: 57). Another *tanzeem* known as Al Faran was built by the ISI by the criminals released from the jails in Pakistan (Roychowdhury 2002: 57). The Al Fateh force came into existence in February 1994 at Bandipur in Baramula District. At that time, it comprised some 35 personnel with 30 AK Series rifles, machine-guns, rockets, etc. Its objective was the merger of Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan (Santhanam et al., 2003: 61, 63).

Like the democratic political parties of South Asia, the *jihadi* groups underwent frequent splits and mergers. The Harkat-ul-Ansar (HUA) came into existence during October and November 1993. The HUA is the successor of Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami International (HUJI), a pan Islamic terrorist outfit which was floated in 1980 by Jamaat-ul-Ulemah-e-Islam and Tabligh Jamaat of Pakistan. The HUJI was actually the end product of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HKUM) and Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen (JUM). The HKUM was banned by the US in 1997 because of its HKUM's association with Osama Bin Laden. Its headquarters was at Rawalpindi. Its cadre strength comprised 800 Pakistan and Afghan trained militants including 300 to 350 foreigners. The HUA's aim was to establish the global supremacy of Islam and force the Muslims to follow the *Shariat*. Its weapons store included 50 LMGs, 50 rocket launchers, 10 sniper rifles, 100 pistols/revolvers and a sizeable amount of explosives. The HUA established its cells in Bangladesh, Myanmar, United Kingdom, Bosnia and Tajikistan. Its recruits included Tajiks, Burmese, Bosnians, Bangladeshis, Kashmiris, Pakistanis and Afghans. The Myanmar unit located in the Arakan trains the Burmese Muslims in handling arms and explosives and in guerrilla warfare. This *tanzeem* had links with the Ittehad-e-Islami of Somalia that fought against the US Peacekeeping Force. In 1994, the Hamas of Palestine extended support to HUA and sent a delegation to attend the latter organization's annual conference at Lahore. Between 1991 and 1996, ISI's funding of HUA rose from 1.5 lakhs to 27 lakhs per month (150,000 to 270,000) (Mir 2006: 48; Santhanam et al., 94–105).

The Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM), a splinter group of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, was formed on 31 January 2000. The ISI occasionally encourages division among the *jihadi* groups to ensure some control over them. On 13 December 2001, the JEM carried out a daring attack against the Indian Parliament in New

Delhi. General Pervez Musharraf (then President of Pakistan) banned this group. However, JEM's leader Maulana Masood Azhar (famous for his oratorical skill and was also a reputed scholar) registered his group under a new name: Khudam-ul-Islam (Mir 2006: 47–9). Masood Azhar was an alumnus of the Binori *madrasa* in Karachi. He learned his anti-Americanism and anti-Shia philosophy at the feet of men like Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, the founder of anti-Iran anti-Shia Sipah-e-Sahaba. The Darul Uloom Islamia Binori Town mosque is one of the most influential centres of Deobandi Sunni ideology. This mosque had led the anti-Ahmadiya and anti-Shia movements in Pakistan for the last half a century. Many leaders of the Taliban also came from Binori *madrasa*. Several leaders of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan are also drawn from this mosque. In fact, Azhar proclaimed the formation of the JEM at Binori mosque (Mir 2006: 54). Thus, we see that *jihad* in Kashmir was interrelated with the global *jihad*.

The JEM itself also suffered from splits during its lifetime. In October 2001, *Amir* (leader) Maulana Abdullah Shah Mazhar left JEM and founded a new outfit named Jamaat-ul-Furqa. He was soon joined by *Nazim* (Commander of Military Affairs) Maulana Abdul Jabbar (alias Maulana Umer Farooq) and 12 other commanders from JEM. Mazhar was nominated as *Nazim-i-Ala* (Chief Organizer) of the Jaamat (Mir 2006: 50).

The Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) is a Wahabi *jihadi* group, formed in 1986 by Hafiz Mohammad Saeed as the military wing of the Markaz Dawa Wal Irshad (Centre for Religious Learning and Social Welfare). The LET joined the *jihad* in Afghanistan in 1989 when the Soviet troops were already pulling out. The LET then turned its attention to Kashmir. The LET is the most important group to operate from Azad Kashmir. Its two training camps are Muaskar-e-Toiba and Muaskar-e-Aqsa at Muzaffarabad, the capital of Azad Kashmir (Mir 2006: 61–2). The LET's congregations are dominated by the lower middle class (traders, merchants and small government officials) and peasants from parts of Punjab and some from the North-West Frontier Province. The annual congregations serve as indicators of the size and support base of the organization. The LET in the congregations narrate success stories of the *jihad* and shared experience of waging holy war across the world. These stories explain the bravery, sacrifice and success of the martyrs and further motivate the potential recruits to join the rank of this organization. In these congregations, the concept of Muslim *ummah* is also propagated. Finally, these congregations also function as important international media events (Shafqat 2002: 131–2).

As early as 1989, Osama Bin Laden declared a *jihad* in Kashmir. During the 1990s, he extended support to Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HKUM), Harkat-ul-Jihadi-Islami (HUJI), HUA, Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) *tanzeem*s (Santhanam et al., 2003: 25). From the mid-1990s, the Afghan *mujahideen* also entered the fray in a big way (Suri 2012: 61).

Among the Pakistani volunteers fighting the *jihad* in Kashmir, the Punjabis (from Pakistan's Punjab, that is, pre-1947 West Punjab) dominate (Shafqat 2002: 145). Interestingly, the Pakistan Army also draws most of its personnel from the

Pakistani portion of Punjab (Talbot 2002: 315–16). During 1999–2000, according to the Government of India's Ministry of Defence's estimate, more than 70% of the insurgents who operated in Kashmir were of foreign origins (*MODAR 1999–2000*: 2). That the *mehman* (foreign guest) *mujahideen* were hardliners did not really gel with the Kashmiri Muslims. Islam had come to Kashmir during the 14th century and this religion was spread mostly by the Sufis (Jha 2003: 16). About 64% of Jammu and Kashmir's Muslims are converts. And they have retained several aspects of their previous Hindu lifestyles (Hewitt 2001: 13). The Muslims of Kashmir Valley practice a syncretic version of Islam that is different from the hardline Islamic version (Jha 2003: 15). Thus, the Kashmiris follow a set of cultural values which could be categorized as *Kashmiriyat*. Further, the Afghan *mujahideen* fighting in Kashmir abused the local Kashmiris, especially the Kashmiri women and this alienated local support and resulted in a positive development for the Indian state (Suri 2011: 70).

Youths joined the insurgency for a mix of reasons. Many joined to wage *jihad;* for them, *jihad* means to kill as many Hindus as possible. A few joined because possessing Kalashnikov rifles makes them feel powerful, respected and feared among the masses. Unemployment also pushed the youth towards militancy. In 1993, there were more than 100,000 unemployed youth who were ready material for militancy (Rao 2001: 480). At times, forced recruitment occurred. Senior insurgent commanders visited villages and the parents of youths aged between 15 and 17 years were threatened into handing over at least one child from each house for the cause of *jihad* (Jamwal 2003: 384). The forced recruitment of child soldiers is not uncommon in South Asia. The Nepali Maoists and the LTTE also forcibly recruited minors (Becker 2010).

By December 1989, due to the threats posed by the *jihadi*s, 200,000 Hindus fled from the Kashmir Valley. Some 400,000 personnel of the Indian Army and other paramilitary forces were deployed in Kashmir (Ganguly 1996: 76). From the late 1980s, India was not able to follow the tactics of launching conventional strikes against Pakistan across the international border which it had followed in 1947–48 and again in 1965 in tackling cross-border terrorism caused by the induction of nuclear weapons in Pakistan's arsenal. This in turn encouraged the insurgents as well as their Pakistani backers to conduct insurgency with greater vigour. On 18 January 1990, Farooq Abdullah resigned as Chief Minister (Jagmohan 2011: 110). Jagmohan, who served as Governor of Jammu and Kashmir twice (26 April 1984 to 12 July 1989 and 19 January 1990 to 26 May 1990), accused the Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah of encouraging the secessionist force in the Kashmir Valley in early 1990 (Jagmohan 2011: 1–3). On 30 January 1990, Jagmohan, Governor of Jammu and Kashmir, in his letter to the President of India noted: 'Dissolve the State Assembly immediately and hold elections after six months or so' (Jagmohan 2011: 33).

The insurgency reached its height in 1990. The militants were able to subvert a portion of the Kashmir State Police. There was a mutiny in the police in the first half of 1990. A rumour spread among the police that in the outskirts of Srinagar,

a constable of the Jammu and Kashmir Armed Police was killed by the Indian Army. A batch of 500 policemen started a procession to the local UN office and presented a memorandum demanding action against their SP, revival of the police union, and reinstatement of those who had been dismissed from the service. Instigated by the insurgents, the policemen started to fire into the air. The Indian Army units surrounded the police lines. Then, the mutinous police surrendered and after an enquiry, the ringleaders among the police were dismissed from service (Rao 2001: 436). Large-scale searching of the houses in Srinagar by the police in early 1990 also alienated the masses (Jagmohan 2011: 10). General K.V. Krishna Rao, who was appointed as Governor of Jammu and Kashmir on 1 July 1989, noted: 'As far as the Pakistani media was concerned, they were pouring out venom all the time. Unfortunately, as our television programme was either unimaginative or failed to reach them, most of the people used to watch Pak TV' (Rao 2001: 442). In 1990, Indian television continued to telecast scenes of the ethnic revolts in Azerbaijan and the Rumanian Liberation Movement. This further inflamed the masses (especially the youth) and strengthened the secessionist force in the Kashmir Valley (Jagmohan 2011: 12).

Following the Kautilyan policy of 'divide and rule' by providing money, employment and social status, New Delhi was able to co-opt some of the insurgents who happened to be Kashmiri Muslims. Some of them formed an organization, Ikhwan-e-Muslimeen, which was headed by Kukka Parray, a former insurgent leader. They worked in concert with the security forces to hunt down their former comrades (Ganguly 2002a: 189). Krishna Rao, the General turned Governor of Kashmir, notes in his autobiography about the co-option policy that operated in 1996:

> For some time past, we had been encouraging militants to surrender to the authorities. A surrender policy was promulgated which included provision of jobs for the surrenderees to the extent possible, vocational training for self-employment, provisions of loan for self-employment, sympathetic handling of cases against militants in accordance with the rule of law, and so on. Based on this, quite a number of militants had been surrendering. Operations of course continued against the hardcore militants. (Rao 2001: 520)

General Shankar Roychowdhury COAS of the Indian Army (November 1994 – 30 September 1997) notes the following duties of the military personnel in Kashmir:

> In Kashmir, the Indian Army was deployed in two separate but closely interlinked conflicts. One flickered along and across the LOC involving exchanges of intense artillery, missile, mortar and automatic fire between the regular armies of India and Pakistan along with almost daily clashes between our border patrols and *mujahideen* attempting to infiltrate into the Valley. The other was the counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism in the hinterland of the Valley against militant Islamic *tanzeems*, and their overground organizations. (Roychowdhury 2002: 44)

During Roychowdhury's tenure, there was an attempt to induct US Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) into the Indian Army for checking unauthorized crossings across the LOC. The UAVs were taken from Delhi to the Indian Air Force base at Awantipur near Srinagar for test overflights over actual terrain. The UAVs were not designed to operate at very high altitudes. But in Kashmir, the average mountain peaks are at least 10,000 to 12,000 feet high. Again, limitations on the manoeuvrability of the UAVs prevented low-level search missions across the meandering valleys (such as Warwan) which were used by the insurgents (Roychowdhury 2002: 62).

About 2,213 insurgents were killed during 1990 and 1992. In 1993, 1,300 militants were killed and 4,780 militants were apprehended. In 1993, 195 security personnel lost their lives (Rao 2001: 469). It was estimated that in 1993, there were more than 10,000 militants in Kashmir and about 1,000 foreign mercenaries (mainly Afghan *mujahideen*) ready to enter from POK (Rao 2001: 473). In 1995, the Indian intelligence discovered that a large number of foreign mercenaries of Harkat-ul-Ansar equipped with sophisticated weapons and communication systems were about to enter into Kashmir from Pakistan (Rao 2001: 485). The insurgents started using programmed time devices attached to the improvised explosive devices. The programmed time devices could be set from seven and half minutes to 365 days (Rao 2001: 488). In 1995, 1,332 militants were killed and 3,288 militants were arrested. Of the latter, 601 militants surrendered to the security forces. 1995 witnessed the death of 234 security force personnel (Rao 2001: 514–15).

To implement urban counter-insurgency in Srinagar, the BSF was used even though it not was originally constituted for this purpose. Moreover, the BSF was neither oriented nor trained for such a task. The BSF was suited for guarding the borders (Roychowdhury 2002: 217–18). Between 1994 and 1999, the BSF had reduced the highly unsuccessful house-to-house searches (Hewitt 2001: 2). The Assam Rifles were also deployed in Kashmir. General Roychowdhury notes in his autobiography that the junior officers of the Assam Rifles displayed more initiative than their counterparts in the Indian Army (Roychowdhury 2002: 227). One author claims that by 1999, not much enthusiasm was left among the Kashmiris for an independent Kashmir (Hewitt 2001: 4). The sudden lull in Kashmir was broken by Pakistani incursion in Kargil in 1999.

The Kargil and Drass hills are more than 15 km inside the Indian part of the LOC (Blom 2002: 287). The town of Kargil is five miles within the Indian side of the LOC (Lavoy 2010a: 1). While Drass is 10,000 feet high, Tiger Hill and Tololing are 15,000 feet above the sea level. The sub-conventional Kargil War was fought from May to July 1999 on a 200 kilometre front across Mashkoh, Kaksar, Bimbar, Batalik, Yaldor, Turtok and Saltoro Ridge, which marks the western flank of the Siachen Glacier. The war was fought on one of the world's most inhospitable battlefields. The harsh and cruel landscape is characterized by windchill and knife-edged ridges. Both sides maintained summer posts for launching patrols and these posts were withdrawn from November to May because of the onset of winter and

heavy snowfall. During winter, the Westerlies bring 10 to 60 feet of snow and cause frequent avalanches (*Kargil Committee Report* 2000: 16–7). In general, India used to move two brigades from Leh to the Srinagar Valley each winter (Musharraf 2006: 88). However, during the subzero temperatures, the Pakistani troops were able to move into the Kargil sector. Personnel of the 12th Northern Light Infantry crossed the LOC during February 1999 and lost 13 men to avalanches. They suffered from lack of water and lived in igloos (*Kargil Committee Report* 2000: 20). A diary entry by one of the personnel notes: 'The weather cruelest, harshest and most nasty. Disappointed to the lowest ebb of hope and courage. No mercy from Allah Almighty received yet despite five days of rigorous treatment. Cry in the desert' (*Kargil Committee Report* 2000: 20–21).

In May 1999, when the Indian units reoccupied the posts vacated during winter, they found that infiltrators were commanding the heights above the strategic National Highway IA which climbs up from the Kashmir Valley to Ladakh. The Pakistani infiltrators were able to intrude five to nine kilometers deep within the LOC undetected. The Indian troops had to ascend the cliffs with pitons and rope laden with arms, ammunition and essential supplies under cover of darkness in the rarefied deoxygenated atmosphere to silence the *sangar*s. When the incursion at Kargil was noted by the Indian security agencies, the GOI went for vertical escalation. In other words, air power was used to contain the incursion. However, high-speed combat aircraft with limited turning circles were not so useful in the narrow valleys (*Kargil Committee Report* 2000: 17–20). The IAF's operation was named Safed Sagar (White Sea). It was the first air combat in world history which occurred at 15,000 feet altitude (Singh 1999: 401). The total number of sorties flew by the IAF were: fighters-1,730 sorties; transport aircraft-3,427 sorties and helicopters-2,474 sorties. In total, the IAF lost three craft: A MIG-21 and a MI-17 were lost to SAMs launched by the Pakistani soldiers and a MIG-27 was lost due to engine failure. Five aircrews lost their lives (*MODAR 1999–2000*: 34). For India, Kargil was the first televised war, as Vietnam was for the US middle class. The viewers watched live as the bodies of the dead soldiers wrapped in tricolor were carried back to their homes for the last rites (*Kargil Committee Report* 2000: 20). Kargil was the second war between two nuclear armed antagonists in world history. The first such was the Sino-Soviet border war of March 1969 over Damanskii Island in the Ussuri River (Lavoy 2010a: 1; Singh 1999: 391).

Pervez Musharraf the COAS of the Pakistan Army (appointed COAS by Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif in October 1998) claims in his memoir that Sharif was briefed about the Kargil Operation. On 3 July 1999, Nawaz Sharif flew to USA. Before the departure of Sharif to USA, Musharraf told the Prime Minister that the military situation was in favour of Pakistan. On 4 July 1999, Sharif capitulated at Washington. Musharaff claims in his autobiography that during the Kargil crisis neither India nor Pakistan came to the brink of nuclear war. The official report of casualties of the Indian Army for the Kargil War was 600 KIA and 1,500 wounded. Musharraf asserts that the real figures for Indian casualties are double that number (Musharraf 2006: 97–8, 109, 163). Musharraf offers his own rationale

for activating the incursion at Kargil: 'We had both wanted to put Kashmir firmly on the world's radar screen, politically as well as militarily. The Kargil initiative succeeded in doing so. Yet when external political pressure forced Nawaz Sharif to vacate the liberated area, he broke down. Rather than deriving strength from national solidarity, he blamed the army and tried to make himself look clean' (Musharraf 2006: 136). Musharraf, like Musa, blithely supports Pakistan's policy of supporting cross-border terrorism in Kashmir in the following: 'The Pakistani people are emotionally and sentimentally attached to their Kashmiri brethren. Dozens of support groups sprang up all over the country, prepared to join the *jihad* against the Indian Army' (Musharraf 2006: 276).

Previously, India's policy was that in cases of incursion by Pakistan in Kashmir, New Delhi would retaliate massively by crossing across the international boundary at a point of its own choice. The nuclear balance between India and Pakistan prevented India from horizontally escalating the conflict during the Kargil episode. Pakistan's policy of 'bleeding India to death through a strategy of thousand cuts' by sponsoring insurgency in Kashmir seems to be working well (Racine 2002: 200). Just after the Kargil episode, insurgency got another spurt in Kashmir. Between 124 and 194 insurgents were killed per month by the security forces. During September and October 2000, 368 insurgents were eliminated by the Indian Army (*MODAR 2000–2001*: 20–21). Between 1990 and 2001, the total fatalities of the proxy war in Kashmir exceeded 25,000 (Blom 2002: 284).

On 12 October 1999, Nawaz Sharif removed Pervez Musharraf from the post of COAS and appointed General Ziauddin (a military engineer) of ISI as his successor. Musharraf initiated a coup and replaced Sharif (Cheema 2002: 151). In April 2005, Musharraf as President of Pakistan, visited India to meet with Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh. Singh said that he could not accept redrawing the border. Musharraf responded that he could not accept the LOC as permanent. Musharraf notes in his autobiography that there needs to be a solution that is acceptable to India, Pakistan, and the people of Kashmir (Musharraf 2006: 300–301). Such a tripartite 'solution' remains a chimera.

Three major political initiatives have been floated by different political parties in recent times: The NC (Farooq Abdullah and his son Omar Abdullah) demands autonomy, the People's Democratic Party want self-rule, and the INC emphasizes increased cross-Line of Control interactions.

In the new millennium, Jammu and Kashmir has a population of over 40,000,000 Muslims and there are 10,000,000 Muslims in the rest of India (Rao 2001: 432). The British political scientist Vernon Hewitt raises a very important issue: Political commentators and scholars rarely show concern about Azad Kashmir. The inhabitants of this region felt threatened by the Muslim Punjabis, Pathans and Mohajirs. The people of this region are denied any adult franchise and democratic rights for a say at the national level (Hewitt 2001: 4–5). Within the Indian part of Kashmir, the Buddhist inhabitants of Ladakh believe that the politicians of the Kashmir Valley who dominate the state legislative assembly do not care much for their region. Ladakh is demanding greater autonomy from

Srinagar (Hewitt 2001: 11). In response, the GOI set up Leh Autonomous Hill Development Council on 3 September 1995 (Rao 2001: 502).

Conclusion

India's acquisition of Muslim-dominated Kashmir just after the partition of the subcontinent was considered unjust by Pakistan. To this day, Pakistan has never reconciled with the merger of the Muslim majority province of Jammu and Kashmir to the Indian Union. In accordance with Pakistan's two-nations theory, the Muslim majority provinces should belong to themselves. Moreover, Pakistan believed that the Dogra (Hindu) ruler Maharaja Hari Singh had no right to sign the legal documents for merging the state with India during late 1947. In contrast, the retention of Jammu and Kashmir is considered essential by Indian strategic managers in order to strengthen the multi-cultural and multi-religious values of independent India. During 1947 and 1948 and in 1965, Pakistan pushed infiltrators into Jammu and Kashmir to encourage the Kashmiris to rebel against India. However, the Kashmiris remained at least neutral or at best loyal to the Indian state. The consequences of these two infiltrations also contributed to causing two conventional wars between India and Pakistan. However, since the late 1980s, for a variety of reasons, an indigenous insurgency developed in Kashmir on a massive scale, and Pakistan whole-heartedly supported the insurgents.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the rise of hardline Islamist guerrillas along with the CIA's policy of supporting them resulted in upsurge of the insurgency in Kashmir since the late 1980s. The rise of Islamic insurgency in Bosnia and Chechnya further encouraged the Islamist insurgency in Kashmir. Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear technology established a balance of terror in the subcontinent. As India's conventional superiority is nullified, Pakistan went whole hog supporting the *jihadi*s. In the beginning of the second decade of the new millennium, although Pakistani support continues, the Indian security forces (for the time being) have been able to gain an upper hand over the *jihadi*s. In this new millennium, the ordinary Kashmiris are tired of the insurgency conducted mostly by the foreign insurgents in their name. And this seems to be the only ray of hope for India.

References

Bajwa, Major-General Kuldip Singh (2012). *India-Pakistan War 1971: Military Triumph and Political Failure*. New Delhi: Har-Anand.

Becker, Jo (2010) 'Child Recruitment in Burma, Sri Lanka, and Nepal', in Scott Gates and Simon Reich (eds), *Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States.* Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.Bhan, Ashok (2012). 'Jammu and Kashmir: Is the Violence Returning?', in D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari

(eds), *Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2011: The Promise and Threat of Transformation*. London/New York/New Delhi: Routledge, pp. 147–72.

Blom, Amelie (2002). 'The "Multi-Vocal State": The Policy of Pakistan on Kashmir', in Christophe Jaffrelot (ed.), *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation?* New Delhi: Manohar, pp. 283–309.

Blom, Amelie (2009). 'A Patron-Client Perspective on Militia-State Relations: The Case of the Hizb-ul-Mujahidin of Kashmir', in Laurent Gayer and Christophe Jaffrelot (eds), *Armed Militants of South Asia: Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists*, tr. by Cynthia Schoch, Gregory Elliott and Roger Leverdier. New Delhi: Foundation Books, pp. 135–56.

Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal (2003). *The Armed Forces of Pakistan*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. Originally published in 2002.

Dasgupta, C (2002). *War and Diplomacy in Kashmir: 1947–48*. New Delhi/ Thousand Oaks/London: Sage.

Dunham, Mikel (2005). *Buddha's Warriors: The Story of the CIA-Backed Tibetan Freedom Fighters, the Chinese Invasion, and the Ultimate Fall of Tibet*. New Delhi: Penguin. Originally published in 2004.

From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report, 1999 (2000). New Delhi: Sage.

Ganguly, Sumit (1996). 'Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay', *International Security*, vol. 21, no. 2 (1996), pp. 76–107.

Ganguly, Sumit (2002a). 'The Islamic Dimensions of the Kashmir Insurgency', in Christophe Jaffrelot (ed.), *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation?* New Delhi: Manohar, pp. 179–93.

Ganguly, Sumit (2002b). *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tension since 1947*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Hewitt, Vernon (2001). *Towards the Future? Jammu and Kashmir in the 21st Century*. Cambridge: Portland Books.

Jagmohan (2011). *My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir*. New Delhi: Allied. Originally published in 1991.

Jamwal, N.S (2003). 'Terrorists' Modus Operandi in Jammu and Kashmir', *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 382–403.

Jha, Prem Shankar (2003). *Kashmir 1947: The Origins of a Dispute*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Jones, Owen Bennett (2002). *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*. New Delhi: Viking.

Kashmir, Prime Minister Nehru's Statement in Parliament, 13 August 1963. New Delhi: Information Service of India, n.d.

Lavoy, Peter (2010a). 'Introduction: The Importance of the Kargil Conflict', in Peter R. Lavoy (ed.), *Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 1–37. Originally published in 2009.

Ministry of Defence Government of India Annual Report 1999–2000. New Delhi: Ministry of Defence.

Ministry of Defence Government of India Annual Report 2000–2001. New Delhi: Ministry of Defence.

Mir, Amir (2006). *The True Face of Jehadis: Inside Pakistan's Network of Terror*. New Delhi: Lotus.

Musa H.J., General Mohammad (1987). *Jawan to General: Recollections of a Pakistani Soldier*. Karachi: East & West Publishing Company. Originally published in 1984.

Musharraf, Pervez (2006). *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir*. New York: Free Press.

Prasad, S.N. and Pal, Dharam (2005). *History of Operations in Jammu & Kashmir: 1947–48*. Dehra Dun: Natraj in association with the Ministry of Defence, Government of India.

Racine, Jean-Luc (2002). 'Pakistan and the "India Syndrome": Between Kashmir and the Nuclear Predicament', in Christophe Jaffrelot (ed.), *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation?* New Delhi: Manohar, pp. 195–227.

Raghavan, Srinath (2010). *War and Peace in Modern India*. Ranikhet: Permanent Black.

Rao, K.V. Krishna (2001). *In the Service of the Nation: Reminiscences*. New Delhi: Viking.

Riza, Major-General Shaukat (2003). *The Pakistan Army: 1947–1949*. DehraDun: Natraj. Originally published in 1977.

Roychowdhury, General Shankar (2002). *Officially at Peace: Reflections on the Army and its Role in Troubled Times*. New Delhi: Viking.

Santhanam, K, Sreedhar, Saxena and Manish (2003). *Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir: A Portrait Gallery*. New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses and Sage.

Sen, Lieutenant-General L.P. (1994). *Slender was the Thread: Kashmir Confrontation 1947–48*. New Delhi: Orient Longman. First published in 1969.

Shafqat, Saeed (2002). 'From Official Islam to Islamism: The Rise of Dawat-ul-Irshad and Lashkar-e-Toiba', in Christophe Jaffrelot (ed.), *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation?* New Delhi: Manohar, pp. 131–47.

Singh, Lieutenant-General Harbakhsh (2000). *In the Line of Duty: A Soldier Remembers*. New Delhi: Lancer.

Singh, Major-General Jagjit (2001). *With Honour & Glory: Wars Fought by India 1947–1999*. New Delhi: Lancer.

Singh, Jasjit (1999). 'Pakistan's Fourth War for Kashmir', in *Asian Strategic Review: 1998–9*. New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, pp. 376–414.

Singh, Major-General Jogindar (1993). *Behind the Scene: An Analysis of India's Military Operations, 1947–1971*.New Delhi: Lancer.

Suri, Kavita (2011). 'J&K: Return to Violence?', in D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2010: Growing Left-wing Extremism and Religious Violence*. London/New York/New Delhi: Routledge, pp. 67–90.

Suri, Kavita (2012). 'Jammu & Kashmir: Upsurge', in D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2011: The Promise and Threat of Transformation*. London/New York/New Delhi: Routledge, pp. 61–83.

Swami, Praveen (2007). *India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947–2004*. Oxon/New York: Routledge.

Talbot, Ian (2002). 'Does the Army shape Pakistan's Foreign Policy?', in Christophe Jaffrelot (ed.), *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation?* New Delhi: Manohar, pp. 311–35.

The American Papers: Secret and Confidential, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh Documents, 1965–1973, Compiled and Selected by Roedad Khan, Introduced by Jamshed Marker (1999). Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Varshney, Ashutosh (1991). 'India, Pakistan, and Kashmir', *Asian Survey*, vol. 31, no. 11, pp. 997–1019.

This page has been left blank intentionally

Chapter 5
Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies in Pakistan

Introduction

About 2.3% of the world's population lives in Pakistan. Its population rose from 110 million in 1991 to 140 million in 2000 and is increasing by an estimated 3.2 million per year. The number of scientists and engineers per 10,000 people in 1997 was 72, compared to 149 in its bigger counterpart India (Mukherji 2003: 181). Pakistan's population is 77% Sunni and 20% Shia (Lakshman 2008: 47). Like India, it is afflicted with insurgencies in different regions and since 1970, its army has been conducting COIN in varied ecological landscapes. In this chapter, we analyze three important areas where the Pakistan Army had conducted COIN: East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), Baluchistan (also Balochistan), and North-West Pakistan (known as Federally Administered Tribal Areas [FATA] and the North-West Frontier Province [NWFP]). At present, the Pakistani security forces are conducting COIN in two of these regions. First, let us focus on East Pakistan.

East Pakistan: 1971

> In 1971 Pakistan Army was the superior military force. A peace loving unarmed Bengali nation transformed itself into fighters and fought the mighty Pakistan Army. We broke the morale and destroyed the Pakistan Army to such an extent that they wanted to surrender almost without a fight when Indian Army chipped in the battle. The Indian Army did help us in our fight but the claim that the Pakistan Army surrendered en masse just because Indian Army came to help us is not true. (Ahmed 2000: 2)

From its very inception, Pakistan has been dominated by a triple alliance between the Punjabi army, bureaucracy and feudal landlords. East Pakistan, which hosted 53% of Pakistan's population, was more populous than West Pakistan. East Pakistan had a substantial (15%) Hindu minority population (Cohen 2005: 46, 67). The declaration of Urdu as a national language and the administrative dominance of non-Bengalis with their haughty conduct led to language riots in the early 1950s. This increased the friction between the eastern and western wings of Pakistan and also tension between the centre and the province (Qureshi 2002: 13). On 21 February 1952, four Bengali youths (Salam, Barkat, Rafique and Jabbar) died

during the language movement that demanded recognition of the Bengali language as one of the official languages of Pakistan along with Urdu. After this incident, 21 February every year is celebrated as the Language Movement Day (Ahmed 2000: 18). In 1954, the Muslim League was in decline on both wings of Pakistan. Field-Marshal Ayub Khan as President of Pakistan followed an economic policy which proved negative for East Pakistan. The industrial licensing policy favoured the West Pakistani businessmen over the local entrepreneurs (Cohen 2005: 7, 67).

In February 1969, Major-General Muzaffaruddin of the GOC 14th Infantry Division was the Martial Law Administrator in East Pakistan. When Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was in West Pakistan, the COAS General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan assured him that if the Awami League were to proceed with an anti-Ayub campaign, the army would remain neutral. On 25 March 1969, Ayub Khan resigned and Yahya Khan became the Chief Martial Law Administrator [CMLA] (Siddiqi 2004: 1–2, 13).

There were two powerful political parties in East Pakistan: the Awami League and the National Awami Party. Dacca was the stronghold of the Awami League and the National Awami Party was powerful among the peasants in the countryside and in the labour dominated (mostly railway men) northern districts of Rangpur and Saidpur. One Pakistani officer notes that there was a 60:40 ratio between these two parties. The National Awami Party suffered from lack of discipline and organizational chaos. Moreover, the party was divided along ideological lines. The extreme left faction was represented by Toha, Allauddin, and Abdul Matin, and the moderates were represented by Mashiur Rahman. The student organization known as the East Pakistan Students' Union was divided between the pro-Beijing faction of Rashid K. Menon and the pro-Moscow faction of Mrs Motia Choudhry. The third important party was the Pakistan Democratic Party, but it had few followers. The Jamaat-i-Islami stood for Muslim solidarity and the adoption of an Islamic Constitution and was well organized but marginalized in the overall political landscape (Siddiqi 2004: 23).

In November 1969, Bengali versus non-Bengali riots broke out in Dacca. The traditional trouble spots like Mirpur and Muhammadpur – predominantly Bihari areas – had been scenes of police firing (Siddiqi 2004: 30). The Muslims who had migrated into the eastern part of Bengal from Bihar before 1947 were known as Bihari Muslims. Because of their language and cultural affinity, they were closer to the West Pakistanis and were separate from the mainstream Bengali Muslim nationalism. The Bihari Muslims lived in closely knit communities in Saidpur, Parbatipur, and Santhahar, in certain localities of Dacca, and in some other towns of East Pakistan, where they dominated the railway service (Qureshi 2002: 9). On 19 November 1970, East Pakistan's coastal belt and the offshore islands were struck by a devastating cyclone which killed some 150,000 people. Despite Admiral Ahsan's (Governor of East Pakistan) pleas, Lieutenant-General Sahibzada Mohammad Yaqub-Khan, who was responsible for the defence of the province against external attacks, was reluctant to spare troops for relief work. Mujib was able to exploit the feelings of alienation of the Bengali Muslims due

to the indifference and ineffectiveness of the West Pakistani administrators. Some Pakistani military officers claim that the army did indeed engage in relief work (Siddiqi 2004: 46–7; Qureshi 2002: 10).Of the 300 elected seats in Pakistan, the Awami League won 160 out of 162 seats for East Pakistan and the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) of Z.A. Bhutto won 81 out of 138 seats allocated to West Pakistan. Bhutto won his biggest majority in Punjab, from where 75% of the rank and file of the Pakistan Army came. The Awami League, despite being a regional party, emerged as the single largest party at the national level; it had acquired the legal power to frame a national Constitution and run the central government for the next five years. Such a situation was not acceptable to the West Pakistani politicians, the Pakistan Army, or the West Pakistani civil servants who dominated the civilian bureaucracy. It must be noted that the Pakistan Army and the civil service were dominated by the Punjabi Muslims. Bhutto and his party made contacts with certain generals (like Gul Hassan) and others to mobilize support against Mujib and the Awami League (Siddiqi 2004: 50, 52–3). On 31 August 1970, Colonel Hakeem Arshad Qureshi took command of the 26th Frontier Force (FF) Regiment located at Saidpur in East Pakistan. He writes that Pakistan's intelligence agencies failed to anticipate such a landslide victory on part of the Awami League. Qureshi continues that the Awami League used strongarm tactics and threatened ordinary Bengali Muslim families to vote for the party. Moreover, asserts Qureshi, the Bengali Muslims in the civil administration also cooperated with the Awami League (Qureshi 2002: 3, 8, 10, 12)

Mujibur Rahman claimed that the election results were, in effect, a referendum for his six points that confined the jurisdiction of the Federal Government to defence and foreign affairs and proposed separate currencies for East and West Pakistan. Each wing was to possess their own paramilitary forces and formulate their own fiscal policies (Qureshi 2002: 9). The Awami League openly defied authority from January 1971 onwards (Singh 1991: 67). Instead of allowing Mujib to form the government immediately, which was not acceptable to Z.A. Bhutto, Yahya Khan also started to manoeuvre for a place for himself in the future political set-up that was to be established. Bhutto's PPP, despite being a minority party, still demanded an equal share of power with the Awami League. Bhutto declared *'Idhar hum, udhar tum'*, (Me here, you there); he was not ready to become the opposition leader of a united Pakistan (Niazi 2000: xxiv; Qureshi 2002: 14–15). The Bihari Muslims were loyal to the Pakistani establishment. They joined organizations like the Al Badr and the Razakars and helped the Pakistan Army maintain law and order and acquire intelligence about the rebel Bengali Muslims (Singh 1991: 66, 70).

The Bengali Muslims in the security apparatus of Pakistan also turned against the state. There were six battalions of East Bengal Regiment (EBR) and a training centre at Chittagong. The latter was commanded by Brigadier Majumdar who was suspected of sympathizing with the Bengali Muslim nationalists. The East Pakistan Rifles (EPR), a paramilitary force trained for anti-smuggling activities and collection of border intelligence, had 13,000 men. The rank and file of this

force was Bengali Muslims but the JCOs, NCOs and the commissioned officers were West Pakistanis. The EBR had regular infantry units trained for conventional warfare (Singh 1991: 67–8). In total, five EBRs were deployed in East Pakistan. Although Bengali Muslims were underrepresented in the combatant branches, they were present in significant numbers in the Pakistan Army Medical Corps, Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Corps and in the Education Corps (Ahmed 2000: 17, 27). Major Akhtar Ahmed, who was in the 40th Field Ambulance Unit, noted: 'Teaming up with Bengali officers were more of a convenience because then one could speak in Bangla [Bengali]. With a West Pakistani, one had to speak English or Urdu as they could not speak in Bengali' (Ahmed 2000: 16). From early March 1970, the TV programmes broadcasted from Dacca shifted more towards Bengali programmes and away from the standard programmes of West Pakistani orientation. Songs of the Bengali poet Rabindranath Tagore (which had been taboo in the Pakistani national media) and Kazi Najrul Islam were broadcasted. The activities of Mujib and the Awami League leaders replaced traditional Pakistani news items. The TV announcers instead of using the term 'Pakistan' started to use 'Dacca Television Centre'. The civilian population stopped all communications with the Pakistan Army, which was perceived as an army of occupation, and the local contractors stopped supplying food and rations to the Pakistan Army (Ahmed 2000: 20). Qureshi writes: ' … a Bengali translation of Che Guevera's book on guerrilla warfare, with illustrated recipes of the explosive charges required to destroy bridges to make bombs, blow up dumps, houses, etc., was being sold on the footpaths of the main cities and towns of East Pakistan' (Qureshi 2002: 8). In December 1970, the 26th FF was in charge of supervising Dinajpur District (population 2.5 million) (Qureshi 2002: 11).

On 25 March 1971, on President of Pakistan General Yahya Khan's order, the military establishment in East Pakistan ordered a massive crackdown on the 'rebels' in Dacca and attempted to disarm the EBR and EPR units (Singh 1991: 67). There were no Bengali Muslim units stationed in Dacca. The nearest unit was the 2nd EBR located at Joydebpur, about 15 miles north of Dacca. The 4th EBR was deployed east of River Jamuna in Brahmanbaria and the 8th EBR was in Chittagong. During the night of 25 March, the 9th EBR at the East Bengal Regimental Centre in Chittagong was successfully disarmed. On 27 March 1971, the 4th EBR mutinied and the two West Pakistani officers were taken prisoners and later handed over to the Indian authorities. The commanding officer of this unit, Lieutenant-Colonel Khizir Hayat Khan, was a Punjabi Muslim. Instead of *Pakistan Zindabad* (Long Live Pakistan), the Bengali Muslim soldiers started shouting *Joi Bangla* (Victory goes to Bangladesh). After the rebellion, the 4th EBR retreated to Sylhet because it was near the Indian border (Ahmed 2000: 28, 43–4, 46, 49, 51, 54). Major Zia-ur-Rahman, who later became the President of Bangladesh, broadcasted a declaration of independence on 27 March 1971 and fought his way out of Chittagong (Singh 1991: 67–8). On 29 March, the 2nd EBR rebelled under Major Shafifullah. Initially, he decided to move into Dacca, but later changed his plan and joined the 4th EBR at Teliapara (Ahmed 2000: 59).

On 11 April 1971, the mutinous Bengali Muslim elements cobbled together a force known as *Mukti Bahini*. On 13 April 1971, the Provisional Government of Bangladesh was proclaimed. On 14 April 1971, Colonel Mohammad Attaul Ghani Osmani (a short man with a big grey moustache), was appointed as Commander-in-Chief to organize armed resistance (Niazi 2000: 69; Singh 1991: 68–9). Osmani's deputy was Wing Commander Khondkar. The *Mukti Bahini* also recruited some Bengali Muslim students A women's wing was also formed but served merely propaganda purposes for the foreign correspondents (Niazi 2000: 71). Separate sector commands were created. Major Zia was made responsible for Chittagong;, Major Khalid Musharaf was in charge of Comilla; Major Saifullah for Mymensingh; Wing Commandar Bashar for Rangpur; Lieutenant-Colonel Zaman was in charge of Rajshahi; Major Osman for Kushtia; and Major Jalil for Khulna. Each sector was further sub-divided into several sub-sectors (for example, one of the Sector 7 sub-sectors was the Mohidpur Sub-Sector, which was commanded by Mohiuddin Jahangir (Jacob 1997: 90; Nooruzzaman 2; Singh 1991: 69–70). A few young, educated and adventurous leaders like Noorul Kadar and 'Tiger' Siddiqi also organized their followers for conducting an armed struggle against the Pakistani Government in Pabna and Tangail region. Toha, a Maoist, also organized his own armed cadres. These groups operated independently of Osmani's organization (Singh 1991: 70).

After the March 'police action', the internal security force in East Pakistan was reorganized. The East Pakistan Civil Armed Force (EPCAF) was raised to a strength of 13,000 personnel drawn mainly from the non-Bengali Muslim population of East Pakistan and West Pakistan. The police force available to the GOP in East Pakistan included 16,500 men of the Old East Pakistan Police, 11,500 men of the New East Pakistan Police, and 5,000 men of the West Pakistan Police. After March 1971, many personnel of the Old East Pakistan Police deserted and many defected to the *Mukti Bahini*. The rest were demoralized and ineffective. They were disarmed. In order to fill the gaps, the New East Pakistan Police was raised to a strength of about 11,500 men. A contingent of 5,000 West Pakistan Police was brought over to man the police stations in the countryside of East Pakistan. The HQ CMLA and the GHQ planned to raise 50,000 Razakars (a sort of paramilitary force) who would be spread throughout all the districts of East Pakistan. Battle schools were established to train the Razakar platoon and company commanders. To provide an effective command, 60 young army offices were selected and appointed as Razakar Group Commanders. In August 1971, a separate Razakar Directorate was established. The Razakar had two wings: Al Badr and Al Shams. The students from the *madrasa*s were inducted into the Al Badr and were trained to undertake specialized operations. The Al Shams was responsible for static garrison duties: protection of bridges, vital points etc. However, the Razakars were prone to subversion due to local influence and threats and harassment of their families by the Bengali Muslim nationalists. In October 1971, their desertion rate was 4%; this increased to 6% in November of the same year (Niazi 2000: 75, 77, 78–9).

Whenever insurgents infiltrated into the posts of the Pakistan Army along the India-East Pakistan border, they were supported by Indian shelling. While the rifle group among the insurgents engaged the Pakistani units in a firefight, the explosive group blew up culverts and bridges, and then escaped (Niazi 2000: 73). On 18 April 1971, Lieutenant-General Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi (nicknamed Tiger), then Commander of the Pakistani troops in East Pakistan, issued this order to the commanders of 9th, 14th and 16th divisions: 'There is far too much bunching … . Further, we seem to be getting road bound and are forgetting foot mobility, and hardly ever seem to manoeuvre cross-country' (Niazi 2000: 285).

Initially, the BSF was aiding the *Mukti Bahini*. On 14 October 1971, the BSF units along the India-East Pakistan border came under the operational control of the Indian Army. The code name given to the guerrilla operations in East Pakistan was Operation JACKPOT. The Indian Army's headquarters for recruitment and control of the *Mukti Bahini* operations was set up at Mujibnagar in Theatre Road at Calcutta (Kolkata) (Jacob 1997: 87, 90). The Indian Army also set up various sector headquarters which were organized as brigade headquarters. The sectors were named as Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta, etc. They provided operational and logistical support to the *Mukti Bahini* (Nooruzzaman 3). By end June 1971, Niazi calculated that India had hurriedly trained 30,000 insurgents in a slipshod manner. The insurgents were trained in the handling of small arms, grenades, missiles and explosives and in sabotage activities. By November 1971, Pakistani intelligence calculated that 70,000 had already been trained and another 30,000 were in training in various camps in India (Niazi 2000: 72).

About the slipshod manner in which the new recruits for guerrilla warfare were trained by the Indian security authorities, Niazi's claim is substantiated by Lieutenant-General J.F.R. 'Jake' Jacob, Chief of Staff of India's Eastern Army in 1971. Jacob notes in his memoirs:

> We had visualized training some 8,000 guerrillas in the border areas. Recruits were to be given three months training. An additional period of specialized training would be required for leaders. Once trained, these guerrillas would penetrate deep into East Pakistan to form cells and function in the manner that guerrilla forces throughout history have done. Osmani also required a very large number of recruits to make the existing East Bengal battalions upto strength as also to man the large number of additional East Bengal battalions and artillery batteries that he planned to raise. However, the Provisional Government visualized the *Multi Bahini* training a force of 100,000 and felt that three weeks of training would be adequate. We felt that in the period of six or seven months the *Mukti Bahini* would find it difficult to put together an effective force of 100,000 guerrillas. (Jacob 1997: 90–91)

According to an estimate by a former *Mukti Bahini* leader, some 100,000 Bengali Muslims joined the insurgency (Nooruzzaman ix). Anyway, Jacob was overruled, and Major-General Onkar Singh Kalkat was deputed by Indian Army's COAS

Sam Manekshaw to oversee Operation JACKPOT. Kalkat reported directly to the Commander of India's Eastern Army, Lieutenant-General J.S. Aurora. However, Kalkat was a commander with a taste for conventional, not unconventional warfare. After two months, he was replaced by Major-General B.N. Sarcar (Jacob 1997: 91). Major-General Oban selected the best personnel from the *Mukti Bahini* and trained them in the forested area of Dehra Dun. The personnel were given political and military training (Nooruzzaman 2). One *Mukti Bahini* Sector Commander, Quazi Nooruzzaman, writes: 'Having received the training, political commandos found it embarrassing to identify themselves as products of the Indian authorities. So they gave themselves the name of Bangladesh Liberation Force. After December 16 … the people of Bangladesh gave this force the name "Mujib Bahini"' (Nooruzzaman 2). During 1970–71, the Naxals under Charu Mazumdar were rampaging in north Bengal and in Calcutta. The Naxals also influenced the radical left in East Pakistan (especially the college students). To neutralize the influence of left extremism, the Indian authorities resorted to political training of the *Mukti Bahini* personnel. In general, India's policy was to give preference to the supporters of Awami League. While the Bangladesh Liberation Force 'boys' got trousers and shirts, the other *Mukti Bahini* personnel had to do with *lungi* and *gamcha* (Nooruzzaman 2, 4).

In the town of Panighata in West Bengal, the Indian authorities trained the Bengali Muslim 'freedom fighters' who subsequently joined the *Mukti Bahini* in Sector 7, which was commanded by Quazi Nooruzzaman from 1 July 1971. Nooruzzaman's estimate is that there were about 14,000 'freedom fighters' in his sector, Sector 7. The Charlie Sector Commander, Brigadier Prem Singh, also had an independent force of Bengali Muslim guerrillas who operated under an Indian major in Sector 7 of the *Mukti Bahini* (Nooruzzaman 2–3). A.A.K. Niazi, notes: 'India could not establish a Government of Bangladesh on the soil of East Pakistan despite the eight month long insurgency. In desperation, India invaded East Pakistan on 21 November 1971' (Niazi 2000: xxv).

Nevertheless, the Bengali Muslim guerrillas achieved some success in naval guerrilla warfare. India's Eastern Command trained some 400 naval commandos and frogmen. They were effective in attacking the port facilities. The *Mukti Bahini*'s naval guerrillas, in a gunboat equipped with a 40-mm Bofors Gun, sunk and damaged 15 Pakistani merchant ships, 11 coasters, seven gunboats, 11 barges, two tankers and 19 river crafts. The Eastern Command approached the West Bengal State Government for aid. The latter provided two crafts: MV PALASH and MV PADMA. Their decks were reinforced in the workshops and Bofors L/60 anti-aircraft guns were mounted on them. The Bengali Muslim naval personnel of the Pakistan Navy manned these ships. Commander Samant of the Indian Navy who was a submariner assisted the Task Force (Jacob 1997: 91–2).

On 3 December 1971, India recognized the Bangladesh Government-in-exile (Ahmed 2000: 6). On 4 December 1971, India invaded East Pakistan and Dacca was captured on 16 December. About 90,000 Pakistani security personnel (including 44,000 Pakistani Army personnel) became Indian prisoners of war.

The loss of East Pakistan strengthened the Punjabi domination of West Pakistan. Punjab is more populous than Sindh, Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). Punjab is also Pakistan's breadbasket and is the wealthiest province of the country. Moreover, the Pakistan Army, which is the strongest pillar of the state, recruits mostly from Punjab (Cohen 2005: 9, 61). After the disaster of 1971, as Bhutto was consolidating his power over West Pakistan, an insurgency appeared in Baluchistan in 1974.

Baluchistan

Baluchistan covers 147,000 square miles, that is, 47% of Pakistan's land mass, but this province has only 5% of Pakistan's population (Bansal 2005: 251). According to the 1998 census, Baluchistan had eight million inhabitants: Baluchis (55%), Pushtuns (30%), and the Brahui/Brohvi tribe (15%) (Baluchistan's Maze of Violence 2011: 4). The principal Baluchi tribes are Bugtis, Marris and Mengals (Chandran 2008: 73). Quetta is the capital and the principal commercial city of Baluchistan. The Pushtuns dominate the commercial activities in Quetta. More than two million Afghan refugees also settled in Quetta and in the surrounding areas (Baluchistan's Maze of Violence 2011: 4). Baluchistan is rich in mineral resources and is the major supplier of natural gas after Sindh. One of the world's biggest copper deposits has been found at Reko Diq in the Chaghi District of Baluchistan. These deposits are believed to be bigger than those at Sarcheshmesh in Iran and Escondido in Chile which are believed to be the second and third largest deposits of copper in the world (Khetran 2011: 24). Baluchistan is also strategically located. The south-western province of Pakistan shares a 723 mile (1164 km) long border with Afghanistan in the north-west and 520 mile (837 km) long border with Iran in the west. Baluchistan commands Pakistan's entire sea coast: 470 miles (756 km) of coastline along the Arabian Sea, which marks the southern boundary of the province. And the Indus Valley forms the eastern boundary of Baluchistan (Bansal 2005: 251–2; Khetran 2011: 24–5).

Baluchistan had rebelled in 1958, 1963–69, 1973–77 and most recently – and still continuing – in 2004. In 1973, 55,000 insurgents faced 80,000 Pakistani troops who were supported by elements of the PAF and a team from the Iranian Air Force. The insurgency that ended in 1977 cost the lives of 3,300 soldiers and more than 5,000 insurgents (Bansal 2005: 252).

The insurgents of the new millennium have attacked the Sui gas pipeline and the personnel laying the gas transmission lines. About 626 rockets were fired in 2004 and of these 379 targeted the Sui gas fields. There were more than 30 bomb attacks in Quetta alone during 2004. There are five militant outfits in Baluchistan: the Baluch Liberation Army (BLA), the Baluch Liberation Front (BLF), the Baluchistan Republican Army (BRA), Lashkar-e-Baluchistan, and the Jhalawan Baluch Tiger. The BRA came into the limelight on 21 August 2007, when Sarbaz Baluch, a BRA spokesman, condemned the killing of Baluch

Parrari (Guerrilla Wing of BLA) personnel by the security forces on 8 August 2007 (Iqbal 2008: 2). The BLA and the BLF are the driving forces behind the insurgency. Their avowed aim is to free Baluchistan from Punjabi dominance (Bansal 2010: 89–90).

In 2005, trouble started in Sui after a lady doctor named Sonia Naz was allegedly gang raped by a captain and three personnel of the Defence Security Guards (DSG) within the Pakistan Petroleum Limited Complex. The BLA started firing rockets and mortar shells in the Lundi area, three kilometres from Sui township, on the night of 7 January 2005. Personnel of the Frontier Corps (FC) guarding the pipelines and other installations returned fire (Bansal 2005: 90). Sporadic fighting continued till 11 January 2005. In the four days of fighting, the insurgents had fired 14,000 rounds of small arms, 436 mortar shells and 60 rockets (Bansal 2010: 91).

The Bugtis is the largest Baluchi tribe; it numbers 150,000 and controls an area of roughly 13,000 square kilometres. Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, the hereditary feudal lord of the Dera Bugti District during the above-mentioned rape incident, asked the 'Punjabi' Army (Pakistan Army) to go back and not to commit such a heinous crime again on Baluch soil. The Pakistani state concentrated about 10,000 FC men, 750 DSG personnel and 3,000 soldiers along with artillery and helicopter gunships. In addition, 4,000 Rangers guarded the border of the Bugti tribe, which touches the provinces of Sindh and Punjab (Bansal 2010: 91–2). In August 2006, *Nawab* Akbar Khan Bugti, the chief tribal elder of the Bugti tribe and one of the prominent leaders of the Baluchi insurgents, was killed in a military operation. Mir Balach Marri, the head of BLA, was killed in November 2007 (Iqbal 2008: 3).

The BLA primarily consists of the Marri tribe and middle-class Baluchis. The BLA's objective is pan-Baluch autonomy. In Kohlu, which is a Marri stronghold, it is estimated that there are between 30 and 40 militant camps and each camp has between 300 and 500 recruits (Chandran 2007: 165). According to another account, in 2005, the BLA had 60 camps in the mountains with generators, walkie talkies, satellite phones and sophisticated weapons (Chandran 2008: 73). The monthly expenditure of the BLA totalled somewhere between Rs 40 and 90 million. Pakistan's intelligence agencies suspect that the insurgents are getting financial support and arms from Iran and India (Bansal 2008: 191–2). The GOP takes advantage of inter-tribal rivalries in Baluchistan, just as Indian state takes advantage of inter-tribal rivalries in North-East India. The Bijarani tribe is used as levies by the GOP against the rebel Marris (Chandran 2007: 163).

North-West Pakistan

> It is a deadly war where we are fighting an invisible enemy … . We never know where the next bullet is coming from.
>
> A Pakistani Army officer deployed in South Waziristan in 2004
> (Hussain 2007: 142)

North-West Pakistan comprises the FATA, the Frontier Regions (FRs) and the North-West Frontier Province (now called Khyber Pakhtunkhwa [KP]). The KP, located between Indus River in the east and FATA in the west, consists of 24 districts. These districts are 'settled'; that is, they (like the three other provinces, Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan) are governed by the rules and regulations of Pakistan's Constitution (Chandran 2012: 40). The tribal areas in Pakistan comprises of FATA and six FRs. The FATA includes seven tribal agencies: Bajaur, Orakzai, Mohmand, Khyber, Kurram, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan. FATA covers 27,220 square kilometers and is located along the porus and problematic Durand Line. The 1,200 kilometer long Durand Line forms the boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The six FRs are as follows: Peshawar FR, Kohat FR, Bannu FR, Laki Marwat FR, Dera Ismail Khan, and Tank FR (Gunaratna and Iqbal 2011: 18–19).

In 1998, the FATA's population was 3.2 million and by 2010 it had risen to 3.5 million (Gunaratna and Iqbal 2011: 20). Most of the inhabitants are Pushtuns/ Pakhtuns and they could be divided into a dozen tribes (Khan 2011: 40). FATA's per capita income is half that of Pakistan's national average. More than 60% live below the poverty line. Only 2.7% of the people in the tribal areas live in towns. Literacy rates in FATA for women are the lowest in the world at roughly 3%. The national average for female literacy in Pakistan is 32.6%. The literacy rate for men hovers around 12 to 15%, much lower than the national Pakistani average of approximately 50%. There are only 41 hospitals in the FATA. According to a report published in 2001, 75% of the population had no access to clean drinking water (Gunaratna and Iqbal 2011: 22; Rashid 2010: 372). Natural resources like minerals and coal are underexploited. Because there is little industrial development and few jobs, most of the locals depend on subsistence agriculture. According to one estimate, in 2010, 80,000 males of the age bracket 18 to 25 in FATA were unemployed. The local economy is pastoral and only a few valleys, being fertile, are used for agriculture. Data from 2003–04 shows that only 7% of the FATA's total land area were cultivated. More than 82% of the land is unsuited for cultivation. Of the area cultivated, 44% have irrigation facilities and the rest depend on rainfall. Besides subsistence agriculture, most of the households engage in livestock rearing and small-scale, local business. The economy of the FATA is based on trade in arms and drugs and on smuggling luxury consumer goods (Gunaratna and Iqbal 2011: 22–3).

The Pushtuns have a high sense of personal dignity and a great love of freedom. The Pukhtunwali code mostly governs their behaviour. The cardinal features of the code are *melmastia* (hospitality), *ghairat* (honour), *nanawatay* (providing sanctuary to a stranger) and *badal* (revenge). A crucial component of tribal life is the *jirga* system based on consensus and consultation. The *jirga* technically means dialogue. An assembly or a council of tribal elders, also known as *Spin Geera* (men with white beards) and *malik*s heads the *jirga*. The *jirga*'s decision is verbal and is settled by an oath on the Quran (Khan 2011: 45). The tradition of carrying a weapon is an integral part of the tribal culture. Moreover, this region was the launching pad for the 'holy warriors' against the Godless Soviets during

the heydays of the Cold War. The CIA and the ISI funelled large amounts of funds into this region to establish numerous *madrasa*s. The latter churned out *mujahid*s in large numbers for fighting the Soviets. Thus, a whole generation grew up immersed in a culture of radical Islam and militancy (Gunaratna and Iqbal 2011: 21). The 1980s saw the rise of the hardline *mullah*s in Pakistan's frontier region. These *mullah*s became partners in the *jihad* against the Soviets as the Afghan Pakhtuns adhered to a puritanical interpretation of Islam (Musharraf 2006: 275).

Ahmed Rashid asserts that while the Afghan Taliban consists of illiterate or semi-literate rural farmers and labourers, the Pakistani Taliban is much more radicalized and includes a strong youth component, drawn from the Pashtuns. The Afghan Taliban personnel mostly fight for several reasons that have little to do with the global '*jihad*'. In contrast, the younger members of the Pakistan Taliban are drawn from youths radicalized in the *madrasa*s of the FATA and frontier regions of Pakistan. The *madrasa*s teach a particular type of Sunni Islam that presents a very narrow interpretation of Islam (Rashid 2010: 371).

One author claims that in 1947, there were only 250 *madrasa*s in Pakistan. By 1987, there were 2,862 *madrasa*s producing 30,000 graduates annually. In 1995, in Punjab alone, there were 2,512 *madrasa*s. In 2001, President of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf claimed that there were somewhere between 7,000 and 8,000 *madrasa*s in Pakistan and 600,000 to 700,000 students attended them. In 2005, there were 14,000 *madrasa*s in Pakistan. They had about one million poor students. About 80% of the *madrasa*s provide free food and lodging to the students. However, they impart only religious education. The clerics at the *madrasa*s emphasize religious rigidity and intolerance of other religions and even other Islamic sects. The products of the *madrasa*s could only become clerics in the mosques. Naturally, the *madrasa*s remain the hotbeds of religious extremism and terrorism (Jones 2002: 32; Musharraf 2006: 310).

Funding the *madrasa*s in a systematic manner started under Zia who was himself a Sunni Muslim of the Deobandi sect (a strand of Islam allied with the Wahabism of Saudi Arabia). Zia authorized the district '*zakat*' committees to fund the *madrasa*s (Datta 2003: 117; Lakshman 2008: 48). By 1984, 9.4% of the *zakat* funds supported 2,273 *madrasa*s which catered to 111,050 students. They, along with the semi-educated unemployed youth, became foot soldiers of various *jihadi* organizations (Sharma 2010: 43). Not only the domestic society, but also the Pakistan Army was Islamicized under General Zia-ul-Haq, who became the President of Pakistan after supplanting Z.A. Bhutto. The officers were encouraged to grow beards, and their evaluation forms included a box for comments on an officer's religious sincerity. A number of signboards quoting the Quran and the Prophet were placed around the cantonments (Cohen 2005: 170–71). The Hudood Ordinance and Zakat Ordinance were promulgated in February 1979 and in 1980 respectively (Sharma 2010: 42).

The journalist Zahid Hussain notes that many young professionals, sons of businessmen and university graduates have joined the *Al-Qaeda* in Pakistan. He notes that many of the terrorist and insurgent leaders are children of opportunity,

not deprivation (Hussain 2007: 137). Thanks to Pakistan's Afghan adventure, the number of drug addicts in Pakistan is a little over three million which includes a large number of youth (Deo 2003: 21). According to an estimate by an Indian scholar, in 2002, there were an estimated 250,000 fully armed *jihadi*s floating in Pakistani society who could be used to fight 'proxy wars' anywhere in the world (Datta 2003: 101).

The ratio of roads per square kilometre in FATA is 0.017% and the national average is 0.26% (Gunaratna and Iqbal 2011: 22).The shortage of roads somewhat obstructs the ground mobility of the Pakistan Army during COIN campaigns. During 9/11, there were 70,000 FC personnel in the FATA. In 2010, their numbers had increased to 80,000 (Nawaz 2011: 6). After 11 September 1991, Washington forced Pakistan to conduct COIN against the militants by offering threats as well as massive financial aid (over $ 2 billion annually) (Fair and Jones 2009–10: 161). During 2001–02, the Pakistan Army deployed two infantry brigades of the 9th Division of 11th Corps for border and internal security missions in the FATA. In addition, two Quick Reaction Forces from the Special Services Group (SSG) were deployed in Kohat and Wana. In October 2001, the FC forces clashed with the militants who were crossing the border around the Nawa Pass in Bajaur Agency. In December 2001, Pakistani security forces deployed in Khyber and Kurram tribal agencies aided the capture of *Al-Qaeda* and other foreign militants who were pushed south into the FATA by US operations at Tora Bora (Jones and Fair 2010: 41–3).

Waziristan comprises of 5,000 square kilometre and is the largest of the seven tribal agencies in Pakistan's western border with Afghanistan. Inhabited by one million fiercely independent Pushtuns, Waziristan is full of difficult rugged mountains and deep defiles. Its porous border with Afghanistan's Paktia and Khost provinces allows the *Al-Qaeda* and Taliban insurgents to move to and fro between Afghanistan and Pakistan (Hussain 2007: 143). In 2002, Pakistan Army initiated Operation Al Mizan (Justice) against the foreign militants in South Waziristan. President Musharraf had survived several assassination attempts planned and launched by the foreign militants in South Waziristan. In fact, *Al-Qaeda*'s deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri issued a *fatwa* calling for the execution of Musharraf. During Operation Al Mizan, Pakistan deployed about 80,000 troops. About 20 infantry battalions, six engineer battalions, one SSG battalion, two signals battalions, and 39 FC wings were involved. These units were under eight brigade headquarters which were under two divisional headquarters. Aviation units and heavy artillery accompanied the troops. In October 2003, about 2,500 Pakistan Army soldiers went to the Baghar Village in South Waziristan to capture the militants. On 8 January 2004, while conducting a similar operation in South Waziristan, the army column was ambushed. On the same date, the Pakistan Army camp at Wana and a military check post (Shulma, west of Wana) were attacked in the night by militants equipped with rockets (Jones and Fair 2010: 46–7).

Under US threats to cross the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and bomb *Al-Qaeda* and Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan if the GOP did not take action, President

Pervez Musharraf took the decision in February 2004 to use the army in Waziristan (Hussain 2007: 140). In March 2004, the Pakistan Army launched Operation Kalosha 2 in response to the ambush of the FC personnel in the Wana Valley of South Waziristan. This operation was conducted by personnel of the FC and elements of the 11th Corps based at Peshawar under the command of Lieutenant-General Muhammad Safdar Hussain. This operation involved a 13 day cordon-and-search mission across a 36 kilometre area west of Wana. The militants in this region were under Nek Muhammad Wazir, Nur-ul-Islam, Haji Mohammad Sharif, Maulvi Abbas, and Maulvi Abdul Aziz. They also harboured foreign fighters. On 16 March, FC personnel surrounded the fortress-like houses of Nek Mohammad, Haji Mohammad and Nur-ul-Islam. The FC cordon was in turn attacked from outside by the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe. In the fighting that ensued, dozens of army trucks and armoured personnel carriers were burned. By 19 March, about 7,000 FC and regular army personnel were engaged with the militants in a 50 kilometre stretch southwest of Wana. More than a dozen Cobra helicopters and fighter jets were also used. The Pakistani security forces faced strong opposition from the villages of Dzha Ghundai, Shin Warsak and Karikot. On 26 March 2004, General Hussain declared victory (Jones and Fair 2010: 47–9).

Major-General Niaz Khattak, a Pashtun from the NWFP commanded the COIN force in South Waziristan. One of the villages captured by his troops, Nano, sat on the top of a mountain 10 miles away from the Afghan border. It was the home of former Guantanamo prisoner Abdullah Mehsud. The long-haired one-legged 29 year old commander rose into prominence after masterminding some daredevil guerrilla attacks against the Pakistani troops. Abdullah's real name was Nur Alam; he had fought for Taliban in Afghanistan and had been captured by the US Coalition Force in December 2001. Interestingly, Abdullah had joined the militancy after he failed to obtain a commission in the Pakistan Army in the early 1990s. Many of his relatives, including an uncle, were army officers and it was his passion to join the army. He joined the Taliban as a dejected man. Two years in Guantanamo Prison further radicalized him. A member of the Mehsud tribe that inhabit South Waziristan, he had joined the rebels after he was freed from US custody in March 2004. In Nano Village, the fort-like sprawling superstructure that was his house served as his operation headquarters. Inside, the army found a large stockpile of heavy machine-guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and bomb making equipment. Major-General Khattak's 7,000 troops even after eight months of operation, Khattak's 7,000 troops were unable in November 2004 to nab the top *Al-Qaeda* operatives in Pakistan's 'wild west'-Waziristan (Hussain 2007: 141–2). Due to Pakistani military pressure, *Al-Qaeda* made a tactical retreat from South Waziristan to Northern Waziristan (Musharraf 2006: 270).

About the organizational structure of the *Al-Qaeda*, Musharraf notes:

> At its peak strength in Pakistan, its core comprised up to 300 battle-hardened fighters of Arab, Uzbek, Tajik, Chechen, and Afghan origin … . The terrorists are very well trained in hit-and-run tactics and are adept at raids and ambushes.

> Most of their actions are intense and swift. They are capable of putting up stiff, last-man-last-bullet resistance. They are equipped with sophisticated weapons and high-tech communications, which they use efficiently for effective command and control … . Gathering intelligence about *Al-Qaeda* is harder than conducting physical operation against it. (Musharraf 2006: 270)

Drone attacks by the US in the FATA started in 2004 and increased greatly in 2008 (Chandran 2011: 63). Between 2004 and 2007, there were 10 drone attacks. In 2008, the drone attacks were successful in neutralizing the foreign fighters in the FATA, such as the Uzbeks, the Chechens and the Arabs. In addition, important leaders (such as Abu Lath al-Libi, Abu Sulayman, Al-Jazairi, and Khalid Habib) were killed (Chandran 2010: 80).

Musharraf notes in his memoirs that Pakistan has deployed 80,000 troops for COIN campaigns and established 900 posts along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border (Musharraf 2006: 271). The Pakistan Army lacks state-of-the-art technology for intelligence gathering, surveillance, and target acquisition. For these, the Pakistan Army remains dependent on technical intelligence provided by US sources (Musharraf 2006: 270). The 7th and 9th divisions deployed in the FATA were drawn from the 11th Corps in Peshawar. This corps was traditionally part of the strike force against India. Both these divisions had been trained in the border region of Pakistan's eastern rather than its western frontier. The 7th and the 9th divisions had little operational knowledge of the physical and human terrain of the FATA (Nawaz 2011: 7). The Punjabi Muslims make up about 60% of the Pakistan Army. The Pakhtuns constitute 14.6% of the army, which is in proportion to the population of NWFP in relation to Pakistan's population. The Punjabi Muslims do not speak Pushto and have difficulty interacting and operating with the locals. Thus, both the army and the inhabitants of the FATA feel alien to each other. Shuja Nawaz notes that the Pakistan Army should have deployed into the FATA only those regiments that have 50% Pakhtun personnel. In its mixed regiments (a legacy of the British-India's Martial Race theory), 50% of the personnel are Pakhtuns and 50% Punjabi Muslims. All their officers must learn Pushtu (Nawaz 2011: 7). In recent times, the Pakistan Army has increased its recruitment from the FATA. The number of officers and men from the FATA has increased between 1989 and 2005 (Nawaz 2011: 6), and the Mesheds and the Khattaks are well represented.

By 2005, the Taliban strengthened its hold over North and South Waziristan. The pro-government elders were murdered and their relatives kidnapped and the secular *jirga*s were attacked by the suicide bombers. The result was the Talibanization of the FATA (Chandran 2012: 41). The *jirga*s' tribal *lashkar*s were on the run due to attacks by the Taliban (Chandran 2011: 62).

In the Malakand and Swat regions, unrest started in the 1990s when the local troublemakers coalesced under a Wahabi orthodox group, the Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohmmadi (the Movement for the Imposition of the Prophet Muhammad's Traditions, known as the TNSM). This group wanted to introduce a mix of customs and fundamentalist religious ideology to replace the Pakistani

government system which had itself replaced the erstwhile princely states (Nawaz 2011: 8). In 2009, the Taliban started using suicide bombings and hit-and-run attacks in the settled districts of the NWFP, especially in the Malakand and Swat regions. Moreover, military operations in the FATA caused an exodus of people from the FATA to the settled districts that created social and economic problems (Chandran 2010: 79).

In 2009, the Pakistan Army launched Operation Rah-e-Rast (The Correct Path) in the Malakand and Swat regions. For operational purposes, the Swat is divided into North and South Swat. In total, three divisions were used. Some 52,000 troops were employed, including commandos of the SSG and two wings of the FC. Before the beginning of the military operations, the army cleared the area of civilians. About three million persons were displaced and had to take refuge with relatives and friends in other parts of the country. Only 200,000 were moved to official camps. The operation was characterized by aerial bombardment for a week and then the infantry assault started. The TNSM used its knowledge of terrain and activated IEDs and booby traps to cause casualties among the security forces. Although the area was cleared, the TNSM leadership escaped first to Dir and then into Afghanistan. Afterwards, the army helped relocate the displaced persons. Helping civilians is an essential component of COIN and the Pakistan Army is learning it (Nawaz 2011: 10).

Overall, Pakistan lacks the capacity to clear and hold areas and to win and sustain the support of the locals in disturbed areas. Again, Pakistan is not conducting operations against the 'good *jihadi*s' who are supposed to advance Pakistan's interest in Afghanistan and Kashmir. The COIN operations are lowering the image and popularity of the Pakistan Army somewhat. Moreover, part of the public considers that by taking action against the 'militants', the GOP is actually conducting America's War (Fair and Jones 2009–10: 162).

Conclusion

Insurgency and the government's responses in the FATA and to a lesser extent in Baluchistan are studied thanks to the US-NATO involvement in Afghanistan. However, the rebellion in East Pakistan and the Pakistani Government's response was of equal if not greater historical significance because it resulted in the Indian intervention and the 'liberation' of Bangladesh in 1971. By all means, the Indian Army's training of the *Mukti Bahini* fell short of the training provided by the Pakistan Army to the *mujahid*s who fought the Soviet 40th Army in the 1980s. The *mujahid*s were smaller in number (30,000 to 40,000 at most) compared to the 100,000 strong *Mukti Bahini*. Compared to the Soviet 40th Army with its *Spetsnaz* battalions, the Eastern Army of Pakistan under Niazi in 1971 was a softer target. The failure resulted from several reasons: The Bengalis (especially high-caste Bengali Hindus) have a history of conducting individual terrorist strikes against the colonial government, but unlike the tribesmen of North-East India and the

North-West Pakistan, they have no tradition of conducting armed insurgency (Singh 1991: 71). Besides the cultural traits of the Bengali Muslims, the Indian Army's strategic culture is uncomfortable with the strategy of conducting unconventional warfare against an enemy state because of its *dharmayuddha* tradition (Bakshi 1990: 74). Finally, the Pakistan Army could never have hoped to engage the Soviet 40th Army in conventional battle in Afghanistan. In fact, General Zia-ul-Haq feared Soviet retaliatory actions, if the *mujahid*s attacked targets in Soviet Central Asia (Yousaf and Adkin 2007). Pakistan, the weaker party in the equation, has always had to strategize from a position of weakness, and guerrilla warfare is a weapon of the weak. As we have discussed in earlier chapters, Pakistan's very weakness forces it to conduct unconventional warfare in Kashmir against much stronger India. In contrast, at least from April 1971, the Indian Army, being the stronger party in the equation, was planning to conduct a conventional war as soon as the Himalayan passes were blocked by snow. This would have neutralized the Chinese along the North-East Frontier Agency of India and enabled the Indian Army to concentrate against the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan. Thus, the Indian Army was not interested in planning and conducting an attritional guerrilla war against the Pakistani authorities in East Pakistan.

For Pakistan, the Baluchi insurgency remains a comparatively minor problem, equivalent to the Naxal-Maoist problem of India. Seth G. Jones and C. Christine Fair claim that Pakistani COIN in East Pakistan and Baluchistan relied heavily on firepower and inflicted significant collateral damage (Jones and Fair 2010: 44). The Pakistani COIN in East Pakistan during 1971 was definitely ham-handed. However, we have to remember that the Indian and Bangladeshi authors overemphasize the 'atrocities' committed by the West Pakistani troops in East Pakistan. One thing is certain: The Bengali Muslims had already been alienated and their loyalty to a United Pakistan had already reached a point of no return before the 'police action' of March 1971. And we must note that despite India's support, the *Mukti Bahini* was not successful. A full-scale conventional campaign that lasted 16 days was needed to capture Dacca. One can see how Ivan Arreguin-Toft's argument regarding the successful employment of a 'barbaric strategy' applies to Pakistan. Compared to East Pakistan, Pakistan's COIN in the FATA during the new millennium is more technology oriented and sensitive to the demands of the human terrain. Now, let us turn the focus to a successful COIN by the Indian state.

References

Ahmed, Major Akhtar (2000). *Advance to Contact: A Soldier's Account of Bangladesh Liberation War*. Dacca: University Press Limited.

Bakshi, Lieutenant-Colonel G.D (1990). *Mahabharata: A Military Analysis*. New Delhi: Lancer.

Baluchistan's Maze of Violence, Centre for Research and Security Studies, 2011, http://www.crss.pk, accessed on 15 June 2012.

Bansal, Alok (2005). 'The Revival of Insurgency in Balochistan', *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 250–68.

Bansal, Alok (2008). 'Factors leading to Insurgency in Balochistan', *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 182–200.

Bansal, Alok (2010). *Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroads*. New Delhi: Manas.

Chandran, D. Suba (2007). Pakistan: Tribal Troubles in Balochistan and Waziristan', in D. Suba Chandran (ed.), *Armed Conflicts and Peace Processes in South Asia 2006*. New Delhi: Samskriti in association with IPCS and KAF, pp. 159–79.

Chandran. D. Suba (2008). 'Pakistan: The War of Tribes', in D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2008: Growing Violence*. New Delhi/Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 71–91.

Chandran, D. Suba (2010). 'FATA and NWFP: Spreading Anarchy', in D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2009: Continuing Violence, Failing Peace Processes*. New Delhi/Abingdon: Routledge, 2010, pp. 62–82.

Chandran, D. Suba (2011). 'Armed Conflict in FATA and NWFP: Continuing Violence', in D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2010: Growing Left-wing Extremism and Religious Violence*. New Delhi: Routledge, pp. 44–66.

Chandran, D. Suba (2012). 'Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: Drone Attacks and Suicide Terrorism', in D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2011: The Promise and Threat of Transformation*. New Delhi: Routledge, pp. 40–60.

Cohen, Stephen Philip (2005). *The Idea of Pakistan*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Originally published in 2004.

Datta, S.K. (2003). 'The Internal Political Dynamics of Pakistan', in Vice-Admiral K.K. Nayyar (ed.), *Pakistan at the Crossroads*. New Delhi: Rupa in association with the Observer Research Foundation, pp. 98–133.

Deo, Arvind R. (2003). 'Pakistan's Unending Search for a Viable Foreign Policy', in Vice-Admiral K.K. Nayyar (ed.), *Pakistan at the Crossroads*. New Delhi: Rupa in association with the Observer Research Foundation, pp. 1–52.

Fair, C. Christine and Jones, Seth G. (Dec. 2009-Jan. 2010). 'Pakistan's War Within'. *Survival*, vol. 51, no. 6, pp. 161–88.

Gunaratna, Rohan and Iqbal, Khuram (2011). *Pakistan: Terrorism Ground Zero*. London: Reaktion.

Hussain, Zahid (2007). *Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam*. New Delhi: Viking.

Iqbal, Khurram (2008). Counter-Insurgency in Baluchistan: Pakistan's Strategy, Outcome and Future Implications, Political Violence and Terrorism, 15/7, Pak Institute for Peace Studies, PIPS Knowledge for Peace.

Jacob, Lieutenant-General J.F.R (1997). *Surrender at Dacca: Birth of a Nation*. New Delhi: Manohar.

Jones, Owen Bennett (2002). *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*. New Delhi: Viking.

Jones, Seth G. and Fair, Christine (2010). *Counterinsurgency in Pakistan*. Santa Monica CA: RAND.

Khan, Amina (2011). 'FATA: Voice of the Unheard-Path Dependency and Why History Matters', *Strategic Studies*, vol. 31, nos. 1–2, pp. 40–74.

Khetran, Mir Sher Baz (2011). 'Crisis in Balochistan: Challenges and Opportunities', *Strategic Studies*, vol. 31, nos. 1–2, pp. 24–39.

Lakshman, Kanchan (2008). 'Pakistan: The Sectarian Conflict', in D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2008: Growing Violence*. New Delhi/Abingdon: 2008, pp. 47–70.

Mukherji, I.N. (2003). 'The Pakistan Economy: Challenges and Opportunities', in Vice-Admiral K.K. Nayyar (ed.), *Pakistan at the Crossroads*. New Delhi: Rupa in association with the Observer Research Foundation, pp. 152–200.

Musharraf, Pervez (2006). *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir*. New York: Free Press.

Nawaz, Shuja (2011). *Learning by Doing: The Pakistan Army's Experience with Counterinsurgency*. Washington, DC: Atlantic Council.

Niazi, Lieutenant-General A.A.K (2000). *The Betrayal of East Pakistan. Karachi*, Oxford University Press. Originally published in 1998.

Nooruzzaman, Quazi (n.d.). *A Sector Commander remembers Bangladesh Liberation War 1971*. Dacca; Writers ink. tr. from Bengali.

Qureshi, Major-General Hakeem Arshad. *The 1971 Indo-Pak War: A Soldier's Narrative*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Rashid, Ahmed (2010). 'The Situation in Pakistan', *Asian Affairs*, vol. XLI, no. 3, pp. 367–80.

Sharma, Raghav (2010). 'Sectarian Violence in Pakistan', in D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2009: Continuing Violence, Failing Peace Processes*. New Delhi/Abingdon: Routledge, 2010, pp. 42–61.

Siddiqi, Brigadier A.R. (2004). *East Pakistan: The Endgame, An Onlooker's Journal, 1969–1971*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Singh, Major-General Lachhman (1991). *Victory in Bangladesh*. Dehra Dun: Natraj. Originally published in 1981.

Yousaf, Mohammad and Adkin, Mark (2007). *The Battle for Afghanistan: The Soviets versus the Mujahideen during the 1980s*. Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword. Originally published in 1992.

Chapter 6
Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan: From the Soviets to the Americans

From the end of World War II until the beginning of the 1970s was one of the longest periods of stability in Afghanistan. However, by the late 1970s, the state in Afghanistan disintegrated because of both local faction politics and the great power rivalry that occurred in the background of the Cold War. USSR, which had invested much political and economic capital from the 1920s until the 1970s, was drawn into Afghanistan by the vortex of fractious Afghan power politics. USSR also viewed the regional problems in Afghanistan through the lens of the Cold War which operated at the systemic level. This heightened the paranoia about the 'stagnant' superpower and finally resulted in the invasion. The first section of this chapter analyzes the nature of unconventional warfare between the *mujahideen* and the Soviets against the tortuous political background. Fractious struggles among the various *mujahideen* parties enabled the Taliban to emerge victorious. And the danger posed by radical Islamic insurgency at a global level pushed USA and NATO into Afghanistan. US-NATO COIN against the Islamist insurgents is the focus of the second section. This chapter compares and contrasts the COIN policies of the two superpowers in Afghanistan. Let us look back to pre-1970 Afghanistan.

Disintegration of the Afghan State and Soviet Intervention

King Zahir Shah was crowned in 1933 at the tender age of 19, after the assassination of his father Nadir Shah. Under King Zahir Shah, Afghanistan was ruled mostly by members of the royal family, especially by his cousin (later the king's brother-in-law) Prince Muhammad Daud Khan (Feifer 2010: 21). Two of Zahir Shah's paternal uncles, Muhammad Hashim Khan and Shah Muhammad Khan served as prime ministers from 1933 to 1946 and from 1946 to 1953 respectively (Maley 2009: 13).

In 1953, Lieutenant-General Muhammad Daud Khan assumed the office of Prime Minister and undertook the task to modernize Afghanistan. He remained in office till 1963. Daud also developed ties with USSR. In 1956, an accord was signed by which the Soviets would equip and train the Afghan Army. In 1961, Afghanistan was sending large numbers of cadets and officers to USSR. And by 1963, many Soviet officers functioned as military instructors in Afghanistan (Baumann 1993: 131).

By 1953, taxes on land and livestock represented only 14% of the government's domestic revenue and 39% came from taxes on foreign trade. Overall, in that year, only 7% of the state's expenditure was funded by foreign aid; 93% was funded with domestic revenue. By 1963, foreign aid funded 49% of the state expenditure and domestic revenue covered only 38%. The balance came from domestic borrowing (Maley 2009: 13). The Soviets were interested in the natural gas from the Shibargham field in Jowzjan Province and constructed a 60 mile (97 km) pipeline to the USSR's border in 1967 (O'Ballance 2003: 78). Before 1978, about 80% of the Afghans lived in the villages. Agriculture remained the primary economic activity, followed by animal husbandry (Nojumi 2002: 18). In the 1970s, life expectancy was less than 40 years. Only half of the children survived beyond their fifth birthday (Galeotti 2001: 4).

The Communist party in Afghanistan (People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, i.e. PDPA) had two factions: the Khalq and the Parcham. The Parcham (Banner Wing), which was the moderate faction, had the support of the urban intellectuals, Tajiks and the Uzbeks and was led by Babrak Karmal (1929–1996). Karmal was a Pushtun and son of an army general. He studied law at Kabul University and was a founding member of the PDPA, which came into existence on 1 January 1965. Later, he became a member of the parliament. The Parcham were gradualists. In 1978, only 11.7% of the Afghans lived in the urban areas. The Khalq (masses), the more radical faction, drew support from the countryside and the Pushtun tribes. Its leaders were Nur Muhammad Taraki (1917–1979) and Hafizullah Amin (1929–1979). Amin studied at Kabul University and later at Columbia University in USA. Taraki learned English while working as a clerk in Bombay, and later he studied political economy at Kabul University and then became a journalist, and finally a politician. The PDPA received funding from the KGB and maintained close ties with the Kremlin (Braithwaite 2012: 38; Feifer 2010: 21–2; O'Ballance 2003: 87).

In 1972, Afghanistan was struck by a famine and the state's response was inadequate. In July 1973, Zahir Shah's monarchy was overthrown by a palace coup initiated by the former Prime Minister Muhammad Daud (Maley 2009: 15). Feuds within the ruling elite and Daud's ambition were important factors behind the coup. Moscow was not directly involved with this coup. Daud was aided by a group of rebellious Soviet-trained military officers with ties to the GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate, i.e. the Soviet Military Intelligence Agency). Daud viewed them as disposable allies to be discarded when convenient. Daud was a militant nationalist who believed that the King had betrayed Afghan interests by agreeing to a treaty, giving Iran extensive access to the waters of the Helmand River, especially during a draught in Afghanistan. The Pushtuns of Afghanistan were also angry over the king's failure to retaliate against Islamabad for its repression of the Pushtun and the Baluchi ethnic minorities in Pakistan (Harrison 1995a: 14).

This coup was the first step in the breakdown of the state in Afghanistan. Previously, the Afghan monarchy represented the focus of legitimate loyalties over and above the clan and tribal loyalties. Now, as the symbol of that loyalty

vanished, divided loyalties engulfed the state's civilian and military bureaucrats. Initially, Daud included some members from the Parcham faction of the PDPA in his Cabinet. However, with time, Daud tried to distance himself from the Parcham faction and purged several Parcham ministers in 1976 (Baumann 1993: 131–2). In the 1970s, Reza Shah's son wanted to link the Iranian and Pakistani rail systems. It was planned that the three cities, Herat, Kandahar and Kabul, were to be interconnected to this new Trans-Persian Railway. For this purpose, the Shah offered President Daud a $2 billion credit. If completed, the Shah's new railway system would have redirected the flow of Afghanistan's trade away from the Soviet border towards the Middle East. It might have resulted in the rise of Tehran-Kabul-Istanbul alliance. This new lateral axis would soon have connected to China, which was then completing the 1,200 kilometre long Karakoram Highway across the Himalayas from Kashgar to Islamabad. Milan Hauner speculates that Moscow took a dim view of such developments (Hauner 1991: 77). Daud's attempt to establish a good relationship with the Western countries resulted in Leonid Brezhnev turning against him. On 12 April 1977, during a state visit to USSR, Brezhnev demanded the removal of experts of the NATO countries from north Afghanistan. Daud, a nationalist, retorted that he would never tolerate Soviet interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan (Loyn 2009: 138; Maley 2009: 20).

The communists also infiltrated the Afghan Army. In 1974, Colonel Abdul Kadir who had played a significant role in replacing the king in 1973 and who was a supporter of the Khalq, set up a secret United Front of Afghan Communists within the army. Elements of the army were loyal to the Khalq faction. Due to constant Soviet pressure, the two factions of the PDPA agreed to unite and in July 1977, they met at Jalalabad. They elected a new Central Committee and a Politburo. Taraki was appointed as General Secretary and Karmal as his deputy. However, Amin's candidacy was contested. Amin's opponents claimed that he was a CIA stooge. Amin argued that when he was studying in USA, he was short of money and merely played the CIA along (Braithwaite 2012: 39–40).

On 27 April 1978, a small leftist group of Soviet-trained Afghan officers seized control of the government and founded the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), which became a client state of USSR (Grau 1998: xxvii). The rebel Afghan officers belonged to the PDPA and they called the military coup as the Saur (April) Revolution (Braithwaite 2012: 37). The role of USSR in instigating this coup remains ambiguous.

According to one version, the planning for the coup started as early as 1975. At that time, the Parcham faction had considerable influence over the republican government. Amin's task was to recruit the army and air force officers who would mobilize military units to seize the centres of communications to paralyze the Daud Government. Then, its leaders would be removed by a surgical strike before the loyal elements of the regime could rally and attempt a strike back. The immediate factor behind the Khalq-Parcham coup was Abdul Qadir Nuristani's (Daud's Minister of the Interior) crackdown on the left-wing radicals which led to the assassination of Mir Akbar Khyber, an important leader of the Parcham faction

on 17 April. Khyber's death started a chain reaction that the Daud Government was unable to contain. The two Marxist factions jointly mounted demonstrations in the streets, mourning Khyber and defying the government. At times, the number of demonstrators exceeded 10,000. The government responded by arresting more Marxist leaders. Taraki was arrested during the night of April 25. On 26 April, Amin was arrested (Braithwaite 2012: 40).

On the morning of 27 April 1979, the rebel 4th Armoured Division started to move towards Kabul from its Puli Charki base located south of the city. It was led by Colonel Muhammad Aslam Watanjar. Once the armoured division had moved inside Kabul, it helped Air Force Colonel Abdul Kadir seize the airport. Kadir then flew a helicopter to Begram, 40 miles north of Kabul, to take over the air headquarters there. Once in command, Kadir ordered air strikes on the palace. Meanwhile, Watanjar's force joined by rebel infantry units strengthened rebel control over Kabul. Throughout the day, scattered actions occurred between the loyal and rebel forces as the rebels took over the ministries of interior, communications, and foreign affairs. General Ghulam Haidar Rasuli, the Chief of Staff of the Afghan Army, attempted to rally the loyal units. He found out that most of the units and their commanders were sitting on the fence, waiting to find out who would win. Detachments from the loyal Rishkhor Division moved into Kabul from the south and engaged the rebels. In the early afternoon, the 'rebel' MIGs from Begram Air Base made their rounds at the palace. The presidential guards who were fighting courageously against the rebels found that bombs and rocket strikes were too much for them. Earlier in the day, Daud had ordered the loyal air units at Shindand Air Base (500 miles west of Kabul) to assist him. They arrived early in the afternoon, but when they arrived, they had only 10 minutes of flying time before having to return to Shindand. They could not establish radio command with Daud's Government and so could not identify the rebel units. They had to return without dropping a single bomb. In late afternoon, the tanks broke into the president's palace and the presidential guards fled. It is not clear whether Daud died in gun battle or committed suicide (Newell and Newell 1981: 67–71).

The Khalq regime lasted from 27 April 1978 to 27 December 1979. USSR favoured the Parcham faction over the Khalq. The expulsion of Karmal and other Parcham leaders from the Cabinet and their banishment abroad enabled Taraki and Hafizullah Amin to consolidate their hold over power by late 1978. From that time, the Khalq initiated several reform programmes, which increased popular opposition. When popular resistance against the Khalq increased, USSR felt the future of Marxism in Afghanistan and its own influence were gravely threatened. This was the principal factor behind the Soviet invasion on 27 December 1979 and the execution of Amin, the principal leader of the Khalq (Newell and Newell 1981: 66–7).

Beside the objective of putting a puppet government in Kabul, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was probably also driven by the desire to get closer to a warm water port and within striking distance of the Persian Gulf. The Soviets expanded and fortified the airbase at Shindand in south-west Afghanistan which

put the Soviet bombers within close range of the Persian Gulf. Further, the aim was to surround China and prevent a hostile Afghanistan from allying itself with China and USA in order to surround USSR completely (Sinno 2008: 108).

Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison claim that Soviet objectives in Afghanistan were limited from the start. Moscow did not have any master plan to dominate the Middle East or the Persian Gulf. Rather, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan to prevent the emergence (in their eyes) of an American supported Afghan Tito on their southern flank (Cordovez and Harrison 1995: 4). Selig S. Harrison emphasizes that the timing of the 1978 Revolution was decided not by Moscow but by the local Communist leaders. The Afghan Communists who emerged in control of the new regime were not the trusted Afghan protégés of the KGB (Committee for State Security). Leonid Brezhnev viewed Amin as a potential Tito who was plotting with USA, Pakistan and China to establish an anti-Soviet regime (Harrison 1995a: 13). In fact, the Afghan communist leader Babrak Karmal fed the Soviet fear of American links to his rival Hafizullah Amin (Cordovez and Harrison 1995: 5). Further, the Soviet leaders were worried about the possible spread of Islamist influence from Afghanistan into their Muslim republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus (Sinno 2008: 110–11). The rising number of Muslim people made the Soviet ruling elite nervous. The Soviet census of 1979 counted 43.7 million Muslims, which was 16.7% of the total population. Of the Muslims, the groups included Uzbeks (12.5 million), Kazakhs (6.5 million), Tatars (6.3 million), Tajiks (3 million) and Kirghiz and Turkmen (about 2 million each). It was estimated that by 2000, the Muslims in USSR would have been between 65 and 80 million. In contrast, the slower growth rate of the Slavic population meant that by 2000, they would have numbered between 190 and 195 million. That is, between 1979 and 2000, the Slavic share of the total Soviet population would have declined from 72% to 65% and that of the Russians from 52.4% to 46.7%. According to one calculation, if the Soviet Union survived in the twenty-first century, then by 2050, the Muslims would have achieved demographic parity with the Russians (Hauner 1991: 42, 48).

Initially, the Soviets were anxious that the invasion of Afghanistan would stand in the way of East-West détente. However, opposition to SALT II agreements in the US Senate hardened the Soviet stance towards Afghanistan. The NATO's announcement that strategic arms deployed in West Europe would be further increased was the last straw. The growing rapprochement between Washington and Beijing made the Kremlin more uncomfortable (Newell and Newell 1981: 116).

The decision to move into Afghanistan was taken in a secret meeting convened by General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev (who had come to power in 1964) on 12 December 1979. The meeting was attended by Chief Party ideologue Mikhail Suslov, KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and Defence Minister Ustinov. Most of the decisions in USSR at that time were taken by a triumvirate: Andropov, Gromyko and Ustinov. In the meeting, Andropov criticized Amin's mass repression and feared that Amin was moving closer to the 'West' (Feifer 2010: 9–12).

About 75% of the Soviet armed forces' personnel were conscripts who served between two and three years. Annually, some 37.7% of the Soviet military manpower had to be replenished by new 18 year old conscripts. The Soviet officer corps was dominated by the Russians who constituted 80% of the officers (Hauner 1991: 43, 46). According to Edgar O'Ballance, the Soviet Army in the units earmarked for invasion replaced most of the Muslim soldiers with Slavic conscripts to prevent empathy between the Muslim Soviet soldiers and their religious compatriots in Afghanistan (O'Ballance 2003: 97). A new battalion of paratroops and *Spetsnaz* troops from the Central Asian republics was formed in May 1979 and called Muslim Battalion. It was based in Uzbekistan and was initially designed to guard the Afghan President Taraki but was never used for this purpose. This battalion included Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, etc. and was used later to soften the impact of Soviet presence in Afghanistan (Feifer 2010: 16–17). On 27 December 1979, the Soviet forces started moving into Afghanistan. The invasion had begun. The initial aim of the Soviets was to replace Amin with Karmal, securing the major cities like Kabul, Herat, Kandahar and Jalalabad, and to secure the lines of communications with USSR (especially the Salang Tunnel) (Arreguin-Toft 2005: 173). Gradually, the Soviets were drawn into military operations against the Afghan rebels.

Meanwhile, the new government installed by the Soviets after the execution of Amin failed to stand on its own legs. Karmal, under Soviet pressure, was forced to accept several leaders of the Khalq faction as his colleagues in the new government. Asadullah Sarwari, who had served as Taraki's Secret Police Chief, was installed as Deputy Prime Minister. Minister of Mines Muhammad Ismail Danish had served in Amin's last Cabinet. Another Khalqi, Sayyid Muhammad Gulbazoi was installed as Minister of Interior. Major-General Abdul Kadir became a member of the Revolutionary Council's Presidium. And Colonel Muhammad Aslam Watanjar served as Minister of Communications. Colonel Sherjan Mazduryar, the Minister of Transport, fell out with Amin in September 1979 (Newell and Newell 1981: 120, 122–3).

Islamic Insurgency and Soviet COIN in Afghanistan

The Soviets faced opposition from the dispersed groups of *mujahideen* who conducted a classic guerrilla war tinged with Islamic flavour. The Islamic doctrines of *jihad* and *shahadah* motivated the insurgents. In Neamatollah Nojumi's view, the concept of *jihad* provided the *mujahideen* a moral duty to defend their home and family against the Godless Soviets and *shahadah* encouraged one to sacrifice his life for establishing the safety and peace of the *qaum*. The concept of *ghazi* gave the commanders of the resistance group high moral superiority to exercise political and military leadership. If the *ghazi* died, his death glorified his victory. Frequently, the locals cheered the *mujahideen* as *ghazian* (Nojumi 2002: 22).

In 1979, the population of Afghanistan was about 13.05 million, including about 800,000 nomads. According to another calculation, Afghanistan's population

was about 15 million. In the 1980s, one scholar noted that there were 55 ethnic groups in Afghanistan. Pushtuns/Pasthuns (Pathans) comprise the largest single ethnic group followed by the Tajiks, Uzbeks and the Hazaras. The Pusthuns numbered about six million and inhabited mostly south-eastern and south-central Afghanistan. The Tajiks numbered about three and half million (Baumann 1993: 134: Maley 2009: 8–9). Overall, there are hundreds of tribes belonging to more than a dozen ethnic groups in Afghanistan and the neighbouring areas of Iran and Pakistan. Most of these tribes are loosely organized. In some cases, the power of the tribal chiefs is more or less dominant. While some of the tribes have a few thousand members, others might have several hundred thousand members. Some of the tribes are nomadic and some are settled (Memorandum, The Soviets 1980).

According to a CIA document dated 23 September 1980:

> Those who cling most closely to the traditional tribal ways are the least likely to be influenced by Communism. To the extent that the tribesmen have an ideology it is a belief that a combination of Islam and even older tribal traditions is the proper guide for action. Among most tribes, the traditional views include such things as the obligation to seek revenge, masculine superiority, an emphasis on personal bravery and honour and suspicion of outsiders. Tradition also tends to sanctify everything from rules governing property ownership to ways of treating illness. Any change in the traditional way of life is considered wrong, and modern ideas – whether Communist or Western – are seen as a threat. (Memorandum The Soviets 1980)

A secret CIA report dated 23 September 1980 noted that the insurgency was strongest in the most traditionally minded Pushtuns of Paktia Province and in Nuristan and also among the Tajiks further north along the Pakistani border. They resisted the Afghan Marxists and the Soviets more to preserve their old ways than to fight communism. The reforms that had incensed the tribes included the education of women. Such reforms were opposed to the worldview of the Afghans. Many tribes assisted the insurgents because gun smuggling boosted their income (Memorandum The Soviets 1980).

After the 27 April 1978 coup that brought the communists to power in Afghanistan, Afghan resistance groups started sprouting up along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. And the Jimmy Carter Administration made Pakistan partially a US base of operation for supporting the Islamic guerrillas who were fighting the Soviets (Talbot 2004: 18). In June 1981, the resistance groups united to form the Islamic Unity of Afghan *Mujahideen* (IUAM). In August 1981, the latter group split into the Group of Seven (IUAM-7) and the Group of Three (IUAM-3). While IUAM-7 was a union of fundamentalist organizations, IUAM-3 was a union of traditionalist organizations. In May 1985, both the IUAM-7 and IUAM-3 joined as the Peshawar Seven. It comprised *Hizb-i-Islami* Gulbuddin (HIH/Islamic Party), *Jamat-i-Islami* (JIA/ also known as Islamic Society), *Harakat-i-Inqilabi-i-Islami* (Islamic Revolutionary Movement, IRMA), *Ettihad-i-Islami* (Islamic Union for

the Liberation of Afghanistan, IUA), *Hizb-i-Islami Khalis* (Islamic Party, HIK), *Mahaz-i-Milli Islami* (National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, NIFA) and *Jeb-i-Nejat-i-Melli* Afghanistan (Afghanistan National Liberation Front, ANLF) (Grau and Gress 2002: 53).

The HIH wanted to establish an Islamic state in Afghanistan and spread the message of Islam throughout the world. Most of its personnel were Tajiks and Pushtuns of north-east, east, central and south-west Afghanistan. The central committee was headed by Amir Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Pashtun from the Kharoti tribe. He was born in the Imam Shabi region of the Kunduz Province in 1944 and graduated from the Engineering Faculty of Kabul Polytechnic Institute. The JIA comprised of Tajiks, Pushtuns, Turks and Uzbeks. This organization was powerful in Herat and was led by Professor of Theology Burhanuddin Rabbani. He was a Tajik born in 1941 who graduated from the Kabul Theological Lycee and then from the Theological Faculty of Kabul University. The HIK split from the HIH in 1975. The leadership of this party comprised of old *mullah*s and *ulema*s who fanatically wanted to go back to the preaching and practices of medieval Islam. This party mainly comprised Pushtuns engaged in barbarous sabotages and terrorism. Its leader was Mawlawi Mohammed Yunis Khalis, a Pushtun from the Khugiani tribe. He was born in 1920 in the Wazir Kuchiyani in the Nangrahar Province. He was known among the Pushtun tribes as a poet and a religious authority. From 1963 to 1973, he led a group of *mullah*s called the Taliban who conducted propaganda in the mosques of Kabul (Grau and Gress 2002: 53–4). This name would come back to haunt the world twenty years later.

The IUA came into existence in March 1982. It was headed by Abd Al-Rab Abdul-Rasul Sayaf, a Professor of Theology. He was born in 1945 in the Paghman region of Kabul Province. He hailed from a poor peasant family. After graduating from the Theological Faculty of Kabul University, he attended Al-Akhzar Muslim University in Egypt in 1970. He then taught for some time at the Theological Faculty of Kabul University. He was a supporter of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (Grau and Gress 2002: 54).

The ANLF was founded in Pakistan in 1979. Its objective was to establish an Islamic society and observe the principles of *Sharia* laws. The ANLF was powerful in the provinces of Kabul, Logar, Kunar, Nangrahar, Paktia and in the eastern border areas of Afghanistan among the Pushtun pockets. Some detachments of the ANLF also fought in the provinces of Faryab, Takhar and Kunduz. The ANLF leader was Sebqhtullah Mojadeddi who was born in Kabul in 1925 in a hereditary spiritual Sunni family called the *Hazarat*s. He graduated from Al-Azhar University in Cairo. The NIFA was founded in 1978 in Pakistan by *Pir* Sayid Ahmad Gailani. He was born in 1931 in a hereditary family of Hazarat of Arabian descent. His family belonged to the Qadria Sufi branch (Grau and Gress 2002: 54–5).

The IRMA came into existence in 1973 at the Pakistani Province of Baluchistan. The founder was Muhammad Nabi Mohammadi who was born in 1920 in the Logar Province. The second-tier leadership comprised of *ulema*s and *mullah*s who

whipped up support in the rural regions. The IRMA had 10,000 members and about 25,000 followers. It was mostly a Pushtun organization. It was active in the provinces of Kabul, Logar, Ghazni, Paktia and Zabol. The warriors of the IRMA's armed detachments were fanatical and were mostly peasants of Southern Afghanistan. The total strength of all these organizations fluctuated between 40,000 to 60,000 men (Grau and Gress: 2002: 55, 57).

Two important *mujahideen* leaders were Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ahmad Shah Masud. Hekmatyar was a Pushtun, and Masud was a Tajik from the Panjshir Valley in the north-east of Kabul. The Soviets launched several attacks to capture Panjshir but ultimately failed. The Panjshir Valley with high ridges, narrow canyons and winding cliffs bordering on the Hindu Kush is certainly not an ideal terrain for the Soviet conventional ground force (Loyn 2009: 137).

To a great extent, the Soviets did not win the war in Afghanistan because they fought the *mujahideen* with conventional doctrine and tactics suited for conducting a conventional war in central Europe against the NATO forces. In 1980, a Vietnamese delegation came to Afghanistan and advised the Soviets to use small sub-units of Special Forces supported and supplied by helicopters for conducting the war against the *mujahideen*. However, Marshal Sokolov rejected this recommendation (O'Ballance 2003: 101). Very often, Soviet COIN operations took the shape of small and medium grade conventional operations.

The first major Soviet military operation against the *mujahideen* occurred in March 1980 when the guerrilla forces in the Kunar Valley were on the verge of capturing Asadabad, the capital of the Nangrahar Province which was then under the control of the Afghan Army. The Soviet 40th Army launched its attack with indiscriminate shelling of the valley, warning the guerrillas of the coming offensive. Armoured regiments moving across the valley's main roads were able to supply the Afghan Army detachments. However, no attempt was made to block the withdrawal of the guerrillas and destroy them. So, when the Soviet detachments went back, the guerrillas again resumed their operations (Harrison 1995b: 59).

Major A.P. Pivovarenko describes a Soviet action in May 1980 in Bamian city and the surrounding countryside:

> … one of our battalions was structured as a raiding detachment. The battalion was reinforced with a tank company, a self-propelled artillery battery from division artillery, the regiment's reconnaissance company, a platoon of ZSU-23–4s and a squad of sappers. The reconnaissance company carried out its first raid in the area of Ghorband during the pre dawn hours of 20–21 May and arrived at the village at daybreak … . On the following day, the entire raiding detachment finally began to move onto the city of Bamian. The detachment moved by road and fell into a *mujahideen* ambush, losing one BMP and one ZSU-23–4 … . The detachment conducted further raids which combed outlying villages and canyons. But, again the *mujahideen* had successfully withdrawn and the battalion swept empty blocks and areas. (Grau 1998: 11–2)

The Soviet motorized columns were easily disabled by the Afghan insurgents who pushed boulders into the long narrow winding roads. This was a tactic that the Pathans had followed against the British during late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Then, the blocked Soviet motorized columns were destroyed by Molotov cocktails and machine-gun fire (Arreguin-Toft 2005: 193–4).

In the Soviet paradigm of warfare, combat helicopters were regarded as ground attack systems and operated in direct support of the ground forces. The combat helicopter shared this role with the SU-25 Frogfoot fixed-wing aircraft. In Soviet doctrine, the concept of vertical envelopment was considered essential for striking the enemy throughout its depth. In accordance with this concept, for specific missions, troops (known as *desanti*) were inserted far behind the enemy lines (i.e. about 50 miles (80 km) behind the enemy frontline) with the help of troop-carrying helicopters which in turn, were protected by combat helicopters and at times by the fixed wing aircraft. The *desanti* cooperated with forward detachments that comprised a combined-arms group that included tanks, motorized rifle units and artillery (Holcomb 1990: 165, 167–71).

The *mujahideen* closed the road from Gardez to Khost in 1981. This was the main line of communication to Khost. The threat to Gardez-Khost Road was also posed by the *mujahideen* supply and armament complex at the caves of Zhawar. In September 1985, the DRA forces tried to seize Zhawar but failed. During February 1986, the DRA and the Soviet 40th Army launched a campaign that lasted 57 days and resulted in the capture of Zhawar. The DRA and the Soviet forces held it for five hours, destroyed whatever they could, and then withdrew (Grau 2011: 218–19). In April 1986, during the Second Battle for Zhawar, the Soviet aircraft used smart munitions against the caves. The Pakistani instructors unsuccessfully tried to down the Soviet aircraft with Blowpipe missiles (Grau and Jalali 2001: 81–3).

During the Battle of Khost fought in December 1987, 10,000 Soviet and Afghan troops, supported by bomber aircraft, helicopter borne *Spetsnaz* units and artillery, moved out from Gardez towards Khost on 27 December. Part of the Gardez-Khost Road lay through the Kanay Valley, where the twisting ravines were ideal for ambush. The heights on both sides of the road were picketed by the loyal Afghan troops (a tactic which would have won the approval of the officers of British-Indian Army) and Soviet helicopters flew overhead. The Afghan commandos were deployed ahead of the column to trap *mujahideen* parties (O'Ballance 2003: 175).

The air base at Bagram, north of Kabul, was best equipped for the operation of Soviet aircraft like MIG-23 Flogger, SU-25 Frogfoot and MIG-29 Fulcrum (Towle 1990: 187). Paucity of maps and reliable intelligence data resulted in only 25% of the ordnance being delivered on the targets. The MIG-21 was the principal bomb hauler of the Soviet Air Force. These Mach 2 high-altitude interceptors were forced to fly low and slow to fire rockets and drop bombs on the *mujahideen*. Needless to say, the MIG-21 was not suited for such ground-attack missions. The TU-16 medium and SU-24 light bombers were used to carpet bomb suspected guerrilla zones (O'Neill 1998: 230). Such aerial tactics alienated the neutral Afghans from the Soviets. According to one author, the *mujahideen*'s acquisition of Stinger

missiles in 1986 put the Soviet Air Force in Afghanistan on the defensive and to some extent hastened the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 (Towle 1990: 184). Even before the advent of the Stingers, the supply of surface-to-air missiles by the US to the insurgents resulted in the Soviet Air Force, from late 1982, resorting to bombing raids from higher altitudes and using heat flares as counter-measures to mislead the heat-seeking missiles fired by the insurgents (Negus 1982). In total, USSR lost over 2,000 aircraft in Afghanistan by 1989. As a point of comparison, during the Vietnam War, the USA lost over 7,000 fixed-wing and rotary aircraft (including fighter and attack aircraft) from all causes over the 10 years. Around 3500 – 50% was combat related (Pawloski 1990: 129–30).

Neamatollah Nojumi tells us that the bulk of the *mujahideen*'s economic resources (financial and food supply) came from the local communities, especially the rural areas (Nojumi 2002: 18). From 1980 to 1985, the Soviets attempted to eliminate the *mujahideen* support in the countryside. The rural population provided food and shelter to the *mujahideen* and the Soviets bombed the rural villages and destroyed the granaries, irrigation systems, and crops. The Soviet sweeps throughout the countryside resulted in conscription of young males and destruction of their herds. As a result, seven million Afghan refugees fled to Pakistan and Iran (Grau and Jalali 2001: 69–70). According to another estimate, five and a half million Afghans (one-third of Afghanistan's prewar population) became refugees, two million Afghans were forced to migrate from one part of the country to another, and 1.3 million died (Grau 1998: xviii). Ivan Arreguin-Toft notes: '… the main causes of Afghanistan's high noncombatant casualty and refugee rates were due to the systematic and deliberate targeting of noncombatants and their food, water, and shelter. These attacks were intended to weaken the *mujahideen* by disrupting their logistical and intelligence base among the broader civilian population' (Arreguin-Toft 2005: 183).

The US military aid to the *mujahideen* increased steadily. In 1980, it amounted to only US$ 30 million and in 1981, US$ 50 million (Harrison 1995b: 53). The rugged terrain and limited manpower of the Soviets prevented them from sealing off the routes from Pakistan through which the *mujahideen* got their supplies of weapons. In November 1982, US intelligence estimated that even with a surge of 50,000 troops and subsequent concentration of such numbers in a particular zone, the Soviets might be able to temporarily pacify a particular region, but not the whole country. The US decided to provide the insurgents with more anti-tank mines, man pack mortars, radios, heavy machine-guns, surface to air missiles and anti-aircraft guns (Negus 1982).

The Soviets were also growing tired of the unending Afghan War. Mikhail Gorbachev criticized Soviet involvement in Afghanistan as a 'bleeding wound' (O'Ballance 2003: 177). Despite being a festering wound, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan continued because of a lack of decisive political will in Moscow. General Secretary Brezhnev became incapacitated in 1980 but did not die until 11 November 1982. He was succeeded by the ailing Yuri Andropov, who lasted less than two years (November 1982-February 1984). He was succeeded by the

sick Konstantin Chernenko in February 1984, who died in March 1985 (Grau 1998: xxviii). However, Andropov was ready to withdraw from Afghanistan provided Pakistan accepted the legitimacy of the regime in Kabul. Andropov was eager to cooperate with the United Nations and was ready to replace Karmal with another person and to include the non-communists in the Kabul Government. But hardliners in both USA and Pakistan shot down this proposal (Harrison 1995c: 91). While in office, Andropov's search for a diplomatic initiative occurred simultaneously with a policy of resisting military escalation. His aim was to minimize casualties and to scale down operations while looking for a negotiated settlement. For instance, in 1982, two major division level offensives occurred at Panjsher Valley and in Herat, and in 1983, Soviet offensives were confined to battalion and regimental level attacks supplemented by aerial bombings of the *mujahideen* strongholds. Under Chernenko (February 1984 to March 1985), the level of Soviet military operations escalated. Six military offensives (each involved between 5,000 and 10,000 soldiers) were conducted (Harrison 1995d: 147). With the accession of Gorbachev in March 1985, the political leadership got a grip on the situation. He ordered the military to get victory in Afghanistan within a year; failing that, he would find a way out of the impasse by withdrawing from the 'hell on earth' (Matthews 2011: 45).

Between April 1985 and April 1986, there was a huge surge in the Soviet 40th Army in Afghanistan, like the last flicker of a dying flame. The Soviets had some 6,000 tanks, BTRs and BMPs. The number of personnel rose from 81,000 to 108,000. Of the 108,000 soldiers, there were some 73,000 combatants. The cutting edge of the 40th Army was provided by the airborne, air assault, *Spetsnaz* soldiers and two motorized rifle brigades. The other motorized forces were used in security missions such as guarding the lines of communication, airfields and major cities. Overall, some 85% of the Soviet soldiers were tied up in such security missions (Matthews 2011: 45–6). Two important communication links for the Soviets were across the Hindu Kush. The Salang Road, made possible by the Soviet construction of the Salang Tunnel in the late 1960s, ran north from Kabul to Termez in the Soviet frontier. Another route was the Shibar Road west of Kabul that had been functioning since the 1930s (Baumann 1993: 131, 134). Many Soviet soldiers were occupied in guarding these communication routes.

The Soviet failure resulted also from inadequate troop density. In Vietnam, at the point of maximum surge, USA had 500,000 troops. In Afghanistan, which is five times larger than Vietnam, the maximum strength of Soviet troops never exceeded 104,000 soldiers (Grau 1998: xii). The four motorized rifle divisions comprised mostly third-echelon Central Asian reservists. This represented Soviet underestimation of the *mujahideen* combat capacity (Arreguin-Toft 2005: 172). More to the point is Lester W. Grau's assertion: 'The Soviet Army was trained for large scale, rapid tempo operations. They were not trained for the platoon leaders' war of finding and closing with small, indigenous forces which would only stand and fight when the terrain and circumstances were to their advantage' (Grau 1998: xxviii). Similarly, the American military officer turned analyst Matt M. Matthews

concurs: 'One of the primary reasons the other motorized rifle forces were not used more aggressively was because of their inability to adapt to the challenges of counterinsurgency warfare' (Matthews 2011: 46). Geography also helped the *mujahideen*. Afghanistan is a dry and rugged land, dominated by the Hindu Kush Mountains in the east and centre and by the plateaus and deserts of the west and south. In the mountainous country, the modern mechanized Soviet Army was constrained to move along a few vulnerable winding passes and its combat effectiveness was limited by the dust and sand of the desert (Galeotti 2001: 3–4).

After the withdrawal, the Soviets assessed *mujahideen* combat performance. The Soviets concluded that the *mujahideen* were influenced by the Basmachi movement. The Basmachi were resistance fighters in Central Asia who resisted the imposition of Bolshevik regime between 1918 and 1933. The Basmachis conducted hit and run raids and ambushes against the Red Army. The *mujahideen* always used surprise; they knew the terrain well and were natural scouts. The tactical strong points of the guerrillas included their ability to conduct night actions and to move rapidly and secretly through the mountains. Also, the *mujahideen* were supported by large number of agents who provided reconnaissance for them (Grau 1998: 197). The point to be noted is that the nineteenth century British officers also emphasized night actions and ability of the light-footed Pathan insurgents to move quickly and secretly across mountainous terrain.

To sum up, the Soviet Army, writes Pavel Baev, failed in Afghanistan because the officers thought about total victory in the physical sense and failed to grasp the political and propagandistic steps (Baev 1996: 22). Not all was negative with the Soviets. The Communist regime's reforms aided the landless labourers who got land, and the women acquired education and better health care. But the Soviets did not use propaganda properly to win over a large portion of the tribesmen. Nor did they ever play the Pusthunistan card that would have turned the Pusthuns in Pakistan against the Punjabi governing elite of that country (Memorandum 1980).

At a broader level, the Soviet strategy regarding Afghanistan was faulty. The Soviets and their client, PDPA Government, attempted to hold the cities and destroy the *mujahideen*'s economic resources. Not only did such a strategy alienate the rural people, it also made the PDPA regime hollow. The PDPA could only survive by depending on flow of aid from USSR (Nojumi 2002: 19). Arreguin-Toft asserts: 'Barbarism should have been an ideal COIN strategy because the Soviets were not vulnerable to domestic or interstate political costs associated with its prosecution. Moreover, it should have devastated the intelligence and logistical capacity of the *mujahideen* and to a large extent it did … . Barbarism didn't work in Afghanistan because the *mujahideen* were able to rely on foreign intelligence and logistical support and operated from sanctuaries in Pakistan and Iran' (Arreguin-Toft 2005: 215).

Pakistan's dictator General Zia-ul-Haq's policy of supporting the Afghan *mujahideen* was designed to meet several needs: First, this move would raise Zia's legitimacy among the fundamentalists within Pakistan and among fundamentalist Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia. Second, fighting the Soviets would enable Zia

to curry favour with USA during the Cold War. Third, Zia was troubled by the threat posed by USSR along Pakistan's north-western border and India (a Soviet ally) along Pakistan's eastern border. By installing a friendly regime in Afghanistan, Pakistan aimed to expand its strategic depth. Fourth, the Zia government was afraid that a hostile Afghanistan would encourage secessionist movement among the Pathan inhabitants of Pakistan's north-west region. The Afghanistan-Pakistan border problem could be traced back to the creation of the Durand Line in 1893. Pakistan accepted it, but Afghanistan never accepted this line as the ultimate frontier. Afghanistan actually voted against Pakistan's admission into the United Nations in 1947 (Cordovez 1995b: 124–5).

In February 1982, Foreign Minister of Pakistan Agha Shahi resigned and was succeeded by the hardliner General Sahibzada Yaqub Khan. After a distinguished military career, Yaqub Khan functioned as an ambassador in Washington, Paris, and Moscow (where he was stationed during the invasion). On 21 March, Yaqub was sworn in as minister (Cordovez 1995a: 80–81). While negotiating with the United Nations, Yaqub demanded that Karmal vanish from the scene, allowing the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan with minimal bloodshed (Cordovez 1995b: 132).

Muhammad Yousaf, a Brigadier in the infantry branch of the Pakistan Army was ordered in 1983 to take over the Afghan Bureau of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The ISI's Director-General was Lieutenant-General Akhtar Abdul Rehman Khan who had direct access to President Zia. From October 1983 till August 1987, Yousaf's job was not only to train and equip the *mujahideen* but also to plan operations inside Afghanistan. Yousaf had a staff of 60 officers and 300 senior NCOs. Yousaf's headquarters was located on the northern outskirts of Rawalpindi, about 12 kilometres from Islamabad. Although the main headquarters and warehouses were located in Rawalpindi, there were two forward detachments at Peshawar and Quetta. The supplies that arrived at Karachi in ships were moved to the Quetta warehouse and then to Rawalpindi (Yousaf and Adkin 2001: 1–3, 26–8). Yousaf writes in his memoirs: 'To the Mujahideen I could issue no orders … . I had to achieve operational results by cajoling and convincing, not commanding' (Yousaf and Adkin 2001: 2–3). Yousaf claimed that in the four years of his tenure, his organization had trained more than 80,000 *mujahideen*. The ISI drew the *mujahideen* recruits from the two million Afghan refugees who were spread along the borderland that stretched from Chitral in the north to Quetta in the south. They lived in squalid mud huts or tents (Yousaf and Adkin 2001: 4, 25). Besides USA and Pakistan, the *mujahideen* were also aided by China, which equipped the Tajik insurgents, and Iran, which trained the Shia militants (Sinno 2008: 106).

After 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru, independent India's first Prime Minister followed a 'myopic' foreign policy. In his framework of grand strategy, there was no place for Afghanistan or Central Asia. This proved to be a cardinal error (Singh 1999: 111). Afghanistan would return to haunt India with the rise of the Taliban and Zia's forward policy in Afghanistan during the 1980s. Since the 1970s, India had been acquiring 90% of its weapon systems from USSR. USSR provided India with low

interest rates for repayment of the arms supplied and also greater time period for repayment. Further, repayment was allowed to be made in local currency or goods. On the other hand, Western companies demanded hard currency on 'cash and carry' terms. As a tactical ploy, the Indian bureaucrats, accompanied by military experts, toured Western countries to buy arms. In 1982, despite India's refusal to give basing rights to the Soviets in Vishkhapatnam Port, Moscow gave massive numbers of weapons to Delhi. India has some 85 million Muslims, and it could not afford to fully support USSR on the issue of Afghan invasion. Nor could India afford to alienate USSR because it would need military aid in the near future. So Delhi's condemnation of the Soviet invasion was muted. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan raised Pakistan's value in USA's eyes. Pakistan received a large number of F-16s and other military goods. The F-16s were capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Although the US planners wanted Pakistan to deploy these weapons along the Afghanistan border against a possible Soviet threat, Islamabad deployed them along the India-Pakistan border (Smith 1994: 22, 96, 107–8, 111–12).

Gorbachev wanted new leadership in Kabul, and in May 1986, Karmal was replaced by Dr Najibullah, who was head of the KHAD (Afghan Government's Security Agency). Najibullah, previously a boxer, was known as 'the Bull' (Loyn 2009: 155). On 13 November 1986, Gorbachev and the Politburo decided to withdraw from Afghanistan (Sinno 2008: 109). In 1988, the United Nations aided Soviet withdrawal, and by February 1989, the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan was complete (Grau 1998: xxix).

Did Afghanistan prove to be the Soviet Union's Vietnam? Abdulkader H. Sinno seems to imply yes. The Soviet dead and missing in Afghanistan numbered 15,000 soldiers (13,833 killed) of the 642,000 men who served during the 10 years. Of these troops, 525,000 were in the Soviet armed forces, another 90,000 were in the KGB and 5,000 were in the MVD. However, 415,932 soldiers were victims of disease (115,308 suffered from hepatitis and 31,080 from typhoid). Dysentery was another killer. The total number of sick and wounded numbered 469,685 and 10,751 of them became invalids (Grau 1998: xiv, xix). Like the American soldiers in Vietnam, by 1985 the Soviet troops were suffering from drug and alcohol abuse (Matthews 2011: 46). One author argues that many Muslim reservists who were used in non-combat roles during the invasion fraternized with fellow Muslims in Afghanistan (Hauner 1991: 45–6). By 1985, the morale of the Soviet soldiers was also shaky. At the training centres, the Soviet conscripts were told that they were going to fight Chinese and American mercenaries. When they reached Afghanistan, they found out that they were unwelcome occupiers in a hostile land (Matthews 2011: 47). In terms of military hardware, besides the aircraft and helicopters, the Soviets lost 147 tanks, 1,314 APCs, 433 artillery pieces and mortars, 1,138 radio sets and CP vehicles, 510 engineering vehicles, and 11,369 trucks (Grau 1998: xix). The Afghan misadventure cost the Soviets eight billion roubles annually, which was about 10% of the 1989 Soviet defence budget. The Soviet defence budget consumed between 15 and 25% of the Soviet GNP. Thus, the Afghan policy cost the USSR between 1.5 and 2.6% of its GNP (Sinno 2008: 106).

Mark Galeotti asserts that the Afghan misadventure did not destroy USSR. The war was a minor, ill-conceived and uncomfortable military adventure which resulted in a negligible drain on Soviet economy. The Afghan War was not a critical factor in the transformation of the Soviet system. Some 65,000 died annually on Soviet roads. The 60 billion roubles that was the total cost until 1988 of the Afghan War (official figure) was equivalent to the amount spent in one year for subsidizing basic foodstuffs. USSR spent 1–2% of its budget on the war. In comparison, USA spent 23% (in 1969) of its defence budget for the war in South-East Asia. In 1969, USA had 500,000 men in Vietnam and the force-space ratio exceeded seven troops per square mile. During the time of maximum troop concentration, the Soviets in Afghanistan had fewer than 150,000 soldiers and the ratio was 0.7 troops per square mile. USA lost 40,000 men in Vietnam and USSR lost only 15,000. The true cost of the war, concludes Galeotti, for USSR was psychological and political (Galeotti 2001: 2, 224–5).

Yousaf claims that after the Soviet withdrawal, the *mujahideen* could have achieved outright victory. But this was not because US policy was against such a victory. In fact, it suited the interests of both superpowers to have a chaotic stalemate in Afghanistan. Also, the accidental death of Zia removed one of the strongest and most consistent supporters of the *mujahideen* from the equation. On 17 August 1988, the Pakistan Air Force's Lockheed C-130 transport aircraft (US made) crashed after taking off a few miles north of Bhawalpur. General Akhtar Abdul Rahman Khan, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and head of ISI until 1987, also died. Zia was on the KGB-trained KHAD's hit list. Even for the US Government, after the withdrawal of USSR from Afghanistan, Zia was becoming a liability. After the Soviet withdrawal, USA did not want communist rule in Afghanistan to be replaced with an Islamic fundamentalist regime. In the US Government's eyes, Zia's aim was to create an Islamic Block stretching all the way from Middle East to Central Asia (Yousaf and Adkin 2001: 6, 8, 12). Zia reportedly told Selig S. Harrison: 'We have earned the right to have a friendly regime there … . We took risks as a frontline state, and we won't permit it to be like it was before, with Indian and Soviet influence there and claims on our territory. It will be a real Islamic state, part of a pan-Islamic revival that will one day win over the Muslims in the Soviet Union, you will see' (Quoted from Harrison 1995c: 92). Yousaf speculates that either the KGB, or KHAD, or RAW through its Soviet contacts, or the CIA, or a small caucus within the Pakistan Army with links to the CIA might have supplied the ultra-sophisticated poison gas that killed the pilots of the C-130 and caused its crash (Yousaf and Adkin 2001: 15). After Zia's death, a general election was held and Benazir Bhutto (daughter of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who was executed by Zia) became the Prime Minister, and the new head of ISI was Hamid Gul. They continued to support the fundamentalist *mujahideen* against the Soviet backed regime in Kabul (Loyn 2009: 160). However, it could be argued that their support was not as intense as it was under Zia's regime.

After withdrawing from Afghanistan, the Soviet aid to its client regime was US$ 1.5 billion annually according to one estimate (Loyn 2009: 164). Arreguin-Toft

writes that the *mujahideen* were so dependent on external aid that when the tap was turned off in 1989, they failed to defeat the Najibullah regime (Arreguin-Toft 2005: 198). The American 'tap' was probably not turned off completely. According to one author, in 1991, US aid to the *mujahideen* was US$ 500 million annually (O'Ballance 2003: 225). The Soviet backed government led by President Najibullah collapsed in 1992. At that time, the Tajik forces were under Burhanuddin Rabbani and his military commander Ahmed Shah Masud. They were aided by the Uzbek Commander in the north, General Abdul Rashid Dostum (Marston 2008: 221). Dostum was a *jang salar* (warlord), and to most of the Afghans, he was known as the *Pasha* (Commander). Dostum's power base was the Uzbek community who made up 10% of Afghanistan's population. The Uzbeks are the Turco-Mongols who had descended from the Golden Horde Mongols (Williams 2010: 611–12). However, in January 1992, Dostum turned against the Afghan Government that had supplied him with arms (Jones 2010: 43).

In the collapse of the regime of President Najibullah in April 1992, a group of Afghan Army generals and militia commanders under Dostum's leadership played an important role. They formed a faction known as *Junbesh-i-Milli Islami* (National Islamic Movement). The units of the Afghan regular army constituted the largest portion of the *Junbesh*'s Army of the North. In mid-1992, the regular units were the best equipped among the armies operating in Afghanistan. Dostum inherited five divisions, several independent brigades, police and armed units belonging to the WAD, and a number of militias. Theoretically, Dostum had some 120,000 men under arms; in reality, the troops numbered 60,000 men. The regular units had a large number of armour and artillery and a small air force distibuted over the seven provinces of Afghanistan (Giustozzi 2004: 1–2).

Taliban and US Intervention in Afghanistan

The withdrawal of the Soviets resulted in bickering among the various *mujahideen* factions. Ultimately, after a lengthy chaotic civil war, the Taliban emerged supreme. The Taliban's symbiotic relationship with *Al-Qaeda* resulted in 9/11 which brought the world's sole superpower, USA into Afghanistan. History repeated itself. USA, like USSR and the British Empire, won the conventional war but failed in the unconventional war. The Taliban has resurrected itself like a Phoenix rising from the ashes. Let us have a look at the origins of the Taliban.

Talib is an Arabic word, and its literal meaning is one who is seeking something for himself. This word is derived from the word *talab* meaning desire. In Urdu, Taliban is the plural of *talib*. In Pushto, the word Taliban denotes students studying in *deeni madari*s (religious institutions). The *talib*s go to different *alim*s (religious scholars) in order to gain religious knowledge. A *talib,* after completing several years of studies in a *deeni madari,* is given the title of a *mullah*. A *mullah* is qualified to become an *imam*, *qazi* and a *mufti* (Matinuddin 2001: 12–13, 15–16).

When the Soviet troops moved into Afghanistan, the military dictator of Pakistan General Zia-ul-Haq established a chain of *deeni madari*s along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The objective was to create a body of religious oriented students who would fight the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Soon, the *deeni madari*s spread across Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan, Punjab and Sind (Matinuddin 2001: 14; Friedman 2004: 200). The establishment of these religious schools was in line with Zia's policy to Islamize Pakistan's identity on Sunni lines which led to the introduction of the Sunni-Hanafi-Deobandi system of jurisprudence as evident from the promulgation of Hudood Ordinances in February 1979. It was followed by the *Zakat* Ordinance in 1980. By 1984, 9.4% of the *Zakat* fund was used to support 2,273 *madrasa*s which catered to 111,050 students who, along with the semi-educated unemployed youth, became the foot soldiers of the extremist sectarian outfits (Sharma 2010: 42–3). According to one calculation, in May 1997, in the Rawalpindi Division of Pakistan's Punjab (west Punjab of British-India), there were 169 *deeni madari*s with 17,533 *talib*s registered with them. Most of these schools were used as hideouts for the Afghan terrorists/insurgents who were fighting the Soviets (Matinuddin 2001: 14).

The capture of Afghanistan by the Taliban was something short of a miracle. In 1994, the Taliban emerged in Kandahar. The Taliban aimed to impose a radical Sunni Islamic *Caliphate* in Afghanistan. Its philosophy was derived from the Deobandi School of thought (Jones 2008: 38). The Taliban's leader Mullah Omar was not merely a *mujahideen* commander but also a religious teacher. Being a religious teacher gave him an advantage in negotiating with the local and tribal communities (Nojumi 2002: 23). However, the Taliban failed to control all of Afghanistan. A group of Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara war lords known as *Shura Nazar* (the West called them Northern Alliance), differed with Taliban's orthodox radical Islamic policies and controlled parts of northern Afghanistan especially the Panjshir Valley, north of Kabul. The Northern Alliance received support from Iran, France and Russia (Maloney 2007: 29). The Northern Alliance was mainly the product of Dostum, Masud (the Lion of Panjshir) and the Hazaras. In 1998, Dostum fled to Turkey (Williams 2010: 614).

Initially, USA remained indifferent to the Taliban because Pakistan advised Washington that the Taliban would be able to establish peace and stability within Afghanistan and also would allow American companies to exploit the energy resources in Central Asia. However, things changed with the arrival of Osama Bin Laden. In 1996, the Taliban provided sanctuary to Osama Bin Laden when he escaped from Sudan. When Osama was held responsible for the 1998 US Embassy bombing in Africa, the Taliban refused to extradite him. Even after 9/11, the Taliban did not hand over Osama to USA because the *Al-Qaeda* financed the Taliban regime and also because of the Afghan cultural tradition of *melmastia* (D'Souza 2010: 19–20).

In response to 9/11, USA launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) on 7 October 2001 to crush the *Al-Qaeda* network in Afghanistan and to remove the Taliban regime which was playing host to Osama Bin Laden (Wills 2006: 35–6).

Even before 2001, the CIA maintained links with the Northern Alliance (Rothstein 2006: 7). In fact, the Clinton Administration, which took office in 1993, decided to bomb *Al-Qaeda* training camps with long-distance weapons. On 20 August 1998, US submarines and surface ships from the Arabian Sea launched several Tomahawk cruise missiles at *Al-Qaeda* training camps located outside Khost. The Pakistan Government was not informed earlier about the American strikes in order to prevent the information being leaked to the Taliban and *Al-Qaeda* through Pakistan's ISI, which had ties with the terrorist organizations (Talbot 2004: 115–16). Strobe Talbott who was Deputy Secretary in the State Department in Clinton Administration notes in his memoirs:

> Joe Ralston had the awkward assignment of making sure that he was with General Karamat [General Jahangir Karamat, COAS Pakistan] during the launch of the Tomahawks. That way, if the low-flying missiles showed up on Pakistani radar screens, Joe would be able to assure Karamat that they were not the first wave of an Indian sneak attack. Toward the end of a dinner at the VIP lounge at Islamabad airport, Ralston checked his watch and told Karamat that about sixty Tomahawks had just passed through Pakistani airspace en route to their targets in Afghanistan. Shortly after, he thanked his host for dinner, shook hands, and departed. (Talbot 2004: 116. [ ] are mine)

Initially, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was called Operation Infinite Justice. Because Muslims believe that only God can compel infinite justice, the name was changed to Operation Enduring Freedom. Afghanistan, as the area of operation, came under US Central Command (CENTCOM). Afghanistan being a landlocked country, USA had to gain flight rights as well as control over the air bases in the neighbouring countries to station its troops and aircraft. This involved a lot of diplomatic activities on the part of the Americans. Iran, although an opponent of Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, opposed joining a US led Coalition claiming that the war was a pretext for helping Israel and extending American military power. In late September 2001, Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khomeni claimed that USA has tampered with Iran's interest and Iran would not go along with the arrogant Americans. At the south of Afghanistan lies Pakistan, and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is 2,430 kilometer long. Most of Pakistan's population in September 2001 was sympathetic to the Taliban. According to one estimate, in 1999–2000, only 22% of the Pakistanis have a favourable image of USA and this dropped to only 10% in 2002. Worse, Pakistan and India have a serious disagreement over the issue of Kashmir. At that time, it seemed as though the high tension between Pakistan and India could have boiled over into a conventional conflict which might have escalated into a nuclear conflagration. Due to American pressure, on 13 September 2001, COAS turned President Pervez Musharraf announced that Pakistan would cooperate completely with USA. America acquired the rights to use the bases near the Pakistani cities of Pasni, Dalbandin and Jacobabad. These Pakistani bases became forward-operating bases

of the Americans. However, the Shahbaz Air Base in Jacobabad is too far away for the aircraft from European airfields. Hence, USA and the Coalition required airfields in Central Asia (*War* 2010: 27, 35–6, 39–40, 58).

The states on the north of Afghanistan are Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. They are actually ex-Soviet republics in which Russian influence has been declining slowly but steadily. Soviet President Vladimir Putin asked these Central Asian polities to cooperate with USA in its war against terror, probably because Russia is also feeling the pinch of Pan Islamic terrorism in Chechnya. Uzbekistan's border with Afghanistan is 137 kilometres long but is very close to Mazar-e Sharif and other Northern Alliance strongholds. The airfields in Uzbekistan are necessary for providing logistical support to the Northern Alliance troops. US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfield met with President Islam Karimov and secured the use of Uzbekistan's ex-Soviet air base Karshi-Khanabad (i.e. K2). USA pledged military and financial support in return for basing rights. From US$ 24.8 million in 2001, the general aid to Uzbekistan rose to US$ three billion in 2002. Another reason for Uzbekistan cooperating with USA was the fact that Uzbekistan was also facing threat from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, an insurgency supported by the Taliban and the *Al-Qaeda*. Tajikistan offered the use of three air bases and in December 2001, Kyrgyzstan offered the use of Manas Airport which became the principal logistical hub of the Coalition force (*War* 2010: 37–9).

Meanwhile, the Northern Alliance was rejuvenated with the return of Dostum from Turkey in April 2001. His enclave was the Dar-Y-Suf (River of Caves) Valley in the Hindu Kush Mountains. There, Dostum rallied 2,000 Uzbek *cherik*s (horse-mounted guerrillas) and started a hit-and-run expedition against the Taliban (Williams 2010: 614).

One of the characteristics of this campaign was that a few SOF personnel worked with the anti-Taliban Afghan forces to topple the Taliban government. In Lieutenant-Colonel Craig D. Wills' view, the Afghan model of warfare is a combination of SOFs, Afghan auxiliary forces and airpower. This combination was initially designed to prepare the battlefield for decisive operation by the conventional ground force. However, allied Afghan auxiliary force (15,000 Afghan Northern Alliance troops) supported by US airpower was able to lay siege to Kabul within five weeks of the start of the campaign and before the induction of a significant number of US ground troops. In fact, the US-led Coalition installed a friendly regime at Kabul within two months of the beginning of the conflict. On 19 October 2001, Rumsfield announced that US troops would provide direct assistance to the Northern Alliance. On 21 October, the SOF teams called in their first air strikes in support of the Northern Alliance towards Mazar-e-Sharif. Portable laser designators enabled SOF teams to direct the laser-guided weapons dropped from aircraft,, and the GPS enhanced overland navigation and allowed the SOF teams to pass precise targeting data to orbiting aircraft (Wills 2006: 35–9). In late November 2001, the 10th Mountain Division headquarters was deployed in Begram to take charge of all military operations in Afghanistan. The 10th Mountain

reported to the theatre land component headquarters stationed in Uzbekistan and the latter reported to General Franks in Tampa, Florida (Rothstein 2006: 13). On 9 December 2001, the Taliban withdrew from Kandahar. This marked the end of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (D'Souza 2011: 19).

One of the principal objectives of USA in this war was to capture and eliminate the top leadership of *Al-Qaeda* and the Taliban. Early in the war, a Ranger team was parachuted into Mullah Omar's compound in Kandahar. Delta Force units were positioned in Pakistan rather than in Uzbekistan to prevent six-feet-five-inch tall Osama Bin Laden from escaping through southern Afghanistan into Pathan dominated North-West Pakistan (Friedman 2004: 192).

Some hard ground fighting occurred, especially at the Tora Bora cave complex. The Tora Bora borders on Pakistan's FATA. The Pakistan government's reach is at best limited in this region. The inhabitants are mostly Pathans, like the inhabitants of eastern Afghanistan, while the governing elite of Pakistan mainly comprised of Punjabi Muslims. The Tora Bora, a complex combination of natural caves and manmade tunnels located on the Pakistani border, south-east of Kabul, was constructed during the Cold War era by USA. The complex was heated and ventilated by electrical generators and designed to withstand overpressure from explosions. The Tora Bora occupies an area of about five miles from south to north and seven miles from east to west. Entry into the caves was difficult due to terrain and hostile ground fire. Each cave is about 25 to 50 feet high and the entrances are at various altitudes and at an inclination of 45 to 60 degrees, making attacks by troops and artillery difficult. It takes about 17 hours to trek from the road to the caves. The mountains are sheer and the passes are covered by dense forest. Some of the cave openings could only be reached by climbing or by helicopters. From 30 November, US aircraft started hitting the Tora Bora with daisy-cutter anti-personnel bombs, massive bunker buster bombs, and JDAMs which were guided by GPS satellites. However, no US troops were involved in the ground assault and the Afghan auxiliary troops were not willing to launch a frontal assault against the defensive complex for fear of heavy casualties. The result was that the Saudi 'villain' escaped into north-west Pakistan (Friedman 2004: 194–5, 200).

US-NATO COIN in Afghanistan

> You cannot stop us. We've been using these tactics for hundreds of years and they have always worked. After an attack fighters can easily stash their weapons among villagers sympathetic to their cause. They can melt in with the local population and move on to another village, where there are more caches of weapons available to them for mounting another attack … . The foreigners have the watches, but we have the time.
>
> Taliban leader Ashoor
> (Quoted from Spencer and Horn 2009: 16)

History seems to repeat itself. Once the Taliban's conventional forces were destroyed, insurgency like a hydra headed monster reappeared to haunt the US Led Coalition. After the collapse of the Taliban, USA had to conduct COIN operations for establishing security and peace in the country as part of the state-building policy with a friendly government installed in Kabul.

After the fall of the Taliban regime at the end of 2001, NATO agreed to take command of an internal stabilization force in 2003, known as International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). It was located in Kabul and comprised a British infantry battalion. Initially, NATO's mission was confined to Kabul and kept separate from the US COIN operations in the south and east of Afghanistan (Tootal 2009: 22). The Coalition troop suffered from lack of unity of command. While OEF is an American led military oriented force which is part of the Global War on Terror, the ISAF started as a UN mandated European organization that evolved into a NATO led mission mainly for Afghanistan (Maloney 2007: 27–8).

In mid-2003, the US led Coalition had over 12,000 troops representing 19 nations. It was led by the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 180 formed in June 2002 and based at Bagram (a 20 minute flight from Kabul) (Barno 2007: 33). In 2004, there were only 25,000 Coalition troops in Afghanistan. Most of these soldiers were Americans. By 2005, USA had 19,000 soldiers in this country. In comparison, in the same year, USA had 140,000 troops in Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom (*Wanat* 2010: 10, 12). As USA became more engaged in Iraq, NATO agreed to expand its operation in the north, west and finally south of Afghanistan. In August 2006, NATO troops assumed responsibility from the Americans in an area known as Regional Command South. This included the provinces of Oruzgan, Zabol, Kandahar and Helmand (Tootal 2009: 22). Afghanistan is about 50% larger than Iraq and has four million more people. The population of Afghanistan in 2003 was about 31 million (Barno 2007: 33); according to one estimate, its population in 2006 was 32 million (Tootal 2009: 21). Between 2005 and 2008, USA increased its troops share in Afghanistan but it never matched the troop level of Iraq. In 2008, USA had 31,000 soldiers in Afghanistan (*Wanat* 2010: 12). In early 2009, US President Barack Obama ordered the deployment of 21,000 additional US troops (Christia and Semple 2009: 34).

The insurgency is intense in the Konar and Nuristan provinces. According to US military analysts, there are three types of insurgents: local fighters, dedicated core fighters of the Afghan fundamentalist groups and criminal cartels, and transnational foreign fighters. The local fighters are recruits from the localities, who are selected from the *madrasa*s and the Afghan refugee population in Pakistan. They are young, unemployed and poorly educated and mainly used as labourers and given rudimentary weapon training. Economic and material concerns motivate them. These young fighters are rewarded with cash and clothing. They also join for the excitement and to gain a reputation among their peers and communities. They are not ideologically motivated and can be gleaned away from insurgency through provision of regular employment and financial opportunities. If the fundamentalist organizations lose the support of these local youths, then the

former's logistical infrastructures will be seriously dislocated, especially in the spheres of transportation and heavy labour (*Wanat* 2010: 8–9).

The members of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's *Hizb-i-Islami,* now known as *Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin* (HIG), are core fighters. This fundamentalist organization was originally founded to fight the Soviets and received much support from Pakistan's ISI. Several fundamentalist groups in Afghanistan are linked with the *Lashkar-i-Toiba*, a Pakistan based militant organization which is fighting India in Kashmir. Moreover, the timber, gem mining and drug cartels also possess dedicated fighters. These cartels resist establishment of government control, especially the trade restrictions, regulations and taxation by the central government (*Wanat* 2010: 8). Many drug lords are also local tribal leaders and have extensive international connections (Hammes 2006: 168). In 2001, the GNP of the Afghan economy was US$ five billion, mainly raised through smuggling and drug trade (Chin 2003: 61). The core insurgents are skilled, well trained, and equipped with state-of-the-art military equipment that is often taken from Coalition forces. They are strongly motivated by religious ideology. Like the local fighters, they have also grown up within the regional communities and speak the local dialects. They operate within their immediate home community, district or at best within their province (*Wanat* 2010: 9).

The dedicated foreign insurgents are members of the *Al-Qaeda*. They operate across the international borders and fight to establish a global Islamic *Caliphate*. These foreign fighters, mostly Arabs and Central Asians, hail from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Chechnya and Western China. Till 2008, most of them were based in Pakistan. They have considerable financial resources which they use to influence the local and dedicated Afghan insurgents. The foreign insurgents are dedicated to their cause and are unwilling to compromise. According to one US military estimate, the foreign fighters who fought in Nuristan from 2002 to 2008, numbered 200 men in this province (*Wanat* 2010: 9–10).

There is no unified leadership among the insurgents. The *Hizb-i-Islami* is based in Nuristan, Konar, Laghman and Nangarhar. The *Lashkar-i-Toiba* is also active in this region. The Central Asian and Arab insurgents are active along the Afghan-Pakistan border in Bajaur in FATA in Pakistan, to Khost and Paktia in Afghanistan. The resurrected Taliban (i.e. neo-Taliban) is active in Baluchistan and in the Afghan provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Zabol and Paktika. Between 2004 and 2006, there were about 5,000–10,000 Taliban fighters active in Afghanistan (Jones 2008: 38–9).

According to RAND Corporation analyst Seth G. Jones, the Taliban comprised of two tiers. The top tier included the principal political leadership structure and guerrilla commanders who were motivated by a radical version of Islam and viewed the struggle as a fight between Islam and the Western infidels and their puppet governments. The Taliban leadership, Mullah Omar and his key leaders, was based in Quetta. A second group of leaders was based in Pakistan's FATA and one of the principal leaders remains, Sirajuddin Haqqani. In 2006, he commanded several hundred fighters and was semi-autonomous of the Taliban leadership in

Afghanistan. Haqqani's support was powerful in the Khost, Logar, Paktia and Paktika provinces of Afghanistan as well as in Waziristan. Haqqani enjoyed close cooperation with the Pakistan Army and especially the ISI. Haqqani also ran *madrasa*s around Miranshah and Mir Ali. The bottom tier of Taliban guerrillas comprises thousands of local Afghan fighters. They are men from the villages who are paid to set up roadside bombs, launch rockets and mortars. At best, they function as part-time soldiers. They are not ideologically committed to *jihad*. They are motivated by unemployment and anger over the killing and wounding of their friends and relatives by Afghan Government, US or NATO forces (Jones 2008: 40–41).

The British returned to Afghanistan after almost a century, not as a principal player but as a subsidiary to its dominant partner, USA. From 2004, the Coalition force used Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to improve the living standards of the Afghans (*Wanat* 2010: 10). Kersti Larsdotter makes a comparative analysis of the German PRT in Kunduz in north-east Afghanistan with British PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif (in Balkh), in north-west Afghanistan between 1 March 2004 till 28 February 2006. While the British approach emphasized 'hearts and minds' and minimum force approach, the German PRT emphasized 'show of force'. While the British conducted patrols with six to seven men, the Germans conducted patrols with 20 to 30 soldiers who wore more heavy armour and carried more weapons while moving about in the villages than the British personnel. The German Quick Reaction Force, too, was bigger than the British one. In contrast to Kunduz, at Mazar-e-Sharif, the intensity of insurgent-related attacks increased during the above-mentioned time. Larsdotter concludes that her case study should at least question the basic supremacy of the British minimum-force approach for all the regions in all the times (Larsdotter 2008: 352–73).

The decision to send 3rd PARA to Afghanistan formed part of Britain's agreement to take over responsibility of the Helmand Province and send a United Kingdom Task Force (UKTF) of 3,700 troops. The troops were drawn from the 16th Air Assault Brigade with the 3rd PARA forming the infantry element of the force. Besides its normal complements of three rifle companies and specialist platoons of heavy machine-guns, anti-tank missiles, mortars, reconnaissance patrols, and snipers, the battalion expanded to become an all-arms unit of 1,200 men. The artillery was made up of a battery of six 105-mm light-gun howitzers. The Scimitar reconnaissance vehicles and Spartan personnel carriers provided light-armoured capability. The CH-47 Chinook troop carrying helicopters provided the battalion group with air mobility. Close air support was provided by A-10 tank buster aircraft and AC-130 Hercules Spectre gunships from the US Air Force. The Apache helicopter gunships and Harrier jets of the RAF provided further firepower (Tootal 2009: 22–3).

The mission of the 3rd PARA was to use force as a last resort. Hunting down the Taliban was not its objective. Rather, 3rd PARA's role was to provide security to protect the development and reconstruction efforts of the PRTs, which would deploy with the task force. This was made up of both military elements

and development specialists from the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). It was assumed that their efforts would win over the loyalty of the majority population of the Pushtuns and allow the Kabul Government to extend its authority in this province (Tootal 2009: 23).

When NATO decided to expand the ISAF to southern Afghanistan, Britain agreed to take responsibility for the Helmand Province. Helmand is sandwiched between Kandahar Province in the east and Nimruz Province in the west along the Iranian border. Helmand is a flat featureless desert which extends southwards to the border near Pakistan. In the north, the rugged mountains of Hindu Kush rise sharply from the desert landscape. Helmand River has water throughout the year and is fed by the snow from the mountains. Wells and ditches suck water from the Helmand and are used to make the land fertile for a few hundred metres on either side of the river banks (Tootal 2009: 27). This province is highly underdeveloped and the narco-economy is dominant and local support for the Taliban remains high (Farrell 2010: 574). Afghanistan's economy depends on poppy growing; it produces 90% of the world's opium (Docherty 2007: 57–8). According to another estimate, 93% of the world's opium comes from Afghanistan and half of the crop is grown in Helmand. Most of it is converted into heroin and it supplies 95% of Britain's addicts. The local farmers, trapped in a cycle of poverty and facing intimidation by the feudal drug barons, have no other alternative except to grow poppies. The opium trade sustains the Taliban insurgency by providing money for purchase of arms and munitions (Tootal 2009: 24–5). Colonel Stuart Tootal, who commanded the 3rd PARA in 2006 at Helmand Province, notes in his autobiography that when he asked the officials how they would be able to gain the consent of the people if they banned opium cultivation which constitutes the livelihood of the poor farmers, he did not get any clear answer.

Tootal describes the operation of the 3rd PARA Battalion in the following words:

> It was clear that the struggle that we were about to become engaged in would be psychological as well as physical; it would be a battle for the hearts and minds of the people. I doubted whether eradication would help achieve this. We would be operating in a guerrilla landscape, where our protagonist lived and operated among the civilian population. He would be indistinct from them until he decided to attack us. He would do so at a moment of his own choosing, before melting back into the obscurity of the community from whence he had come. While we would be constrained by the norms and conventions of war, such as Geneva Convention, the insurgents would not. (Tootal 2009: 25)

In April 2006, 1,200 soldiers of the 3rd PARA Battle Group started their journey to southern Afghanistan. They were the first British unit to be sent to Helmand. During its six-month tour of duty, the 3rd PARA fired over 479,000 rounds of

ammunition. The action took place along the desert plains and the foothills of Hindu Kush. During the Afghan summer, the battle group attempted to protect the scattered district centres against the Taliban (Tootal 2009: xiii).

Between 2006 and 2009, in the Helmand Province of southern Afghanistan, six British Task Forces were deployed, each one based around a brigade (with some supplementary units) that served a six-month tour. Between May 2006 and September 2007, three successive British brigades engaged in major combat operations against the Taliban. But, in September 2007, the fourth British Task Force came up with a population-centric approach. The objective was securing and developing the key areas of Helmand (Farrell 2010: 573).

One British officer who participated in the first phase of this campaign, Leo Docherty, is caustic about its effectiveness. Docherty was born in Scotland and attended the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and was commissioned into the Scot Guards in 2001. He fought in Iraq in 2004. He trained as a paratrooper and passed a language course in Pusthu. He was deployed as aide-de-camp to the commander of the British force deployed in Helmand in April 2006. However, he left the army in December 2006 (Docherty 2007: 3–34, 44–5).

The British Task Force in which Docherty served was made up mainly of the 16th Air Assault Brigade (Docherty 2007: 55). Docherty writes: 'At the tactical level – for the troops on the ground – the plan to use something called "the Mosaic". It demands that all British units be aware of all facets of Afghan society – the tribes, the economy and local politics – while working within it … . Strategically, the plan for Helmand Province as a whole is based on "the Comprehensive Approach"' (Docherty 2007: 56). The objective is to improve the security in Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital, so that the Department for International Development (DfID) could start practical developmental projects and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office could focus on counter-narcotics and improvement in governance. An 'inkspot', a security haven, will be established in which life can return to normal (Docherty 2007: 56). One DfID official informed Docherty that improving the livelihood of the Afghans is their objective. Polio increased in southern Afghanistan after 2001 (Loyn 2009: 228). In Afghanistan, 20% of the children die before the age of five and about 70–75% of the populace is illiterate. The objective is to provide electricity and drinking water. Through microfinance lending and quick impact projects, the DfID is trying to achieve its objectives (Docherty 2007: 57; Tootal 2009: 21). Child mortality has declined a bit. From about 165 deaths for every 1,000 individuals aged five or less, early in the first decade of the new millennium, the rate in 2008 was 130 per 1,000 (O'Hanlon 2009: 140).

But the overall situation in Docherty's eye was indeed grim. Docherty writes that the Afghan National Police (ANP) with whom the British were supposed to be working, were hand-in-glove with the personnel associated with the opium industry (Docherty 2007: 65). Recruitment in the ANA started in May 2002. Battalions were given a basic 10 week course and the creation of fully disciplined units was expected to take about six months (Giustozzi 2007: 48). About the ANA, Docherty

notes: 'They wear soiled green camouflage fatigues donated by the US and plastic sandals or inferior black leather boots' (Docherty 2007: 74). The ANA actually was not well motivated and suffered from large desertions because many soldiers were not eager to serve far away from home.Low wages and the personnel's unwillingness to accept military regulations were other factors. Some elements of the ANA were actually involved in the narcotics trade (Giustozzi 2007: 52–5). The Governor of Helmand, Engineer Daoud, who was appointed by the Hamid Karzai Government, was guarded by a private military company (Docherty 2007: 67, 71). Docherty notes in his memoirs: 'In a country where family, kin and tribe are of paramount importance in political affairs, it's suddenly very clear that he's relying on us to support his position' (Docherty 2007: 73).

The insurgent-related attacks are increasing with time. According to one author, insurgent-inspired incidents rose by 50% from 12.4 attacks per day in 2007 to 18.4 per day in 2008. At the beginning of 2008, indigenous security forces in Afghanistan numbered only 130,000 men. In comparison, the Iraqi Army had 130,000 personnel and the Iraqi police had 190,000 men. A decision had been taken in 2008 to raise the size of the ANA and ANP from 57,000 and 75,000 to 70,000 and 82,000 men respectively (Orr 2009: 87–8). As a point of comparison, the Soviets in Afghanistan maintained about 500,000 soldiers and uniformed militias; still they failed (Loyn 2009: 227). In 2008, fatalities among the Afghan security forces exceeded 1,000 annually (O'Hanlon 2009: 140).

In 2011, an article jointly written by an American academician and a Canadian military officer asserted that throughout Afghanistan's history, Islam in general and the *mullah*s in particular have played crucial roles. The objective of the *mullah*s is to establish a Deobandi Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan. The *mullah*s have led opposition against foreign invaders in history, and at times, they have also replaced village elders and taken control in various localities (Malevich and Youngman 2011: 37–9). The British civilian official named Roos-Keppel, an important voice in the GOI before the beginning of First World War, would have agreed with such an analysis.

Daniel Marston rightly says that the Afghan insurgency is not primarily religious. Rather, the feelings among the Pashtuns (who had been traditionally dominant in Afghanistan) that they have been marginalized by the Uzbek and Tajik led Northern Alliance supported by the Coalition and the presence of the foreign troops are strengthening the insurgency (Marston 2008: 220). Before 1979, the Pushtu speaking Pathans who mainly live in South and East Afghanistan comprised 42% of the population. The Turkic and Iranian minorities include Tajiks, Uzbeks, and the Turkomans who are in north of the country (Galeotti 2001: 3). It should be noted that the resurgence of insurgency in Iraq after the collapse of the Saddam regime is also partly for the Sunnis, who had been dominant till Saddam's time, now feeling sidelined by the US backed Shia regime.The Sunnis also hate the presence of Western troops in their country (Hashim 2006: 1–102). Hence, power-politics and ethnic rivalries to a great extent are shaping the insurgencies in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

Conclusion

Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was the product of an amalgamation of global superpower rivalry in the Cold War era with regional faction politics in Afghanistan. The Soviet defeat was not inevitable. In fact, there was no outright defeat of the Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan like the French Army in Vietnam. The *mujahideen* won, like all successful guerrillas, by holding out and not getting defeated. The clan structure of the Afghans, terrain and lifeline from Pakistan prevented the Soviet COIN from becoming successful. Given adequate political will and military assets, the armed forces of USSR would have been able to contain but not destroy the *mujahideen*. However, by mid 1980s, the Soviet leadership found the game not worth the gamble. Hence, the Soviet withdrawal occurred under Gorbachev's leadership. However, the withdrawal ball had been set rolling, albeit at a slow speed under Gorbachev's predecessor Andropov. The heavily armed and highly motivated *mujahideen*, mostly the creation of Zia and the CIA, prevented the rise of a stable Afghanistan in the post-Soviet withdrawal era, and this context combined with Pakistan's meddling was partly responsible for the rise of the Taliban.

There seems to be no easy way of stabilizing Afghanistan. The phantom threat posed by radical Islam is motivating Western countries to pour manpower and resources into a country ravaged by three decades of civil war and foreign occupation. How long this massive infusion of foreign assets will continue is also questionable. It seems that there is no clear-cut formula for conducting a successful COIN in Afghanistan in particular and in the troubled spots of the world in general. The effectiveness of the much-vaunted British minimum force approach is also challenged in Afghanistan. Although the US COIN strategy is a bit more sensitive than the Soviet one as regards population control, US and NATO just did not have adequate troops (unlike India) to clear and hold territory over the long term. At the time of writing this chapter, despite the death of Osama bin Laden in the hands of US special troops, combat between NATO-US security forces and the insurgents continues in Afghanistan. This conflict does not represent New War but traditional guerrilla war being fought with the latest technologies.

References

A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM October 2001-September 2005, Donald P. Wright with the Contemporary Operations Study Team (2010). Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press.

Afghan Resistance, by Gordon Negus, 5 Nov. 1982, Directorate for Research, S-26553/DB-2C, George Washington University, online archives, accessed 20 Aug. 2011. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/us1.pdf.

Arreguin-Toft, Ivan (2005). *How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Baev, Pavel K (1996). *The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles*. London: Sage.

Barno, Lieutenant-General David W (2007). 'Fighting "the Other War": Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan, 2003–5', *Military Review*, vol. LXXXVII, no. 5, pp. 32–44.

Baumann, Robert F (1993). *Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan*, Leavenworth Papers, No. 20. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Centre of Military History, Washington D.C.

Braithwaite, Rodric (2012). *Afghantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–89*. London: Profile Books. Originally published in 2011.

Chin, Warren (2003). 'Operation "Enduring Freedom": A Victory for a Conventional Force fighting an Unconventional War', *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 57–76.

Cordovez, Diego (1995a). 'My Mission Begins', in Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 73–88.

Cordovez, Diego (1995b). 'From Breakthrough to Breakdown', in Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 109–43.

Cordovez, Diego and Harrison, Selig S (1995). 'Overview: Afghanistan and the End of the Cold War', in Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3–10.

Docherty, Leo (2007). *Desert of Death: A Soldier's Journey from Iraq to Afghanistan*. London: Faber and Faber.

D'Souza, Shanthie Mariet (2010). 'Afghanistan: Tipping Point', in D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2009: Continuing Violence, Failing Peace Processes*. London/New York/New Delhi: Routledge, pp. 19–41.

D'Souza, Shanthie Mariet (2011). 'Afghanistan: Turning the Tide', in D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2010: Growing Left-Wing Extremism and Religious Violence*. London/New York/New Delhi: Routledge, pp. 18–43.

Farrell, Theo (2010). 'Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006–9', *JSS*, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 567–94.

Feifer, Gregory (2010). *The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan*. New York: Harper Perennial. Originally published in 2009.

Fotini, Christia, and Semple, Michael (2009). 'Flipping the Taliban: How to Win in Afghanistan', *Foreign Affairs* (July/August), pp. 34–45.

Friedman, George (2004). *America's Secret War inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle between the United States and its Enemies*. London: Abacus.

Galeotti, Mark (2001). *Afghanistan: The Soviet Union's Last War*. London: Frank Cass. Originally published in 1995.

Giustozzi, Antonio (2004). 'The Demodernization of an Army: Northern Afghanistan, 1992–2001', *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 1–18.

Giustozzi, Antonio (2007). 'Auxiliary Force or National Army? Afghanistan's "ANA" and the Counter-Insurgency Effort, 2002–6', *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 45–67.

Grau, Lester W. (ed.) (1998). *The Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan*. London: Frank Cass.

Grau, Lester W. (2011). 'The Battle for Hill 3234: Last Ditch Defence in the Mountains of Afghanistan', *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 217–31.

Grau, Lester W. and Gress, Michael A. (tr. and eds). (2002). *The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost*, The Russian General Staff. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.

Grau, Lester W. and Jalali, Ali Ahmad (2001). 'The Campaign for the Caves: The Battles for Zhawar in the Soviet-Afghan War', *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 69–92.

Hammes, Colonel Thomas X. (2006). *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*. St Paul, MN: Zenith Press.

Harrison, Selig S. (1995a). 'How the Soviet Union Stumbled into Afghanistan', in Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 13–49.

Harrison, Selig S. (1995b). 'Soviet Occupation, Afghan Resistance, and the American Response', in Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 53–72.

Harrison, Selig S. (1995c). 'Making the Russians Bleed', in Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 91–107.

Harrison, Selig S. (1995d). 'The War Escalates', in Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 147–64.

Hashim, Ahmed S. (2006). *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq*. London: Hurst & Company.

Hauner, Milan (1991). *The Soviet War in Afghanistan: Patterns of Russian Imperialism*. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America in association with Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Holcomb, Major James F. (1990). 'Developments in Soviet Helicopter Tactics', in Air Commodore E.S. Williams (ed.), *Soviet Air Power: Prospects for the Future, Perestroyka and the Soviet Air Forces*. London: Tri-Service Press, pp. 163–83.

Jones, Seth G. (2008). *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

Jones, Seth G. (2010). *In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan*. New York/London: Norton.

Larsdotter, Kersti (2008). 'Exploring the Utility of Armed Force in Peace Operations: German and British Approaches in Northern Afghanistan', *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, vol. 19, no. 3 pp. 352–73.

Loyn, David (2009). *In Afghanistan: Two Hundred Years of British, Russian and American Occupation*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Malevich, Lieutenant-Colonel John J. and Youngman, Daryl C (2011). 'The Afghan Balance of Power and the Culture of *Jihad*', *Military Review* (May-June), pp. 33–9.

Maley, William (2009). *The Afghanistan Wars*. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Originally published in 2002.

Maloney, Sean M. (2007). 'Conceptualizing the War in Afghanistan: Perceptions from the Front, 2001–2006', *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 27–44.

Marston, Daniel (2008). 'Lessons in 21st Century Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan 2001–7', in Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (eds), *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*. Oxford: Osprey, pp. 220–40.

Matinuddin, Kamal (2001). *The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994–1997, With an Afterword covering the Major Events since 1997*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. Originally published in 1999.

Matthews, Matt M. (2011). *'We have not Learned how to wage War there': The Soviet Approach in Afghanistan, 1979–89*, Occasional Paper, No. 36. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press.

Memorandum, The Soviets and the Tribes of South-West Asia, 23 Sept. 1980, Georgetown University online documents. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/us1.pdf. Accessed on 20 Aug. 2011.

Newell, Nancy Peabody and Newell, Richard S. (1981). *The Struggle for Afghanistan*. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.

Nojumi, Neamatollah (2002). *The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region*. New York: Palgrave.

O'Ballance, Edgar (2003). *Afghan Wars: Battles in a Hostile Land 1839 to the Present*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Originally published in 2002.

O'Hanlon, Michael (2009). 'Toward Reconciliation in Afghanistan', *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 139–47.

O'Neill, Mark A. (1998). 'Air Combat of the Periphery: The Soviet Air Force in Action during the Cold War, 1945–89', in Robin Higham, John T. Greenwood and Von Hardesty (eds), *Russian Aviation and Air Power in the Twentieth Century*. London: Frank Cass, pp. 208–35.

Orr, Allan (2009). 'Recasting Afghan Strategy', *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 87–117.

Pawloski, Richard A. (1990). 'Lanes, Trains and Technology', in Air Commodore E.S. Williams (ed.), *Soviet Air Power: Prospects for the Future, Perestroyka and the Soviet Air Forces*. London: Tri-Service Press, pp. 125–62.

Rothstein, Hy S. (2006). *Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare*. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.

Sharma, Raghav (2010). 'Sectarian Violence in Pakistan', in D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2009: Continuing Violence, Failing Peace Processes*. London/New York/New Delhi: Routledge, pp. 42–61.

Singh, Jaswant (1999). *Defending India*. Chennai: Macmillan.

Sinno, Abdulkader, H. (2008). *Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond*. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.

Smith, Chris (1994). *India's Ad Hoc Arsenal: Direction or Drift in Defence Policy?* New York: Oxford University Press in association with SIPRI.

Spencer, Emily and Horn, Bernd (2009). 'Introduction', in Emily Spencer (ed.), *The Difficult War: Perspectives on Insurgency and Special Operations Forces*. Toronto: Dundurn, pp. 11–21.

Talbot, Strobe (2004). *Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb*. New Delhi: Viking.

Tootal, Colonel Stuart (2009). *Danger Close: Commanding 3rd PARA in Afghanistan*. London: John Murray.

Towle, Philip (1990). 'Air Power in Afghanistan', in Air Commodore E.S. Williams (ed.), *Soviet Air Power: Prospects for the Future, Perestroyka and the Soviet Air Forces*. London: Tri-Service Press, pp. 184–205.

Wanat: Combat Action in Afghanistan, 2008, The Staff of the US Army Combat Studies Institute (2010). Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press.

Williams, Brian Glyn (2010). 'General Dostum and the Mazar-i-Sharif Campaign: New Light on the Role of Northern Alliance Warlords in Operation Enduring Freedom', *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 610–32.

Wills, Lieutenant-Colonel Craig D. (2006). *Airpower, Afghanistan, and the Future of Warfare: An Alternative View*, Cadre Paper No. 25. Alabama: Air University Press.

Yousaf, Mohammed and Adkin, Mark (2001). *The Battle for Afghanistan: The Soviets versus the Mujahideen during the 1980s*. Barnsley: Pen & Sword. Originally published in 1992.

Chapter 7
Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Punjab

Introduction

The Sikh militancy in Punjab occurred between 1984 and 1995. However, the roots of the Sikh insurgency can be traced back to 1978. In that year, the Sikh extremists attacked an annual gathering of Nirankaris (a sect they considered heretical and apostates) in Amritsar. The Sikh militants believed that the central government was supporting the Nirankaris and it was a Hindu government. The militants' demand was that because the Sikhs were treated as second-class citizens by 'Hindu' India, an independent Khalistan would solve all the problems of the Sikhs. The insurgency reached its apogee in the mid-1980s. Between 1981 and 1993, some 21,469 persons were killed. After 1993, the situation normalized somewhat because elections were held in Punjab and no appreciable recruitment in the insurgents' ranks occurred. (Fair 2009: 107; Marwah 2009: 89–90). Let us look at the origins of insurgency in the truncated land of five rivers.

Origins of the Insurgency

During 1947, Punjab was divided into Eastern (Indian) and Western Punjab. The latter province went to Pakistan. After independence, the INC organized the states on a linguistic basis. As early as 1963, veteran INC leader C. Rajagopalachari critiqued the official policy of creating linguistic states by arguing that multilingual states would have been better; they would have given rise to synthesis among the disparate communities within India (Kamath 2011: 158). As a result of the Sikh demand for a separate state in 1966, Indian Punjab was divided into Haryana and Punjab on a linguistic basis, and Himachal Pradesh was separated from the two in 1971. The Sikhs comprised 60% of the population of Punjab and 2% population of India (Pal Singh 2002: 223–4; Singh 2011: 10).

Lopsided economic development somewhat fuelled the agitation. The fruits of 'Green Revolution' were reaped by the top 10% of the owner-farmers. Between 1961 and 1981, the average area tilled by each agricultural labourer fell from 2.23 hectares to 1.75 hectares. The real wages of agricultural labour fell as their numbers swelled. In the early 1980s, 48.44% of the farming households had holdings less than five acres each and together they owned only 13.13% of the land. About 41.56% of the farming households owned 49.7% of the arable land.

Some 37.08% of the land was held by 10% of the big farmers each of whom owned more than 20 acres (Kamath 2011: 163–4). Again, the *bhapas* (Khatri Punjabis who had migrated from West Pakistan during 1947) thought that in independent Khalistan, they would not have to face economic competition from the *banias* (Hindu business groups) (Pal Singh 2002: 131).

One scholar asserts that violence is inherent in Sikhism and that this accelerated the germination of Sikh insurgency. The founder of the Sikh faith was Guru Nanak (1469–1539 CE). Guru Arjan/Arjun asserted that the Sikhs were an independent community. After his execution in 1606 CE, he became the first martyr of Sikhism. Arjun's son, the sixth Guru Hargovind (1595–1644 CE) declared himself both spiritual and temporal head of the community. He ordered his followers to equip themselves with horses and weapons (Singh 2011: 1–4). Balbinder Singh Bhogal asserts that the teachings of Guru Nanak demand violence from those who seek love. He continues that religion as non-violence is rejected by Guru Nanak's teachings. For the Sikhs, physical violence is sublimated as a mental violence; physical ascetic practices and renunciation are reread as internal struggle. Mental *ahimsa* may require compassionate violence to promote less suffering overall. The Sikh's violent love is the product of the fusion of Vaisnava and Sakta traditions: love of God Krishna's flute with Goddess Kali's blood dripping sword. The Sikh texts and traditions conflate Hari (flute) with the sword, Lotus (compassion) with wisdom (thunderbolt and sword) (Bhogal 2007: 124–8).

Pakistan's support to the Sikh secessionists was considerable. There was a press in Lahore that printed books about Sikh religion and Sikh history in Gurmukhi script. The Sikh gurdwaras in Pakistan were also used for Khalistani propaganda, whenever a large number of Sikhs visited Pakistan on occasions such as Guru Nanak's birthday. (Dang 2001: 154). The insurgents also received aid from the Sikh diaspora in USA and Canada. The gurdwaras in these countries were used for this purpose (Dang 2001: 155). Nevertheless, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi deliberately over-stressed the role of Pakistan in instigating Sikh separatism. Mark Tully and Satish Jacob argue that Pakistan's dictator General Zia-ul-Haq was cautious about supporting the Sikh insurgents. Zia and his advisors were afraid that Indira Gandhi was spoiling for a fight with Pakistan because such a war would divert the attention of the Sikhs and Hindus from internecine struggle and unite the country under Indira's leadership (Tully and Jacob: 1985: 210–12).

Jugdep S. Chima asserts that neither fundamentalism inherent in Sikhism nor economic reasons, but political mismanagement by the elites resulted in the origins of the ethno-nationalist insurgency. The dynamics of the pattern of political leadership between and amongst state and ethnic elites affected the trajectory of ethnic sub-nationalist movement by defining the political relationship between the ethnic group and the central government. From 1947 until the mid-1960s, Master Tara Singh enjoyed dominance in Sikh politics. Sant Fateh Singh held the predominant position from mid 1960s till 1972 (Chima 2010: 263, 267). Then, the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) fractured and started losing its dominance in Sikh politics. The Akali leaders believed that the only way to create a mass

base amongst the Sikh community was to appeal to the religious sentiments of the Sikhs. They portrayed themselves as guardians of the Sikh faith, so they raised the bogey of Hindu communalism and domination. The ultimate aim of the Akali Dal was to emerge as the 'soul spokesman' of the Sikh community. The interpretation of the Sikh religion became their prerogative (Kaur 2011: 20). In October 1973, the Anandpur Sahib Resolution was adopted by the Akali Dal. This resolution asked for immediate merger of the Punjabi-speaking Sikh-populated areas of Haryana, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh plus Chandigarh with Punjab. It also sought a fundamental re-evaluation of the centre-state relationship. The Akali Dal started an agitation in October 1981 in support of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution (White Paper 2011: 198–9). The World Sikh Convention was held at Amritsar in July 1981 under the presidentship of Harchand Singh Longowal. It asked the Akali Dal to work for the acceptance of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution. The centre's role was to be restricted to postal, telegraph, currency, railways, foreign and defence affairs. During the linguistic agitation in 1953, over 50,000 Sikhs had courted arrest, and during the 1983 agitation, over 100,000 Sikh volunteers (according to another estimate, 200,000) offered themselves for arrest. The moderates among the Sikhs demanded an autonomous state but the radicals wanted a sovereign Punjab (Kamath 2011: 161; Pal Singh 2002: 128). On 4 August 1982, the *Dharam Yudh Morcha* was formed and this *morcha* unified all the factions of the Akali Dal (Pal Singh 2002: 128). The INC (then known as Congress-I; I stands for Indira Gandhi) leaders like Indira Gandhi, her son Sanjay Gandhi, and Zail Singh stoked the fire of Sikh and Hindu fundamentalism from the 1970s to marginalize the moderate section of the SAD (Gayer 2009: 238).

The leading role in Sikh militancy was played by Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. He was born in 1947 at Rode Village in Moga in a family of small Jat landholders and was the youngest of seven children. Actually, he was the second son by the second wife. He became interested in religion from an early age and dropped out of school after class five to concentrate on learning the Sikh scriptures. He then joined a religious group called *Chakravarti Gurmat Prachar Jatha Bhindran* and ended up as a follower of Sant Kartar Singh of the Damdami Taxal (Gayer 2009: 239; Singh 2011: 43). Between 1978 and 1980, Bhindranwale's gang started to kill the Sant Nirankaris throughout Punjab. The Sant Nirankari Bhawans were sometimes surrounded and attacked. Bhindranwale demanded their closure. On 10 June 1978, a *hukamnama* (religious edict) was issued from the Akal Takht criticizing the INC central government for supporting the Nirankaris. On 24 April 1980, the Sant Nirankari Chief was killed at Delhi along with numerous Nirankaris in Punjab (Pal Singh 2002: 123, 125). By 1982, Bhindranwale's anti-Nirankari tirade was slowly transformed into anti-Longowal (moderate faction of the Akali Dal), anti-GOI and anti-Hindu propaganda (Sethi 2011: 173). During October and November 1983, the Sikh insurgents started to kill the Hindus in urban areas (White Paper 2011: 207–8). In 1607, when the sixth Guru Hargovind took charge, he stood at the Akal Takht and held two swords, one symbolizing spiritual power and the other, temporal authority. He adopted regal

paraphernalia and issued orders to his followers to arm themselves. Similarly, in December 1983, Bhindranwale moved from Guru Nanak Niwas to the Akal Takht and ordered his followers to collect arms (Sethi 2011: 177). By 1983, Major-General Shabeg Singh and several other retired Indian Army and IAS officers were guiding Bhindranwale (Kaur 2011: 30).

Several Sikh militant groups operated in Punjab during the 1980s. The Babbar Khalsa was the first militant group created as an armed wing of Bhindranwale's *Akhand Kirtani Jatha* in 1978. On 25 April 1983, DIG Avtar Singh Atwal was shot dead outside the Golden Temple (Singh 2011: 40). The culmination point of COIN against the Sikh insurgency was Operation Blue Star.

Operation Blue Star: 3 June to 6 June 1984

On 25 May 1984, General A.S. Vaidya (COAS of India from 1983 to 1986) and Lieutenant-General K.S. Sundarji (GOC Western Command) were informed about the impending operation. On the same day, Lieutenant-General K.S. Brar was ordered to move his troops to Amritsar but was not given any details. Too much secrecy actually prevented the Indian Army from conducting a thorough reconnaissance before the main attack. Indira Gandhi made a broadcast to the nation during the evening of 2 June 1984. She appealed to the Sikh leaders for negotiations. At that time, the Darbar Sahib Complex in Amritsar was surrounded by the CRPF and the BSF. Intermittent exchange of fire was taking place at that time between the paramilitary forces and the militants on the periphery of the temple complex. The devotees were thoroughly searched for weapons before they were allowed to enter the temple complex. On 3 June, the army was called for aid to civil power and the police and paramilitary forces were placed under its control. Lieutenant-General R.S. Dayal, Chief of Staff HQ Western Command, was appointed Security Advisor to the Punjab Governor. That evening, the army surrounded the Darbar Sahib Complex. Throughout Punjab, for COIN in the countryside and for guarding the border against Pakistan, nine divisions were deployed. Infantry companies were deployed in the various police stations (Sodhi 1993: 154, 158–9).

The Indian Army decided to attack the Golden Temple with force on 5 June. It was a bad choice of date. It seems that Indian intelligence agencies have again failed the GOI. In 1984, 3 June was Guru Arjan Dev's martyrdom day. What is strange is that Indira Gandhi wanted the assault on the temple complex to occur on 3 June. On that day, large number of Sikh devotees visited the Golden Temple and curfew was imposed in Amritsar, but when the administration realized that it was the fifth guru's martyrdom day then the curfew was lifted and then re-imposed. As a result, many of the devotees were not able to come out and they remained within the Golden Temple when the army operation occurred during the night of 5/6 June. The assault without all this extra hassle could have been carried out a few days later or earlier (Aurora 2011: 126–7; Sodhi 1993: 158). All foreign media persons

were sent out of Punjab. Not even the BBC could provide adequate coverage on Punjab by 5 June (Brar 2011: 81).

Lieutenant-General K.S. Brar (nicknamed Bulbul, the name of a bird) was in charge of the actual operation. However, Sundarji, GOC Western Command, was also present in the area of operation and almost breathing down the neck of Brar (Sodhi 1993: 155). Just before the onset of the operation, Brar informed the soldiers:

> I stressed the fact that the action we were about to take was not against the Sikhs, nor was it against the Sikh religion; it was against terrorism. I went on to say that if there was anyone amongst them, who had strong religious sentiments or other reservations, and did not wish to take part in the operation he could opt out, and it would not be held against him. Not a single soldier opted out---and that included a sizeable number of Sikh officers, junior commissioned officers and other ranks. (Brar 2011: 75)

By a swift decisive action, the 350th Infantry Brigade and attached troops were given the mission of clearing the Golden Temple Complex at Amritsar and capturing as many militants as possible. Before launching the main assault, the army ordered the paramilitary forces to secure two buildings beside the Golden Temple by 10 p.m. 5 June. The mission was accomplished, but was delayed. The CRPF cleared the Brahm Boota Akhara by early the evening of 6 June 1984, and after suffering two casualties, the BSF commandos used grenades to clear the Hotel Temple View (Brar 2011: 77; Gupta 2011: 77).

In accordance with the plan, the 10th Guards were to secure the northern wing of the temple by 1 a.m. 6 June; the 1st Para Commandos were to secure a lodgement within the Akal Takht; the Special Frontier Force (SFF) was to secure the western wing of the temple; the 26th Madras was to secure the southern and eastern wings of the temple; and the 9th Kumaon was to take over Guru Ram Das Serai and the SGPC building. In the next phase of the operation, the 9th Kumaon was to occupy the hostel complex by 8 a.m. 6 June; the 12th Bihar with CRPF elements under its command was ordered to seal off all exit- and entry-points to and from the temple complex; and the last named force was essentially deployed as an outer perimeter defence and in cordon operation (Brar 2011: 77–8).

For the main strike force, elements of armour were provided by the 16th Cavalry. Three tanks were with the 10th Guards with orders to close in along the Ghanta Ghar approach to the northern entrance of the temple. The tanks were ordered to use their machine-guns to eliminate the insurgent fortifications on the battlements. Another three tanks with the 26th Madras from the area of *kotwali* (police station) were to come towards the *langar* and provide close fire support to the assaulting infantry. The 8th Mechanized Battalion provided elements of mechanized infantry. Four BMP infantry carrying vehicles were deployed with the 10th Guards for carrying the Para Commandos and the divers who were ordered to search the water tank within the complex for hidden weapons and ammunition. In addition, four BMPs and three APCs (SKOT) were assigned to the 26th Madras (Brar 2011: 79).

At 4.30 p.m. on 5 June, a representative of the civil administration and a senior staff officer of Brar, appealed over the public address system to the militants and the devotees inside to come out of the temple and surrender themselves. Repeated appeals continued till 7 pm. The militants previously did not allow the devotees to come out of the temple. Finally, 129 men, women and children (many of the adults were sick) came out of the temple. The devotees told the army officers that many other civilians also wanted to come out but were prevented by Bhindranwale's armed followers. The devotees were obviously held inside as a sort of shield. The insurgents assumed that fear of causing casualties to the civilians would discourage the army from assaulting the temple complex. After sunset, the whole city of Amritsar was immersed in darkness. Ever since curfew was clamped 48 hours earlier, there was no electricity in the town (Brar 2011: 80–81).

At 10.30 p.m. 5 June, the attack started on the temple complex proper. The insurgents perched on top of the water tank constituted the outer line of defence. The two eighteenth century bungas on either side of the *langar* and the elevated water tank to the rear of the Teja Singh Samundari Hall were engaged by a 106-mm recoilless gun and a 3.7-inch howitzer. The firing lasted five minutes. The fortifications which the insurgents constructed with sandbags for providing cover to the snipers behind were blown to smithereens (Brar 2011: 76, 83). They were finally silenced and then the security forces turned their attention towards the *Burj* (an old observation tower with thick walls built under *Maharaja* Ranjit Singh). Throughout 5 June, the Akal Takht was under fierce attack. At some point, a 3.7-inch howitzer and 105-mm main gun of the Vijayanta tank opened fire on the Akal Takht (Kirpekar 2011: 110; Sodhi 1993: 156).

The infantry assault on the Golden Temple started in the evening of 6 June. The 10th Guards led the assault (Gupta 2011: 76). Lieutenant-General Jagjit Singh Aurora argues that the Indian Army should have conducted simultaneous assaults at the rear and the front of the Akal Takht. The multipronged assault would have overwhelmed the defenders earlier and could have resulted in fewer casualties among the *jawans* and minimal collateral damage on the temple (Aurora 2011: 127–8). According to the unofficial estimate, there were about 2,000 casualties resulting from this operation. It is difficult to substantiate this claim because most of the cremations were done after curfew (Kirpekar 2011: 113).

COIN in the aftermath of Blue Star

The Sikhs, despite the Akali Dal's propaganda for unfair discrimination, comprise some 10% of the Indian Army and the Sikh community was the only one in India at that time that had its own regiment, the Sikh Regiment. The Sikh Regiment was manned but not totally officered by the Jat Sikhs. Some 3% of the Sikh troops in the Indian Army mutinied in the aftermath of Operation Blue Star (Tully and Jacob 1985: 194, 197).

On 7 June 1984, there was a mutiny in the 9th Sikh Battalion. About 600 soldiers broke into the regimental armoury in their cantonment on the outskirts of the Ganganagar town at the India-Pakistan border. They drove through the streets of Ganganagar shouting 'Long live Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale' and fired indiscriminately. One policeman was killed and one was wounded. One group of rebels turned towards Delhi and another group towards the Pakistan border. The Rajputana Rifles was sent in pursuit of the mutineers and was able to round up most of them (Tully and Jacob 1985: 194).

Another mutiny occurred at the Sikh Regimental Centre at Ramgarh in Bihar. It was an infantry regiment's depot where recruits for the battalions of the Sikh Regiment were inducted and trained. The soldiers assembled in the *gurdwara*. Sepoy Gurnam Singh and a few senior NCOs decided to mutiny and take the road to Amritsar. At 10 in the morning, the mutineers attacked the armoury and the magazine. The guards did not resist. The JCOs remained silent spectators as the mutineers loaded arms and ammunition in the regimental lorries. The subdear-major did not get in touch with the Commandant Brigadier S.C. Puri when the mutiny broke out. Puri and two other senior officers drove in a car towards the magazine. As the car approached, the mutineers opened fire. Puri was wounded and the officers drove back to the military hospital. Puri passed away at 11.15. When the mutineers reached Ramgarh, they hijacked civilian vehicles and started towards Amritsar some 840 miles away. Army helicopters failed to spot the convoy but the progress was monitored by the police wireless. At 10.45, the Punjab Regiment that was near the Ramgarh Regimental Centre was informed of the mutiny. At 17.30 hours, they started taking effective steps to quell the mutiny. At Benaras, the rebel column was divided into two groups because the mutineers learned that the road ahead was obstructed by army roadblocks. Half of the column was engaged by the artillery at the Shakteshgarh railway station, about 190 miles from Ramgarh. A few trucks filled with the mutineers escaped but they were rounded up by the 21st Mechanized Infantry Regiment. The other half of the mutineers was stopped by artillery and the 20th Infantry Brigade. In the ensuing firefight, some 35 men (soldiers and mutineers) were killed. About 1,461 soldiers (1,050 of them were raw recruits) in the Ramgarh Regimental Centre joined the mutiny (Tully and Jacob 1985: 195–6).

The court of inquiry did not accept the government's version that the mutiny was due to 'outside' influence. There was no evidence of any Pakistani instigation behind the Sikh mutiny. The officers and the JCOs were blamed for the breakdown of discipline at the Sikh Regimental Centre. The inquiry committee report stated that the soldiers cannot be isolated from the influences at work in their own villages. The emergence of linguistic chauvinism and religious fundamentalism in the countryside adversely affected the Sikh soldiers (Tully and Jacob 1985: 196–7).

A battalion of the Sikh Regiment rebelled in Jammu. The Sikhs in the Punjab Regiment at Pune also mutinied. One party of Sikh soldiers fought a gun battle at the outskirts of Bombay with the soldiers who had come to arrest them.

The mutineers laid down their arms only after the arresting party suffered one soldier killed and 10 injured (Tully and Jacob 1985: 197).

The GOI with the aid of Public Works Department repaired the Golden Temple. The rubble was cleared by the Harijan labourers, and Muslim craftsmen skilled in marble work were brought from Rajasthan. Goldsmiths were brought from Uttar Pradesh. The repairs cost between Rs 30 and 40 million (approximately two to three million pounds). The shrine was completely repaired by the end of September 1984 (Tully and Jacob 1985: 214–15). When the army left the Darbar Sahib Complex. By that time, the government-sponsored repair of the Golden Temple was also completed (Sodhi 1993: 157).

In 1984, Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards and in November 1984, anti-Sikh riots occurred in Delhi (Pal Singh 2002: 224, 227). This gave further spurt to Sikh insurgency. The Khalistan Commando Force (KCF) under Manbir Singh was started by the Panthic Committee in 1986 to coordinate the activities of all the militant groups. However, due to differences of ideology and policy objectives, the Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF) was established in late 1986 by Arur Singh who was pushed out of the Panthic Committee. The Bhindranwale Tiger Force of Khalistan (BTFK) was led by Gurbachan Singh and Nishan Singh. And the Khalistan Liberation Organization was under Sukhdev Singh Babbar and Jaswant Singh (Marwah 2009: 92–3).

In 1988, the GOI launched Operation Black Thunder to flush out the terrorists again from the Golden Temple. The basics of this plan were outlined by DG K.P.S. Gill to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and initially this plan was called the Gill Plan. This operation, unlike BLUE STAR, did not cause much collateral damage to the temple (Gill 2011: xi).

The GOI's COIN strategy was to swamp the disturbed area with a large number of security forces in accordance with the objectives of 'clear and hold'. During the election in February 1992, about 53,000 Punjab police personnel, 28,000 Home Guards, 10,000 Special Police, and 70,000 paramilitary personnel were deployed. As a point of comparison, Iraq covers 168,743 square miles but had only 160,000 US troops in 2006, and Punjab, which covers 19,445 square miles, was flooded with 120,000 Indian troops. By this comparison, even Bush Administration's decision to raise the number of US troops by another 25,000 in Spring 2007 was inadequate (Chima 2007: 627). Some 21,000 died in the decade-long Punjab insurgency. Between October 1952 and November 1956, British COIN in Kenya resulted in 20,000 dead among the African civilians. In contrast to the Indian Army's minimum force policy as regards COIN, the British security force in Kenya in the 1950s relied upon indiscriminate violence. The policy was to use exemplary force against the whole population. Since the insurgents cannot be identified, the whole population was more or less coerced (Bennett 2007: 638, 658).

The Punjab Police also recruited large number of SPOs. These SPOs were provided with a daily stipend, a gun, and a license to kill militants within their own villages and in nearby locales by functioning as unorthodox counter-insurgents. This measure prevented the economically and socially disadvantaged Sikhs from

joining the insurgency as a means of empowerment. Further, this strategy created a divide within the villages among the Sikhs rather than the insurgency, and the COIN becoming a Sikh versus Hindu or Sikh versus central government struggle. The insurgents, instead of attacking government security forces, had to direct their attention to protect themselves from local COIN units within the countryside (Chima 2007: 630).

Chima notes that patterns of politics by the ethnic and central government political leaders were crucial in maintaining peace after Operation Blue Star. The governing elites took a unified stand and restarted the political process. This encouraged the moderate and extremist factions within the Akali leadership to rejoin the political mainstream to prevent being marginalized. As the democratic political process started to strike roots in the ground, the Akali leadership united and moderated its ideology and finally established a hegemonic position vis-à-vis the insurgents. Thus, by 1997, the Punjab insurgency had ended. Two important factors facilitated the dominance of the Akali leadership over the insurgents. First, the central government in the 1990s, unlike in the early 1980s, did not interfere in Punjab in order to weaken the Akali Dal and to fill the vacuum with Congress Party members. So the absence of partisan political intervention by the central government enabled the Akalis to consolidate their position in the political mainstream (Chima 2010: 266). Second, the insurgents continued to be weakened by COIN measures initiated by the Indian state.

However, the process of transition from insurgency to democracy was not all that smooth. The Akali Dal boycotted the February 1992 election. Only 23.9% of the eligible voters voted and the INC came to power (Fair 2009: 110). By 1997, the moderate Prakash Singh Badal completed his dominance over the state's political system and won the state assembly election. In late 1998, Gurcharn Singh Tohra, the radical SGPC president (he previously had tried to utilize Bhindranwale) challenged Badal's leadership. Tohra encouraged the Akal Takht *jathedar* Bhai Ranjit Singh to issue a *hukamnama* against Badal. The Badal faction within the Akali Dal ignored the political meddling by the Akal Takht. In February 1999, Ranjit Singh was removed from his position as Akal Takht *jathedar*. In March, Tohra was removed from the presidentship of SGPC and the post was filled by a Badal loyalist (Chima 2010: 266–7).

Conclusion

In contrast to the Indian Army's previous and later COIN operations, BLUE STAR was comparatively a ham-handed operation. For the first and last time, heavy artillery and tanks were used which were not signatures of the Indian COIN campaign. BLUE STAR is reminiscent of the Pakistan Army's COIN. Selected commando units, helilift of troops, and attack through the roofs of the buildings, or use of sniper fire probably would have been swifter and a more surgical use of force at the Golden Temple Complex. It could be argued that the Sikh insurgency

was the product of economic over-development and a sense of relative deprivation. A large portion of the Sikhs probably used the bogey of insurgency to extract more concessions from the centre. To quote a colonial British officer, 'the Sikhs became a bit too big for their boots'. Except for a fringe (the fundamentalists) within the Sikh community, in general the Sikhs did not really want secessionism from India. Overall, the Sikhs were too privileged and well integrated within the body politic of India. However, had the insurgency lingered on, its adverse effect on the loyalty of the Sikh *jawans* and officers in the Indian Army might have proved dangerous for the Indian Republic.

References

Aurora, Lieutenant-General Jagjit Singh (2011). 'Assault on the Golden Temple Complex 5–6 June 1984', in *The Punjab Story*, Foreword by K.P.S. Gill. New Delhi: Roli, pp. 123–43. Originally published in 1984.

Bennett, Huw (2007). 'The Other Side of the COIN: Minimum and Exemplary Force in British Army Counterinsurgency in Kenya', *JSS*, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 638–64.

Bhogal, Balbinder, Singh (2007). 'Text as Sword: Sikh Religious Violence taken for Wonder', in John R. Hinnells and Richard King (eds), *Religion and Violence in South Asia: Theory and Practice*. Oxon/New York: Routledge, pp. 107–35.

Brar, Lieutenant-General K.S. (2011). *Operation Blue Star: The True Story*. New Delhi: UBSPD. Originally published in 1993.

Chima, Jugdep, S. (2007). 'Controlling the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq: "Political" and "Military" Strategies from Successful Counterinsurgency in Punjab-India', *JSS*, vol. 18, 615–37.

Chima, Jugdep, S. (2010). *The Sikh Separatist Insurgency in India: Political Leadership and Ethnonationalist Movements*. New Delhi: Sage.

Dang, Satya Pal (2001). '"Cross-Border" Terrorism in Punjab', in V.D. Chopra (ed.), *Rise of Terrorism and Secessionism in Eurasia*. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, pp. 153–63.

Fair, C. Christine (2009). 'Lessons from India's Experience in the Punjab, 1978–1993', in Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (eds), *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*. Oxon/New York: Routledge, pp. 107–26.

Gayer, Laurent (2009). 'The Khalistan Militias: Servants and Users of the State', in Laurent Gayer and Christophe Jaffrelot (eds), *Armed Militias of South Asia: Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists*, tr. by Cynthia Koch, Gregory Elliott and Roger Leverdier. New Delhi: Foundation Books, pp. 237–57.

Gill, K.P.S. (2011). 'Foreword', in *The Punjab Story*, New Delhi: Roli, pp. ix–xii. Originally published in 1984.

GOI (2011). 'White Paper on Punjab Agitation: A Summary' in *The Punjab Story*, Foreword by K.P.S. Gill. New Delhi: Roli, pp. 197–217. Originally published in 1984.

Gupta, Shekhar (2011). 'Blood, Sweat and Tears', in *The Punjab Story*, Foreword by K.P.S. Gill. New Delhi: Roli, pp. 73–101. Originally published in 1984.

Kamath, M.V. (2011). 'Myth and Reality', in *The Punjab Story*, Foreword by K.P.S. Gill. New Delhi: Roli, pp. 145–70. Originally published in 1984.

Kaur, Amarjit (2011). 'Akali Dal: The Enemy Within', in *The Punjab Story*, Foreword by K.P.S. Gill. New Delhi: Roli, pp. 19–38. Originally published in 1984.

Kirpekar, Subhash (2011). 'Operation Bluestar: An Eye Witness Account', in *The Punjab Story*, Foreword by K.P.S. Gill. New Delhi: Roli, pp. 103–22. Originally published in 1984.

Marwah, Ved (2009). 'India's Counterinsurgency Campaign in Punjab', in Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (eds), *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*. Oxon/New York: Routledge, pp. 89–106.

Sethi, Sunil (2011). 'The Great Divide', in *The Punjab Story*, Foreword by K.P.S. Gill. New Delhi: Roli, pp. 171–95. Originally published in 1984.

Singh, Birinder, Pal (2002). *Violence as Political Discourse: Sikh Militancy Confronts the Indian State*. Shimla: Indian Institute for Advanced Studies.

Singh, Khushwant (2011). 'Genesis of the Hindu-Sikh Divide', in *The Punjab Story*, Foreword by K.P.S. Gill. New Delhi: Roli, pp. 1–18. Originally published in 1984.

Singh, Tavleen (2011). 'Terrorists in the Temple', in *The Punjab Story*, Foreword by K.P.S. Gill. New Delhi: Roli, pp. 39–71. Originally published in 1984.

Sodhi, Brigadier H.S. (1993). *Top Brass: A Critical Appraisal of the Indian Military Leadership*. Noida: Trishul Publications.

Tully, Mark and Jacob, Satish (1985). *Amritsar: Mrs Gandhi's Last Battle*. London: Rupa.

This page has been left blank intentionally

Chapter 8
Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Sri Lanka: 1983–2009

Introduction

The Tamil insurgency started in the mid-1980s. Initially, there were five major and 30 minor Tamil militant groups. The major groups were the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), the People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), the Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS), the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). From the mid-1980s, the most important militant group was the LTTE (Manoharan 2010: 191). The rise and fall of the LTTE between 1983 and late 2009 proves that insurgency could be successfully tamed by a state. The sections below provide a historical analysis of insurgency and COIN in Sri Lanka.

Origins of the Insurgency

The island of Sri Lanka covers an area of roughly 65,610 square kilometres. From north to south, it is 437 kilometres long and east to west is 225 kilometres wide at its broadest point. The south-central part is mountainous; the peaks vary in height between 900 and 2,000 metres. The climate in general is tropical and humid. The temperature in the coastal region varies from 26 to 28 degrees. Rainfall is about 100 cm in Jaffna and increases to 500 cm in the highlands. Most of the rainfall occurs during the South-West Monsoon (May to September) and North-East Monsoon (November to February). Monsoon rains increase the size of lagoons and create problems for cross-country movement (Singh 2001: 5–6). Most of the rivers originate in the Central Highlands and then flow to the sea. The longest river is Mahavali Ganga which covers a distance of more than 300 kilometres from its source to the sea near Trincomalee (Singh 2001: 7).

Sir Lanka is a plural society. Its population of about 20 million is 74% Sinhalese, 18% Tamil (mostly Hindus) and 7% Muslims (Singh 2005: 300). Among the Sinhalese, 67.5% are Buddhists, 17.6% Hindus, 7.9% Christians, and the rest are Muslims. The Tamils could be divided into Sri Lanka Tamils and those Tamils who migrated as plantation labourers from Tamil Nadu in India to Sri Lanka during the British period. The Sri Lanka Tamils constitute some 12.7% of overall population of Sri Lanka. And the share of the Indian Tamils is about 5.5%. The Tamils are concentrated in the Northern and Eastern provinces, except

the plantation Tamils who are in the southern highlands (Mehta 2009: 156; Singh 2001: 11). The long-term origins of the Tamil insurgency could be traced back to the imposition of the Sinhala Only Act by the Sinhala dominated regime in 1956. Later, Colombo started a colonization programme by planting Sinhalese enclaves in the Tamil dominated eastern part of the island. This resulted in the germination of demand for autonomy of a Tamil 'homeland'. The passage of the 1972 Republican Constitution was another stage in the domination of Sinhala-Buddhism in Sri Lanka (Manoharan 2012a: 211). Belief in militancy and sympathy for the militants gradually emerged among the Tamils after the ethnic riots of 1983. Anti-Tamil riot broke out in Colombo following an LTTE attack against the SLA in Jaffna during July 1983, which killed 13 soldiers (Swamy 2011: 178). These riots resulted in 300,000 Tamil refugees fleeing to India. India's 60 million Tamils in Tami Nadu were enraged. With the massive immigration of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees after the 1983 riots, India could not remain neutral. India had to take into account the emotions of its Tamil population in the state of Tamil Nadu. Furthermore, India's geopolitical interests demanded that intervention by foreign 'hostile' powers within Sri Lanka would be detrimental to New Delhi's security interest. In 1983, the Indian representative in the UN drew the notice of the international community to the Tamil problem in Sri Lanka (Mehta 2009: 157).

Although Prime Minister Indira Gandhi rejected a 1971 East Pakistan type intervention, Indian intelligence agencies provided training and arms to the Tamil militants (Manoharan 2010: 191). Two Indian Army officers claim that from late 1977, India was engaged in Sri Lanka in a covert fashion and started training the Tamil militants (Das and Gupta-Ray 2008: 19). India's aim was to pressure the Sri Lanka Government (SLG) to go for a negotiated settlement with the moderate Tamil leaders. However, in the process, the moderate Tamil leaders were marginalized and the LTTE emerged supreme (Swamy 2011: 178). General Zia-ul-Haq's eagerness in supporting the SLG with arms and money against the Tamil militants and the rise of Chinese influence in the island provoked the GOI to purse an active policy in Sri Lanka. In fact, India was super-sensitive to the probable presence of US or Chinese warships in the Trincomalee Harbour (Das and Gupta-Ray 2008: 21). It is to be noted that the 24 kilometre wide Palk Strait separates Sri Lanka from the southern tip of India. In 1985, the LTTE chief Velupillai Prabhakaran (also spelled Pirabakaran) came to Delhi to meet India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, the son of Indira Gandhi (Swamy 2011: 173).

The GOI's first active initiative was to launch Operation POOMALAI on 4 June 1987. It involved dropping relief supplies from an IAF AN-32 cargo aircraft that was escorted by Mirage 2000 fighter-bombers to prevent interference from the Sri Lankan Air Force (Das and Gupta-Ray 2008: 21). On 29 July 1987, the India-Sri Lanka Agreement was signed in Colombo by Sri Lanka's President Jayawardane and India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. A battalion of Indian commandos was on stand-by in a ship in Colombo Harbour to rescue the Indian High Commission staff in case chauvinistic elements within the SLAF attempted to take some form of anti-Indian action (Das 2007: 245). In late July 1987, India

sent an expeditionary force into Sri Lanka. Now, let us shift the focus to the LTTE and its chief opponent.

LTTE and the SLAF

In 1972, Prabhakaran (1954–2009) fled his home and formed the LTTE on 5 May 1976. Its objective was to create an independent Tamil state in the north-east of Sri Lanka (Swamy 2011: 177). The LTTE was the successor of the Tamil New Tigers (TNT). This militant group shot to fame after the assassination of Alfred Duraiappah, the Mayor of Jaffna, in 1975 (Mehta 2010: 50). From 1974, the TNT was led by Chettio Thanabalasignham and Prabhakaran was second in command. In May 1976, Thanabalasingham was arrested and Prabhakaran took over and changed the name to the LTTE (Mehta 2010: 51). In April 1984, the LTTE joined a common militant front which was known as the Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF). The ENLF included the TELO, EROS, PLOTE and EPRLF. The TELO generally supported the Indian position. The LTTE denounced the TELO as an Indian surrogate. So in 1986, the LTTE broke from the ENLF. Then the TELO and the LTTE fought against each other. As a result, the entire TELO leadership and many of its cadres were killed. Next, the LTTE attacked the training camps of the EPRLF and the latter organization withdrew from Jaffna. Prabhakaran ordered all the other Tamil militant groups to merge themselves with the LTTE. Notices to that effect were issued in Jaffna and in Madras. About 20 minor Tamil militant groups were then absorbed by the LTTE (Mehta 2010: 51–2).

Very little is known about the LTTE Supremo. Just like Osama Bin Laden, Prabhakaran remained an elusive figure till his death. In a rare interview given to *Newsweek* on 11 August 1986, Prabhakaran said about his generalship: 'Through sheer personal training. I use my natural instincts and I watch war films and westerns by … Clint Eastwood. If I were trained in Cuba, I would have been a better fighter' (quoted in Das and Gupta-Ray 2008: 33). Prabhakaran was also influenced by the Bengali patriot turned war lord Netaji (Subhas Chandra Bose) and Napoleon. The Hindu epic *Mahabharata*'s tragic heroes Bhisma and Karna influenced Prabhakaran's psyche. While Karna represented the ultimate sacrifice for a cause, Swami Vivekananda's emphasis on youth power also strongly influenced him. Prabhakaran said that from the age of 16, these figures shaped his mentality (Das and Gupta-Ray 2008: 36–7). Prabhakaran emphasized that although he had read M.K. Gandhi's *An Experiment with Truth*, he was still convinced that the political struggle require an armed dimension. Prabhakaran continued that an action-oriented politician like Subhas Chandra Bose, who created the *Azad Hind Fauj* for acquiring India's freedom, influenced him most (Das and Gupta-Ray 2008: 36, 39). Prabhakaran claimed that he wanted to establish a socialist society of an indigenous model, that would obviously not be a copy of the Chinese or Soviet Union type (Das and Gupta-Ray 2008: 35). Prabhakaran had a photographic memory and was paranoid about his security (Swamy 2011: 174).

In 1984, some Jaffna University students were on a hunger strike. The LTTE asserted that the era of peaceful strikes was over and deported the students to Chennai. One of the students was a female with 'big' eyes. Her name was Mathivathani (Mathy). In Chennai, she was put up with Adele, the Australian wife of Anton Balasingham, the ideologue of Prabhakaran. Mathy and Prabhakaran fell in love and got married at a temple near Chennai on 1 October 1984. The couple had two sons and a daughter. The eldest son was named after Charles Lucas Anthony, a friend of Prabhakaran from Trincomalee who had been killed by the Sri Lankan security forces (Swamy 2011: 173).

At the height of his power, the LTTE controlled an area of about 15,000 square kilometres (Manoharan 2012b: 140). Between 1982 and 1986, the LTTE became the supreme Tamil militant organization. The LTTE's first combat casualty occurred on 27 November 1982. Then its losses started increasing slowly but consistently. The casualties were 5 in 1983, 36 in 1984, 123 in 1985, and 423 in 1986 (Das and Gupta-Ray 2008: 30).

Initially, the LTTE drew most of its cadres from the middle- and low-caste fishermen and coastal traders from the fishing villages north of Jaffna Peninsula. Some of the cadres were Hindus but many were also Catholic Christians (Smith 2009: 93). The LTTE fighters were mostly drawn from the lower middle class and the labouring poor. The Westernized middle class provided only a few recruits. From the early 1990s, the farming and fishing villages of the Eastern Province and the northern Vanni were major sources of recruits. Prabhakaran himself was a Hindu (Saivite) from the Karaiyar caste in the Velvitathurai/Velvethiturai (VVT) locality (Roberts 2005: 494). According to M.R. Narayan Swamy, towards the later stages, thousands of children from the poor Tamil families were forced to enlist and wage war on the LTTE's behalf (Swamy 2011: 175).

From the mid-1980s, the LTTE aggressively recruited women into its fighting ranks. Women were involved in propaganda tasks, medical care, intelligence gathering, fund raising and recruitment, but many of them were given combat training and participated in the fighting. In 1983, the LTTE formed a special section for women known as *Vituthalai Pulikal Munai* (Women's Front of the Liberation Tigers). The first group of women was trained in 1985 for combat in Tamil Nadu and they participated in combat action against the Sri Lankan military in July 1986. In October 1987, an all-women training camp was set up at Jaffna (Alison 2003: 38–9). It is to be noted that S.C. Bose also set up an all-women unit known as Rani Jhansi Regiment in 1944. Miranda Alison asserts that most of the women combatants (including the suicide bombers) joined the LTTE voluntarily (Alison 2003: 39).

One scholar asserts that joining the LTTE's combatant ranks resulted in the empowerment of the female Tamils. *Sakti*, the power held by women, formed the basis of the Tamil women's overall social position which is further differentiated into an inner and outer space in the society. The inner realm known as *akam* is the domestic sphere where the women are powerful and their voices are heard and aired. The outer realm is known as *puram* and in this space the women are controlled by

the men in their families (Herath 2012: 164–5). As the women combatants got recognition for their abilities and resilience, they gained power to control their own lives. This aspect had been missing in traditional Tamil society where the women's lives were controlled by their fathers, husbands and sons. The empowerment of new women is described by a term known as *Ah-lu-mai*, which means authority, power, leadership, ability, and governance, is used by the female combatants to describe their new identity but the term is never used by the civilian females (Herath 2012: 163). Tamara Herath asserts that participation of the female Tamils in the LTTE's combatant branch resulted in the creation of a new woman-*Puthumai Pen* (Herath 2012: 164). The net result is the loosening of the patriarchal grip of male control because the Tamil women, by assuming the role of male fighters, have become aware of their own potential. The experiences of participating in the civil war transformed the role of Tamil women in civic society (Herath 2012: 168). This is a radical break from the passive role of Tamil women in society. The point to be noted is that S.C. Bose, by advocating a combat role for the women, also initiated a trend that was a break from the passive Sita-like role for women advocated by the apostle of non-violence Mohandas Karam Chand Gandhi (Hills and Silverman 1993: 741–60). Through recently acquired self-confidence, the women fighters have been able to overcome some of the social restrictions about their choice of marital partners and the social position of widows. Love marriages are generally frowned upon by traditional society. However, the LTTE accepted both love marriages and traditional arranged marriages. Further, the LTTE criticized the dowry system. This system, common even in the Hindu society of India, is insulting for the women because the worth of a woman (who is going to get married) is measured in terms of movable and immovable property. The LTTE's anti-dowry laws in Jaffna brought relief to the poor families (Herath 2012: 169).

The LTTE was noted for its indoctrination of personnel and the strict discipline that was imposed on them. The cadres went through a rigorous physical training. Use of alcohol and tobacco was banned. Extra-marital relations were punished, but marriages among the combatants were encouraged and performed in accordance with Hindu rites fused with strains of secularism (Smith 2009: 94). Michael Roberts asserts that the LTTE used the imageries of *sakti* (divine power) and *accaryam* (potency) while commemorating its dead fighters. The dead were regarded as deities. The LTTE personnel practiced the ritual of deriving *sakti* by their sincere devotion to the dead (Roberts 2005: 495, 503).

In 1987, the LTTE established the Black Tigers, an elite wing which specialized in conducting suicide attacks (Mehta 2010: 52). Among the famous victims of the Black Tigers were Rajiv Gandhi (1991) and R. Premadasa (1993) (Manoharan 2012b: 146). The LTTE was probably one of the very few insurgent outfits in world history to possess a navy. The Indian Ocean had been the LTTE's lifeline. It must be noted that Sri Lanka's coastline is about 1,340 kilometres long (Singh 2005: 300). The Black Sea Tigers' fibreglass fast-attack crafts (FACs) and suicide boats operated close to the coast and were difficult to detect amongst the normal fishing traffic (Povlock 2011: 30). By the 1990s, the LTTE possessed six

small freighters. One was sunk by India in 1993, and the SLN sunk another on 14 February 1996 (Sinha 2001: 207). The Palk Strait is actually unsuitable for operation of the heavier sea vessels of the SLN and the Indian Navy which tried to establish a blockade and police this region (Singh 2001: 6).

A million strong Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora provided support to the LTTE (Manoharan 2011: 188). One scholar estimates that the LTTE raised about US$ 2 million from the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora monthly and a quarter of it came from the Tamil expatriates in Canada (Manoharan 2012b: 137).

After the departure of the IPKF, the principal antagonist of the LTTE was the SLAF. In 1986, the SLAF comprised some 51,000 personnel (Das and Gupta-Ray 2008: 33). Between 1981 and 1993, the SLA expanded from 20,000 to 100,000 personnel (Singh 2005: 303). Qualitative transformation and quantitative expansion of the SLA started with the election of President Mahinda Rajapakse/ Rajapaksa in November 2007. He appointed his brother Gotabaya Rajapakse, a retired Lieutenant-Colonel, to the post of Defence Secretary. Lieutenant-General (later General) Sarath Fonseka was appointed to command the SLA. Later, he became the Chief of Defence Staff (De-Silva Ranasinghe 2010: 1). Infantry training was revamped to emphasize section-level small-unit infantry operations. The traditional platoon concept was dropped, and the Special Infantry Operations Team (SIOT) concept was popularized. The SIOT operated in eight-man teams and was first introduced by Fonseka in 2002. The SIOT training programme involved a one-month basic commando endurance course. The soldiers who passed this test were given 18 weeks of additional training in jungle warfare, explosives handling, medical tasks, and the use of signal communications to act as spotters for the coordination of artillery and air strikes. Each rifle company was allotted six SIOT teams (DeSilva-Ranasinghe 2010: 1–2). The SLG increased its defence expenditure during the first decade of the new millennium. In 2006, defence expenditure was US$ 1 billion; in 2007, it rose to US$ 1.29 billion. Increase in the recruitment of the soldiers and the purchase of hardware from Pakistan, China and Ukraine resulted in the increasing military expenditure (Manoharan 2008: 260). Table 8.1 gives an account of the SLAF during the first decade of the new millennium.

In the new millennium, the SLN transformed itself from a ceremonial force into an effective coastal force. The SLN came into existence in 1950. It comprised the FACs, offshore patrol vessels (OPVs), gunboats, Rapid Action Boat Squadrons (RABs) and Special Boat Squadron (SBS). From Israel, Sri Lanka bought Dovra FACs. In 1984, the first pair of 47 ton Dovra class FACs was bought by Sri Lanka. In 1986, another four were purchased. During 1987–88, the 54 ton Super-Dovra MK1 boats were bought. And during 1995–96, Super Dovra MK-II class FACs were delivered from Israel. The SLN also boasted 68 ton US manufactured Trinity Marine class craft and Shanghai II class craft acquired from China in 1991. The SLN also had indigenous Colombo class craft. From 2000 onwards, the SLN started to using a large number of small high-speed inshore patrol crafts (IPCs). After 2006, to some extent, the SLN copied its opponent's vessels that were geared for asymmetric warfare. The SLN introduced three classes of fibreglass IPCs for

operation in the littoral waters off Sri Lanka. The 6.7 metre long fibreglass Arrow class IPC proved effective against the LTTE's boats (Povlock 2011: 31–2) actually turned the tables on the Sea Tigers (Fish 2009: 21). In deeper waters, Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) were used to patrol the exclusive economic zone of Sri Lanka and search for larger LTTE targets like the floating sea bases manned by the LTTE's Sea Pigeons (maritime units in charge of the LTTE's overseas supplies). The OPVs had the range and firepower to prevail against the Sea Pigeons' merchant ships which carried arms and weapons for the LTTE from South-East Asia and were generally moored in the Indian Ocean about more than 100 kilometres away from Sri Lanka (Povlock 2011: 33). To sum up, the SLAF came to age after the departure of the IPKF. The next section focuses on the tussle between LTTE and the IPKF.

Table 8.1 Strength and Organization of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces in 2005

Branch	Strength	Organization	Weapons	Remarks
Army	1,20,000	9 divisions. The break up included 3 mechanized infantry brigade, 1 airmobile brigade, 1 independent brigade, 1 independent special forces brigade, 1 commando brigade, 33 infantry brigades, 3 armoured regiments, 3 armoured reconnaissance regiments, 3 field artillery regiments and 3 field engineer regiments	62 T-55, 217 APCs, towed artillery guns (85-mm, 88-mm, 25-pdr. guns, 130-mm and 152-mm). In addition, the army had 122-mm multiple rocket launchers and AD guns (40-mm and 94-mm)	
Navy	17,000		2 missile craft, 3 OPVs, 10 coastal patrol vessels, 46 IPCs and 5 amphibious vessels	
Air Force	19,800		22 combat aircraft (including 4 MIG-27 and some MIG-23), 26 transport aircraft (including Cessna), 5 training aircraft, 27 armed helicopters (including MI-24 and MI-35) and 6 transport and reconnaissance helicopters	
Total	1,61,000			Reserves = 43,500

Source: (Singh 2005: 300).

The IPKF in Sri Lanka: 29 July 1987-March 1990

The IPKF's mission (nicknamed Operation PAWAN) started badly from the very first. No detailed logistical plans for induction of troops into Sri Lanka were made because initially planning for the operation was confined to the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) (Das and Gupta-Ray 2008: 15). Initially, the Indian Army Headquarters planned to induct the 36th Infantry Division of the 1st Corps into Sri Lanka (Das and Gupta-Ray 2008: 22), but only the 54th Infantry Division from its peacetime location at Secunderabad (Hyderabad) in Andhra Pradesh (minus its heavy arms and equipment) was inducted (Das 2007: 247). See Table 8.2 for the formations initially selected as part of the IPKF.

The IPKF's adventure in Sri Lanka could be divided roughly into four phases: Phase I involved induction of the troops into the island which started during the night of 29 July 1987. The objective was to maintain the troops for keeping peace between the SLG and the LTTE in accordance with the India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord. At that time, the IPKF was designed to be a peacekeeping force. On 3 October 1987, induction of the 340th Independent Infantry Brigade started. The 26th Battalion of the Punjab Regiment was deployed in Trincomalee. However, the logistical preparation of this unit was inadequate. Its vehicles had tyres fitted for movement across deserts. Even after a long wait, no maps were issued to this unit. The 11th Battalion of the Madras Regiment was moved to Trincomalee to prevent the SLA from moving out of the barracks and to maintain law and order. Brigadier I.M. Dhar, commanding the 76th Infantry Brigade, was in charge of maintaining law and order in the districts of Batticaloa and Amparai (Singh 2007: 75).

Phase II started on 5 October 1987 with the breakdown of the India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord and the IPKF's transition from 'soft' to 'hard' options. This phase involved the capture of Jaffna town and clearing the Jaffna District of the Tamil insurgents. On 5 October, 17 LTTE cadres committed suicide. Because six of those who committed suicide hailed from Velvitathurai (the LTTE's stronghold), the reaction was violent and immediate. At Velvethiturai, two Sri Lankan policemen were beaten to death. On the same day, at Vavuniya, six Sri Lankan policemen were shot dead. Further, nine SLA personnel held captive by the LTTE were killed. The SLA camps at Point Pedro and Thondamannar were attacked by the LTTE. On 6 October, the LTTE attacked Jaffna Fort camp (Singh 2007: 75–6).

The LTTE's first confrontation with the IPKF occurred on 8 October 1987 when an Indian Army ration truck was attacked and five Para Commandos were killed by strapping burning tyres on their necks (Mehta 2010: 53). On the nights of 8/9 and 9/10 October 1987, the IPKF conducted raids in Parappakudantan, Killonochchi, Vellankulam, Mulankovil and Kalnnadina-Kulam areas. This resulted in the capture of 131 militants and 27 weapons (Singh 2007: 77). Lieutenant-General Depinder Singh (Overall Force Commander of IPKF) accepts that during phase II, the Tamil refugees were provided with supplies, and a significant share of these supplies went to the LTTE through their cadres who were in the refugee camps

(Singh 2001: 110). By initiating some welfare measures, the IPKF half-heartedly tried to win the hearts and minds of the Tamils. For instance, the IPKF restored electric supply in Jaffna (Singh 2001: 112).

Major-General Harkirat Singh GOC IPKF notes in his memoirs:

> Headquarters IPKF (at Palaly) was dependent on daily intelligence briefs and intercepts from the Sri Lankan Advance Army Headquarters at Palaly. It was they who kept us updated on the enemy situation. What was missing was an adequate network to obtain and disseminate tactical and strategic intelligence. Such intelligence was not disseminated to me, by either the Director General Military Intelligence (DGMI) at Army Headquarters or the General Staff at the Headquarters OFC. (Singh 2007: 76)

On 8 October 1987, General Sundarji (COAS of India) visited the IPKF HQ at Palaly and ordered Harkirat Singh to adopt the hard option against the LTTE. At that time, the 54th Indian Infantry Division was spread over an area of 540 kilometres in Sri Lanka (Singh 2007: 77). Harkirat Singh notes in his autobiography: 'I had warned the Vice Chief S.F. Rodriguez at the end of September 1987 that once we launched an operation against the LTTE, long drawn out counter-insurgency operations would have to be carried out for the next decade or so' (Singh 2007: 78).

The HQ of the 47th Infantry Brigade was located at Vavuniya with one infantry battalion each at Mannar-Vavuniya, Manakulam-Mullaitivu and Killonochchi-Pooneryan. The HQ 91st Infantry Brigade had one infantry battalion in the Vadamaradchchi-Tenmarachchi region and one infantry battalion in the Valikmam region. The third infantry battalion from this brigade was in the Jaffna Fort. The 76th Infantry Brigade was placed under the command of the HQ 36th Infantry Division (Singh 2007: 79). On 10 October 1987, the IPKF found out that it had no tanks at its disposal for undertaking the Jaffna Operation. At that time, the IPKF's Tactical HQ was in Trincomalee and the main HQ at Palaly (Singh 2007: 79). Many formation commanders were recently superimposed and they lacked knowledge about the troops and staff officers under their command. This in turn reduced the cohesiveness of the units concerned. On 10 October, the LTTE attacked the 5th Battalion of the Madras Regiment with mortar and automatic rifles. The militants posing as Tamil insurgents also hijacked a jeep containing five paratroopers. At Jaffna Fort, the 1st Maratha Light Infantry was fired upon (Singh 2007: 81). The 18th Infantry Brigade concentrated at Navatkuli and started to advance along two thrust lines. The 4th Mahar advanced along the Puttur-Kopai axis and captured Kopai after stiff resistance from the LTTE by 19 October 1987. The 12th Grenadier advanced along the Navatkuli-Jaffna Fort axis and entered the suburbs of Jaffna town (Singh 2007: 88).

Phase III involved COIN campaigns against the LTTE in the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka. In this phase, the LTTE resorted to hit and run attacks against the IPKF. The latter responded by mounting small unit patrols under junior leaders as the Indian Army had done in Nagaland and Mizoram since

1965 (Singh 2001: 114). Some of the small unit actions conducted by the IPKF in the Jaffna Peninsula need to be explained in detail. On 23 December 1987, an IPKF patrol comprising a company was ordered to conduct a cordon-and-search operation. The company commander decided to deploy one platoon as a 'base' and the rest of the company advanced northwards from the south and east of the village sweeping and carrying out a search to drive any LTTE cadres who might be hiding in the village towards the base. The landscape was full of banana plantations and groves. Considerable undergrowth and thick bushes grew three to five feet high on either side of the road. The vegetation, thus, offered scope for concealment of a large number of persons on both sides of the road. At the base, the platoon commander set up an LMG which was camouflaged with grass, weeds and some bricks. In fact, the LMG post was so well camouflaged that it was not visible even from a distance of 10 metres (Singh 2001: 1–2). The base was attacked by a girl and a man, who threw two grenades before being mowed down (Singh 2001: 3). Meanwhile, the rest of the company that had moved into the village opened fire on one hut harbouring suspected insurgents with a rocket launcher (Singh 2001: 3).

Combat helicopters were used to some extent to support the ground troops, but fixed wing attack aircraft were not used in order to avoid excessive collateral damage (Gill and Lamm 2009: 177). Phase IV finally started with the unceremonious pull out that ended in March 1990 (Das and Gupta-Ray 2008: 17). Between 1987 and 1990, the IPKF suffered 1,155 soldiers KIA (Singh 2007: 9).

Table 8.2 Formations Originally Earmarked for Operation PAWAN

Branch	Units	Remarks
Indian Army	HQ 1st Corps, 36th Infantry Division, 54th Infantry Division, 2nd Armoured Brigade and 340th (Independent) Infantry Brigade Group	It was not a joint tri-service HQ but an *ad hoc* grouping.
Indian Navy	5 Frigates, 6 LSTs, 2 Submarines, 12 Patrol Boats, 2 Fleet Auxiliary Ships, 9 Naval Aircraft	
Indian Air Force	Jaguars (fighters-ground attack) 24, Canberras (light bombers) 6, Ilyushin-76 (transport) 4, Antonov-12 (transport) 6, Antonov-32 (transport) 30, HS-748 (transport) 7 and MI-8/17 helicopters 22	Aircraft from Indian Airlines and Air India were also made available. And the Indian railways provided rolling stock in order to aid movement of the units within India

Source: (Das 2007: 247).

One Indian Army officer claims that one of the reasons behind the failure of the IPKF was that its infantry was not good enough. The IPKF suffered from a shortage of young bachelor privates. Because the Indian Army remains a long-term volunteer service, most of the soldiers remain in the ranks for a long time in order to earn pensions. Most of the *jawans* are married and have families. The Indian Army is an ageing force (Das 2007: 232, 234). Initially, the IPKF was designed to function as a peacekeeper; its task was to maintain peace between the SLAF and the LTTE. However, when the LTTE suddenly broke the ceasefire agreement, the IPKF was forced to engage the LTTE, a task for which it was not initially prepared (Das 2007: 237). Overall, lack of coordination between the RAW, the MEA, and the Indian Army somewhat marred India's COIN effort in Sri Lanka (Gill and Lamm 2009: 176).

Sri Lanka's COIN

Most of the roads were mined and some culverts and bridges were destroyed by the LTTE to impede the mobility of the SLAF (Singh 2001: 7). About 400 LTTE cadres attacked a fortified SLA complex during the night of 11 November 1993. The LTTE moved through a mile of mangrove forest. The confrontation known as the Battle of Ponneryn in Kilali Lagoon resulted in the death of more than a hundred SLA personnel (Sinha 2001: 195). In 1994, the SLG under Chandrika Kumaratunga initiated talks with the LTTE based on a comprehensive devolution package, but the talks broke down and this resulted in war (Manoharan 2012a: 213). In April 1995, the LTTE sank two boats of the SLN (Mehta 2010: 53). The SLA launched Operation JAYA SIKURU (VICTORY ASSURED) in May 1997 which continued till December 1998. The objective was to open the principal highway A9 between Jaffna and Vavuniya. This operation resulted in the deaths of 3,000 Sri Lanka military personnel, but only two-thirds of the highway was recaptured (Farrell 2007: 8–9). The 2002 international peace process under Norwegian leadership did not last either because the LTTE pulled out of the peace talks in 2003 (Swamy 2011: 178). During the April 2002 press conference at Kilinochchi (a town in northern Sri Lanka and de facto capital of the LTTE state), Prabhakaran declared that he too could be dubbed as a traitor and killed if he turned his back to Tamil Eelam (Swamy 2011: 176).

The SLG-LTTE civil war was also to some extent a Buddhist-Hindu struggle. We have seen that the LTTE used Hindu symbolism to recruit and motivate its cadres. The hard line Buddhism also strengthened the Sinhala domestic front to conduct the war against the Hindu Tamils for establishing a Buddhist state/society in the island. In the December 2001 general election, a Buddhist monk was elected to the parliament of Sri Lanka for the first time. In February 2004, over 260 Buddhist monks affiliated with the *Jathika Sangha Sammelanaya* (National *Sangha* Assembly) vowed to save Sri Lanka by standing for the general election which was held in April 2004. They formed a political party named as *Jathika Hela Urumaya* (National Sinhala Heritage Party) and the party did well in the election (Deegalle 2006: 9).

One Indian scholar notes that SLG's COIN policy included the following principles: political will; ignorance of domestic and international criticism; no negotiations with the rebels; regulated media; no ceasefire; completed operational freedom to the security force commanders; deployment of a large number of young security officers in combat operations; and keeping the neighbours in the loop. It is argued that Sri Lanka's COIN is different from US COIN which emphasizes a population-centric approach. The US *Field Manual 3–24 Counterinsurgency* emphasizes attempts to influence and persuade the population to willingly side with the COIN force by providing a superior alternative to the insurgent cause. The principal elements of this philosophy are to protect the civilians and to avoiding unnecessary collateral damage (Smith 2010: 40). It is somewhat akin to Rupert Smith's war amongst the people.

The SLG's COIN policy was not geared to winning the hearts and minds of the people in the disturbed zone. Nevertheless, the LTTE was losing support among the Tamils. The LTTE's tactic of using civilians as human shields was one important reason for its gradual loss of popularity among the Sri Lankan Tamils (Sardeshpande 2009: 58–9). Colonel Karuna was originally from Batticaloa. He joined the LTTE in 1983 and from being a trusted guard of Prabhakaran he became LTTE commander of the entire Eastern Province. He was a member of the LTTE delegation that held talks with the SLG in 2002–03. Karuna revolted in March 2004 and with many of his soldiers surrendered to the SLG. Karuna's move seriously weakened the LTTE and was an important nail in its coffin. Karuna became the Minister for National Integration and Reconciliation in President Mahinda Rajapaksa's Government (Swamy 2011: 168–9). After Karuna's desertion, Prabhakaran had Karuna's brother Reggie, a LTTE personnel, murdered (Swamy 2011: 174). Besides the desertion of Karuna, the LTTE's shift in strategy from conducting guerrilla warfare to conventional warfare against the Sri Lankan security forces, argues Lieutenant-General S.C. Sardeshpande (Deputy GOC, HQ IPKF after Harkirat Singh), was one of the principal reasons behind the Tigers' failure (Sardeshpande 2009: 59).

The LTTE's financial lifeline and SLOCs were being choked slowly but steadily. The LTTE's financial assets in Britain were frozen in 2001 (Povlock 2011: 33). On 17 September 2006, at a distance of 120 nautical miles off Sri Lanka, a Sea Pigeon vessel was located and destroyed by Sri Lanka's OPVs which were refuelled in the high seas by civilian ships (Povlock 2011: 36). On 29 May 2006, the European Union imposed a ban on the LTTE (Manoharan 2008: 265). In mid-2007, even after losing the Eastern Province, the LTTE had about 7,000 combatants in the Northern Province (Farrell 2007: 13). By 25 January 2009, the SLAF cleared Mullaitivu on the north-east coast of Sri Lanka. This forced 2,000 LTTE personnel to disperse into the hinterland. By mid-February 2009, about four SLA divisions (about 50,000 troops) closed in towards the remaining rebel positions (Fish 2009: 20). The final offensive against the LTTE, which continued from January to May 2009, resulted in the deaths of 7,000 Tamil civilians and 16,700 Tamil civilians wounded (Smith 2010: 42). As the end was approaching, in May 2009, Prabhakaran was with 18 of his loyal bodyguards when he was killed by the SLAF near a lagoon in the forest

of Mullaitivu District. The fighting started with this group of Prabhakaran at 4 a.m. Monday and was over in 90 minutes (Swamy 2011: 168). On 18 May 2009, the SLG formally proclaimed the end of the civil war in the island (Manoharan2012b: 140).

Peace Building

One of the reasons behind the protracted and brutal nature of war between the Sri Lanka Government and the LTTE was weak civil-society actors in the island. Civil society is defined by two authors as '… "an arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values". This definition incorporates a range of organizations such as NGOs, trade unions, religious groups and the media'. (Walton and Saravanamuttu 2011: 184). Lack of a strong civil society which can at least facilitate if not mediate between the warring parties is also an impediment behind the establishment of a post war liberal society in war-torn Sri Lanka. Trust building is central to civil society's peace building role both among the grass-root and top-level leaders. Spreading information and encouraging dialogue are essential for trust-building efforts and for inculcating pro-peace popular attitudes. Civil society actors can enhance the peace processes by addressing the ethnic divide and public opinion with education and cross-ethnic dialogue, addressing politics with popular mobilization and informal diplomacy, and focusing on economic issues through reconciliation and development (Orjuela 2003: 209). However, there were several defects in the civil society actors like the NGOs that operated in Sri Lanka. Many of their activities were initiated in a top-down manner, reaching the rural periphery from an urban centre and not vice versa. So people from below did not play an important role among the civil society actors. Further, peace work in Sri Lanka was done in a fragmented manner by the elite NGOs and not by any dynamic mass-based social movement. Overall, the civil society bodies were not democratically organized but were characterized by authoritarian structures. Moreover, the civil society groups were not cross-ethnic associational forms. In a divided society like Sri Lanka, it was difficult to bridge the ethnic cleavages and organize people from all communities jointly for establishing 'humane' peace (Orjuela 2003: 210). Worse, as Sri Lanka experienced hostilities after the breakdown of ceasefire negotiations in 2006, there were confrontations between pro-peace civil society organizations and patriotic nationalist groups. The latter formations mobilized against peace negotiations and international engagements in the reconciliation process. Growing attacks on the NGOs in the media and in other public events became common (Walton and Saravanamuttu 2011: 183).

Within four days after the COIN campaign ending, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton telephoned Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa and appealed for political reconciliation and the quick resettlement of 300,000 displaced Tamil civilians. Hillary Clinton also emphasized the necessity for post-conflict power sharing with the Tamils. Indian Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna also asked the SLG to address the root cause of the Tamil problem which will involve devolution of

power to the minority communities. In the same week, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon stressed the early resettlement of the Tamil civilian population in the detention camps (Uyangoda 2010: 105–6). Tension developed between Sri Lanka and the EU overextending the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) facilities to the former. The GSP, which offers locally manufactured goods concessionary access to the EU market, benefits Sri Lanka's apparel industry. This arrangement was to be renegotiated and renewed by the end of 2009. The EU wanted an inquiry into the human rights violations during Sri Lanka's campaign against the LTTE. However, Sri Lanka refused, saying that it is an intervention in the internal matters of a sovereign country (Uyangoda 2010: 106–7).

Conclusion

The insurgency/civil war in Sri Lanka during the last two decades accounted for more than 60,000 casualties, including 18,000 SLAF members. Probably, the same number of LTTE cadres became casualties. One estimate suggests that between 1983 and 2006, over two millions were displaced (Deegalle 2006: 1). According to another estimate, between 1983 and 18 May 2009, 90,000 people died and 24,000 of them were LTTE guerrillas (Swamy 2011: 169). However, the casualties of this civil war must be compared with those caused by 'mother' nature. The Tsunami in December 2004 claimed the lives of 30,000 people in 20 minutes and more than 700,000 people were displaced. In other words, manmade casualties pale into insignificance compared to massive natural calamities. It is worth recalling that the effect of the Tsunami was equivalent to the use of a strategic nuclear weapon (Singh 2005: 301).

The LTTE used terrorism, guerrilla warfare and even some form of conventional war to achieve its aims. The LTTE's specialization in suicide bombings and motivating its cadres with a particular strain of Hinduism shows that *fidayeen* attacks is not unique to a particular brand of Islam. Prabhakaran's greatest blunder was to alienate the 'regional superpower' India by fighting against the IPKF and then assassinating Rajiv Gandhi. India did opt for a 1971 East Pakistan type intervention in Sri Lanka. They did not because the Bengali Muslim rebellion in East Pakistan in 1971 offered India a chance to cut New Delhi's traditional enemy Pakistan to half its size. In contrast, by dividing Sri Lanka, India would not have gained any points in the spheres of its geopolitical and security interests. Along with India's latent hostility, the post 9/11 Western mind-set, which is against any sort of insurgency/terrorist movement, choked the flow of funds from the international Tamil diaspora to the LTTE. And the qualitative improvement of the SLA allowed the SLG to give hammer blows to the LTTE which had transformed itself from a guerrilla force into a ragtag conventional army. Finally, the improved SLN choked the LTTE's overseas supply lines. With the death in combat of Prabhakaran in May 2009, the LTTE for all intents of purpose was finished and Sri Lanka's victory was total. However, some problems remain. For instance, about

9,000 LTTE cadres (child soldiers and adults) have to be rehabilitated (Manoharan 2011: 197). A conservative Sinhalese Government intoxicated with a complete military victory over the LTTE is in no mood to devolve power to the Tamils of Jaffna Peninsula. Thus, the root cause behind Tamil insurgency remains.

References

Alison, Miranda (2003). 'Cogs in the Wheel? Women in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam', *Civil Wars*, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 37–54.

Das, Gautam (2007). *Unlearned Lessons: An Appraisal of India's Military Mishaps*. New Delhi: Har-Anand.

Das, Gautam and Gupta-Ray, M.K. (2008). *Sri Lanka Misadventure: India's Military Peace-Keeping Campaign 1987–1990*. New Delhi: Har-Anand.

Deegalle, Mahinda (2006). 'Introduction: Buddhism, Conflict and Violence', in Mahinda Deegalle (ed.), *Buddhism, Conflict and Violence in Modern Sri Lanka*, Oxon: Routledge, pp. 1–21.

DeSilva-Ranasinghe, Sergei (2010). 'Strategic Analysis of Sri Lankan Military's Counter-Insurgency Operations', Strategic Analysis Paper, Future Directions International, 12 February, pp. 1–8. http://www.futuredirections.org.au accessed on 22 June 2012.

Farrell, Tom (2007). Northern Exposure: The Next Stage in Sri Lanka's War', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, vol. 19, no. 12 (December), pp. 8–13.

Fish, Tim (2009). 'Sri Lanka learns to counter Sea Tigers' Swarm Tactics', *Jane's Navy International* (March), pp. 20–25.

Gill, John H. and Lamm, David W. (2009). 'The Indian Peace Keeping Force Experience and US Stability Operations in the Twenty-First Century', in Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (eds), *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*. Oxon/New York: Routledge, pp. 173–85.

Herath, Tamara (2012). *Women in Terrorism: Case of the LTTE*. New Delhi: Sage.

Hills, Carol, and Silverman, Daniel, C. (1993). 'Nationalism and Feminism in Late Colonial India: The Rani of Jhansi Regiment, 1943–45', *Modern Asian Studies*, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 741–60.

Manoharan, N. (2008). 'Sri Lanka: Thumbs Up to Violence; Thumbs Down to Peace', in D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2008: Growing Violence*. New Delhi/Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 238–68.

Manoharan, N. (2010). Sri Lanka: Unprecedented Violence, Unclear Future', in D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2009: Continuing Violence, Failing Peace Processes*. New Delhi/Abingdon: Routledge, 2010, pp. 191–210.

Manoharan, N. (2011). 'Sri Lanka: Conflict is Dead, Long Live the Conflict', in D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2010: Growing Left-Wing Extremism and Religious Violence*. New Delhi/Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 174–98.

Manoharan, N. (2012a). 'With Lions and without Tigers: Conflict Transformation and the Search for Peace in Sri Lanka', in D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds), *Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2011: The Promise and Threat of Transformation*. New Delhi/Abingdon: 2012, pp. 211–32.

Manoharan, N. (2012b). 'Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam: Crouching Violence; Hidden Peace', in Arpita Anant (ed.), *Non-State Armed Groups in South Asia: A Preliminary Structured Focused Comparison*. New Delhi: Pentagon Security International, pp. 126–47.

Mehta, Ashok K. (2009). 'India's Counterinsurgency Campaign in Sri Lanka', in Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (eds), *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*. Oxon/New York: Routledge, pp. 155–72.

Mehta, Major-General Raj (2010). *Lost Victory: The Rise & Fall of LTTE Supremo, V. Prabhakaran*. New Delhi: Pentagon Security International.

Orjuela, Camilla (2003). 'Building Peace in Sri Lanka: A Role for Civil Society?', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 195–212.

Povlock, Paul A. (2011). 'A Guerrilla War at Sea: The Sri Lankan Civil War', *Small Wars Journal*, 9 Sept., pp. 1–51. http://www.smallwarsjournal.com accessed on 25 June 2012.

Roberts, Michael (2005). 'Tamil Tiger "Martyrs": Regenerating Divine Potency?', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, vol. 28 (2005), pp. 493–514.

Sardeshpande, Lieutenant-General S.C (2009). 'LTTE's Self-Destruction', *Indian Defence Review*, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 57–9.

Singh, Lieutenant-General Depinder (2001). *Indian Peacekeeping Force in Sri Lanka: 1987–1989.* Dehra Dun: Natraj.

Singh, Major-General Harkirat (2007). *Intervention in Sri Lanka: The IPKF Experience Retold*. New Delhi: Manohar.

Singh, R.S.N. (2005). *Asian Strategic and Military Perspective*. New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation in association with Lancer.

Sinha, Brigadier S.P. (2001). 'Prabhakaran as Leader of the LTTE', *JUSII*, vol. CXXXI, no. 544, pp. 194–210.

Smith, Chris (2009). 'The LTTE: A National Liberation and Oppression Movement', in Laurent Gayer and Christophe Jaffrelot (eds), *Armed Militias of South Asia: Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists*, tr. by Cynthia Schoch, Gregory Elliott and Roger Leverdier. New Delhi: Foundation, pp. 91–111.

Smith, Niel, A. (2010). 'Understanding Sri Lanka's Defeat of the Tamil Tigers', *Joint Forces Quarterly*, issue 59, 4th quarter, pp. 40–44.

Swamy, M.R. Narayan (2011). *The Tiger Vanquished: LTTE's Story*. New Delhi: Sage. Originally published in 2010.

Uyangoda, Jayadeva (2010). 'Sri Lanka in 2009: From Civil War to Political Uncertainties', *Asian Survey*, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 104–11.

Walton, Oliver and Saravanamuttu, Paikiasothy (2011). 'In the Balance? Civil Society and the Peace Process 2002–2008', in Jonathan Goodhand, Jonathan Spencer and Benedikt Korf (eds.), *Conflict and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka: Caught in the Peace Trap?* London/New York: Routledge, pp. 183–200.

Conclusion

The state or the polity (be it a democracy or an authoritarian regime) has certain integral features. The state is a legal predatory mafia, that is, a protection-selling racket/enterprise. Its ultimate function is providing security and to perform this function effectively, the policy sucks revenue from the society which hosts the state. In a way, the state functions as a redistributive mechanism. The state legitimizes its security function by initiating certain humanitarian programmes like welfare packages and educational and cultural activities. Ultimately, the effectiveness of the state depends on how well it could function as the sole provider of security in the region over which it claims sovereignty. When the state fails to establish a monopoly over the public organs of violence, then other security providers emerge. In other words, anti-state armed rebel groups start operating and we have an insurgency at hand.

This book has shown that insurgencies, even if they are broad based, cannot sustain themselves without moral and material aid from foreign states. Unless the insurgents are supported massively by a foreign power, they cannot cross a certain threshold. A classic case is the Maoist insurgency in Central India. Because it has no serious foreign backers, the Indian state does not consider it serious enough (despite Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's assertion) to deploy the Indian Army against them. And when insurgencies cross that threshold, then the state is forced to deploy its last line of defence: the army. All the polities giving support to the insurgents in the long run suffer from negative 'blow back effect'. In almost all cases, when a state stops patronizing the insurgents it has created, then their erstwhile allies turn against them. This is similar to politicians patronizing criminal elements; when the politicians stop encouraging the criminals, then, the criminals turn against their political patrons. For instance, India's RAW encouraged the LTTE in Sri Lanka and Pakistan's ISI patronized the *mujahideen* groups in Afghanistan. But when 'national' interests forced India and Pakistan to stop patronizing these militant outfits, the militants turned against their erstwhile sponsors. As a result, the Indian Army had to fight the LTTE in Sri Lanka and the Pakistan Army is still fighting the *jihadi* groups in FATA and Waziristan.

Insurgencies are products of the fusion of interstate rivalries and domestic dynamics. In some cases, absolute poverty (e.g. Jangalmahal, Chhattisgarh, and Central Nepal) and in a few cases relative poverty (e.g. North-East India) is the prime mover of insurgency. Ideologies play an important role in sustaining insurgencies but the ideological dynamics vary. While in FATA, Waziristan and Kashmir, a Wahabi brand of Islam is important in propelling the insurgents; in Baluchistan and North-East India, tribal ethos plays an important role in the anti-

state uprisings. In Sri Lanka and Nepal and among the Maoists of India, mostly secular ideologies operate among the insurgents. Unlike the government polities which have access to territories and a stable taxation base, the insurgent outfits have to depend on extortion, abduction, and drug trade, resulting in many cases of criminalization of their activities.

There are many similarities as well as dissimilarities between the militant insurgent outfits and government armies. The insurgent militias include a larger number of women, 'child soldiers', and lower caste and other marginalized sections than the government security forces. The government security forces are manned mostly by the middle castes and the officers are from the upper stratum of the society. For both the government forces as well as the insurgent forces, joining coercive organizations represents a sort of upward social mobility along with fringe economic benefits. However, in terms of educational qualifications, the government forces' officers had an edge over the officers of the insurgent militias. In no case are the insurgent leaders products of grass-root level revolutions; they are products of the urban middle class. Either these leaders are ideologically committed or they are driven by a hunger for power or both. Regardless of the differences in the social composition, in terms of organizational structure, the insurgent militant forces are mirror images of the government security forces. The company-battalion structural fabric along with the hierarchical command set-up, are adopted by the stateless militias from the government forces.

Again, insurgencies can at times prove to be a nuisance for governments but by themselves, they cannot defeat a government. Only when the state that has been partly weakened by the insurgencies is defeated by a hostile state in conventional warfare can insurgency triumph and secession occur. Otherwise, insurgents, after a period of attritional warfare, tend to compromise with the government. The Bengali Muslim insurgents weakened the Pakistani state and then Pakistan lost a conventional war with India in December 1971. This resulted in the liberation/secession of East Pakistan which became an independent country known as Bangladesh. In contrast, the insurgents in Kashmir and Nepal failed to defeat the government security forces because neither India nor Nepal has been defeated by any hostile state in conventional campaigns. As a result, while the insurgency in Kashmir is on a downswing, the Maoist insurgents in Nepal, after accepting electoral democracy, have entered into a coalition government with the other opposition parties.

Many modern commentators note the linkages between geography and the emergence of civil war. Scott Gates, one of the authors of this volume, and Halvard Buhaug, note that in the case of civil war, factors such as the size of a country, its location, and the nature of its borders are extremely important. Physical characteristics of nations such as size, topography, and natural resources influence the spatial domain of civil war. Rough terrain is ideal for guerrilla warfare and difficult for a government army to control. Mountain areas, giving advantage to rebel troops, allow rebels to expand the scope of conflict, whereas forests provide cover. Mountainous regions with a dense forest cover in the frontier region aid

in the freedom of movement and shipment of arms. The rebels try to gain access to an international border not only because weapons and natural resources are traded and transported across the borders from the neighbouring countries but also because the border regions provide a safe refuge away from government troops. Control of international borders thus ensures that the rebel army will fight another day. They argue that separatist wars emerge when the ethnic groups are located in clearly defined regions of the state. Rebel groups with an ethnic/religious identity will tend to fight their wars farther away from the capital city than non-identity groups. However, rebel groups that aim to seize power from the state will tend to fight their wars closer to the capital city than the secessionist groups (Buhaug and Gates 2002: 417–24). The mountainous terrain with a few motorable roads and an almost non-existent railroad network in Afghanistan, Waziristan, FATA and North-East India, hamper COIN forces.

Finally, this book acts as a corrective to the 'pessimist' view of certain scholars. These analysts claim that due to the rise of the New Wars, insurgents are in a win-win situation. We are neither convinced that New Wars are all that new, nor are we that pessimistic. There are ways to more effectively respond to insurgency. For example, Arreguin-Toft asserts that USA needs two types of armies: one for fighting conventional war and another for COIN. The latter task requires fighters with more initiative than discipline and more endurance than punching power (Arreguin-Toft 2001: 123).

The various chapters dealing with the case studies of South Asia show that insurgencies of the twenty-first century have several commonalities with insurgencies of the twentieth century. And two classic cases (the Khalistani insurgency in Punjab and the LTTE in Sri Lanka) prove that the state could successfully destroy the insurgents. For COIN to be successful, the right policies and considerable adaptation by the armies are necessary. We have seen that none of the South Asian armies (except the Indian Army to some extent) has a sophisticated COIN doctrine because, after all, armies are for fighting conventional wars and not for policing. The importance lies in showing flexibility and adaptability on the part of the armies as regards doctrine and institutions in tackling insurgency. And the Indian, Pakistan and the SLA have been able to make this transition quite effectively. Large infantry forces equipped with hand-held firearms rather than capital-intensive technology seem appropriate for countering the militants. To conclude, insurgencies and COINs are age-old state-building problems. And the future of the 'shadow warriors' does not seem too bright in the new millennium.

As regards COIN campaigns, our case studies of South Asia show that HUMINT rather than SIGINT is more important. This is something which the Americans need to learn especially due to their penchant with advanced technology. And rather than heavy sophisticated weapon systems, for fighting the insurgents, lightly equipped nimble infantry remains most essential. To an extent, present day insurgencies is a throwback to the age old policy of conducting what the British officer named Charles Callwell termed as 'Small War'.

References

Arreguin-Toft, Ivan (2001). 'How the Weak win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict', *International Security*, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 93–128.

Buhaug, Halvard and Gates, Scott (2002), 'The Geography of Civil War', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 417–24.

Index

Ahmed, Akhtar (Maj.) 113–14, 116, 119
All Tripura Peoples Liberation Organization (ATPLO) 48; *see also* rebel groups
All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) 48–50, 55; *see also* rebel groups
Al-Qaeda 7, 9
  in Pakistan 123, 153
  and Tora Bora 124; *see also* Tora Bora
  and USA 147–51
  and Waziristan 125–6
ANP (Afghan National Police) 156–7
Arreguin-Toft, Ivan 21, 128, 136, 140–43, 146–7, 193
Assam 39–45, 50–51, 53–8, 77; *also see* ULFA (United Liberation Front of Asom (Assam); Bodo
  Assam Rifles 26, 45, 51, 54–5, 105
  and Bodo 42–3, 47, 49
  oil and 48
  Sinha, S. K. (Lt. Gen.) 13

Baluch Liberation Army (BLA) 120–21; *see also* rebel groups
Baluch Liberation Front (BLF) 120–21; *see also* rebel groups
Bangladesh 1, 99, 101, 113, 116, 117, 119, 128
  and Assam 41–3; *see* Assam
  and illegal immigration 41, 48–9
  and Mizoram 44
  and Nagaland 43, 46–7
  and North-East India 40, 42, 45
  and politicization of Islam 42
  and the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) 54
  and Tripura
Baruah, Sanjib 40, 56–59
Bhindranwale, Sant Jarnail Singh 165–6, 168–71
Bhutan 1, 40, 45, 54
Bhutto, Z. A. President Pakistan, 31, 97–8, 100, 115, 120, 123, 146
Bin Laden, Osama; *see also* Al-Qaeda; Taliban
  and Kasmir 102
  and USA 101, 148, 151, 158
Bodo 42–3, 47, 49; *see also* Assam
  BLT (Bodo Liberation Tigers) 43; *see also* rebel groups
  Bodoland 42–3, 47–8
  BVF (Bodo Volunteer Force) 43; *see also* rebel groups
Britain; *see also* British Army
  and Afghanistan 154–5
  and India 94
  and LIC (low intensity conflict) 18; *see also* LIC
  and LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) 186; *see also* LTTE
  and Nepal 73
British Army 19
  India and 51, 53
  Malay and 18
British-Indian Empire 4, 40; *see also* Assam
Burma 1, 41, 43–4, 46; *see also* Nagaland
  and the Golden Triangle 49, 59; *see also* drugs
  and India 54

Cassidy, Robert M. 9
ceasefire; *see also p*eace agreements
  TNV (Tripura National Volunteers) and India 52
  NSCN(IM) [Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muviah)] and India 56
  NSCN(K) [Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khalplang)] and India 56

in Kashmir 94–9; *see also* Britain; Middle East; Nehru, Jawaharlal
in Sri Lanka 185–187; *see also* LTTE; IPKF
Chadha, Vivek (Lt.Col.) 1, 13, 15, 17, 19, 41, 45, 48–9
Clausewitz 8–9, 11–13, 24, 33, 69, 71
Coker, Christopher 8, 9, 32
Cold War
and Afghanistan 131, 143–4, 158
and New Wars 5, 14, 32; *see also* New War
and Pakistan 123, 143–4
coup
in Afghanistan 132–3, 137: *see also* Daud, Muhammad Khan
in Nepal 73
in Pakistan 107; *see also* Musharraf, Pervez; Sharif, Nawaz
CPI(M) [Communist Party India (Maoist)] 75–6, 78–9; *see also* Maoist; Naxals
CPI-ML, [Communist Party India (Marxist-Leninist)] 75, 79; *see also* Marxists; Naxals
CPI [Communist Party India] 65; *see also* Marxists
CPN(M) [Communist Party Nepal (Maoist)] 66–8, 71, 73, 74; *see also* rebel groups; Maoists
CPN [Communist Party Nepal] 65, 69; *see also* Marxists
CRPF (Central Reserve Police Force) 26–7, 48, 55, 78, 80, 166–7

Das, Samir Kumar 57
Daud, Muhammad Khan 131–4
Docherty, Leo 155–7
Dreze, Jean 16
drugs, 5; *also see opium*
in Burma 49, 59; *also see* Nagaland
in Nepal 67
in Pakistan 122
and Taliban 15 155–6
Duyvesteyn, Isabella 12

EBR (East Bengal Regiment) 115–16; *also see* Bangladesh; British Army
education 191–2
in Bodoland 43; *see also* Bodo
and Naxalites 81
in Punjab 123
and Afghan women 137, 143
in Sri Lanka 187
EPR (East Pakistan Rifles) 115–16; *also see* Bangladesh

failed state 68
Fair, C. Christine 163, 171
Franke, Marcus 39, 46, 48, 57
French Army
and Algeria (Algerie) 18
and Vietnam 18, 158; *see also* Vietnam War

Ghosh, Air-Commodore C.N 27–8
Giap, Vo Nguyen (Gen.) 20, 68–71, 74; *also see* Vietnam; Vietnam War
Grau, Lester W. 29, 133, 139–43, 145
guerrilla warfare 1, 9, 12, 14, 15, 18, 21, 24, 71, 77, 101, 116, 118–19, 128, 186, 188, 192; *see also* LIC (Low intensity conflict); small wars
urban guerrilla warfare 21
Gyanendra, King of Nepal 67, 72–4

Hammes, Thomas X. (Col.) 7, 9, 11, 153

India-Pakistan War 12, 95, 97–9
infantry battalions
in Assam 51; *see also* Assam
in India 25
in Kashmir 25, 92
in Waziristan 124; *see also* Al-Qaeda; Musharraf, Pervezi Invasion
of East Pakistan 99
of Afghanistan 108, 131, 134–6, 145; *see also* Cold War
IPKF (Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka) 2, 4, 17, 25, 180–86, 188; *see also* Tamils; LTTE; SLA
ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) 152, 155

Jacob, J.F.R "Jake" (Lt.Gen.) 117–19
Jaffna 175–9, 182–5, 189; *see also* LTTE

Janayuddha 68–70, 72; *see also* PLAN; CPN(M); Pasang (Nanda Kishore Pun)
Jihadis 3, 103, 108, 124, 127
Johnson, Wray R. 19, 29
Joshi, Akshay 22

Kaldor, Mary 5
Kalyvas, Stathis 5–6, 8, 11, 14–15, 18, 32
Kamandaka 19–20, 23
Kargil 28, 55, 89, 91, 97, 99, 105–7
Karzai, Hamid, President Afghanistan 30, 157
Khalistan 3–4, 10, 163–4, 170, 193
Kujur, Rajat Kumar 79, 81
Kumar, Ashwini 22

Lecomte-Tilouine, Marie 66–9, 72
LIC (Low Intensity Conflict) 8, 11–13, 15–19, 24, 29, 32, 75; *see also* small wars; guerrilla warfare
LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) 4, 68, 103, 175–89, 191, 193; *see also* rebel groups
  and Britain, 186

Malaya 18, 46, 53
Manipur 39–40, 44, 47, 49–50, 52, 56, 77; *see also* Naga; NSCN(IM); NSCN(K)
Mao, Tse-Tung 9, 12–13, 15, 18, 21, 24, 66, 69–71, 74, 82
Maoists 3, 10, 21, 65, 67; *see also Naxals*
  in India 75–80, 82, 192; *see also Naxals*
  in Nepal 67–75, 82, 103
    Communists
      In Afghanistan 133, 135, 137
      In China 16
      In India 65; *see also Naxals*
      In Nepal 65
      in Peru, Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) 3, 65–66, 72
Marxism 3–4, 9; *see also* Maoists; Naxals
  and guerrilla struggles 5, 9, 14–15, 19
  and Nepal and Vietnam 70
  and the Daud Government 134; *see also* Daud, Muhammad Khan
Mauceri, Philip 66, 72
Middle East
  and Britain 94
  and Soviet 133, 135
  and Zia-ul-Haq 146
migration
  and India 17, 41, 176; *see also* Sapatnekar, Vivek
  Hindu-Bengali migrants 45
  and Nepal 66
  and Pakistan 95
Munkler, Herfried 6, 11, 25, 32
Musa H. J., Mohammad (Gen.) 91, 95, 97, 107
Musharraf, Pervez (Gen.), President Pakistan 98–9, 102, 106–7, 112, 123–6, 149
Myanmar 40, 42–5, 47–8, 55–6, 77, 101; *see also* Burma; Nagaland

Naga 9, 15, 39–41, 43–9, 51–2, 55–9, 68
  Naga Federal Army 45
  Nagalim 44, 57, 59
  Nagaland 2, 13, 39–40, 43–4, 46–7, 49–52, 54, 56–9, 183
  Naga Hills 40–41, 43, 45, 48, 52; *see also* Burma
  NSCN (Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland) 44, 47, 49, 56–7
  NSCN(IM) (Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muviah)) 44, 48, 49, 50, 54–7
  NSCN(K) (Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khalplang)) 44, 47, 49, 50, 54, 56
  NSCN-U (Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland-Unification) 56
Nanavatty, R. K. 21
Naxals *also* Naxalites 65, 76–9, 81–2, 119; *see also Maoists*
Nehru, Jawaharlal 39
  and Assam 45; *see also* Assam
  and Indira Gandhi 41, 99–100
  and Kashmir 90, 93–6
  and Pakistan 144
New War 1, 5–8, 10–11, 14–15, 32, 158, 193
Niazi, A.A.K. (Lt.Gen) 115, 117–19, 127

oil 6
and Assam 48
and India 40, 94
in Nepal 67
Operation PAWAN 182, 184
Operation Rhino 53
opium; *see also* drugs
in Pakistan 122
and Taliban 15, 155–6
Osinga, Frans 7–8, 11

Pakistani Army 119
paramilitary 25–7, 30, 52–3, 79, 103, 115, 117, 166–7, 170
Pasang (Nanda Kishore Pun) 69–71, 74–5
Peace Agreements
Accord between the Bodo Volunteer Force and the Indian government 43
Accord between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan 131
Assam Accord 57; *See also* Bangladesh
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (Nepal) 68, 74
Shillong Accord 56
PLAN (People's Liberation Army of Nepal) 68–71, 73–5; *see also* Maoists
Prabhakaran, Velupillai 176–8, 185–6, 188; *see also* LTTE
Prachanda (Pushpa Kamal Dahal) 66–7, 72, 74; *see also* CPN(M); Maoists
propaganda 18–22, 46, 71, 77–8, 117, 138, 143, 164–5, 168, 178
Punjab 1–4, 89–90, 98, 107, 120–23, 143, 148, 169–71
agriculture 79
Bhutto 115
And Haryana, 79, 165
and Kasmir 102–3
madrasas 123, 148
Muslims 3, 89, 107, 115, 126, 151
Pakistani Army and 31, 120–21
Sikh insurgency and 163–7

Qureshi, Hakeem Arshad (Col.) 113–16

Rajagopalan, Rajesh 2, 13, 23, 25, 32, 35, 45, 52–3, 58
Rao, K. V. Krishna 45, 48, 51–2, 56, 58, 103–5, 107–8
Rashtriya Rifles 20, 25
rebel groups
ATPLO (All Tripura Peoples Liberation Organization) 48
ATTF (All Tripura Tiger Force) 48–50, 55
BLA (Baluch Liberation Army) 120–21
BLF (Baluch Liberation Front) 120–21
BLT (Bodo Liberation Tigers) 43
BVF (Bodo Volunteer Force) 43
CPI(M) 75–6, 78–9; *see also* Maoists; Naxals
CPI-ML 75, 79; *see also* Naxals
CPI 65; *see also* Marxists
CPN(M) 66–8, 71, 73, 74; *see also* Maoists
CPN 65, 69; *see also* Marxists
EPRLF (Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front) 175, 177
EROS (Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students) 175, 177
JEM (Jaish-e-Mohammad) 101–2
JKLF (Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front) 100
JMB (Jamat ul Mujahideen Bangladesh) 42
KLNLF (Karbi Longri National Liberation Front) 50
KLO (Kamtapuri Liberation Organization) 77
LET (Lashkar-e-Toiba) 102
LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) 4, 68, 103, 175–89, 191, 193
Mukti Bahini 117–19, 127–8; *see also* Bangladesh
NDFB (National Democratic Front of Bodoland) 43, 54; *see also* Assam
NLFT (National Liberation Front of Tripura) 48–9
PLA (People's Liberation Army of Manipur) 47, 50; *see also* Manipur
PLAN (People's Liberation Army of Nepal) 68–71, 73–5; *see also* Maoists
PLGA (People's Liberation Guerrilla Army) 77–9

PLOTE (People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam) 175, 177
PWG (People's War Group) 75–8
TELO (Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization) 175, 177
TNT (Tamil New Tigers) 50, 177
TNV (Tripura National Volunteers) 45, 48, 52
ULFA (United Liberation Front of Assom [Assam]) 15, 41, 47–50, 53–4, 57, 77; *see also* Assam
YCL (Youth Communist League) 44, 69, 74
refugees
Afghan 120, 141, 144, 152
Hindu Bengali 41
Muslims in Kashmir 95
Tamil 176, 182
religion
Buddhism 1–2, 67, 176, 185,
Christianity 1, 32, 49, 59
Hinduism 1, 188
Islam 1, 3–4, 8–9, 42, 91, 100–101, 103, 116, 123, 137–8, 150, 153, 157–8, 188, 191
Sikhism 1, 3, 4, 164
Royal Bhutan Army (RBA) 54; *See also* Bhutan
Roychowdhury, Shankar (Gen.) 47, 54, 101, 104–5

Sapatnekar, Vivek 17, 24
Sarkar, Bhaskar (Col.) 20, 45–7, 49, 58
Sharif, Nawaz 106–7; *see also* Musharraf, Pervez (Gen.)
Shrivastava, V. K. 23
Singh, Depinder 17, 22–3, 25, 91–5, 97, 175–6, 180, 183–5
Sinha, S. K. (Lt. Gen.) 13–14, 17–18, 20, 23, 27
SLA (Sri Lanka Army) 4, 176, 180, 182, 185–6, 188, 193
SLAF (Sri Lanka Armed Forces) 176–177, 180–81, 185–6, 188
small war 15, 24, 32, 193; *see also* LIC (Low Intensity Conflict); guerrilla warfare
Smith, Rupert (Gen.) 6–8, 11, 19, 22
Staniland, Paul 29–30

Taliban
in Afghanistan 15, 30, 123–7, 131, 138, 144, 147–56, 158
in Bangladesh 42
in Pakistan 15, 29, 30, 102, 123–7
Tamils, *see also* LTTE, SLA
and Buddhism 2, 185; *see also* Buddhism
and India 176
and IPKF 183; *see also* IPKF
females 178–9
Indian Tamils 175
Sri Lanka Tamils 175
Technologies 5, 22, 27, 32–3, 158
Tora Bora 124, 151
Thorat, S. P. P (Lt.Gen) 43–4, 46, 52, 55–6

US Army 9
in Afghanistan 20
in Iraq 19
in Vietnam 19–20; *see also* Johnson, Wray R.; Singh, Depinder; Vietnam War
US Special Forces Operations (SOF) 30, 150

Vietnam 7, 12, 14, 18–20, 68, 70, 106, 139, 141–2, 145–6, 15; *see also* Vietnam War
Vietnam War 19, 141; *see also* Vietnam
Vohra, B. L. 49, 55

Wood, Elisabeth Jean 10
World War II 46, 91, 93, 131